Complete Works of Samuel Johnson, page 289
I am, therefore, convinced, my lords, that they will not enter into an offensive treaty, and that they have only engaged to do what their own interest required from them, without any new stipulation, to preserve their own country from invasion by sending garrisons into the frontier towns, which they may do without any offence to France, or any interruption of their own tranquillity.
Many other treaties have been mentioned, my lords, and mentioned with great ostentation, as the effects of consummate policy, which will, I suspect, appear to be at least only defensive treaties, by which the contracting powers promise little more than to take care of themselves.
In this state of the world, my lords, when all the powers of the continent appear benumbed by a lethargy, or shackled by a panick, to what purpose should we lavish, in hiring and transporting troops, that wealth which contests of nearer importance immediately require?
It is well known to our merchants, whose ships are every day seized by privateers, that we are at war with Spain, and that our commerce is every day impaired by the depredations of an enemy, whom only our own negligence enables to resist us; but I doubt, my lords, whether it is known in Spain, that their monarch is at war with Britain, otherwise than by the riches of our nation, which are distributed among their privateers, and the prisoners who in the towns on the coast are wandering in the streets. For I know no inconvenience which they can be supposed to feel from our hostilities, nor in what part of the world the war against them is carried on. Before the war was declared, it is well remembered by whom, and with how great vehemence, it was every day repeated, that to end the war with honour we ought to take and hold. What, my lords, do we hold, or what have we taken? What has the war produced in its whole course from one year to another, but defeats, losses, and ignominy? And how shall we regain our honour, or retrieve our wealth, by engaging in another war more dangerous but less necessary? We ought surely to humble Spain, before we presume to attack France; and we may attack France with better prospects of success, when we have no other enemy to divert our attention, or divide our forces.
That we ought, indeed, to make any attempt upon France, I am far from being convinced, because I do not now discover, that any of the motives subsist which engaged us in the last confederacy. The house of Austria, though overborne and distressed, was then powerful in itself, and possessed of the imperial crown. It is now reduced almost below the hopes of recovery, and we are therefore now to restore what we were then only to support. But what, my lords, is in my opinion much more to be considered, the nation was then unanimous in one general resolution to repress the insolence of France; no hardships were insupportable that conduced to this great end, nor any taxes grievous that were applied to the support of the war. The account of a victory was esteemed as an equivalent to excises and to publick debts; and the possessions of us and our posterity were cheerfully mortgaged to purchase a triumph over the common enemy. But, my lords, the disposition of the nation with regard to the present war is very different. They discover no danger threatening them, they are neither invaded in their possessions by the armies, nor interrupted in their commerce by the fleets of France; and therefore they are not able to find out why they must be sacrificed to an enemy, by whom they have been long pursued with the most implacable hatred, for the sake of attacking a power from which they have hitherto felt no injury, and which they believe cannot be provoked without danger, nor opposed without such a profusion of expense as the publick is at present not able to bear.
It is not to be supposed, my lords, that the bulk of the British people are affected with the distresses, or inflamed by the magnanimity of the queen of Hungary. This illustrious daughter of Austria, whose name has been so often echoed in these walls, and of whom I am far from denying, that she deserves our admiration, our compassion, and all the assistance which can be given her, consistently with the regard due to the safety of our own country, is to the greatest part of the people an imaginary princess, whose sufferings or whose virtues make no other impression upon them, than those which are recorded in fictitious narratives; nor can they easily be persuaded to give up for her relief the produce of their lands, or the profits of their commerce.
Some, indeed, there are, my lords, whose views are more extensive, and whose sentiments are more exalted; for it is not to be supposed, that either knowledge or generosity are confined to the senate or the court: but these, my lords, though they perhaps may more readily approve the end which the ministry pretends to pursue, are less satisfied with the means by which they endeavour to attain it. By these men it is easily discovered, that the hopes which some so confidently express of prevailing upon the Dutch to unite with us for the support of the Pragmatick sanction, are without foundation; they see that their consent to place garrisons in the frontier towns, however it may furnish a subject of exultation to those whose interest it is to represent them as ready to concur with us, is only a new proof of what was never doubted, their unvariable attention to their own interest, since they must for their own security preserve their own barrier from being seized by France. By this act they incur no new expense, they provoke no enemies, nor give any assistance to the queen of Hungary, by which they can raise either resentment in one part, or gratitude in the other; and therefore it is not hard to perceive that, whatever is pretended, the Dutch hitherto observe the most exact laws of neutrality; and it is too evident, that if they refuse their assistance, we have very little to hope from a war with France.
Nor is this the only objection against the present measures; for it is generally, and not without sufficient reason suspected, that the real assistance of the queen of Hungary is not intended, since the troops which have been hired under that pretence, are such as cannot march against the emperour. It is known, that the Hessians have absolutely refused to infringe the constitution of the German body, by attacking him who is by a legal grant acknowledged its head; nor is it easy to conceive, why there should be a different law for Hanover than for the other electorates.
The long stay of the troops in Flanders, a place where there is no enemy to encounter, nor ally to assist, is a sufficient proof that there is nothing more designed than that the troops of Hanover shall loiter on the verge of war, and receive their pay for feasting in their quarters, and showing their arms at a review; and that they in reality design nothing but to return home with full pockets, and enjoy the spoils of Britain.
There may, indeed, be another reason, my lords, which hinders the progress of the united forces, and by which the Britons and Hanoverians may be both affected, though not both in the same degree. It is by no means unlikely, that the king of Prussia has forbidden them to advance, and declared, that the king who was chosen by his suffrage shall be supported by his arms; if this be his resolution, he is well known to want neither spirit nor strength to avow and support it; and there are reasons sufficient to convince us, that he has declared it, and that our troops are now patiently waiting the event of a negotiation by which we are endeavouring to persuade him to alter his design, if, indeed, it be desired that he should alter it; for it is not certain, that the elector of Hanover can desire the restoration of the house of Austria to an hereditary enjoyment of the imperial dignity; nor can it easily be shown why the politicks of one house, should differ from those of all the other princes of the German empire.
The other princes, my lords, have long wished for a king with whom they might treat upon the level; a king who might owe his dignity only to their votes, and who, therefore, would be willing to favour them in gratitude for the benefit. They know, that the princes of the house of Austria considered their advancement to the empire as the consequence of their numerous forces and large dominions, and made use of their exaltation only to tyrannise under the appearance of legal right, and to oppress those as sovereigns, whom they would otherwise have harassed as conquerors.
Before we can, therefore, hope for the concurrence of the princes of the empire, we must inform them of our design, if any design has been yet laid out. Is it your intention to restore the house of Austria to the full enjoyment of its former greatness? This will certainly be openly opposed by all those powers who are strong enough to make head against it, and secretly obstructed by those, whose weakness makes them afraid of publick declarations. Do you intend to support the Pragmatick sanction? This can only be done by defeating the whole power of France; and for this you must necessarily provide troops who shall dare to act against the present king. So that it appears, my lords, that we are attempting nothing, or attempting impossibilities; that either we have no end in view, or that we have made use of an absurd choice of means by which it cannot be attained.
Whatever be our design with regard to Germany, the war against Spain is evidently neglected; and, indeed, one part of our conduct proves at once, that we intend neither to assist the Austrians, nor to punish the Spaniards; since we have in a great measure disabled ourselves from either by the neutrality which captain Martin is said to have granted, and by which we have allowed an asylum both to the troops of Spain, which shall fly before the Austrians, and the privateers which shall be chased by our ships in the Mediterranean.
I am, therefore, convinced, my lords, that our designs are not such as they are represented, or that they will not be accomplished by the measures taken. I am convinced in a particular manner, that the troops of Hanover can be of no use, and that they will raise the resentment of the nation, already overwhelmed with unnecessary burdens. I know, likewise, that they have been taken into pay without the consent of the senate, and am convinced, that if no other objection could be raised, we ought not to ratify a treaty which the crown has made, without laying it before us in the usual manner. I need not, therefore, inform your lordships, that I think the motion now under your consideration necessary and just; and that I hope, upon an attentive examination of the reasons which have been offered, your lordships will concur in it with that unanimity which evidence ought to enforce, and that zeal which ought to be excited by publick danger.
To which the duke of NEWCASTLE made answer to the following purport: — My lords, I know not by what imaginary appearances of publick danger the noble lord is so much alarmed, nor what fears they are which he endeavours with so much art and zeal to communicate to this assembly. For my part, I can upon the most attentive survey of our affairs, discover nothing to be feared but calumnies and misrepresentations; and these I shall henceforward think more formidable, since they have been able to impose upon an understanding so penetrating as that of his lordship, and have prevailed upon him to believe what is not only false, but without the appearance of truth, and to believe it so firmly, as to assert it to your lordships.
One of the facts which he has thus implicitly received, and thus publickly mentioned, is the neutrality supposed to have been granted to the king of Sicily, from which he has amused himself and your lordships with deducing very destructive consequences, that perhaps need not to be allowed him, even upon supposition of the neutrality; but which need not now be disputed, because no neutrality has been granted. Captain Martin, when he treated with the king, very cautiously declined any declarations of the intentions of the British court on that particular, and confined himself to the subject of his message, without giving any reason for hope, or despair of a neutrality. So that if it shall be thought necessary, we are this hour at liberty to declare war against the king of Sicily, and may pursue the Spaniards with the same freedom on his coasts as on those of any other power, and prohibit any assistance from being given by him to their armies in Italy.
His lordship’s notion of the interposition of the king of Prussia in the king’s favour, is another phantom raised by calumny to terrify credulity; a phantom which will, I hope, be entirely dissipated, when I have informed the house, that the whole suspicion is without foundation, and that the king of Prussia has made no declaration of any design to support the king, or of opposing us in the performance of our treaties. This prince, my lords, however powerful, active, or ambitious, appears to be satisfied with his acquisitions, and willing to rest in an inoffensive neutrality.
Such, my lords, and so remote from truth are the representations which the enemies of the government have with great zeal and industry scattered over the nation, and by which they have endeavoured to obviate those schemes which they would seem to favour; for by sinking the nation to a despair of attaining those ends which they declare at the same time necessary not only to our happiness, but to our preservation, what do they less than tell us, that we must be content to look unactive on the calamities that approach us, and prepare to be crushed by that ruin which we cannot prevent?
From this cold dejection, my lords, arises that despair which so many lords have expressed, of prevailing upon the Dutch to unite with us. The determinations of that people are, indeed, always slow, and the reason of their slowness has been already given; but I am informed, that the general spirit which now reigns among them, is likely soon to overrule the particular interests of single provinces, and can produce letters by which it will appear, that had only one town opposed those measures to which their concurrence is now solicited, it had been long since overruled; for there want not among them men equally enamoured of the magnanimity and firmness of the queen of Hungary, equally zealous for the general good of mankind, equally zealous for the liberties of Europe, and equally convinced of the perfidy, the ambition, and the insolence of France, with any lord in this assembly.
These men, my lords, have long endeavoured to rouse their country from the sloth of avarice, and the slumber of tranquillity, to a generous and extensive regard for the universal happiness of mankind; and are now labouring in the general assembly to communicate that ardour with which they are themselves inflamed, and to excite that zeal for publick faith, of which their superiour knowledge shows them the necessity.
It has been, indeed, insinuated, that all their consultations tend only to place garrisons in those towns from which the queen of Hungary has withdrawn her forces; but this supposition, my lords, as it is without any support from facts, is, likewise, without probability. For to garrison the barrier towns requires no previous debates nor deliberations; since it never was opposed even by those by whom the assistance of the queen of Hungary has been most retarded. Nor have even the deputies of Dort, whose obstinacy has been most remarkable, denied the necessity of securing the confines of their country, by possessing with their own troops those places which the Austrians are obliged to forsake. Their present disputes, my lords, must be, therefore, on some other question; and what question can be now before them which can produce any difficulties, but that which regards the support of the Pragmatick sanction?
If these deliberations should be so far influenced by the arrival of the army in the pay of Britain, as to end in a resolution to send a sufficient number of forces into Germany, it will not be denied, that the troops which give occasion for this debate, have really been useful to the common cause; nor will his majesty lose the affections of any of his subjects, by the false accounts which have been spread of an invidious preference given to the troops of Hanover.
That every government ought to endeavour to gain the esteem and confidence of the people, I suppose we are all equally convinced; but I, for my part, am very far from thinking that measures ought only to be pursued or rejected, as they are immediately favoured or disliked by the populace. For as they cannot know either the causes or the end of publick transactions, they can judge only from fallacious appearances, or the information of those whose interest it may perhaps be to lead them away from the truth. That monarch will be most certainly and most permanently popular, who steadily pursues the good of his people, even in opposition to their own prejudices and clamours; who disregards calumnies, which, though they may prevail for a day, time will sufficiently confute, and slights objections which he knows may be answered, and answered beyond reply.
Such, my lords, are the objections which have been hitherto raised against the troops of Hanover, of which many arise from ignorance, and many from prejudice; and some may be supposed to be made only for the sake of giving way to invectives, and indulging a petulant inclination of speaking contemptuously of Hanover.
With this view, my lords, it has been asked, why the Hanoverians are preferred to all other nations? why they have been selected from all other troops, to fight, against France, the cause of Europe? They were chosen, my lords, because they were most easily to be procured. Of the other nations from whom forces have usually been hired, some were engaged in the care of protecting, or the design of extending their own dominions, and others had no troops levied, nor could, therefore, furnish them with speed enough for the exigence that demanded them.
It has been asked with an air of triumph, as a question to which no answer could be given, why an equal number of Britons was not sent, since their valour might be esteemed at least equal to that of Hanoverians? I am far, my lords, from intending to diminish the reputation of the British courage, or detract from that praise which has been gained by such gallant enterprises, and preserved by a long succession of dangers, and of victories; nor do I expect that any nation will ever form a just claim to superiority. The reason, therefore, my lords, for which the troops of Hanover were hired, was not that the bravery of our countrymen was doubted, but that the transportation of such numbers might leave us naked to the insults of an enemy. For though the noble lord has declared, that after having sent sixteen thousand into Flanders, we should still have reserved for our defence a body of seven thousand, equal to that to which the protection of this kingdom was intrusted in the late war, his opinion will upon examination be found to have arisen only from the enumeration of the names of our regiments, many of which are far from being complete, and some almost merely nominal; so that, perhaps, if a body of sixteen thousand more had been sent, there would not have remained a single regiment to have repelled the crew of any daring privateer that should have landed to burn our villages, and ravage the defenceless country.
