Complete Works of Samuel Johnson, page 285
Even this expedient, my lords, must in a short time fail them; the products of vice as well as of commerce must in time be exhausted; and what will then remain? The honest and industrious must feel the weight of some new imposition, which the sagacity of experienced oppression may find means to lay upon them; they will then first find the benefit of this new law, since they may, by the use of those liquors which are indulged them, put a speedy end to that life which they made unable to support.
The means by which the expenses of our present designs are to be supported, such means, my lords, as were never yet practised by any state, however exhausted, or however endangered, means which a wise nation would scarcely use to repel an invader from the capital, or to raise works to keep off a general inundation, raise yet stronger motions of indignation, when it is considered for what designs these expenses are required.
We are now, my lords, raising armies, and hiring auxiliaries, for an expedition of which no necessity can be discovered, and from which neither honour nor advantage can be expected; we are about to force from the people the last remains of their property, and to harass with exactions those who are already languishing with poverty; not for the preservation of our liberty, or the defence of our country, but for the support of the Pragmatick sanction, for the execution of a very unjust scheme formed by the late king, to which he purchased at different times, on different emergencies, the concurrence of other powers; but to which he failed to put the last seal of confirmation, perhaps in hopes of a male heir, and left the design, which he had so long and so industriously laboured, to be at last completed by the kindness of his allies; having, by an unsuccessful war against the Turks, exhausted his treasure, and weakened his troops.
Whether we shall now engage in this design; whether we shall, for the defence of the Pragmatick sanction, begin another war on the continent, of which the duration cannot be determined, the expense estimated, or the event foreseen; whether we shall contend at once with all the princes of the house of Bourbon, and entangle ourselves in a labyrinth of different schemes; whether we shall provoke France to interrupt our commerce, and invade our colonies, and stand without the assistance of a single ally, against those powers that lately set almost all Europe at defiance, is now to be determined by your lordships.
It can scarcely be expected, that the French will treat us only as auxiliaries, and satisfy themselves with attacking us only where they find themselves opposed by us: they will undoubtedly, my lords, consider us as principals, since they can suffer little more by declaring war against us.
These, my lords, are the dangers to be feared from the measures which we are now persuaded to pursue; but persuaded by arguments which, in my opinion, ought to have very little influence upon us, and which have not yet been able, however artfully or zealously enforced, to prevail upon the Dutch to unite with us.
It has, indeed, been asserted, that the Dutch appear inclined to assist us: but of that inclination stronger proofs ought surely to be produced, before we take auxiliaries into pay, and transport troops into another country, which has been so often represented to have been raised for the defence of their own, or collect money from the publick by the propagation of wickedness.
Of this favourable inclination in the Dutch I am the more doubtful, because it is contrary to the expectations of all mankind, and to the maxims by which they have generally regulated their conduct. There have been many late instances of their patient submission to the invasion of privileges to which they have thought themselves entitled, and of their preference of peace, though sometimes purchased with the loss of honour; or, what may be supposed to touch a Dutchman much more nearly, of profit, to the devastation and expense and hazards of war; and it can hardly be supposed by any who know their character, that they will be more zealous for the rights of others than for their own; or that they will, for the support of the queen of Hungary, sacrifice that security and tranquillity which they have preferred at the expense of their commerce at one time, and by passive submission to insults at another.
That a nation like this, my lords, will in the quarrel of another engage in any but moderate measures, is not to be expected: it is not improbable, that they may endeavour by embassies and negotiations to adjust the present disputes, or offer their mediation to the contending powers; but I am very far from imagining, that they will find in themselves any disposition to raise armies, or equip fleets, that they will endanger the barrier which has been so dearly purchased, or expose themselves to the hazards and terrours of a French war; and am, therefore, inclined to believe, that if any tendency towards such measures now appears, it is only the effect of the present heat of some vehement declaimers, or the secret machination of some artful projectors among them, who have formed chimerical plans of a new system of Europe, and have, in their imaginations, regulated the distribution of dominion and power, or who, perhaps, have diminished their patrimonies by negligence and extravagance, and hope to repair them in times of confusion, and to glean part of that harvest of treasure which the publick must be obliged to yield in time of war. I am still inclined to believe, that the true interest of the republick will be consulted, that policy will prevail over intrigue, and that only moderate measures will be pursued by the general council of the states.
Moderate measures, my lords, if not always the most honourable in the opinion of minds vitiated by false notions of grandeur, are, at least, always the most safe; and are, therefore, eligible at least, till the scene of affairs begins to open, and the success of a more vigorous conduct may with some degree of certainty be foreknown; and it must at least be thought imprudent for those to hazard much who can gain nothing, and therefore it will not be easy to assign any reason that may justify our conduct on the present occasion.
It is not improbable, my lords, that those who have now obtained the direction of our affairs, may be influenced by the general disapprobation which the British people showed of the pacifick conduct of the late ministry, and may have resolved to endeavour after applause, by showing more spirit and activity. But, my lords, of two opposite schemes it is not impossible that both may be wrong, and that the middle way only may be safe; nor is it uncommon for those who are precipitately flying from one extreme, to rush blindly upon another.
But our ministry, my lords, have found out a method of complicating errours which none of their predecessors, however stigmatized for ignorance and absurdity, have hitherto been able to attain; they have been able to reconcile the extremes of folly, and to endanger the publick interest at the same time, by inactivity and romantick temerity.
No accusation against the late ministry was more general, more atrocious, or more adapted to incense the people, than that of neglecting the war against Spain: this was the subject of all the invectives which were vented against them in the senate, or dispersed among the people; for this they were charged with a secret confederacy against their country, with disregard of its commerce and its arms, and with a design to ruin the nation for no other end than to punish the merchants.
To this accusation, my lords, diligently propagated, willingly received, and, to confess the truth, confirmed by some appearances, do those owe their power, who now preside over the affairs of the nation; and it might, therefore, have been hoped, that by their promotion, one of our grievances would have been taken away, and that at least the war against Spain would have been vigorously prosecuted.
But this ministry, my lords, have only furnished a new instance of the credulity of mankind, of the delusion of outward appearances, and of the folly of hoping with too great ardour for any event, and of trusting any man with too great confidence. No sooner were they possessed of the power to which their ambition had so long aspired, and of the salaries which had with so much eagerness been coveted by their avarice, than they forgot the complaints of the merchants, the value of commerce, the honour of the British flag, the danger of our American territories, and the great importance of the war with Spain, and contented themselves with ordering convoys for our merchants, instead of destroying the enemy by whom they are molested.
The fleets which are floating from one coast to another in the Mediterranean, and which sometimes strike terrour into the harmless inhabitants of an open coast, or threaten, but only threaten, destruction to an unfortified town, I am very far from considering as armaments fitted out against the Spaniards, who neither feel nor fear any great injury from them: their trade may be, indeed, somewhat impeded; but that inconvenience is amply compensated by their depredations upon our merchants: their navies may be confined to their own ports, or to those of France; but these navies are not very necessary to them, since they are not sufficiently powerful to oppose us on the ocean; and therefore they who are thus confined, suffer less than those who confine them. We have, indeed, the empty pleasure of seeing ourselves lords of the sea, and of shaking the coasts with volleys of our cannon; but we purchase the triumph at a very high price, and shall find ourselves in time weakened by a useless ostentation of superiority.
The only parts of the Spanish dominions in which they can receive any hurt from our forces, are those countries which they possess in America, and from which they receive the gold and silver which inflame their pride, and incite them to insult nations more powerful than themselves. By seizing any part of those wealthy regions, we shall stop the fountain of their treasure, reduce them to immediate penury, and compel them to solicit peace upon any conditions that we shall condescend to offer them.
The necessity of invading these countries, my lords, was perfectly understood, and very distinctly explained, when the forces destined for that expedition were delayed, and when the attempt at Carthagena miscarried; nothing was more pathetical than the complaints of the patriots, who spared no labour to inform either the senate or the nation of the advantages which success would have procured. But what measures have been taken to repair our losses, or to regain our honour; or what new schemes have been formed for making an attack more forcible upon some weaker part?
Every one can remember, that the miscarriage of that enterprise was imputed, not to its difficulty, nor to the courage of the Spaniards, nor to the strength of their works, but to the unskilfulness of our officers, and the impropriety of the season; and it was, therefore, without doubt thought not impossible to attack the Spanish colonies with success; but why then, my lords, have they hitherto suffered the Spaniards to discipline their troops, and strengthen their works at. leisure, that at length they may securely set us at defiance, and plunder our merchants without fear of vengeance?
Thus, my lords, has our real interest been neglected in pursuit not of any other scheme of equal advantage, but of the empty title of the arbiters of Europe; we have suffered our trade to be destroyed, and our country impoverished for the sake of holding the balance of power; that variable balance, in which folly and ambition are perpetually changing the weights, and which neither policy nor strength could yet preserve steady for a single year.
In the prosecution of this idle scheme, we are about to violate all the maxims of wisdom, and perhaps of justice; we are about to destroy the end by the means which we make use of to promote it, to endanger our country more by attempting to hinder the changes which are projected in Europe, than their accomplishment will endanger it, and to deliver up ourselves to France before she makes any demand of submission from us.
If any excuse could be made for expeditions so likely to end in ruin, it must be that justice required them; and that if we suffer, we at least suffer in support of right, and in an honest endeavour to promote the execution of the great laws of moral equity; that if we fail of success, we shall always have the consolation of having meant well, and of having deserved those victories which we could not gain.
But, upon an impartial survey of the cause in which we are going to engage, and on which we are about to hazard our own happiness, and that of our posterity, I can discover no such apparent justice on the side of the queen of Hungary, as ought to incite distant nations to espouse her quarrel, to raise armies in her favour, to consider her cause as that of human nature, and to prosecute those that invade her territories, as the enemies of general society.
The Pragmatick sanction, my lords, by which she claims all the hereditary dominions of her family, cannot change the nature of right and wrong, nor invalidate any claim before subsisting, unless by the consent of the prince by whom it was made. The elector of Bavaria may, therefore, urge in his own defence, that by the elder sister he has a clear and indisputable right, a right from which he never receded, as he never concurred in the Pragmatiok sanction; he may, therefore, charge this illustrious princess, for whom so many troops are raised, and for whom so much blood is about to be shed, with usurpation, with detention of the dominions of other potentates, and with an obstinate assertion of a false title.
That the Pragmatick sanction is generally understood to be unjust, appears sufficiently from the conduct of those powers who, though engaged by solemn stipulations to support it, yet look unconcerned on the violation of it, and appear convinced, that the princes who are now dividing among themselves the Austrian dominions, produce claims which cannot be opposed without a manifest disregard of justice.
The pretensions of these princes ought, indeed, to have been more attentively considered, when this guaranty was first demanded; for it is evident, that either no such compact ought to have been made, or that it ought now to be observed; and that those who now justify the neglect of it, by urging its injustice, ought to have refused accession to it for the same reason. But it is probable, that they will urge in their defence, what cannot easily be confuted, that their consent was obtained by misrepresentations; and that he who has promised to do any thing on the supposition that it is right, is not bound by that promise, when he has discovered it to be wrong.
But though justice may, my lords, be pretended, I am far from doubting that policy has, in reality, supplied the motives upon which these powers proceed. Since the world is evidently governed more by interest than virtue, I think it not unreasonable to imagine, that they form their measures according to their own expectations of advantage; and as I do not believe our countrymen distinguished from the rest of mankind by any peculiar disregard of themselves, it may not be improper to examine, even in this place, whether by restoring the house of Austria to its ancient greatness, we shall promote our own happiness, or that of the empire, or of the rest of Europe.
To ourselves, my lords, I do not see what assistance can be given in time of danger by this house, however powerful, or however friendly; for, I suppose, we shall never suffer it to grow powerful by sea as well as by land, and by sea only can we receive benefits or injuries. What advantages the rest of Europe may promise themselves from the restoration of the Austrian power, may be learned, my lords, from the history of the great emperour, Charles the fifth, who for many years kept the world in continual alarms, ranged from nation to nation with incessant and insatiable ambition, made war only for the extinction of the protestant religion, and employed his power and his abilities in harassing the neighbouring princes, and disturbing the tranquillity of mankind.
Nor did his successours, my lords, though weakened by the division of his dominions, enjoy their power with greater moderation, or exert it to better purposes. It is well known, that they endeavoured the subversion of both the liberties and religion of the subordinate states of the empire, and that the great king of Sweden was called into Germany, as well for the preservation of the protestant religion, as of the rights of the electors.
This, my lords, is so generally known and confessed, that Puffendorf, the best writer on the German constitution, has declared it disadvantageous to the empire to place at its head a prince too powerful by his hereditary dominions, since they will always furnish him with force to oppress the weaker princes; and it is not often found, that he who has the power to oppress, is restrained by principles of justice.
It appears, therefore, to me, my lords, that the late election of an emperour was made with sufficient regard to the general good; and that, therefore, neither policy nor equity oblige us to act in a manner different from the other powers who are joined in the same engagements, of whom I do not learn, by any of the common channels of intelligence, that any of them intend the support of the Pragmatick sanction; for no newspaper or pamphlet has yet informed us, that any of the other powers are hiring auxiliaries, or regulating the march of their troops, or making any uncommon preparations, which may foretoken an expedition against the emperour or his allies.
Yet, my lords, they are not restrained from attacking the emperour, by so strong objections as may be made to the present design; for they owe him no obedience as their sovereign, nor have contributed to the acquisition of his honours; they have not, like his majesty, given their votes for his exaltation to the imperial seat, nor have acknowledged his right by granting him an aid. They might, therefore, without charge of disloyalty or inconsistency, endeavour to dethrone him; but how his majesty can engage in any such design, after having zealously promoted his advancement, and confirmed his election by the usual acknowledgment, I am not able to understand. It is evident, that the king of Prussia believes himself restrained by his own acts, and thinks it absurd to fight against an emperour, who obtained the throne by his choice; he, therefore, has, with his usual wisdom, refused to engage in the confederacy, nor have either promises or concessions been able to obtain more from him than a bare neutrality.
