Complete Works of Samuel Johnson, page 273
Nothing is necessary to the regulation of our naval force, but that your lordships vigilantly exert that power which is conferred upon you by the constitution, and examine the conduct of every officer with attention and impartiality; no man then will dare to neglect his duty, because no man can hope to escape punishment.
Of this bill, therefore, since it is thus useless and inconsistent, I cannot but suspect, my lords, that it was concerted for purposes very different from those mentioned in the title, which it has, indeed, no tendency to promote. I believe, my lords, the projectors of it intended not so much to advance the interest of the merchants, as to depress the reputation of those whom they have long taken every opportunity of loading with reproaches, whom they have censured as the enemies of trade, the corrupters of the nation, and the confederates of Spain.
To confirm these general calumnies, it was necessary to fix on some particular accusation which might raise the resentment of the people, and exasperate them beyond reflection or inquiry. For this purpose nothing was more proper than to charge them with betraying our merchants to the enemy.
As no accusation could be more efficacious to inflame the people, so none, my lords, could with more difficulty be confuted. Some losses must be suffered in every war, and every one will necessarily produce complaints and discontent; every man is willing to blame some other person for his misfortunes, and it was, therefore, easy to turn the clamours of those whose vessels fell into the hands of the Spaniards, against the ministers and commanders of the ships of war.
These cries were naturally heard with the regard always paid to misfortune and distress, and propagated with zeal, because they were heard with pity. Thus in time, what was at first only the outcry of impatience, was by malicious artifices improved into settled opinion, that opinion was diligently diffused, and all the losses of the merchants were imputed, not to the chance of war, but the treachery of the ministry.
But, my lords, the folly of this opinion, however general, and the falsehood of this accusation, however vehement, will become sufficiently apparent, if you examine that bulky collection of papers which are now laid before you, from which you will discover the number of our fleets, the frequency of our convoys, the stations of our ships of war, and the times of their departure and return; you will find that no provision for war, no expedient likely to promote success has been neglected; that we have now more ships equipped than in the late war with France, that nothing can be added to the exactness with which our maritime force is regulated, and that there is not the least reason to doubt of the fidelity with which it has been employed.
In every war, my lords, it is to be expected that losses will be suffered by private persons on each side, nor even in a successful war can the publick always hope to be enriched; because the advantage may arise, not immediately from captures, but, consequently, from the treaties or conditions in which a prosperous war may be supposed to terminate.
What concessions we shall in this war extort from the Spaniards, what security will be procured for our merchants, what recompense will be yielded for our losses, or what extent will be added to our commerce, it cannot yet be expected that any man should be able to declare; nor will his majesty’s counsellors be required to give an account of futurity. It is a sufficient vindication of their conduct, and an evident proof of the wisdom with which the war has been conducted, that we have hitherto gained more than we have lost.
This, my lords, will appear from a diligent and minute comparison of the captures on each side, and an exact computation of the value of our losses and our prizes. It will be found that if the Spaniards have taken, as it is not improbable, a greater number of ships, those which they have lost have been far more wealthy.
The merchants, indeed, seem to have distrusted the strength of the evidence which they produced in support of their allegations, by bringing it only before the other house, where, as an oath could not be administered, every man delivered what he believed as what he knew, and indulged himself without scruple in venting his resentment, or declaring his suspicions; a method of allegation very proper to scatter reproaches and gratify malevolence, but of very little use for the discovery of truth.
Had they come before your lordships, every circumstance had been minutely examined, every assertion compared with other evidence, all exaggerations repressed, and all foreign considerations rejected; each part would have been impartially heard, and it would have plainly been known to whom every loss was to be imputed. The negligence or treachery of the commanders of the convoys, wherever it had been found, would have been punished, but they would not have charged them with those miscarriages which were produced only by the obstinacy or inattention of the masters of the trading vessels.
Such inquiries, my lords, they appear to have thought it their interest to decline, and, therefore, did not proceed on their petition to this house; and if they did in reality avoid a rigorous examination, what can be inferred, but that they intended rather to offer insinuations than proofs, and rather to scatter infamy than obtain justice.
And, that nothing was indeed omitted that could secure our own commerce, or distress our enemies, may reasonably be collected from the number and great strength of our fleet, to which no empire in the world can oppose an equal force. If it has not been supplied with sailors without some delays, and if these delays have given our enemies an opportunity of adding to their securities, of fortifying their ports, and supplying their magazines, it must be ascribed to the nature of our constitution, that forbids all compulsory methods of augmenting our forces, which must be considered as, perhaps, the only inconvenience to be thrown into the balance against the blessings of liberty.
The difficulty of manning our ships of war, is, indeed, extremely perplexing. Men are naturally very little inclined to subject themselves to absolute command, or to engage in any service without a time limited for their dismission. Men cannot willingly rush into danger without the prospect of a large advantage; they have generally some fondness for their present state of life, and do not quit it without reluctance. All these reasons, my lords, concur to withhold the sailors from the navy, in which they are necessarily governed with higher authority than in trading vessels, in which they are subjected to punishments, and confined by strict regulations, without any certain term of their bondage; for such they, who know not the necessity of subordination, nor discover the advantages of discipline, cannot but account subjection to the will and orders of another.
By serving the merchants, they not only secure to themselves the liberty of changing their masters at pleasure, but enjoy the prospect of a near and certain advantage; they have not, indeed, any expectations of being suddenly enriched by a plate ship, and of gaining by one engagement such wealth as will enable them to spend the rest of their lives in ease and affluence; but they are sure of a speedy payment of their wages, perhaps, of some profits from petty commerce, and of an opportunity of squandering them at land in jollity and diversions; their labour is cheerful, because they know it will be short, and they readily enter into an employment which they can quit when it shall no longer please them.
These considerations, my lords, have no influence upon the preparations of France and Spain, where no man is master of his own fortune, or time, or life, and where the officers of the state can drive multitudes into the service of the crown, without regard to their private views, inclinations, or engagements. To man a fleet, nothing is necessary but to lay an embargo on the trading vessels, and suspend their commerce for a short time; therefore no man dares refuse to enter into the publick service when he is summoned; nor, if he should fly, as our sailors, from an impress, would any man venture to shelter or conceal him.
Absolute monarchs have, therefore, this advantage over us, that they can be sooner prepared for war, and to this must be ascribed all the success which the Spaniards have obtained. This, my lords, will not be obviated by the bill now before us, nor will it, indeed, procure any other benefit to the trade, or any addition to the power of the nation.
Of the ten clauses comprised in the bill, the greatest part is universally allowed to be injudiciously and erroneously proposed; and those few, which were thought of more importance, have been shown to contain no new expedients, nor to add any thing to the present regulations.
I cannot, therefore, discover any reason, my lords, that should induce us to refer to a committee this bill, of which part is confessedly to be rejected, and the rest is apparently superfluous.
[Then the question being put, whether the bill should be referred to a committee; it passed in the negative. Content, 25. Not content, 59.
On the rejection of this bill by the lords, a bill which related to an affair of no less importance than the security of trade and navigation, and which had been unanimously passed by the commons, it was satirically remarked, that the upper house understood trade and navigation better than the lower. However, the circumstances that attended it, made the publication of the bill, with the amendments and the reasons offered by the lords on both sides, expected with the more impatience.]
HOUSE OF LORDS, NOVEMBER 16, 1742.
Parliament having met, according to the royal summons, on this day, his majesty made a speech from the throne, which being afterwards read by the president, lord TWEEDALE rose, and spoke as follows:
My lords, it is not without the highest satisfaction, that every lover of mankind must look upon the alterations that have lately been produced in the state of Europe; nor can any Briton forbear to express an immediate and particular pleasure to observe his country rising again into its former dignity, to see his own nation shake off dependence, and rouse from inactivity, cover the ocean with her fleets, and awe the continent with her armies; bid, once more, defiance to the rapacious invaders of neighbouring kingdoms, and the daring projectors of universal dominion; once more exert her influence in foreign courts, and summon the monarchs of the west to another confederacy against the power of France.
The queen of Hungary, who was lately obliged to retire at the approach of her enemies, to leave her capital in danger of a siege, and seek shelter in the remotest corner of her dominions, who was lately so harassed with invasions, and so encircled with dangers, that she could scarcely fly from one ravager, without the hazard of falling into the hands of another, is now able to give laws to her persecutors, to return the violence which she has suffered, and instead of imploring mercy from those who had no regard but to their own interest, and were determined to annihilate her family and divide her dominions, now sits in full security on her throne, directs the march of distant armies, and dictates the terms on which those who have entered her dominions shall be suffered to escape.
Such, my lords, is the present state of the German empire; nor have the affairs of the rest of Europe been less changed; the power of the house of Bourbon has been diminished on every side, its alliance has been rejected, and its influence disregarded.
The king of Sardinia has openly engaged to hinder the Spaniards from erecting a new kingdom in Italy; and though he has hitherto been somewhat embarrassed in his measures, and oppressed by the superiority of his enemies, has at least, by preventing the conjunction of the Spanish armies, preserved the Austrians from being overwhelmed. Nor can the situation of his dominions, and the number of his forces, suffer us to doubt, that in a short time he will be able entirely to secure Italy, since he has already recovered his country, and drove back the Spaniards into the bosom of France.
The condition of the other Spanish army is such, as no enemy can wish to be aggravated by new calamities. They are shut up in a country without provisions, or of which the inhabitants are unwilling to supply them: on one side are neutral states, to which the law of nations bars their entrance; on another the Mediterranean sea, which can afford them only the melancholy prospect of hostile armaments, or sometimes of their own ships falling into the hands of the Britons; behind them are the troops of Austria ready to embarrass their march, intercept their convoys, and receive those whom famine and despair incite to change their masters, and to seek among foreign nations that ease and safety, of which the tyranny of their own government, and the madness of their own leaders, has deprived them. Such is their distress, and so great their diminution, that a few months must complete their ruin, they must be destroyed without the honour of a battle, they must sink under the fatigue of hungry marches, by which no enemy is overtaken or escaped, and be at length devoured, by those diseases, which toil and penury will inevitably produce.
That the diminution of the influence of the house of Bourbon is not an empty opinion, which we easily receive, because we wish it to be true; that other nations, likewise, see the same events with the same sentiments, and prognosticate the decline of that power which has so long intimidated the universe, appears from the declaration now made by his majesty of the conduct of the Swedish court.
That nation which was lately governed by the counsels, and glutted with the bounties of France, which watched the nod of her mighty patroness, and made war at her command against the Russian empire, now begins to discover, that there are other powers more worthy of confidence and respect, more careful to observe their engagements, or more able to fulfil them. She, therefore, requests the British monarch to extricate her from those difficulties, in which she is entangled by a blind compliance with French dictates, to restore to her the dismembered provinces, and recall that enemy which now impends over her capital, and whom the French have neither interest to appease, nor strength to resist.
Such, my lords, is the present prospect which offers itself to him who surveys Europe with a political view, and examines the present interest and dispositions of neighbouring potentates; such is the order which has been produced from general confusion, and such the reestablishment of equal power, which has succeeded these concussions of the world.
It is no small addition to the pleasure which this change must afford every man, who has either wisdom to discover his own happiness, or benevolence to rejoice in that of others, that it has been the effect not of chance but of conduct; that it is not an unforeseen event, produced by the secret operation of causes fortuitously concurring, but the result of a political and just design, well concerted and steadily pursued; that every advantage which has been gained, is the consequence of measures laid to obtain it; that our happiness has been procured by prudence, and that our counsels have not been lucky but wise.
If we reflect, my lords, upon the causes which have contributed to the rescue of Europe from impending slavery, which have reestablished the queen of Hungary in her dominions, enabled her to lay waste the territories of her invaders, confirmed her friends in their fidelity, and intimidated those whom rival interests inclined to wish her fall, or the hope of sharing in the plunder, had incited to form designs against her. If we inquire to what it is to be ascribed, that she is able to form new alliances, and defend her dominions with confederate armies, we shall find it easy to trace all these revolutions to one cause, the steady and prudent conduct of the king of Britain.
Our sovereign, my lords, has looked on the troubles of Europe with that concern which publick virtue inspires; he has seen the sufferings of this illustrious princess with that compassion which is always due to magnanimity oppressed, and formed resolutions for her assistance with that ardour, which courage naturally kindles; but with that caution, likewise, and secrecy, which experience dictates. But he remembered, my lords, that, though he was the friend of the queen of Hungary, he was to consider himself as the father of the people of Britain; that he was not to exhaust the forces of this nation in romantick expeditions, or exhaust its treasures in giving assistance which was not needed.
He therefore waited to observe the event of the war, and to discover whether the incessant struggles of the Austrians would be able to throw off the load with which they were oppressed; but he found that their spirit, however ardent, could not supply the want of strength; he found, that they were fainting under insuperable labours, and that, though they were in no danger of being conquered by the valour of their enemies, they must, in a short time, be wearied with their numbers.
His majesty then knew, my lords, that, by sending them speedy assistance, he at once promoted the interest of his people, and gratified his own inclinations; he therefore supplied the queen with such sums as enabled her to levy new forces, and drive her enemies before her. By procuring a reconciliation with the king of Prussia, he freed her from the nearest and most formidable danger, and gave her an opportunity to secure herself against the menaces of other powers.
But though she was set free from domestick dangers, though invasion was driven from her capital, though captivity no longer pursued her flight, nor usurpation hovered over her throne, her more distant dominions were still a prey to her enemies. The Spaniards had already landed one army in Italy, with which another was hastening to join. The success of this enterprise, which would have gained the greatest part of Italy, could only be hindered by the king of Sardinia, who was, therefore, solicited by the Spaniards and French to favour their design, with the strongest protestations, and the most magnificent promises. But these were overbalanced by the influence of the king of Britain, whose name was of sufficient importance to make the weaker part most eligible, and to counterbalance the force of immediate interest.
Thus was the passage into Italy barred against the Spaniards, by obstacles which they can never surmount, while the other army is besieged by our fleet, and by the Austrians; and reduced, instead of conquering kingdoms, to change their camp, and regulate their marches, with no other view than to avoid famine. While that prince, whose dominions might most commodiously afford them succour, and whom all the ties of nature and of interest oblige to assist them, is awed by the British ships of war, which lie at anchor before his metropolis, and of which the commanders, upon the least suspicion of hostilities against the queen of Hungary, threaten to batter his palaces, and destroy his city.
