Complete Works of Samuel Johnson, page 271
On this occasion, my lords, it may not be improper to obviate the objection produced by the seeming omission of penal sanctions, which is only another proof of implicit confidence in the officers of the admiralty, who have already the power, allowed to military courts, of proceeding against those who shall deviate from their orders. This power, which is in a great degree discretionary, it was thought improper to limit, by ascertaining the punishment of crimes, which so many circumstances may aggravate or diminish; and, therefore, in my opinion, this clause is far from being so defective as the noble lord represented it.
The last three clauses, by which the ships in America are prohibited to leave their station, by which it is required that accounts should be once in six months transmitted to the admiralty, and by which the captains are subjected to the command of the governours of our colonies, are, in my opinion, justly to be censured. The first is impossible to be observed, the second is unnecessary, and the third will probably produce more inconveniencies than benefits.
Thus, my lords, I have endeavoured to show, that this bill, though not perfect, is yet such as, with some emendations, may produce great advantages to the traders of this empire. For, though it is undoubtedly a just observation, that the success of military attempts cannot be promoted by rigid restrictions and minute regulations, yet it is equally certain that no nation has yet been so fortunate as to be served by men of integrity superiour to laws, or of wisdom superiour to instructions; and every government has found it necessary to direct the conduct of its officers by general rules, though they have been allowed to comply with particular circumstances, and to give way to sudden accidents.
I think it, therefore, my lords, necessary to propose, that this bill shall be more particularly examined in a committee, that, after having received the necessary explanations and amendments, it may be referred again to the other house.
Lord DELAWARE rose next, and spoke to the purpose following: — My lords, the noble duke has, by his arguments in favour of this bill, given a very eminent proof of great abilities; he has shown every clause in that light which may least expose to view its improprieties and defects; but has at length only shown, that it is not impossible to make a useful law, for the purposes mentioned in the title of this bill; not that any of the expedients, now proposed, will afford the desired advantage to the publick, or obviate any of the inconveniencies of which the traders have been so long and so importunately complaining.
This bill, my lords, is, indeed, founded upon a law made in a reign celebrated for the wisdom of our conduct and the success of our arms; but it will not, I suppose, be asserted, that nothing was, even in that period, ill conducted; nor will it be an argument, sufficient for the justification of an expedient, that it was practised in the victorious reign of queen Anne.
If we inquire into the consequences of that law, we shall find no inducement to revive it on this or any future occasion. For it had no other effect than that of exposing us to our enemies by dividing our forces; a disadvantage of which we soon found the effects, by the loss of two large ships of seventy guns, and of a multitude of trading vessels, which, by that diminution of our naval armament, necessarily fell into the hands of privateers and small cruisers, that ravaged the ocean without fear or molestation.
If we examine the present establishment of our navy, my lords, it will be discovered, that nothing is proposed in this bill, which is not more efficaciously performed by the methods now in use, and more judiciously established by laws, of which long experience has shown the usefulness. This, my lords, will easily appear from the perusal of the orders which every commander of a convoy regularly receives, and of the printed rules, established by his majesty in council, for the royal navy.
In these, my lords, much more is comprehended than can properly be inferred in a law not occasionally variable; nor do I think any thing omitted, which an experienced and candid inquirer will think useful to the increase of our naval strength, or necessary to the protection of our commerce.
In considering this bill, I shall not trouble your lordships with a minute consideration of every single paragraph, though every paragraph might furnish opportunity for animadversions; but shall content myself with endeavouring to evince the reasonableness of some of the objections made by the noble lord who spoke first, and enforcing his opinion with such arguments as have occurred to me, though, indeed, it requires no uncommon sagacity to discover, or superiour skill in ratiocination to prove, that where this bill will produce any alteration in our present scheme, it will manifestly change it for the worse.
For surely, my lords, it will not be necessary to show, by any elaborate and refined reasoning, the absurdity of confining cruisers to particular stations, with an absolute prohibition to depart from them, whatever may be the certainty of destruction, or prospect of advantage.
If the intention of cruising ships is to annoy the enemies of the nation, ought they to be deprived of the liberty of pursuing them? If they are designed for the protection of our merchants, must they not be allowed to attend them till they are out of danger.
Every one, my lords, has had opportunities of observing, that there are men who are wholly engrossed by the present moment, and who, if they can procure immoderate profit, or escape any impending danger, are without the least solicitude with regard to futurity, and who, therefore, live only by the hour, without any general scheme of conduct, or solid foundation of lasting happiness, and who, consequently, are for ever obliged to vary their measures, and obviate every new accident by some new contrivance.
By men of this disposition, my lords, a temper by which they are certainly very little qualified for legislators, the bill now before us seems to have been drawn up; for their attention is evidently so engaged by the present occurrences, that there is no place left for any regard to distant contingencies. The conclusion of this war is to them the period of human existence, the end of all discord and all policy. They consider Spain as the only enemy with whom we can ever be at variance, and have, therefore, drawn up a law, a law without any limitation of time, to enable us to oppose her. They have with great industry and long searches discovered, that cruisers on this side cape Finisterre, may be of use against the Spaniards, and propose, therefore, that in all times of war they are to be despatched to that individual station, though we should be engaged in disputes with the northern crowns, or fit out fleets to make conquests in the East Indies.
In all our wars, my lords, however judiciously concerted, and however happily concluded, the pleasures of success have been abated by the mortification of losses, and some complaints have been at all times mingled with the shouts of triumph. How much soever the glory of the nation has been elevated, the fortunes of particular persons have been impaired, and those have never thought themselves recompensed by the general advantages of the publick, who have suffered by the acquisition of them; they have always imagined themselves marked out for ruin by malevolence and resentment, and have concluded that those disasters which fell upon them only by the common chance of war, were brought on them by negligence or design.
The losses of our merchants in the present war must be acknowledged to have been more than common, but if we examine accurately into the causes that may be assigned for so great a number of captures, we shall find them such as this law will have no tendency to remove, such as might be easily imagined before the commencement of hostilities, and such as it will be extremely difficult on any future occasion of the same kind, to hinder from producing the same effects.
The first and greatest cause, my lords, of the number of our losses, is the number of our ships, which cannot all be sufficiently protected. The extent, therefore, of our commerce, in proportion to that of our enemies, exposes us to double disadvantage; we necessarily lie open in more parts to the depredations of privateers, and have no encouragement to attempt reprisals, because they have few ships of value to be seized. The profit of our commerce naturally withholds our sailors from our ships of war, and makes part of our navy an idle show; the certainty of plunder incites them to turn their merchant ships into cruisers, and to suspend their trade for more profitable employment. Thus they at once increase the number of plunderers, and take away from us the opportunity of repairing our losses by the same practice.
And, my lords, if the losses of our merchants have been greater than in former wars, our trade is more extensive, and our ships far more numerous. Nor is it to be forgotten that a very important part of our commerce is carried on before the eyes of the Spaniards, so that they may issue out upon our merchants from their own coasts, and retire immediately beyond danger of pursuit.
But, my lords, neither the situation of Spain, nor the extent of our commerce, would have made this war so destructive, had not our merchants sometimes facilitated the attempts of our enemies by their own negligence or avarice.
I have been informed, my lords, that as the masters of trading vessels complain of having been deserted by their convoys, the captains of the ships of war have, in their turn, exhibited such representations of the conduct of the trading masters, as may prove that their caution is not proportioned to their clamour, and that in however melancholy terms they may recount the miseries of captivity, the calamities of ruined families, and the interruption of the trade of Britain, they will not endeavour to escape their enemies at the expense of much circumspection, and that the prospect of no large profit will be sufficient to overbalance the danger of those evils which they so pathetically lament.
It is not uncommon, my lords, when the fleet has entered the open seas, for the traders to take different courses both from the convoy and from each other, and to disperse themselves beyond the possibility of receiving assistance in danger or distress; and what wonder is it if part of them be lost, since only part of them can be protected?
It may be imagined, my lords, that this is only an excuse forged by the commanders to cover their own negligence or treachery. It may be asked, what motives could induce the merchants to expose themselves to unnecessary dangers, or what proofs they have ever given of such wild negligence of their own interest or safety, as that they should be suspected of rushing precipitately into the jaws of rapine?
This, my lords, is an objection specious in itself, and such as those who have not inquired into the present state of our traffick will not very readily discover to be fallacious; but it may easily be removed, by showing that the danger of being taken by the enemy is generally not so great to those who have the direction of the ship as it is commonly believed.
By the present custom of insurance, my lords, the merchant exempts himself from the hazard of great losses, and if he insures so much of the value of the ship and cargo, that the chance of arriving first at market is equivalent to the remaining part, what shall hinder him from pressing forward at all events, and directing his course intrepidly through seas crowded with enemies?
It is well known, my lords, that there is, in a great part of mankind, a secret malignity, which makes one unwilling to contribute to the advantage of another, even when his own interest will suffer no diminution; nor is it to be imagined, that this disposition is less predominant in traders than in the other classes of the community, though it is exerted on different occasions. The envy of one part of mankind is excited by reputation, or interest, or dignity, or power. The trader, for the most part, envies nothing but money, in which he has been taught from his infancy that every human excellence is comprehended, and contributes to the increase of the riches of another, with the same unwillingness with which a soldier would concur in the advancement of an inferiour officer to a post of higher rank and authority than his own.
For this reason, my lords, there is generally a malevolence in the merchant against the insurer, whom he considers as an idle caterpillar, living without industry upon the labours of others, and, therefore, when he lays down the sum stipulated for security, he is almost in suspense, whether he should not prefer the loss of the remaining part of the value of his vessel to the mortification of seeing the insurer enjoy that money, which fear and caution have influenced him to pay.
This disposition, undoubtedly, inclines him to proceed with less regard to his own security, and betrays him into dangers which it was, at least, possible to avoid; for to what purpose, says he, have I insured my ship if I am not to be set free from the necessity of anxiety and caution? If I arrive safely at the port, I shall dispose of my commodities with uncommon advantage; if I miscarry, the insurer will at least suffer with me, and be deservedly punished for his suspicions and extortion.
I doubt not but some of your lordships will imagine, that I am now indulging chimerical speculations, that I am ascribing great force to weak motives, and supposing men to act upon principles which, in reality, never operated in the human breast. When I think disadvantageously of others, my lords, I am, indeed, always desirous to find myself mistaken, and shall be pleased to hear on this occasion from any of your lordships, who have conversed at large among mankind, that it is not common for one man to neglect his own interest for fear of promoting that of another. In the present question, my lords, I have only supposed that envy may be one motive among many, and wish its influence were so small, as that it might have been less proper to mention it.
The practice of insurance, my lords, whether it contributes or not to the number of the captures, undoubtedly increases the clamour which they occasion; for as the loss is extended, the complaint is multiplied, and both the merchant and insurer take the liberty of censuring the conduct of the naval officers, and of condemning the measures of the government. The ministry is charged with neglecting the protection of commerce, with oppressing the merchants, and with conniving at the enemy’s preparations; that they who most eagerly solicited the war, may be the first that shall repent it.
Another cause of the frequency of our losses in the present war, is the general circulation of intelligence throughout Europe, by which it is made impossible to conceal from our enemies the state of our armies, our navies, or our trade. Every regiment that is raised, every ship that is built, every fleet of trading vessels that lies waiting for the wind, is minutely registered in the papers of the week, and accounts of it transmitted to every nation of the world, where curiosity or interest will pay for information. The Spaniards, therefore, need only regulate their schemes according to their instructions from Britain, and watch those fleets which are frequently sent out, for they may be confident that some masters will wander from their protectors, enticed by avarice, negligence, or temerity, and that they shall have opportunities of enriching themselves without the necessity of engaging the convoy.
To protect ships which are to be steered each at the will of the master, is no less impossible, my lords, than to conduct an army of which every private man is at liberty to march according to his own caprice, to form and pursue his own plan of operation, and to dispute and neglect the orders of his leader. Nor is it more reasonable to subject the captains of the ships of war to penalties for the loss of a vessel, over which they have no authority, than to require from an officer in the army an account of the lives of men, who perished by disobeying his commands.
In my opinion, my lords, we might, with far greater probability of success, revive a precedent that may be found in the reign of king William, in which it was appointed by an order of council, that the name of every ship which went out with a convoy should be registered, and that the owners should give security to provide a sufficient number of arms and a proper quantity of ammunition to assist the imperial ships in annoying or repelling the enemy; with one injunction more of the utmost importance to the efficacious protection of our commerce, and which, therefore, in every war ought to be repeated and enforced; an injunction by which the masters of the ships of trade were required to obey the directions of the commander of the convoy.
That some measures ought to be concerted for the preservation of our trade I am very far from denying, and shall willingly concur in such as shall to me appear likely to promote the end proposed by them. Our losses, my lords, are undoubtedly great, though I believe far less than they are reported by discontent and malevolence; for if a ship be delayed by an accidental hinderance, or kept back by contrary winds for a few days, there are men so watchful to snatch every opportunity of reproaching the measures of the government, that a clamour is immediately raised, the ship is taken, the merchants are sacrificed, and the nation betrayed.
While this report is conveyed from one to another, and, like other falsehoods, increasing in its progress; while every man adds some circumstance of exaggeration, or some new proof of the treachery of the ministry, the ship enters the port, and puts an end, indeed, to the anxiety of the owners and insurers, but by no means pacifies the people, or removes their prejudices against the conduct of their governours; for as no man acknowledges himself the first author of the report, no man thinks himself under any obligation to retract or confute it, and the passions of the multitude, being once in commotion, cannot be calmed before another opportunity of the same kind may be offered for agitating them afresh.
To the expectations of the people, my lords, it is always proper to have some regard, nor is there any valuable use of power but that of promoting happiness, and preventing or removing calamities; but we are not to endeavour to pacify them by the appearance of redress, which, in reality, will only increase those evils of which they complain, nor to depress the reputation of this assembly by passing laws which the experience of a single month will prove to be of no use.
Of this kind, my lords, the bill now before us has been shown by the noble lord that spoke first on this occasion; by whom every clause has been discovered to be either defective or unnecessary, and who has evinced, beyond all possibility of reply, that the regulations here proposed can be divided only into two kinds, of which one is already established either by law or prescription, and the other cannot be admitted without apparent injury both to our navy and our trade.
