Delphi Complete Works of Stephen Leacock, page 541
LaFontaine, in retiring from political life at the age of forty-four, had yet a distinguished career before him on the bench. Returning, after his resignation, to legal occupations, he was appointed in 1853 chief-justice of Lower Canada, and in the year following was created a baronet in recognition of his distinguished career. As chief-justice, Sir Louis LaFontaine presided over the sittings of the seigniorial tenure court established for the adjustment of claims under the Act of 1854, and attained a distinction as a jurist which rivalled his eminence as a political leader. In 1860 LaFontaine, whose first wife, as has been seen, had died many years before, married a Madame Kinton, widow of an English officer. Of this marriage were born two sons, both of whom died young. Sir Louis LaFontaine died at Montreal, February 26th, 1864.
It is beyond the scope of the present volume to follow the subsequent political career of Francis HINCKS’S CLOSING YEARS Hincks. His reconstruction of the Reform party, his joint premiership with Morin, and the “sleepless vigilance” of his policy of railroad development and public improvement, form an important chapter in the history of Canada to which Sir John Bourinot and other authors of the present series have done ample justice. Hincks’s career as a colonial governor in Barbadoes and Guiana, his subsequent return to Canada as Sir Francis Hincks, and the story of his services as minister of finance (1869-73) under Sir John A. Macdonald, lie altogether apart from the subject-matter of this book. Sir Francis Hincks died August 18th, 1885, after a long, active and useful life. His Reminiscences of his Public Life, published in 1884, is precisely one of those books which it is greatly to be desired that men who have taken a large part in public affairs would more frequently give to the world. For Canadian political history from 1840 to 1854, it will always remain an authority of the first importance.
It may, at first sight, appear strange that the two great Reformers, whose joint career has been chronicled in the foregoing pages, should have abandoned political life at an age when most statesmen are but on the threshold of their achievements. But the resignation of Baldwin and LaFontaine meant that their work was done. To find a real basis of political union between French and British Canada, to substitute for the strife of unreconciled races the fellow-citizenship of two great peoples, and set up in the foremost of British colonies an ensample of self-government that should prove the lasting basis of empire, — this was the completed work by which they had amply earned the rest of eventide after the day of toil.
Economic Prosperity in the British Empire
CONTENTS
FOREWORD
PART I. UNTIL NOW
CHAPTER I. THE EMPIRE AS A PROPRIETARY ASSET
CHAPTER II. THE POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF THE WHITE RACE WITHIN THE BRITISH EMPIRE
CHAPTER III. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITHIN THE EMPIRE
CHAPTER IV. THE MIGRATION OF POPULATION IN THE PAST
CHAPTER V. THE EXPORT AND INVESTMENT OF BRITISH CAPITAL
PART II. FROM NOW ON
CHAPTER I. A PROPOSAL FOR AN INTEGRATED TARIFF SYSTEM WITHIN THE EMPIRE
CHAPTER II. A PROPOSAL OF POLICY FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF NEW COUNTRY
CHAPTER III. THE INTEGRATION OF CREDIT, CURRENCY, AND CAPITAL
CHAPTER IV. THE INTELLECTUAL UNITY OF THE EMPIRE
CHAPTER V. WHAT TO DO AND HOW TO DO IT: THE WORK OF AN ECONOMIC CONFERENCE
FOREWORD
THE PROPOSALS FOR inter-Empire co-operation, trade and investment contained in Dr. Stephen Leacock’s Economic Prosperity in the British Empire connect closely with the present active discussion in Great Britain of the problem of economic unity.
This book is sent you by the Board of Trade of the town of Orillia, Ontario, Canada in the hope that it may help to draw attention to the opportunities for investment of British capital in the industries of Canada.
The town of Orillia is situated at the centre of population of the Dominion, with unusual facilities for cheap power and for the distribution of manufactured products. The Orillia Board of Trade invites your co-operation in developing with British capital and financial experience the abounding resources of this and similar Canadian districts. The Board will welcome correspondence on the subject.
PART I. UNTIL NOW
CHAPTER I. THE EMPIRE AS A PROPRIETARY ASSET
IT IS THE purpose of this book to discuss the economic integration of the British Empire. By this is meant the establishment of a system of mutual co-operation for the development of the vast potential wealth of the Empire and for the expansion of its present limited population.
It is no longer possible to aim at complete economic union. For that the day is past. Such a union is probably no longer even desirable. In each of the great Dominions there has been established a system of manufacture and an urban concentration dependent on it, that cannot now be obliterated. But as towards the outside world a uniformity of economic policy may still be achieved; and the now separated parts of the Empire may co-operate with one another in the use of capital, the movement of population and the development of national resources, with results as yet scarcely imagined. It is within the reach of statesmanship to initiate in the British Empire an era of prosperity and progress such as the world has never yet seen anywhere at any time.
For three generations past, in the name of “political freedom”, British statecraft and colonial aspirations have set themselves to break up the Empire into a series of disconnected parts. The gift of “responsible government” to the colonies, that began in 1840, carried with it a division of resources, a separation of public debts, a repudiation of all common obligations, a complete dislocation of all common action. It was the partition of an estate. Each of the beneficiaries retired with his own, to use it or not as each saw fit. Most of the talents stayed hidden in the ground. The parent source of capital and migration flowed away to enrich the United States and Argentina. In the sixty years from 1840 to 1900, 10,513,000 British emigrants, or seventy-five per cent of the total, moved outside of the bounds of the Empire; only 3,688,000, or twenty-five per cent, migrated to territory under the British Crown.
As a result of all this, what should have been a united economic commonwealth, comparable to the United States, but immensely greater, is but a group of fragments. The vast totality of resources that is the heritage of all is available to none. A part of the Empire is crowded to the verge of standing room. Two million idle men look across the sea at 2,000,000 square miles of empty land. In some quarters of our disunited commonwealth each single subject of the Crown, as in Western Australia, represents three square miles of land; elsewhere, as in England itself, his share is less than the five-hundredth part of one square mile.
Nor is there any single authority left that can bring the people to the land or the land to the people. Capital accumulates in Lombard Street while the empty fertile spaces of the outer Empire remain, decade after decade, silent. Western Australia, as large as all of Europe west of Warsaw, lies almost motionless under its own weight. Its little handful of people cannot use more than a fraction of it. Canada, portioned off into half a continent in 1867, staggers forward under its burden; alternately it falls prone and rises again: each successive “land boom” is followed by a flat collapse. It has never had money enough and men enough for its development. It has thrown about itself an outline apparatus of 40,000 miles of railways, with vast bridges carrying nothing to nowhere and town sites in the grass of the prairies. The frame is too big for the picture. And those who might help fill it in are warned off in the nature of “responsible government”. In the sixty odd years since the Confederation of 1867 Canada has established in its north-west a population of 2,000,000 people. This feat, if we could rightly use our population, capital and resources, could be duplicated in two years.
The same picture of imperfect development and of relative stagnation for lack of capital resources is reflected throughout the Empire. In the temperate uplands of Africa, such an area as Northern Rhodesia, with over a quarter of a million square miles, supports the white population of a country town. The Pacific Islands on the British Columbia coast represent as large a territory, as rich a heritage of resources as the whole Ægean civilization of Greece. The Queen Charlotte Islands alone have an area (3,780 square miles) that is one-third the size of Belgium. The islands possess a temperate climate, magnificent harbours, anthracite and bituminous coal, large forests, prolific fisheries and the population of an English market town — 2,000 as against the 7,500,000 people in Belgium. Yet this island group has been in the possession of British people for over a hundred years, scarcely known and utterly unutilized till a few years ago, while four generations of British people at home looked in vain for food and work for all. South Africa, with its agricultural areas scarcely touched, remains quiescent, a heroic land of sorrows, still making its politics out of history and importing food from Australia.
In the West Indies a white population of 50,000 occupies what were once the treasure islands of the world. Here as elsewhere — almost everywhere — in the British Empire, a principal lively hope is placed in the money of the American tourist, for whom all the world is turned into an hotel.
As with the divided resources of the British Empire so with its population. Migration within the Empire is no longer free. It is no longer co-operative. It is no longer under any single control. Quite apart from all questions of the colour line, of the conflict of oriental civilization with western, quite apart from all problems of political freedom — the white population of the Empire is no longer free to move, except to get out of it. The erroneous doctrine that an empty-handed man is not worth having has carried the day. Economic ignorance has bred legislative restraint: the labour vote helps to shut labour out of its inheritance.
As a result, population in the Empire crowds and congests at the centres. The overcrowding of England begins to be reproduced in the great cities of the Dominions. The gloomy shadow of Malthus falls over the entire scene. The population of Great Britain in each generation of the manufacturing era has been strongly held in check by poverty, by opinion, by lack of economic knowledge and statecraft — in short, by what seemed sheer necessity — at the very period when population was the principal need of the British commonwealth. The unborn British population of the nineteenth century — the children that could have been born from Malthus’ time to ours, with the natural increase of humanity, would have reached now a final total of half a billion. Their little ghosts flutter in the ether of our historic background.
And of those born, 10,980,000 went, needlessly and to our detriment, out of the Empire.
The lack of economic unity that has thus retarded the development of the British Empire appears all the more striking when we place beside it the contrasted picture of the United States. Here was a country which at the outset of the nineteenth century could not be compared to Great Britain and its dependencies, except in hope. Its population in 1800 was only 5,000,000 as compared with the 16,000,000 of the British Isles. Its territory, prior to the Louisiana purchase of 1803, was only half a million square miles as compared with an approximate 10,000,000 under the British Crown. Its accumulated monetary capital was almost negligible beside that of England. Manufacture was only struggling into existence as between independence and the war of 1812. There were water-power mills in New England spinning yarn still woven on handlooms. Anthracite coal had been discovered, but no one could melt it, and the settlers used it to make side-walks. For the furnaces and forges that had sprung up in Western Pennsylvania they used bituminous coal from England. Not till the ingenious Joseph Smith applied a forced draught to the “stone coal” did the first outline of the world’s greatest industry begin to reveal itself. For fifty years after the Declaration of Independence the manufactures of the United States were as nothing compared to the rising glory of Yorkshire and Lancashire.
Yet the United States, after the adoption of the sagacious constitution of 1789, possessed the supreme advantage of economic unity; and after the Louisiana purchase and the exploits of Clark and Lewis and other pathfinders, its territory reached unbroken from sea to sea. Its population could move, could expand, could multiply without limit. Each application of capital, industrial and monetary, opened the way for more. Immigration after 1840 entered in a flood, each successive wave washing farther across the continent.
Meantime the outlying empire of Great Britain remained for the most part empty, with no system, and little attempt at any system, for filling it up. In the fortunate United States Nature and circumstances supplied the system. There was no need of a plan. The western frontier moved of itself, like an industrial skirmish of civilization.
In the earlier half of the nineteenth century it was perhaps scarcely to be avoided that the migratory population of the British Isles should go to the United States rather than to the unoccupied territory of the greater colonies. Australia was still separated from England by a sailing voyage of six months. The Cape was little more than a port of call mid-way on the Australian voyage. The province of Canada, apart from entry by crossing the United States, was cut off from the world for nearly six months in the year. The empty north-west was unapproachable except by the Hudson Strait, and those who best knew its value kept this knowledge to themselves. To alter this situation would have needed an initial effort beyond the foresight of the times.
But the situation by the latter half of the century had altered of itself. Steam navigation, after the opening of the Suez Canal (1869), cut even the Australian voyage to less than two months, and presently to one. The Atlantic service became a ferry. Gold opened, in turn, Australia, British Columbia and South Africa. The Canadian North-west came within easy reach of lake steamers and Minnesota railways by 1880. At this point the moving flood of capital and migration could have been — should have been — diverted to the empty empire; the natural expansion of population of the British Isles should have gone unchecked with bread and work for all under the flag, over the seas if not at home. But by this time “responsible government” had done its work. The spiritual insistence on political freedom had dislocated economic unity.
As a result, the increasing wealth and power of the United States foreshadowed with every decade its coming dominance. On the eve of the Civil War the population of the United States (31,000,000) had overtaken and passed that of the British Isles (30,000,000). At the end of the outgoing century it surpassed it as 76,000,000 to 42,000,000.
The economic unity of the United States enabled it to develop its resources in a way unknown in the British Empire. Four transcontinental railways linked up the republic from ocean to ocean, while British North America for hundreds of miles north of Lake Superior had not even a wagon road. Kansas and Nebraska were filling up with farmers, while Alberta, a better country, remained only a game preserve and a buffalo pasture. During all the earlier part, at least, of this development a principal basis for the economic development of the United States was supplied by British capital and by the unending migration from the British Isles. Between the years 1860 and 1900 the United States opened up with railways and land grants the north-west territory represented by the seven northern states that lie between the Mississippi and the Rocky Mountains, an area of 700,000 square miles, and put into it a population of 6,000,000 inhabitants. During that same time the north-west territory of Canada (what is now Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta), a better country with an area almost identical and with higher resources gathered in only 400,000 people. There was no reason for this except our lack of statecraft. With this economic development of the United States has come also a growth of urban population, of manufactures and of wealth that first rivalled, then equalled and then far overpassed, that of Great Britain.
More than that, the American people were earlier to seize the opportunities that arose out of the new environment. They made the motor-car their own. About two-thirds of the 33,000,000 motor-cars in the world belong in the United States, where there is one motor-car for every five people; in the world at large there is about one to every sixty.
Similarly the moving picture was seized and turned into a world industry. The climate of California — which enjoys advantages very similar to those of Cape Town and Western Australia, with an equal variation of scenery and the similarly fortunate proximity of the sea — supplied the first initial advantage that guided the flood of effort and capital. So may a pebble in a stream divert the course of a river.
As a result, the United States, a country of smaller resources, less territory, less capital and without — let us hope — a superiority of intellect — surpassed in its industrial development its greater rival. This never should have been. It is for the present century to reveal whether this condition need continue.
