Delphi Complete Works of Stephen Leacock, page 452
Elected
United States
Senate
House of Representatives
90
386
Each senator 6 years; one third renewed every 2 years
2 years
0
0
0
90
“All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills.” Constitution, art. i, § 7.
The United Kingdom
House of Lords
House of Commons
593 (1905)
670
Life, except Peers represent-
ing Scotland
7 years unless Parliament previously dissolved
2 archbishops
24 bishops
519
4 Lords of Appeal
28 from Peers of Ireland; 10 from Peers of Scotland
The Commons have exclusive control of the raising and spending of money. In other matters the relations of the houses stand thus: “If there is a difference of opinion between the House of Lords and the House of Commons, the House of Lords ought at some point (not definitely fixed) to give way; and should the Peers not yield, and the House of Commons continue to enjoy the confidence of the country, it becomes the duty of the crown, or of its responsible advisers, to create or threaten to create enough new Peers to override the opposition of the House of Lords and thus restore harmony between the two branches of the Legislature.” Dicey, “Law of the Constitution.” p et seqq.
Canada
Senate
House of Commons
81
214
Life
5 years unless sooner dissolved
0
0
81
0
“Bills for appropriating any part of the public revenue or for imposing any tax on imports shall originate in the House of Commons.” British North America Act, 1867. § 53.
Australia
Senate
House of Representatives
36
75
6 years
3 years unless sooner dissolved
0
0
0
36
“Proposed laws appropriating revenue or moneys or imposing taxation shall not originate in the Senate. The Senate may not amend proposed laws imposing taxation or proposed laws appropriating revenue or moneys for the ordinary annual services of the government.” Commonwealth of Australia, Constitution Act, 1900, § 53.
France
Senate
Chamber of Deputies
300
584
9 years. One third of the senators retire every 3 years
4 years unless sooner dissolved
0
0
0
300
“Finance bills must first be presented to the Chamber of Deputies and voted by them.” Loi Constitutionelle, 24 Feb., 1875, § 8.
German Empire
Bundesrath
Reichstag
58
397
At the discretion of the constituent parts of the Empire
5 years unless sooner dissolved
0
0
58
0
Coördinate powers. “Imperial legislation is effected by the Bundesrath and the Reichstag. The consent of the majority vote of both houses is necessary and is adequate for an imperial law.” Constitution, act 6.
Prussia
Herrenhaus
Abgeordneten-
haus
About 330
433
Life
5 years unless sooner dissolved
Representatives of chapters
103 and the princes of the royal house
Ex officio, 4; appointed by king on present-
ation by landowners universities, chapters, etc., 170; others appointed, 45
0
“Finance bills shall be submitted first to the Chamber of Deputies; they shall be accepted or refused in their entirety by the House of Lords.” Constitution, 1850, v. § 62.
Spain
Senate
Congress
360 maximum
431
Life
5 years unless sooner dissolved
0
80 maximum
100
180
“Laws in reference to the taxes and the public credit must be first presented to the Congress.” Constitution, 1876, § 42.
Austria
Herrenhaus
Abgeordneten-
haus
About 260
425
Life tenure
6 years unless sooner dissolved
18
68
157
0
“The consent of both houses and the consent of the emperor is necessary for every law. If in a finance law in regard to particular items, or in a law for raising recruits in regard to the number of the contingent to be raised, in despite of repeated consideration no agreement can be reached by the two houses, then the lower sum proposed shall be considered as adopted.” Fundamental Law of 21 Dec., 1867, § 13.
Hungary
Förendiház (House of Magnates)
Képviselöház (House of Deputies)
408
453
Life tenure except ex officio members
5 years unless sooner dissolved
55
257
74 and 19 ex officio
3 (delegates from Croatia)
Coördinate. — Custom and Law of 1885, § 13.
Italy
Senate
Chamber of Deputies
341 (year 1905)
508
Life
5 years unless sooner dissolved
0
4 princes
337
0
“Every law for imposing taxes or for sanctioning the balances or accounts of the state shall be presented first to the Chamber of Deputies.” Statuto, art. 10.
Switzerland
Ständerath
Nationalrath
44
167
At the discretion of the constituent cantons
3 years
0
0
44 (appointed by cantons)
0
Coördinate powers. — Constitutional Act 89. “Federal laws can only be passed with the consent of both houses.”
PART III. THE PROVINCE OF GOVERNMENT
CHAPTER I. INDIVIDUALISM
1. THE INDIVIDUALISTIC Theory of the Functions of Government. — 2. Individualism as based on a Theory of Justice. — 3. Based on a Theory of Profitability; the Doctrine of Laissez Faire. — 4. Based on a Biological Analogy; the Survival of the Fittest. — 5. Conflicting Forces.
1. The Individualistic Theory of the Functions of Government. In the first and second divisions of the present volume we have considered the general nature of the state, and the constitution and structure of governmental bodies. The discussion of the form of government has of necessity preceded the treatment of the proper sphere of its operation. Yet in our own time the latter topic in practice assumes the place of paramount importance. The general opinion of civilized countries recognizes the validity of the principles of popular sovereignty and democratic government, — whether expressed by means of a limited monarchy or in a republican form. It is generally admitted also that the adoption of popular government does not, in and of itself, as the sanguine theorists of a hundred years ago hoped it might, offer a solution of all our political and economic problems. Even granting that the government is to be controlled by the people and for the people, we have yet to ask what is to be the proper sphere of its operation for the general benefit. We employ in ordinary discourse a variety of phrases to indicate the subject in question, speaking indifferently of the sphere of the state, state control, the functions of government, the province of government, etc. More special aspects of the problem are seen in connection with government ownership of railways, the control of trusts, and the management of public utilities. But whether in its general theoretical aspect or in particular form, the problem involved is emphatically the paramount question of the opening of the twentieth century. In the following three chapters we shall endeavor to deal with it in systematic form, considering one after another the solutions that have been offered in theory and practice to the open question of government control. First we shall deal with the individualistic solution, or system of natural liberty, to which we have already referred in a somewhat different connection in a preceding chapter. In the second place we shall discuss the ideals of collectivism, and the attempts that have been made for its partial realization. The discussion of the actual economic operations of modern states on what may be called an individualistic basis modified to a great extent by utilitarian and opportunistic considerations, will be considered in conclusion.
To the treatment of the individualistic doctrine of the functions of government belongs of right the precedence. For it constituted during a large part of modern times what might be called the official creed of enlightened governments; was, until our own generation, defended by the greatest theorists of the modern era, and although discredited in its extreme form, remains as the working basis of the economic operation of both the American and the British governments. The individualistic theory may be briefly stated in the proposition that the sole duty of government is to protect the individual from violence or fraud. According to this theory the positive interference of the state with the individual even in his own interest is not justified. Nor is the state justified in undertaking operations of an economic character, or in imposing restrictions (other than in prevention of violence or fraud) on the economic activities of its citizens. A schedule of government functions admissible on a purely individualistic plan would include the maintenance of an army and a navy, courts of justice and a force of police, the enforcement of a criminal law and of statutes in reference to sanitation, adulteration of food, inspection of steamboats, etc., these being indirectly protective in their character; but it could not comprise the conduct of the post-office, the maintenance of hospitals and poor-houses, or the operation of railroads. Only such actions on the part of the state as were directed to prevent the interference of its citizens with one another would be legitimate.
2. Individualism as based on a Theory of Justice. This system of individual liberty against the interference of government has been defended on different grounds. As a matter of justice it has been argued that the individual has a right to be let alone. On economic grounds it has been contended that it pays to let him alone. Lastly, on purely scientific grounds, it has been argued that it is in general consonance with the evolutionary nature of human progress that the individual should struggle for himself and survive, or fail, according to his fitness. The first of these arguments — the restriction of the operation of government to the defense of the rights of the individual — is especially found in the writings of the political philosophers of the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. We find it in the theory of the state advanced by Kant and Fichte and following as a corollary upon their view of the doctrine of the social contract. Kant, actuated by a spirit of protest against the paternal interference of the Continental governments of his day, and their intrusion into the private life of the citizen, bases his views of governmental functions on the idea of liberty, and assigns to the state “the hindering of the hindering of liberty” as its proper policy. But among German writers Wilhelm von Humboldt, in his “Sphere and Duties of Government,” offers the most complete expression of the thoroughgoing political individualism characteristic of this period. Taking as his starting-point the “individual man and the highest ends of his existence,” Humboldt finds the paramount consideration to be that of individual variety and self-development. On this the active interference of government can have none but a detrimental effect. For this reason “the state is to abstain from all solicitude for positive welfare, and not to proceed a step further than is necessary for mutual security and protection from foreign enemies.” Even such examples of interference as national education and state relief of the poor are to be condemned. This political theory of non-interference received a decided stimulus from its false analogy with the doctrine of popular sovereignty. It was but natural that at the beginning of modern democratic government the idea of the right of the nation to govern itself should be confounded with the somewhat similar claim of the individual to be left alone to manage his own affairs. Political freedom and non-interference seemed synonymous terms. In America the idea of individual rights was dominant during the formative period of the republic. The original situation of the colonists, compelled to wring their sustenance from a reluctant wilderness, the discredit of government in general by the land fees, quit rents, and tea taxes of the royal régime, inspired the Americans with an intense belief in self-reliance and individual rights. We find it as the central feature of the political philosophy of Thomas Jefferson, and the writers of the period, and it has persisted until to-day in the opinions held by a large section of the people of the United States.
The individualistic theory of governmental non-interference resting on a doctrine of individual rights has an attractive and undoubtedly plausible appearance. Its weak point lies in the fact that on closer examination it is seen to contain inconsistencies of a serious character. To carry it out fully and absolutely would involve the adoption of an attitude at variance with the dictates of common sense, and one which no government has ever found it practical to completely accept. Mill has shown that the limitation of the province of government to the prevention of force and fraud “excludes some of the most indispensable and unanimously recognized of the duties of government.” Every government recognizes and enforces the right of private property, but it can be objected that this, in the case at any rate of property in land, looks very much like positive interference, since the maintenance of the claim of one individual is equivalent to the exclusion of all others. In the case of the regulation of the right of bequest, the fact of interference, though universally approved, is still more evident. In matters such as the coining of money, and the conduct of the postal service, we have instances of governmental action in a positive direction of such obvious convenience and general utility as entirely to warrant the violation of individual liberty involved. In other cases, as has been shown in detail by Professor Sidgwick, there is an obvious breach of public morality in a policy of complete abstention; that a government should leave deserted children to starve, and content itself with “not interfering” with the destitute poor, is a point of view that meets with almost universal condemnation. The positive duties of the state in regard to national education are also generally admitted, although it is hard to find a defense for such a function of government on a purely individualistic plan.
3. Based on a Theory of Profitability; the Doctrine of Laissez Faire. The view that social justice demands that the individual should be left in possession of his “natural rights” may therefore be discarded. Far more importance has attached to the economic defense of individualism, the claim that it is more profitable for the welfare of industry and commerce that every one should be left to follow his own interest as he himself understands it. This is the doctrine that was paramount in England during the rise of modern industrialism and which was to a large extent reflected in America and elsewhere. The cause of the peculiar dominance of individualism in the direction of economic policy is to be found partly in the industrial circumstances of the time, partly in the effect exercised upon public opinion by the writings of the political economists. During the period between 1750 and 1850, England, and in consequence the industrial world, underwent a series of economic changes of such fundamental importance as to earn the name of the Industrial Revolution. The invention of special machinery for the textile industries (the spinning jenny, the mule, the power loom, the cotton gin), together with the application of steam as a motive power, changed the system of production from its previously restricted and domestic character and established the factory system. The contemporary improvements in the smelting of iron ore (coal being used as fuel), the improved means of transportation in the shape of better roads, canals, and later the introduction of steamboats (1807), the building of railroads (1830) enormously increased productive power and stimulated international exchange of products. At the same time the existing system of government regulation of industry (the tolls, duties, prohibitions, labor statutes, etc.) became entirely out of harmony with the industrial situation and with the need for mobility of capital and labor and opportunity to exploit foreign commerce.
The inadequacy and to a great extent the positive hindrance of the older system of state interference became apparent and contributed directly to the rise of modern political economy. Adam Smith in his “Wealth of Nations” (1776), followed by Ricardo, Malthus, Frédéric Bastiat and others, elaborated the economic system of individual liberty as the new guide of legislative policy. The fundamental argument of their system runs as follows: Every man is actuated in his economic relations mainly by the pursuit of his own interest. If individuals are left free to follow their own choice in the use of their capital, the sale of their labor, or the renting of their property, the liberty of each will be in the general interest of all. For capital and labor will by this means be directed to those operations in which they are most profitably employed, and in which the remuneration for them is in consequence the highest. A similar reasoning applies to prices; for if articles are freely exchanged, an increased demand for any commodity will tend to raise the price and to call forth an additional supply, until by the operation of these balanced forces an equilibrium is obtained. International exchange of goods, if left unrestricted, will be effected in the quantity and kind most profitable to those making the exchange: every country will prefer to direct its labor towards the production of those articles for which it has the greatest adaptability and will rely on its trade with other nations to supply the commodities whose production it finds relatively difficult. We have thus a general economic harmony in which every individual seeks to obtain the greatest advantage for himself to the general wellbeing of all. In such a state of things government interference becomes needless and necessarily noxious. To fix prices and wages by legislative act, to assign a legal rate of interest and prescribe a legal schedule of rent, to prohibit importation or hamper the movement of labor from trade to trade or from place to place, — all this is contrary to a natural law which if left to itself will coördinate everything to the best advantage.
