Delphi Complete Works of Stephen Leacock, page 445
6. Alteration of British Colonial Policy in the Nineteenth Century; Establishment of Self-Government. In what has been said above it is not meant to imply that the system of self-government in the colonies was established at once after the American Revolution. Indeed, for the time being, the case was rather the contrary. The king and his ministers, attributing the disaster of their colonial system to the license allowed to the colonial assemblies, were inclined to tighten their grip upon their remaining dependencies. The Quebec act of 1774 established royal government in Canada with no elective assembly, but only a council nominated by the crown. Even under Pitt’s constitutional act of 1791 the measure of liberty granted to the Canadians, and intended to reward the allegiance of the Loyalists, consisted only in the right to elect the members of the lower house in each of two provinces. The governor, the executive council, and the legislative council or upper house, were all appointed by the crown. The same is true of the other North American colonies. Those that already had partial self-government (as Nova Scotia, Barbadoes, Jamaica, Bermuda) were not deprived of it, but those newly acquired (Trinidad, etc.) were kept under crown government. Cape Colony, definitely ceded in 1815, remained under military government till 1835. Even then the civil government established was a nominated and not an elective one. Self-government being out of the question in a penal settlement, Australia remained long in direct dependence on the crown. But the lesson taught by the American Revolution had nevertheless been effective. As the new colonies grew in population and importance, the opinion gained strength that both justice and expediency demanded that they should administer their own affairs. Even on commercial principles it was thought that colonial liberty was more profitable than colonial bondage. The doctrines of the political economists which became in the middle of the century the official creed of the English government, brought about the establishment of free trade (1846) and the repeal of what was left of the navigation acts (1849). Already before this the serious rebellion in Canada (1837) and Lord Durham’s report, strongly recommending the establishment of responsible government, had called public attention to dangers of the existing system. The act of union of 1840, joining upper and lower Canada into one, introduced the principle of parliamentary self-government on the model of the British parliament. In the next decade the same “enfranchisement” was extended to the other provinces of British North America and to all the other colonies in a position to receive it, — to New Zealand (1852), to Cape Colony (1853), to Victoria (1854), to New South Wales and Tasmania (1855), to South Australia (1856), and to Queensland (1859).
It is interesting and instructive to observe the attitude adopted in England towards the colonies at the time of the grant of self-government, and in the period immediately following. In the first place two great questions of paramount interest in the colonial policy of the present day were left entirely out of sight, — the tariff relations of the colonies with the mother country, and the question of imperial defense. That the tariff should have passed unconsidered was entirely to be expected in the light of the ideas then prevalent; indeed the question seemed to have settled itself in the course of nature, and the optimistic free-traders of the middle of the century took it for granted that tariff barriers were soon destined to disappear the world over. It seemed unnecessary, therefore, to stipulate for free trade or any form of customs union between the United Kingdom and its dependencies. The other problem, that of imperial defense, was also passed over: perhaps by virtue of the very difficulty of its solution, perhaps as a result of the sanguine hopes that had been fostered in the peace era. The policy adopted was not everywhere approved. Disraeli, speaking in 1872, and foreseeing with characteristic prescience the difficulties that must arise, pronounced it a mistake. “Self-government,” he said, “ought to have been conceded as part of a great policy of imperial consolidation. It ought to have been accompanied by an imperial tariff . . . and by a military code which should have precisely defined the means and the responsibilities by which the colonies should be defended, and by which, if necessary, this country should call for aid from the colonies themselves.”
But the real secret of the willingness of the English people to leave the government of the colonies in the hands of the colonists themselves lay in the new view that was becoming current as to the “manifest destiny” of the British colonies. The example of the rise and progress of the United States seemed to point towards the inevitable future of all great dependencies inhabited by an enlightened and increasing population. Independence seemed only a question of time, and the duty of the mother country was to give the colonies a sound political education in the methods of responsible government, and when the destined hour came to let them depart in peace. The views of the “little Englanders,” of the Manchester school of economists, averse to large military and naval expenditures, cosmopolitan in their sympathies and sanguine in their hopes of the commercial unity of the world, powerfully stimulated public feeling in this direction. It is astonishing at the present date to look back on the opinion then prevalent. Sir F. Rogers (afterwards Lord Blachford), who for eleven years was permanent under-secretary for the colonies (1860-71), wrote at a later date (1885) of the views he held in the following terms: “I had always believed, — and the belief has so far confirmed and consolidated itself, that I can hardly realize the possibility of any one seriously thinking the contrary — that the destiny of our colonies is independence: and that in this point of view the function of the Colonial Office is to secure that our connection, while it lasts, shall be as profitable to both parties, and our separation, when it comes, as amicable as possible.” Such views were only too common in the period of colonial history from 1840 to 1880. Payne, in his “History of European Colonies” (1877), designed as an educational work for English schools, wrote: “Canada and Victoria are bound to England by a tie so slight that its rupture would not at all be dreaded; and such a rupture would hardly be felt whenever it happened.” Great indeed is the contrast between such a point of view and the sentiments now entertained both in Great Britain and the colonies, of the relations of the dependencies to the mother country. But before considering the new imperialism and its political consequences, it will be best to pass briefly in review the varied systems of government at present obtaining in the colonial possessions of the United Kingdom.
7. Present British System of Colonial Administration. First let us consider the general principles which are adopted in the management of the British colonial possessions. Some persons indeed might deny that there are any general principles involved; for it is contrary to the spirit of British institutions to act on a formal and preconceived plan, and the method adopted is rather a habitual way of doing things, based on the teaching of experience, than a scientific and complete system of administration. The British system, if the word may be allowed, recognizes no absolute right of self-government. It aims, in the words of Earl Grey, to allow “the inhabitants to govern themselves when sufficiently civilized to do so with advantage” and, where this is not the case, to provide “a just and impartial administration of those colonies of which the population is too ignorant and unenlightened to manage its own affairs.” It is recognized therefore that the government adopted in each colony must be in accord with the particular conditions presented, must vary according to the race, character, and number of the population, their degree of enlightenment, the extent of the territory, and (as in the case of Gibraltar) with the possible military importance of the place for the defense of the empire. Within these limits the principle obtains that a colonial community of which the great majority is made of civilized whites shall be granted the fullest autonomy; while to the other colonies shall be extended such a measure of self-government as their circumstances seem rightly to demand. The principle of political training for future self-government, as is seen in the case of the elected municipal bodies in India, is also recognized. In the case of every colony, however, the crown retains a certain power of control; the governor, or executive head of the colony, sometimes nominal, sometimes actual, is the nominee of the crown; the crown reserves a veto on all colonial legislation; the final court of appeal for colonial cases is the judicial committee of the Privy Council.
Though resting on this general plan, the governments of the British colonies present the greatest range of diversity in the details of their political constitution. Various classifications have been offered, of which the most satisfactory seems to be the separation first of all into three great classes, — the crown colonies, the representative colonies, the responsible colonies. The crown colonies are those which have no self-government; the representative colonies are those which have partial self-government; the responsible colonies are those which have complete self-government. These three divisions may be taken to indicate, not only the classification of the dependencies at any particular time, but also the stages through which a British colony passes in the upward progress. Canada, as has been seen, was a crown colony from its conquest until 1791, a representative colony until the act of 1840, and since then a responsible colony.
In the first of these divisions, the crown colonies (with which also the various protectorates are to be included), are comprised all those dependencies whose governing officials are all nominated by the crown. The list includes the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong, Fiji, Trinidad, Sierra Leone, Honduras, Gibraltar, St. Helena, and many other places. Within the group, however, various degrees of dependence on the home government are found. In the places of great military and naval importance (Gibraltar, St. Helena) and in dependencies containing but few white people, the control of the crown is complete; the nominated officials are appointed directly by the home government, and sent out to the colony. In Gibraltar the whole legislative and executive authority is vested in the commander-in-chief, who is also governor. In other possessions, representing a higher stage of colonial evolution, and which contain a considerable element of white, or at least of educated native inhabitants, the control of the crown is less direct. In British Honduras, for example, the administration is conducted by a governor with a nominated executive council of five members, and a legislative council consisting of three ex-officio members and five others nominated by the crown from among the residents. The government of Hong Kong approaches still more nearly to being representative. The governor has as his executive council a nominated body of eight members, six of whom (the secretary, the officer commanding the troops, the treasurer, the attorney-general, the harbor master, and the director of public works) hold their positions ex officio. There is in addition a legislative council composed of the same ex-officio members together with the captain-superintendent of police and six unofficial members, — four appointed by the crown (two of these being Chinese), one nominated by the Chamber of Commerce, and one by the local justices of the peace. Such a body, it will be observed, stops just short of the principle of popular election. The details here given are not of importance in themselves, but are intended to show the careful grading of the British colonial government.
The representative colonies are those in whose government the principle of election has been introduced, without, however, being allowed to predominate. To this class belong Ceylon, Jamaica, Mauritius, the Bahamas, Barbados, British Guiana, Bermuda, etc. Here again two degrees of relative dependence may be distinguished. In some of them (as Mauritius and Jamaica) the legislature consists of a single body, a part of whose members are nominated and the rest elected; in others (as Barbados) the legislature consists of two houses, one entire house being elected by the people. But in all the representative systems, the officers of the executive are nominated, and the parliamentary system of government does not obtain. The legislature (Council of Government) of Mauritius, made up of the governor, eight ex-officio members, with nine nominated by the governor and ten elected members, is typical of the first class. Barbados illustrates the second and more advanced type; it has a bicameral legislature, the upper house (Legislative Council) composed of nine members nominated by the crown, and the lower, or House of Assembly (twenty-four members), being elected annually by the people.
At the apex of the system stand the really self-governing, the responsible colonies, whose governments are modeled on that of the United Kingdom itself. These include Canada, Newfoundland, Australia (now federated), New Zealand, the Cape of Good Hope, and Natal. Within this group, in accordance with the general terms of the agreement of May 31, 1902, between the crown and the Boers, still in arms, are to be included the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony as soon as the progress of their pacification permits. The responsible colonies enjoy a virtual independence. Their governments have been created, as already seen in the case of Canada and Australia, by statutes of the British Parliament which are practically equivalent to written constitutions. With the exception of the nomination of the governor-general (or governor, as the case may be), the reservation of the power of disallowing colonial statutes, and the retention of the judicial committee of the Privy Council as the final court of appeal, the home government withdraws from any internal control of the self-governing colonies. It must however be distinctly understood that in point of law this self-effacement of the imperial government is only operative at the pleasure of Parliament. The claim has indeed been raised in Canada that the grant to the Dominion Parliament of “exclusive legislative authority” over the matters enumerated in the British North America Act was “exclusive” of the authority of the Imperial Parliament itself. Such a contention is at variance with the very basis of the British constitution, and cannot for a moment be accepted. But unless and until a statute of Parliament allows it, neither the crown nor any other authority in the mother country has any power over the colonies beyond that reserved in the constituent acts.
These colonies are thus left free to manage their own internal concerns. This includes the very important privilege of making their own tariff. All of the autonomous colonies have availed themselves of this, and have erected protective tariffs against the trade of the mother country. Though recently British goods have been admitted into Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa at a preferential rate of duty, it was long true that the colonial tariffs placed British goods in the same position as those of a foreign country. The colonies have not the power to conclude treaties with foreign states, but it has been the custom of Great Britain, in negotiating treaties affecting immediately the greater colonies, to give a ready hearing to the wishes of her colonial subjects. “It is an understanding or even maxim of the policy governing the relations between England and the Canadian Dominion,” wrote the late Sir John Bourinot, the leading authority on the government of Canada, “that Canadian representatives shall be chosen and clothed with all necessary authority by the Queen in council to arrange treaties immediately affecting Canada, and all such treaties must be ratified by the Canadian Parliament.” The form of government prevalent in the responsible colonies is virtually the same as in England, except that the existence of the constituent statutes introduces everywhere the principle of constitutional limitations analogous to what is found in the United States. The governor exercises a nominal authority similar to that of the crown. The real executive is the prime minister and his cabinet, whose tenure of power is dependent upon the continued support of the majority of the lower house. The Canadian senate is a nominated body of limited members, but the nominations are made on the advice of the ministry, and not, as in the representative colonial councils, at the pleasure of the crown. The same is true of the legislative councils of Natal, New Zealand, and Newfoundland. The upper houses of Australia and Cape Colony are elective.
India, whose conditions are altogether unique, stands apart from the rest of the British colonial system. Here a vast population, numbering in all about three hundred million and presenting the widest varieties of racial character, customs, and creeds, are more or less under the control of the United Kingdom. About seventy million of these are found in the semi-independent native states, the rest fall under the government of what is technically called British India. The government of India is divided between the home authorities, the central government in India, and the subordinate or provincial governments. At the head of the home government is the crown, acting through the secretary of state for India. With this secretary is adjoined a special council composed of former residents in India, holding office for ten years, and not eligible to sit in parliament. The expenditure of the Indian revenue must be sanctioned by the secretary and a majority of the council. All other business done in the United Kingdom in reference to India is conducted by means of the council, but in some matters of a diplomatic character, as in dealings with native states, the secretary acts alone. In India itself, the supreme executive power lies in the governor-general, or viceroy, who is appointed by the crown. He has an executive council, which includes the commander-in-chief and the highest officials. For legislative purposes, the council is increased by sixteen members appointed by the viceroy. The provincial governments, under governors (appointed by the crown) or lieutenant-governors (appointed by the governor-general) or chief commissioners (appointed by the governor-general in council) assisted by councils, are similar in construction to the central government. There is thus no attempt at self-government in either the central or provincial administration of British India. It is only in the municipal governments (by virtue of acts of Parliament, 1882 and 1884) that the elective principle has been introduced. Over the native states Britain exercises a varying degree of control. They contain no British officials, except an advisory resident; they raise their own armies. But they can hold no diplomatic intercourse with one another or with the outside world, and have no right to make war or peace. Britain also reserves the penalty of dethronement as a punitive power over the native princes.
