Augustus, page 13
In a matter of months the teenage Caesar had raised an army, briefly occupied the Forum, but failed to win significant support and been forced to retreat, then bought the loyalty of two legions and so become a power to be reckoned with, forcing the Senate to choose between fighting or recognising him. They chose the latter, and soon he would wage war against Antony, in the process aiding Decimus Brutus, one of his ‘father’s’ murderers – and the man with whom he had shared a carriage in Spain in 45 BC.
7
REWARD AND DISCARD
‘Caesar, he says, makes no complaints about you to be sure, except for a remark which he attributed to you: “we must praise the young man, reward him, and discard him”. He added that he has no intention of letting himself be discarded.’ – Decimus Brutus to Cicero, 24 May 43 BC.1
The winter months passed in abortive negotiations. It was difficult to feed armies at this time of year and the consuls were still busy training the new legions and gathering supplies. Decimus Brutus took shelter in the city of Mutina, his legionaries living off the salted meat of his slaughtered baggage animals. Antony enclosed them in a blockade, but did not press too closely and made no attempt at an assault. Time was on his side, for if he waited long enough the defenders would begin to starve and be forced to surrender. It also did no harm to make his opponents take the first steps in more aggressive warfare. The sides were not yet clearly drawn, and it was uncertain how the governors with armies at their disposal would act. Cicero urged Caius Asinius Pollio in Spain, as well as Lepidus and Lucius Munatius Plancus in the Gallic provinces, to support Decimus Brutus with their legions. Assuring him of friendship and loyalty to the res publica, none of them took any concrete action.2
Elsewhere the other Brutus was now in command of the province of Macedonia and its garrison. Caius Antonius, sent by his brother to control this region, failed to win over the legions and soon saw his own troops defect before himself becoming a prisoner. Trebonius was dead, arrested and then killed – some claimed tortured first – by Dolabella. He was the first of the assassins to perish. Soon afterwards the legions turned against Dolabella. In the months to come he would rapidly be overwhelmed and eventually took his own life. Cassius assumed control of all the legions in Syria. The conspirators had acquired armies and began to extort money and other resources from the provinces. Cicero set to work persuading the Senate to legitimise what they had already done. Yet none of these armies were in any position to aid Decimus Brutus. Caesar and his soldiers remained critical to the outcome in Italy itself.3
The newly appointed propraetor willingly placed himself under the command of the two consuls and his relations with them were cordial. Both had good Caesarean credentials. It was probably late in 44 BC that Hirtius added an eighth book to Julius Caesar’s Commentaries on the Gallic War and he may also be the author of the Alexandrian War and the African War which continued the dictator’s own Commentaries on the Civil War. These celebrations of past victories no doubt went down very well with former officers from Julius Caesar’s army.4
By March, the forces controlled by the Senate began to move. The propraetor’s legions were the only truly battle-ready section of the army, and Caesar put the Fourth and the Martia under Hirtius’ command, allowing the consul to set out for Cisalpine Gaul. The young general followed soon afterwards with the Seventh – it is possible that the Eighth did not join him until later. They were supported by some cavalry and light infantry – and probably the corps of war elephants brought with the legions when they defected from Antony. Hirtius and Caesar also each formed a praetorian cohort of hand-picked veterans to serve both as guard to the headquarters and a formidable force in battle. For the moment Pansa remained near Rome, hurrying on the training and preparations of the four new legions and presiding over meetings of the Senate. He attended a meeting on 19 March, but by the next day had left the City and was on his way north with the four legions of recruits.5
Hirtius and Caesar built two fortified camps near Antony’s lines, but did not feel strong enough to attempt to break through to Mutina until the rest of the army arrived. They lit beacons as signals to Decimus Brutus, but could not tell whether or not he knew they were there until a messenger managed to sneak through the enemy outposts, swim a river and get into the city. Communication between the besieged garrison and the relief column had to rely on a precarious mixture of such brave men and messages taken by carrier pigeons. For weeks the two sides skirmished. Some of the auxiliary cavalry who had joined Caesar when the Macedonian legions declared for him now decided to defect back to Antony. Antony may also have received other reinforcements as his forces seem to have grown to more than three legions. Inside Mutina, Decimus Brutus’ men were coming to the end of their food, but until they too were reinforced Hirtius and Caesar were unable to help him.6
By the second week in April Pansa and his men were getting close, following the Via Aemilia towards Mutina. Antony could not afford to let the enemy armies combine and so resolved to strike quickly while they were still divided and vulnerable. Small forces were sent to demonstrate against Hirtius’ and Caesar’s camps in the hope of keeping their garrisons busy. Antony himself took two of the Macedonian legions, the Second and Thirty-fifth, along with much of his cavalry and light infantry and hurried south to ambush Pansa’s raw soldiers. Hirtius sensed or received some reports of this move, and during the night of 13–14 April sent the Martia and his and Caesar’s praetorian cohorts to join up with Pansa and escort his column. This was a gamble, risking the destruction of this detachment if they strayed and bumped into stronger Antonian forces, but the risk paid off and they linked up without difficulty.
On the morning of 14 April Pansa’s reinforced army approached the little town of Forum Gallorum, some seven miles from Mutina. Most of the Antonians were concealed in the houses or the marsh and scrubland on either side of the road, but enough outposts were visible to prompt a precipitate attack by the Martia, enraged by memories of the executions at Brundisium. The result was a confused and savage fight, the terrain breaking it up into several smaller battles. Caesar’s praetorian cohort suffered appalling losses as it came up against Antony’s own guards on the road itself. To the rear, the raw legions began to withdraw to the marching camp they had built overnight and did their best to strengthen its defences.
For a while the Martia held its own, and even drove back the Thirty-fifth for half a mile, but in time Antony’s superiority in cavalry began to tell, forcing them to withdraw. The steadiness of these well-trained soldiers and the leadership of Pansa and his officers just managed to prevent the retreat from turning into a rout. Most of the army made it back to the shelter of the camp’s defences, although the consul was struck in the side by a missile and badly wounded. The Antonians attacked the low turf ramparts of the camp, but failed to break in. It was well into the afternoon, and Antony realised that his men were tired and hungry. Julius Caesar would no doubt have built his own fortified camp on the spot and brought food to them, keeping up the pressure on the enemy. Instead Antony marched his men back to their original camp.
By this time Hirtius and Caesar had realised that the probes against them were feints. The consul took the bulk of the Fourth and the Seventh, leaving his young colleague to defend the camps. Through luck or design Hirtius was able to attack Antony’s men as they withdrew. The Antonians formed a hasty battle line in the evening light, but with the elation of victory fading into exhaustion they were physically and mentally unprepared for another battle. The Second and Thirty-fifth broke, suffering heavy casualties and each losing its precious eagle as well as half of its other standards. Most of the men were scattered, some reaching the shelter of Forum Gallorum and others hiding in the marshes. Antony’s cavalry had escaped with few losses, and during the night patrols went out to round up and bring in as many of these stragglers as possible.7
Apart from these remnants Antony still had Fifth Alaudae and other forces in good enough order to maintain the blockade of Mutina. He also retained a distinct advantage in the numbers and quality of his cavalry, and so was able to do well in the skirmishing that occupied the next few days. Yet he was on the back foot, and Hirtius and Caesar increased the pressure on him, advancing to camp closer to the enemy lines and offering battle, which Antony declined. Such gestures were good ways of building up an army’s confidence in their superiority. At the end of a week Antony was at last provoked to form up and fight. He was beaten and Hirtius and Caesar were able to turn this into a full-scale attack on his fortified lines. The nineteen-year-old had played a minor role in the earlier fighting – Antony subsequently alleged that he fled the battle, abandoning the red cloak that marked him as a general – and he may have gone out of his way to act heroically in this second engagement. Suetonius tells us that at one point he carried the eagle of one of his legions after the standard-bearer (or aquilifer) was wounded – a well-known gesture meant to inspire men to attack boldly or rally when they were wavering. Assaulting fortified positions was always a difficult operation, but numbers and confidence told. Hirtius broke into Antony’s main camp, but was killed in the confused fighting among the tent-lines. By the end of the day the Antonians had been driven from several key positions. Antony abandoned his blockade and retreated, hoping to join up with subordinates bringing him fresh reinforcements.8
The pursuit was lacklustre. Hirtius was dead, while Pansa remained confined to his tent and succumbed to his wound before the month was out. Decimus Brutus was consul-elect for the next year – another of Julius Caesar’s appointments – and so senior to Caesar, but his own men were in a bad state after months confined in Mutina eating poor rations. Their commander was also desperately short of money, which made it difficult to pay the troops and provide them with provisions. Before the siege the defenders had slaughtered all their pack animals and mounts and it was difficult to replace them. Decimus Brutus had no effective cavalry or baggage train to take the field. The strongest part of the relieving army remained the legions loyal to the young propraetor and Julius Caesar’s veterans were not well disposed towards one of his murderers.9
Caesar effectively now controlled his own and the consuls’ legions. Later, Caesar was accused of ordering the murder of Hirtius – or even of performing the act himself – and then of arranging Pansa’s death in order to take over the army. It was claimed that the latter’s personal doctor was arrested and interrogated because the consul’s condition had taken a sudden turn for the worse. Hindsight and the propaganda needs of an ongoing civil war were no doubt behind such tales, and it is unlikely that there is any truth in them. Roman commanders led from close behind the fighting line and were conspicuous targets in their scarlet cloaks and fine armour, at risk from missiles or bold enemies wishing to make names for themselves. The confusion inevitable in a civil war fought between identically dressed armies placed them in even greater danger. At the First Battle of Forum Gallorum one of the commanders of the Martia was nearly killed by some of Pansa’s raw recruits who only recognised him at the last moment.10
It was surely chance rather than design that removed the two consuls, but that did not alter the essential truth that Caesar was now left at the head of some seven or eight legions.
ROME AGAIN
The Senate heard rumours of an Antonian victory – perhaps the defeat of Pansa’s men – before the full story of Forum Gallorum arrived. Both consuls and Caesar were lauded for their part in the success, although in truth the latter’s role was marginal. Reports of the breaking of the siege of Mutina were welcomed with even more joy by Cicero and those who shared his fears of Antony. A public thanksgiving of fifty days was proclaimed – far outstripping even Julius Caesar’s honours and quite clearly celebrating a victory in a civil war. Antony was finally declared a public enemy, and Brutus and Cassius were recognised as legitimately in charge of their armies and provinces. Not everyone was so inclined to exult. Asinius Pollio was governor of one of the Spanish provinces and an old Caesarean. When he wrote to Cicero it was to lament the wasted deaths of so many of Italy’s finest sons.11
Decimus Brutus did his best, but could not prevent Antony from escaping. At the start of May he complained that ‘it is impossible to give orders to Caesar, and impossible for him to give orders to his army – both bad things’. The Senate sent instructions for him to be given the Fourth and the Martia. The soldiers refused to accept him, and a few weeks later Cicero had to admit to Brutus that nothing could be done to compel them. He probably received more or less permanent command of some of the legions of recruits, and with them and his own ragged army he set out after Antony. The latter soon joined up with three fresh legions raised by one of Julius Caesar’s old staff officers, Publius Ventidius Bassus. The whole force then crossed into Transalpine Gaul. Lepidus and Plancus were urged to move against him, but all their best officers and troops were once again veterans of Julius Caesar. In May Antony’s army camped next to Lepidus’ main force. Former comrades in each army fraternised and it was soon clear that there was no enthusiasm to fight each other. Lepidus’ legions declared for Antony, their commander soon following. One of his senatorial subordinates committed suicide, but his was the only death. Lepidus and Antony became allies, and were soon joined by Plancus and later Asinius Pollio as well. The public enemy was now far stronger than he had ever been.12
Decimus Brutus was voted a triumph in the Senate. Caesar was given the lesser honour of an ovation, where the recipient rode on horseback instead of in a chariot and did not receive as much prestige. Both men were excluded from a board of commissioners set up to demobilise the legions and provide the discharged soldiers with land, which would mean not only taking away his army, but depriving the young commander of winning their favour through rewarding them. Many senators were inclined to relax, feeling that the crisis was over, and they were slow to appreciate the scale of Antony’s recovery. Unwisely, a meeting decided to halve the bounty promised to the legions when they defected.13
On 24 May Decimus Brutus wrote to Cicero reporting that the nineteen-year-old was repeating a phrase that one of his staff assured him had been uttered by Cicero – ‘we must praise the young man, reward him, and discard him’. The orator did not deny saying this, and the rhythm of the Latin, laudanum aduluscentum, ornandum, tollendum – the last word having a double meaning of both exalt and toss aside – suggests that it was genuine.14
From the beginning Caesar had been a convenient means of fighting Antony. For the youth, accepting the Senate’s orders had given legal confirmation to his raising of an army and helped him to become an important player in the enfolding struggle. Now the Senate was giving official approval to the growing military might of Brutus and Cassius, and even recognising Sextus Pompeius, the younger son of Pompey the Great who had raised rebellion in Spain and the Mediterranean islands. None of these were likely to be well disposed to Julius Caesar’s heir. Earlier in the year, Antony had written to Hirtius and Caesar warning them that the only people to gain from conflict between them were the former Pompeians.15
Caesar had no intention of being discarded, and said as much openly. Like everyone else, he was concerned with preserving his position in the longer run. At the beginning of the month Decimus Brutus hinted that the youth had his eye on the consulship, left vacant by the deaths of Hirtius and Pansa. He may have approached Cicero suggesting that the two of them stand together. A rumour circulated that the old orator had already succeeded to one of the vacant posts. Brutus heard this story in Macedonia, and had from the beginning expressed concern at employing Caesar at all. In June Cicero wrote to assure him that he had spoken in the Senate against relatives of the young man who were working for his elevation to the supreme office. Most likely he referred to Philippus and Marcellus but, although he also told Caesar himself to abandon such a wild ambition, he nevertheless continued to speak highly of the youth. Brutus, whom Julius Caesar had noted tended to be obsessive in his beliefs, remained unconvinced, fearing that Cicero was too ready to take fright and too easily flattered by the boy. He saw only an unelected warlord, whose status was inherited along with the name and wealth of the same Julius Caesar that Brutus and his comrades had killed as a tyrant. Cicero in response kept urging the leader of the Liberators to return to Italy with his army. In the end, armies trumped ideals.16
In July a deputation arrived from Caesar’s army. At 400 men it was roughly the size of a cohort, and so not an army in itself, but it included a significant number of centurions as well as representatives from the rank and file. They demanded the consulship for their commander and the full bounty promised to themselves. Suetonius claims that the spokesman was a centurion named Cornelius. Precedents from the mainly distant past were cited of men below the legal age being promoted to the supreme office when the state needed their talents. Centurions were men of some property and often came from the aristocracies of the country towns of Italy. The old view of them as sergeant majors promoted from the ranks is a sadly persistent myth. Even so, senators saw them as far inferior in social status and resented the forceful tone with which they presented their case. Their demands were angrily rejected. Cornelius is supposed to have brushed aside his military cloak to show the pommel and hilt of his sword, which centurions wore on the left hip, unlike ordinary soldiers. ‘This will do it, if you do not,’ he said.17
