Too Secret Too Long, page 78
This view was challenged, however, by a very few of those concerned, and in July 1974, Lord Trend, the former Secretary of the Cabinet, was asked to review in detail the investigations that had taken place into the case of Sir Roger Hollis and to say whether they had been done in a proper and thorough manner, and whether in his view the conclusions reached were justified. Lord Trend examined the files and records and he discussed the case with many of those concerned, including two people who considered that the investigation should be reopened.
Mr. Pincher’s account of Lord Trend’s conclusions is wrong. The book asserts that Lord Trend “concluded that there was a strong prima facie case that MI5 had been deeply penetrated over many years by someone who was not Blunt”, and that he “named Hollis as the likeliest suspect”. Lord Trend said neither of those things, and nothing resembling them. He reviewed the investigations of the ease and found that they had been carried out exhaustively and objectively. He was satisfied that nothing had been covered up. He agreed that none of the relevant leads identified Sir Roger Hollis as an agent of the Russian intelligence service, and that each of them could be explained by reference to Philby or Blunt. Lord Trend did not refer, as the book says he did, to “the possibility that Hollis might have recruited unidentified Soviet agents into MI5”. Again, he said no such thing.
Lord Trend, with whom I have discussed the matter, agreed with those who, although it was impossible to prove the negative, concluded that Sir Roger Hollis had not been an agent of the Russian intelligence service.
I turn next to the arrangements for guarding against penetration now and in the future.
All Departments and agencies of the Government, especially those concerned with foreign and defence policy and with national security, are targets for penetration by hostile intelligence services. The Security Service, with its responsibilities for countering espionage and subversion, is a particularly attractive target. Recent security successes, such as the expulsion of members of the Russian intelligence service from this country in 1971, would hardly have been achieved if the Security Service had been penetrated.
The Security Service exercises constant vigilance not only against the risk of current penetration but against the possibility of hitherto undetected past penetration, which might have continuing implications. But, however great our confidence in the integrity and dedication of those now serving in the Security Service, we need to make sure that the arrangements for guarding against penetration are as good as they possibly can be, both in this area and throughout the public service.
Existing security procedures were introduced during the years following the Second World War. Burgess, Maclean, Philby and Blunt were all recruited by the Russian intelligence service before the Second World War and came into the public service either before or during the war, well before existing security procedures were introduced.
It was in 1948 that the then Prime Minister announced the Government’s intention to bar Communists and Fascists and their associates from employment in the public service in connection with work the nature of which was vital to the security of the state. This led to the introduction of what came to be known as the “purge procedure”.
In 1952, the positive vetting procedure was instituted, with the object of establishing the integrity of civil servants employed on exceptionally secret work. In 1956, it was publicly declared that character defects, as distinct from Communist or Fascist sympathies or associations, might affect a civil servant’s posting or promotion. In 1961, security procedures and practices in the public service were reviewed by an independent committee under the chairmanship of the late Lord Radcliffe.
The committee’s report, published in 1962, contained an account of those procedures, and made various recommendations for modifying them, which the Government accepted. These procedures, as modified in 1962, are still in operation.
These arrangements have over the years substantially reduced the vulnerability of the public service to the threat of penetration and have served the interests of national security well. But it is 20 years since they were last subject to independent review. In that time the techniques of penetration and the nature of the risks may have changed. We need to make sure that our protective security procedures have developed to take account of those changes. I have therefore decided, after consultation with the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, to ask the Security Commission: “To review the security procedures and practices currently followed in the public service and to consider what, if any changes are required.”
These terms of reference will enable the Security Commission to review, and to make recommendations as appropriate, on the arrangements and procedures used in all parts of the public service for the purposes of safeguarding information and activities involving national security against penetration by hostile intelligence services, and of excluding from appointments that give access to highly classified information both those with allegiances that they put above loyalty to their country and those who may for whatever reason be vulnerable to attempts to undermine their loyalty and to extort information by pressure or blackmail.
There are difficult balances to be struck here between the need to protect national security, the nature and cost of the measures required to do so effectively, the need for efficiency and economy in the public service, and the individual rights of members of the public service to personal freedom and privacy. The Security Commission will be able to consider how these balances ought to be struck in the circumstances of the present time, as it conducts its review and prepares its recommendations. It will be my intention to make its findings known to the House in due course, to the extent that it is consistent with national security to do so.
In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I should like to emphasise once again that this statement arises out of a book that deals with investigations of matters and events that occurred many years ago. My concern is with the present and with the future. That is why I am asking the Security Commission to undertake the review that I have described.
* * *
[1]
Notes and Sources
The entry ‘Confidential information’ implies that the source has requested anonymity, or that the author considers it to be in the source’s best interests. Unless otherwise stated, the contact with the source has been direct.
Introduction (pages 1-7)
1See Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes to War, Hutchinson 1978
[2]See J. C. Masterman, The Double Cross System, Yale University Press 1972
[3]At least two MI6 officers spied for the Abwehr
[4]Chapman Pincher, Their Trade is Treachery, Sidgwick and Jackson 1981
[5]See Chapter 57
[6]K.G.B. – Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security) G.R.U. – Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie (Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff)
[7]The Rote Kapelle, University Publications of America, Washington 1982
[8]By Anthony Simkins and Peter Lunn respectively
[1]Chapter 1: A Soviet Agent Called Sonia (pages 8-13)
1Ruth Werner (Sonia’s pen-name), Sonja’s Rapport, Verlag Neues Leben, Berlin 1982
[2]Confirmed by Peter Wright on television (World in Action), 16 July 1984
[3]Juergen Kuczynski, Memoiren, Aufbau-Verlag 1983 and various German biographical dictionaries on German exiles
[4]Werner, op cit
[5]Letters from Professor Stephen MacKinnon of Arizona State University who, with his wife, Jan, has written a detailed biography of Smedley
[6]Werner, op cit Major-General C. A. Willoughby, Shanghai Conspiracy, Heinemann 1965. Otto Braun, Chinesische Aufzeichnungen (1932-39), Dietz Verlag, Berlin 1975
[7]Jan Valtin (Richard Krebs), Out of the Night, Alliance Book Corporation, New York 1941
[8]F. W. Deakin and G. R. Storry, The Case of Richard Sorge, Chatto and Windus 1966. Chalmers Johnson, An Instance of Treason, Heinemann 1965. Willoughby, op cit
[9]Hans Otto Meissner, The Man with Three Faces, Evans Bros 1955
[10]Chalmers Johnson, op cit
[11]Deakin and Storry, op cit
[12]Willoughby, op cit
[13]Otto Braun, op cit
[14]Willoughby, op cit. Letters from Harold Isaacs to the author. Also letters from Jack Tilton of the Shanghai Municipal Police
[15]Letters to the author from Rewi Alley, who was a Factory Inspector in Shanghai from 1927-38
[16]Letter from Professor MacKinnon
[17]Ibid
[1]Chapter 2: A ‘Good Bottle Man ‘ (pages 14-20)
1Old volumes of Who’s Who and theological references
[2]Oxford University Year Books. Hollis read English
[3]Letters to the author from Sir Harold Acton and Sir Dick White
[4]Michael Davie, The Diaries of Evelyn Waugh, Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1976
[5]Cockburn interview to Daily Mail reporter (unpublished) March 1981. Cockburn wrote in the Daily Worker under the name Frank Pitcairn. He died in December 1981
[6]Letters from Dr P. G. Dickens, New College and James Railton, Secretary Oxford University Sports Centre
[7]Confidential Hollis family source
[8]Conversation with Merlyn Rees
[9]See Werner, op cit
[10]Confidential information
[11]Letter from Sir Dick White
[12]Letters from Sir Peter Macadam, B.A.T. chairman and B.A.T. employees
[13]Letters from Isaacs and Alley
[14]Alexander Foote, Handbook for Spies, Museum Press 1964. Sandor Rado, Code-name Dora, Abelard 1977
[15]Confidential information
[1]16Werner, op cit
[1]Chapter 3: An Unsuspected Communist Connection (pages 21-31)
1Braun, op cit. Werner op cit
[2]Willoughby, op cit. Ewert’s career is summarized in Hermann Weber, Die Wandlung des Deutschen Kommunismus, Band 2, Stuttgart 1969. Also in Geschichte der Deutschen Arbeiterbewegung Biographisches Lexikon, Berlin 1970
[3]Confidential information from former MI5 officer
[4]Ian Angus, Canadian Bolsheviks, Vanguard, Montreal 1981
[5]Gunter Nollau, International Communism and World Revolution, Hollis and Carter 1961
[6]Valtin (Krebs), op cit
[7]Ibid. Also Nollau, op cit
[8]Theodore Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, Viking, New York 1960
[9]Nollau, op cit. J. P. Harrison, The Long March to Power, Macmillan, London 1973
[10]Jane Degras, Comintern Documents 1956-65, Royal Institute of International Affairs
[11]John F. W. Dulles, Anarchists and Communists in Brazil, Austin, Texas, 1973
[12]Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America, Rutgers 1960
[13]13Werner, op cit
[14]Braun, op cit
[15]Ruth Werner, Olga Benario, Verlag Neues Leben, Berlin 1962
[16]The Times, 26 November 1935. Also 17 March 1936
[17]The Times, 18 July 1936. She was living at 181 Maida Vale W.9.
[1]18Werner, Olga Benario
[19]Confidential information
[20]Confidential information. Legal requirements inhibit further presentation of this evidence
[21]Letter from Isaacs
[22]Confidential information
[23]Letter from Isaacs
[24]Foote, op cit
[25]Whittaker Chambers, Witness, André Deutsch 1953. Allen Weinstein in Perjury, Knopf, New York 1978, wrote, ‘Chambers’ precise reasons for becoming a communist in 1925 are unknown but this decision came during a period that included many elements of personal failure.’
[26]Alex Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerilla Warfare, University of Michigan Press 1963
[27]See China Forum, Shanghai (40 issues 1932-34) reprinted by Center for Chinese Research Materials, Washington 1976. Also, About Shanghai, Guidebook for 1934, reprinted by Oxford University Press 1983
[28]Anthony Glees, ‘The Hollis Letters’, The Times, 3 April 1982
[29]Confidential information
[30]Werner, Sonja’s Rapport
[1]Chapter 4: Fully Trained Agent (pages 32-8)
1China Forum reprints, Willoughby op cit. Nollau op cit. Times reports from Reuter, 19 August and 28 August 1931
[2]Elisabeth Poretsky, Our Own People, Oxford University Press 1969
[3]China Forum reprints, North China Herald, 13 July 1932 and various other references up to 23 September 1936
[4]Werner, Sonja’s Rapport
[5]James Maxton, Hansard, 23 February 1932, Col. 216
[6]Werner, Sonja’s Rapport
[7]Times 20 September 1932 and several subsequent reports
[8]Otto Braun quoted in Mader, Stuchlek and Pehnert, Dr Sorge Funkt aus Tokyo, Mitautor 1966
[9]Letter from Tilton
[10]Letter from Isaacs
[11]Werner, Sonja’s Rapport. For Sorge’s movements see Deakin and Storry, op cit. Chalmers Johnson, op cit
[12]Werner, Sonja’s Rapport
[13]Irving S. Friedman, British Relations with China 1931-39, Institute of Pacific Relns. Inquiry Service New York 1940
[14]Confidential information
[15]Glees, ‘The Hollis Letters’ and private conversations
[1]16Ibid
[17]Letter from Times staff
[18]Werner, Sonja’s Rapport
[19]Ibid
[2]20Ibid
[21]Sonia features a photograph of this medal, no. 944, in her memoirs
[1]Chapter 5: A Strange Appointment (pages 39-43)
1Letter from B.A.T. employee (Dick Price)
[2]Glees, ‘The Hollis Letters’
[3]Confidential information
[4]Letters from Police des Etrangers, Leyson and Montreux
[6]5Letters from B.A.T.
6Werner, Sonja’s Rapport
[7]Central Somerset Gazette, 16 July 1937
[8]Marriage certificate. Letter from Sir Duncan Oppenheimer
[9]Family information through intermediary
[10]Letter from Sir Dick White
[11]Ibid
[12]Confidential information
[13]Correspondence between Guy Liddell of MI5 and Ray Atherton, U.S. Embassy, declassified 7 July 1982, no. 755014
[14]Confidential information
[15]Letter from Tilton
[16]Letter from Sir Dick White
[17]Stephen Knight, The Brotherhood, Granada 1984
[18]Information from Dr Glees
[19]Glees, ‘The Hollis Letters’
[20]Confidential information
[1]Chapter 6: The Dangerous Dr Kuczynski (pages 44-53)
1Information from senior R.S.S. source
[2]The Times, 21 November 1981
[3]The Rote Kapelle, C.I.A. Handbook
[4]Juergen Kuczynski, op cit
[5]Karl W. Fricke, Die Staatssicherheit, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, von Nottbeck 1982
[6]Juergen Kuczynski, op cit. Other visitors to Paris included Burgess
[7]Ibid
[8]See Chapters 15 and 18. Also Juergen Kuczynski, Dialog mit meinem Urenkel, Aufbau Verlag 1983
[9]Declassified 31 July 1983 with covering letter from Guy Liddell to Herschel Johnson, dated 26 December 1940
[10]Juergen Kuczynski, op cit
[11]Ibid
[12]Ibid
[13]Glees, Exile Politics during the Second World War, Oxford Historical Monographs, Clarendon Press 1982
[14]Information from Mrs Joan Phipps
[15]David Dilkes, The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, Cassell 1971
[16]Ibid
[17]Confidential information
[18]Confidential information
[19]Confidential information
[20]Richard Deacon, The British Connection, Hamish Hamilton 1979
[21]Mrs Edwards housed the Krivitskys in Montreal when they were hiding from Soviet vengeance under the name Thomas
[22]Confidential information
[1]Chapter 7: Swiss Interlude (pages 54-8)
1Werner, Sonja’s Rapport
[2]Conversations with Mr and Mrs Copeman. Foote, op cit
