Too Secret Too Long, page 24
It has recently been alleged that Maclean, as head of the American Department, accompanied Attlee to Washington as part of the team, but he is not listed in either the British or American archives as a participant, though he might have been on hand for advice.[19] Whether he was present, or not there is little doubt that he leaked the secret results of the talks, helping the Chinese to inflict more British, American and Commonwealth casualties. Like several other traitors, Maclean is dead and apologists for them argue that it is wrong to accuse them when they cannot defend themselves. My response is to point out that their victims are also muted and were deprived of the means of defending themselves effectively when sent to their deaths.
The behaviour of Burgess, who had left the B.B.C. in June 1944 and joined the press department of the Foreign Office as a temporary, was even more reprehensible than Maclean’s. Though his salary remained small, nobody questioned the extravagant life he led, with friends noticing the hundreds of banknotes which he kept in shoe-boxes in his flat. For years he wined and dined influential politicians, diplomats and businessmen at the Dorchester Hotel, securing interesting information for which the Soviets paid. As he tried to recruit some of his guests to the Soviet cause they, at least, must have suspected that he was an agent but kept his secret until interrogated themselves after the unmasking of Blunt.
In 1946 Burgess was invited by his socialist friend, Hector McNeil, to become his personal secretary after McNeil’s appointment as Minister of State to Ernest Bevin in the post-war Labour Government. This put him near to the heart of the nation’s foreign affairs, with access to documents of great interest to his Soviet controller. McNeil had been warned that Burgess was a communist but, understandably, took little notice when there were ministers like John Strachey, who had been so openly associated with communism.
In 1947 Burgess applied for permanent status in the Foreign Office and, to his own surprise and the anger of some of his colleagues, he was accepted. A former Foreign Office man has described to me how Burgess would return to the office after a long lunch ‘tight as a tick. He could get away with behaviour which would speedily have been fatal for the likes of myself.’[20] By the end of the year he was pushed into a newly formed department called I.R.D. (Information Research Department), a semi-intelligence organization for countering Soviet propaganda and waging a modest degree of psychological warfare. He was dismissed from it for general slovenliness after only two months’ service but not before he had had time to reveal its purpose and methods to the Soviets. From there he was shunted to the Far Eastern department, where he specialized in Red Chinese affairs, even lecturing on the subject to a Foreign Office summer school attended by officers of MI5 and MI6. He too saw secret documents about the Korean War.
Late in 1949, during a holiday in North Africa, Burgess was reported for security breaches as a result of indiscreet talk about secret matters, but he was only reprimanded in spite of the fact that by that time, it was obvious to some colleagues that he was dependent on drugs as well as drink. He had also developed diabetes. Partly to get him away from headquarters but also to ‘give him foreign experience’ he was posted to the British Embassy in Washington as a Second Secretary, an extraordinary appointment in view of the importance of improving Anglo-American relations, for Burgess was well known to be virulently anti-American.
The posting to Washington is made all the more incredible by the fact, recently disclosed to me, that Burgess was under such deep suspicion before he went to Washington in August 1950, that someone was sent out from London to take up an appointment specially created to enable him to keep Burgess under some degree of surveillance and to report regularly on his behaviour. Confidentiality requirements forbid me to give as much detail of this operation as I would like, but there can be little doubt that it was organized by the security authorities, either MI5 or MI6, with Foreign Office security possibly being in receipt of the reports. The individual concerned, then a serving army officer, who did not want the task, was ordered to Washington and told that arrangements would be made to get him into the company of Burgess, to whom he was to be as friendly as possible. On being informed of Burgess’s sexual habits the officer told his superiors that he was totally unwilling to accommodate any homosexual advances. He performed the unpleasant surveillance duty until very shortly before the eventual return of Burgess to London when the job ended. The post had put the army officer in touch with information which could have been of great value to the Soviets and it may have been hoped that, realizing this, Burgess would try to pump him. In the event Burgess behaved scrupulously whenever the observer was in his company.[21]
In spite of the precaution taken it was a gross folly to send to the Washington Embassy a man who had been reprimanded for breaches of security so soon after the Fuchs case and while a former Embassy official, Maclean, was under some degree of suspicion, if only slight at that stage. It may be that the security authorities who had set up the surveillance of Burgess were unwilling to tell the Foreign Office that he was suspect in their eyes. Whatever the reason behind the posting, it was to do such irreparable damage to Anglo-American relations that it could hardly have suited the Soviet purpose more admirably if it had been planned by the K.G.B.
Burgess arrived in Washington in August 1950 and was promptly reunited with his old friend Philby, who lodged him in his home against the better judgement of his wife who foresaw trouble and unpleasantness from such a guest. Philby and Burgess worked together closely in the small main Chancery of the Embassy.[22]
Philby’s apparent folly in taking Burgess into his home may, in fact, have been the result of the security decision in London to put Burgess under surveillance. As a senior MI6 officer, completely trusted by his superiors, Philby may have been told in advance about it and found it safer to have his friend under his own eye as much as possible. In that event Philby would have warned Burgess which, in turn, would account for the fact that the army officer’s surveillance produced nothing of significance. The fear generated in Burgess by the knowledge that he was under deeper suspicion than he had appreciated could also account, in part, for his appallingly drunken behaviour at parties, when the person detailed to keep an eye on him was not present.
As the Bride inquiry progressed in Britain, the deciphered traffic suggested that the Soviet authorities trusted ‘Homer’ absolutely, which implied that he was an ideological spy, probably with a left-wing background. On that score, and other grounds, the suspects had been narrowed to two by mid-April 1951, but the Americans were not told. Arthur Martin in London then advised the code-breakers to look for some administrative message added at the end of one of the K.G.B. dispatches, which might pinpoint the culprit.[23]
At the beginning of May code-breakers at G.C.H.Q. made the crucial break which revealed that ‘Homer’ had been able to meet a Soviet controller in New York twice a week on the pretext that he had to go there to visit his wife who was pregnant. Maclean was the only suspect who had a wife in that condition then and she happened to be staying with her American mother in New York at the time.[24] Again, the Americans were not told though the material which had been deciphered had been supplied by their National Security Agency.
When Maclean’s treachery became known to those few Foreign Office men who had to be told of it, the consternation can be imagined. Like all ministries, the Foreign Office was, and still is, responsible for its own security and it had singularly failed to suspect Maclean in spite of the many signs of his instability and former communism. There seems to have been a disastrous in-built reluctance to consider the possibility that a British diplomat could be a traitor.
The reluctance of MI5 to inform the American authorities that ‘Homer’ was almost certainly Maclean may have been partly rooted in Foreign Office sensitivities. There was argument that it would be wrong to name a diplomat as a likely traitor, even under conditions of absolute secrecy, before there was firm proof. Lamphere told me that after Maclean’s disappearance, MI5, in the form of Arthur Martin, claimed that the lack of liaison had been due to pressure from the Foreign Office.[25] There was, however, a much more potent reason for the British decision to keep the Americans in ignorance: there was no intention of prosecuting Maclean, whatever he might confess. After Hoover’s determination to ensure that Fuchs was brought to justice, it was feared that he would demand the same treatment for Maclean. It was, therefore, considered essential that the F.B.I. should not be told, and in the interests of secrecy the C.I.A. had to be deprived of the information too.
I have been assured by former officers of MI5 and MI6 that the sole purpose of interrogating Maclean was to produce a confession so that a damage assessment could be made and any associates and controllers neutralized. Former Foreign Office officials have told me that the view inside that service was totally opposed to prosecution on the grounds of international damage and injury to Foreign Office morale and reputation. It remains a matter for wonder whether the Americans would have been told if Maclean had confessed and not been prosecuted.
Whoever was finally responsible for the failure to keep the F.B.I. informed was stupidly short-sighted, especially when Attlee was setting such store by the resumption of the nuclear secrets interchange. Lamphere had been waiting for months for MI5, through Patterson, to produce a list of suspects, but this was never done.[26] The defection of Maclean, which was bound to become public, forced MI5 to confess the truth to the F.B.I. as soon as it was established tht Maclean had flown. Patterson and Philby had the job of doing it and Lamphere and his colleagues, including Hoover, were very bitter at the way they had been treated. Lamphere told me: ‘Patterson personally lost standing with us in the Maclean affair as he was forced to lie to me over quite a period and was a personal friend.’[27] It is, of course, possible that neither Patterson nor Philby had been kept fully in the picture by London as the list was narrowed down for, if they were forbidden to pass on the information, they had no need to know it. Philby certainly knew what was happening but he may have been kept informed by his K.G.B. controller who was receiving information originating from some quite different source in London.
Maclean was put under surveillance but for reasons which have never been satisfactorily explained this was restricted to central London. Watchers followed him to Charing Cross railway station, to which he commuted each working day from his home at Tatsfield in Surrey. Once he was on the train, he was left until the following morning when watchers were waiting for him to arrive at the same station.[28] This gave Maclean ample opportunity to meet surreptitiously with Soviet controllers or cut-outs, or to visit dead-letter boxes, either during breaks he made in the journey or at Tatsfield itself, which was well within the thirty-mile circle from London in which Soviet diplomats were allowed to travel without seeking special permission.
I have also established that until the later stages of the case his telephone at Tatsfield was not tapped. This may have been due to reluctance on the part of MI5 to secure the necessary warrants from the Home Office as this would have meant alerting the Home Secretary to the suspicion that a senior Foreign Office man was a Soviet spy. Even when the telephone was tapped it was not ‘tapped live’. Conversations were simply recorded on tape and listened to the following day or later. The same was true of microphones surreptitiously installed in the house, so no quick action could have been taken had it become necessary. The case was under the control of the counter-espionage branch headed by Dick White, but Hollis, as Director of Security, was also involved.
It has been stated that once suspicion against Maclean was strong secret reports were withheld from him, which he may have noticed.[29] If that is true, the behaviour of the security authorities was unbelievably ham-fisted. Allegations that the watchers were also so clumsy that a car carrying them almost bumped into Maclean’s taxi are K.G.B. disinformation.[30]
The mechanics of what occurred when Philby, who was still in Washington, learned – from whatever source – that MI5 was nearly certain that the spy called ‘Homer’ was Maclean appear to have been as follows: Philby immediately arranged a meeting with his Soviet controller who alerted the Centre in Moscow which, after deliberations, sent back instructions to the controller and to the K.G.B. resident in London. The K.G.B.’s immediate task was to warn Maclean that the danger of exposure, of which he had been aware for more than a year, had suddenly intensified and that arrangements might have to be made to ensure his safety from interrogation. The K.G.B. realized, and had probably observed, that Maclean was under surveillance by MI5 watchers, whose purpose was to catch him in contact with a Soviet Intelligence officer, an event which would have provided sufficient reason for his immediate interrogation.
The K.G.B. might have learned from a source inside MI5 that Maclean was not under surveillance once he had left Charing Cross, but it could never be sure, with the case coming to a climax, that the restriction had not been lifted. So the normal channels of communication with Maclean could not be used. Indeed, Maclean’s controller in London would have been instructed to cease contact with him as soon as the spy had been identified as ‘Homer’, if not before. Some totally trustworthy intermediary who could meet Maclean without arousing suspicion and pass the warning to him was urgently required. Of the very few who knew about Maclean’s treachery the best fitted for the task was Burgess. The two were known to be friends.[31] Both were employed by the Foreign Office and could meet as colleagues. And to add to this Burgess, in spite of his occasional outrageous behaviour, was a highly capable agent with a long record of devotion to the Soviet cause.
In its forward planning on the Maclean case the K.G.B. would have examined all foreseeable contingencies and would have prepared for them, and there can be little doubt that it had been decided that Maclean would eventually have to defect to the Soviet Union. The Soviets had continuing insight regarding Maclean’s mental condition through his controllers, and also had the judgements of Philby, Burgess and Blunt. All of these three, according to Blunt, who may well have been consulted by the K.G.B., believed that Maclean would crack easily under interrogation.[32] While Blunt paid Maclean the compliment of believing that he would try to protect his friends, he said that if subjected to hostile questioning he could decide to be a martyr, bragging about his exploits to show his contempt for the Establishment.[33]
The K.G.B. could have resolved its problem by assassinating Maclean, but such action is never certain, since an attempt can fail and its perpetrators can be arrested. Even a successful attempt is counter-productive because of its effects on other spies. Further, there was great political advantage to be gained from a defection because of its obvious effects on Anglo-American relations.
It is known, from defector evidence, that K.G.B. officers conferred in Moscow to plan Maclean’s escape, and they must have given deep thought to his likely reaction when ordered to leave Britain.[34] He had never been to the Soviet Union, could not speak the language, and the prospect of spending his life there in exile must have been not only cheerless, but extremely frightening. He knew what had happened to ‘Theo’, ‘Otto’ and other Soviet spies who had given loyal service to Stalin both before and since the war and, in 1951, Stalin was still alive and in full control. In Maclean’s condition it was not impossible that he might prefer to face interrogation than to defect. The intermediary used to inform him, therefore, had to be someone who could explain the absolute necessity for his defection and assure him of his welfare once he reached the Soviet Union. He also had to be capable of convincing him that his wife, Melinda, on whom Maclean felt dependent, would be able to join him. Her condition greatly complicated the situation because she was due to have another baby in mid-June.
Burgess, who had recruited Maclean in the first place, was the obvious choice on all counts. There have been suggestions that the K.G.B. behaved unprofessionally in selecting Burgess to warn Maclean, because it put an end to Philby’s career as a spy, but it had no safe alternative and, in the result, the choice proved to be justified. As will be seen, there was another compelling reason, which the K.G.B. had almost certainly foreseen, for the selection of Burgess.
As a Government White Paper was later to admit, the British security authorities had strong grounds for suspecting that Maclean was the traitor whom they were seeking in April, before Burgess left the U.S. MI5 wanted to search his house for evidence, such as one-time pads and photographic apparatus, but they had decided to delay that operation until June when Mrs Maclean was due to go into hospital to have her baby and a surreptitious entry would be safer. The evidence strongly suggests that Philby knew both these facts, which meant that there was no great urgency in dispatching Burgess to Britain. Burgess was able to return via the Queen Mary instead of racing back by air, after various contrived speeding offences had brought about his deliberate recall to London in disgrace. On arriving in Britain on 7 May, he behaved in a leisurely fashion which has previously defied explanation and has been attributed to his unreliability, a feature which he did not display in his highly successful espionage career.
It seems likely that Philby had been officially informed by London, perhaps via Patterson, about the suspicions concerning Maclean. According to information quoted by Andrew Boyle in The Climate of Treason Sir Robert Mackenzie, the regional security officer stationed at the Washington Embassy, looked into MI5 headquarters to see Guy Liddell only two days before Maclean disappeared and suggested that Maclean should be pulled in without further delay and given a hostile interrogation. That suggests that Mackenzie knew that Maclean was on the short list of two at least, and if he knew, then presumably Patterson and Philby in Washington also knew. It would also suggest, however, that Mackenzie did not know any details of MI5’s timetable for investigating Maclean beyond the fact that they did not appear to be in any great rush. Nor does he seem to have been given any further details by MI5. Mackenzie had no need to know them, nor did Patterson or Philby in view of the ban on informing the Americans. While it seems clear that Patterson and Philby had been told officially of the early development of the short list of six and, possibly, of its reduction to two, Lamphere and other professional security officers see no need why they should have been given further details which would have contravened the ‘need to know’ rule. Yet the leisurely nature of Burgess’s behaviour suggests that Philby did know. Who could have told him?
