Too Secret Too Long, page 77
The present British Government is equally likely to reject any oversight by a completely Parliamentary body. Insight into the Government’s attitude to select committees was afforded to me recently by a senior minister when, through Labour intransigence over another issue, the re-formation of the committees was delayed for seven months after the 1983 general election. He told me that the Government was delighted because the committees were disliked as an intrusive nuisance. Any oversight body must be credible and it is not likely to be so, to either Parliament or the public, unless it has some Parliamentary membership.
Whatever form an oversight body may take it must consist of people whose ability, impartiality and integrity are beyond dispute. This would surely rule out, on the grounds of partiality, any minister or civil servant who had previously been responsible for the secret services. A one-man-band arrangement, like the remit performed by Lord Wigg and later by Lord Trend, will not suffice. Wigg, who had been highly critical of the secret services, was quickly ‘captured’ by the security machine.
While access to operations should, probably, be limited, an oversight body should have sufficient powers for Parliament and the public to accept any assurance it gives as being based on the true facts. It would need a full-time staff of professionals responsible for the main liaison with the secret establishments. It would require the power to report directly to the Prime Minister and not through Cabinet Office officials. How much Parliament and the public would be told would depend on the Prime Minister, working with advisers, as happens now with such bodies as the Franks Inquiry into the Falklands conflict and the Security Commission.
As at present constituted, the Security Commission is no alternative as it is essentially a hindsight body, while an oversight body must be on-going. There is much to be said, however, in the current political climate, for an extension of the Security Commission’s functions so that it could become an oversight body, at least for a pilot period. This might be more acceptable to the Government and could be proposed as its initiative. The Commission’s terms of reference would have to be changed and it would require a small, permanent staff. Its membership could be widened to include Parliamentarians, perhaps from both the Commons and the Lords. The problem of its access to secret information and of its power to question members of the secret services have already been resolved with respect to hindsight inquiries into security breaches.
Given the political will, it should be possible to devise some system to provide an appropriate degree of accountability without overly interfering with ministerial responsibility or damaging the secrecy of the services, but I, and others whom I have consulted, expect a long struggle. The pressures on Mrs Thatcher to resist any improvement in accountability will be intense and it may be in her cautious nature to accede to them. I fear that we shall be assured, once again, that all is well, though we have been told that time and again when the record shows it to have been unfounded.
The best hope lies in the courage of Parliament which has the power if it can summon up the will to use it.
appendix a
Igor Gouzenko’s memorandum to the R.C.M.P. made at the request of MI5 on 6 May 1952
Supt. McClellan
R.C.M.P. H.Q.
Ottawa
6 May 1952
Dear Sir:
Regarding your request for information about the person in British MI5, here’s what I remember, and what I think about the matter.
1. I forget the cover name. You mentioned it in your letter and that looks like it, but since I forget, I won’t repeat it. However, the cover name is not so important in this case. Moscow quite often changed the cover names, and there is great probability that it had changed the cover name of the person in question during the last 10 years.
It seems to me that the cover name in this case was of female character. But of course it is not necessary that the person was a woman. There were some cases when Moscow gave male agents female cover names, and vice versa.
2. History: At the very first moment when I gave Canadian authorities information from a great number of other agents, I mentioned first of all three persons whom I considered to be of most importance:
a) A member of Parliament Fred Rose, in Canada; b) the assistant to Stettinius in the U.S. [ed. note: former Secretary of State Edward Stettinius]; c) a member of MI5 in Great Britain. In the case of Fred Rose there was documental evidence.
In the case of the assistant to Stettinius and the member of MI5, there were only my words. The case of the assistant to Stettinius was particularly weak. I repeated just what I had heard from cipher clerk Kulakov.
During the course of a general conversation with him in the cipher room of the embassy, when I expressed surprise at the amount of documental information which agents in Canada gave to Moscow, he said something in this line: “This is nothing – in the United States the assistant of Stettinius is working for us.”
And then he added that such a person could not only supply vital information, but could even influence the foreign policy of the U.S. in favour of Moscow. I did not ask Kulakov for a name, and probably he did not know it. But I did not doubt his words – he had just come from Moscow where he was working in the cipher branch at Intelligence H.Q.
Now, in retrospect, this information about a certain assistant to Stettinius was really not much to go on. Stettinius, as I learned later from a U.S. magazine, had four or five assistants.
It took Whittaker Chambers to give the full name and all the particulars. The result of this was that eventually (five years later) one of the assistants of Stettinius (during the San Francisco conference), a certain Alger Hiss, was tried and convicted.
If there had been no Whittaker Chambers my words about the assistant to Stettinius would have been just words, and would have been met only with disbelief. How agents arc sometimes powerful and influential can be seen from the fact that almost to the last moment Hiss enjoyed complete confidence and support from no less important a person than Secretary of State [Dean] Acheson.
Whittaker Chambers, who actually wanted to help his country, was ridiculed. Only the conviction of Hiss made high officials, including Acheson, reverse their opinions.
3. The case of the member of MI5 was, in my opinion much stronger and there was much more to go on than in the case of the assistant to Stettinius.
In the first place I was not told by somebody, but saw the telegram myself concerning this person. And then, as a second confirmation, I was told by Lieut. Lubimov.
With these two pieces of evidence there is not the slightest doubt in my mind that there was a Soviet agent inside MI5 during the period of 1942–43, and possibly later on.
4. Telegram: I saw it in the course of my work in the cipher branch of Intelligence H.Q. in Moscow during the latter part of 1942, or the beginning of 1943. I remember that I sat at the same table with Lieut. Lubimov who was, like me, a former student of the Architectural Institute, and who had been mobilized at the outbreak of war and sent, first to the Military Engineering Academy and then to cipher courses at the Intelligence Academy.
The telegram dealt with the description of a contact through a “dubok” – a hiding place for small objects etc. It was clear that the person mentioned, (and it was stated, I remember) was “one of five of MI”.
It was evident that personal contact with the man from MI5 was avoided. The place of the “dubok” in that particular case was at some graveyard – in a split between stones of a certain tomb.
5. Lubimov’s words: I must state that I now forget whether I deciphered the telegram myself or whether Lubimov did it and showed it to me as being interesting stuff. (We quite often showed each other interesting telegrams.)
But I remember that the telegram struck me as unusual and we had a short talk about it. It is more probable that Lubimov deciphered it, since he usually was working on telegrams from London. (He knew the English language better than anybody as he had an English tutor in childhood.)
In a short exchange of words, Lubimov said: “This man has something Russian in his background.” I understood that he learned this from previous telegrams.
6. The words “something Russian” could be understood in different ways:
a) The man himself (White Russian of noble origin, etc.) or his relatives (wife, father, mother etc.) came from Russia or are Russian.
b) He could be 100 percent English but was in Russia (before the revolution of 1917, or during the 1919-21 civil war, or later on official duties, or as a tourist).
c) Or, less probable, he has some friends of Russian origin.
d) And, to stretch the words, he could have attended some Russian courses (language, history, etc.).
7. Total: a) (What I saw with my own eyes): the man was contacted not personally, but through a “dubok”. This showed that Moscow took special precautions in dealing with him. A “dubok” contact might have taken place once a month, or even once every two months. The place of a “dubok” can be changed often.
b) (Words of Lubimov): Something Russian in his background.
8. Indirect but possible evidence: In 1944 (the latter part, or maybe the beginning of 1945) in the embassy. Zabotin received from Moscow a long telegram of a warning character. In it, Moscow informed that representatives of British “greens” (counter-intelligence) were due to arrive in Ottawa with the purpose of working with local “greens” (R.C.M.P.) to strengthen work against Soviet agents, and that such work would be definitely stepped up.
After that the telegram, in a most detailed way, went on to describe what precautions Grant (Zabotin) should take. In the main, his contacts with agents should be twice as rare as before (once a month, or once in two months). Also to split the big groups of agents (as in the Research Council group) and to put them on separate contacts.
To pay more attention, to be careful, and to give detailed instructions to agents in the way of conspiracy (if Communist, to stop attending party meetings; to stop political conversations in the place of work; to throw out all incriminating literature; to learn to avoid shadowing, etc.). The instructions took up two full pages.
Now it could be that Moscow just invented these representatives who were supposed to arrive in Ottawa, in order to make Zabotin more careful. On the other hand, it might be genuine, in which case it would mean that Moscow had an inside track in the British MI5.
This, of course, would be indirect evidence and you are in a good position to check it.
9. Who could possibly know the real name of the agent, or provide more particulars about him outside of Russia?
a) The Soviet military attaché in London.
b) His cipher clerk.
c) Contact man (however in the case of contact through a “dubok”, the man who picked up the letters would not necessarily know who put them in the “dubok”. For example, on several occasions Zabotin sent people to pick up stuff and they had not the slightest idea where it came from.
d) Maj.-Gen. Bolshakov – if he is still in the U.S. as a Soviet military attaché. Before that he was chief of First Intelligence H.Q. in Moscow, and he certainly knows about this agent.
10. The mistake in dealing with the matter: The mistake (in my opinion) was that the task of finding the agent was given to MI5 itself. I conclude this from the fact that on two occasions representatives of MI5 talked with me in Ottawa during the Royal Commission investigation.
The result, even beforehand, could be expected as nil. The same result would be found if the task of finding the assistant to Stettinius was given to the U.S. State Department. After “thorough and careful” investigation they would come up with a disarming smile and the suggestion that someone should visit a doctor.
This is work in the dark. If an agent is so powerful and has influence, he could make this work more dark, more complicated and fruitless. My humble suggestion is (and I think it is not too late yet) to entrust this job to some people outside of MI5 (Scotland Yard, active army men, etc.).
The best thing, in my opinion, would be to send this letter or a copy of it, to former Governor General Alexander who, at the present time, is defence Minister in Britain and MI5 is now under his jurisdiction. He is an energetic and serious man. Let him decide to whom to entrust the job.
Besides, he was in Ottawa during the Canadian spy trials and he would probably treat the information more seriously than anybody in England.
11. Suggestion as to how to get the best results: I am sure that if, during the last six years, British authorities had established a 24-hour, month-after-month check on the movements of members of the Soviet embassy, commercial attaché, military attaché, etc. – and a real check, not just token – they would have not just one, but dozens of agents in their hands by now.
Even contacts through “duboks” are still done by people. The favourite places for a dubok are telephone booths (behind the phone box); toilets (inside the water tank, as in the case of Nora who used the toilet in the dentist’s office in Ottawa); some abandoned stone structure with plenty of splits between the stones – old fences, graveyards, etc.
In most cases all places are selected in such a way that access to them is easy but not conspicuous. So the people who will watch the contact men from the Soviet embassy should carefully examine the place which the contact man had just left (telephone booths, toilets, fences, etc.) and if something is found, wait there for the arrival of the agent to pick it up.
The secret is in persistency – watch every movement of the hands of the contact men.
Sometimes they may use a trick such as this: The contact man sits down on a bench in a casual and relaxed pose.
Unnoticed, he may pin a letter under the bench with thumb tacks, then, minutes later, leave the place. Agents may come half an hour later and pick it up. So those who are watching the agent’s every movement – even the most unsuspicious and relaxed movements – should check them right away.
All this, of course, you know. But as far as I can see in London they don’t practise it. Otherwise, they would have got some results long ago.
12. I might have forgotten some small details, but you have my previous statements and you can add whatever I may have missed.
Sincerely
IGOR GOUZENKO
appendix b
Statement by Margaret Thatcher about Their Trade is Treachery, Hansard, March 1981, col. 1079 et seq
Security
The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher):
With permission, Mr. Speaker, I will make a statement about the security implications of the book published today that purports to give a detailed account of the investigations into the penetration of the Security Service and other parts of the public service that were undertaken following the defection of Burgess and Maclean in 1951.
The events into which those investigations were inquiring began well over 40 years ago. Many of those named or implicated in this book as having been the subject of investigation have died. Others have long since retired. None of them is still in the public service.
The extent of penetration was thoroughly investigated after the defection of Burgess and Maclean, as indeed, the author of this book makes clear. The book contains no information of security significance that is new to the security authorities, and some of the material is inaccurate or distorted. All the cases and individuals referred to have been the subject of long and thorough investigation.
The investigations into the possibilities of past penetration have inevitably extended widely. They have covered not only those suspected of being guilty but all those who could conceivably fit the often inconclusive leads available. The fact that somebody has been the subject of investigation does not necessarily, or even generally, mean that he has been positively suspected. Many people have had to be investigated simply in order to eliminate them from the inquiry.
The results of the investigations into Philby and Blunt are now well known. There were good reasons for suspecting a few others, but as it was not possible to secure evidence on which charges could be founded they were required to resign or were moved to work where they had no access to classified information. Many others were eliminated from suspicion.
Apart from the main allegation, to which I will come, I do not propose to comment on the allegations and insinuations in this book. Nor can I say which allegations are unsubstantiated or untrue – as some certainly are – since by doing so I should be implicitly indicating those that were suspected of having a degree of substance.
I must, however, comment upon the grave allegation that constitutes the main theme of the book – that the late Sir Roger Hollis, director general of the Security Service from 1956 to 1965, was an agent of the Russian intelligence service.
The case for investigating Sir Roger Hollis was based on certain leads that suggested, but did not prove, that there had been a Russian intelligence service agent at a relatively senior level in British counter-intelligence in the last years of the war. None of these leads identified Sir Roger Hollis, or pointed specifically or solely in his direction. Each of them could also be taken as pointing to Philby or Blunt. But Sir Roger Hollis was among those that fitted some of them, and he was therefore investigated.
The investigation took place after Sir Roger Hollis’s retirement from the Security Service. It did not conclusively prove his innocence. Indeed, it is very often impossible to prove innocence. That is why, in our law, the burden of proof is placed upon those who seek to establish guilt and not on those who defend innocence. But no evidence was found that incriminated him, and the conclusion reached at the end of the investigation was that he had not been an agent of the Russian intelligence service.
