Too Secret Too Long, page 38
The main evidence against her, apart from her admissions, consisted of monitored telephone conversations which may have been routine or instituted after a tip from a defector.[1]
In the circumstances many in Whitehall felt that dismissal, the loss of pension rights and the publicity would have been punishment enough but Miss Fell was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, the maximum for a ‘misdemeanour’ under the Official Secrets Act. Even in MI5, starved of success, some officers regarded this as unduly severe as there had been no damage to British security, but Hollis’s view, given to an officer who asked him for it, was that he ‘did not object to cases which showed that MI5 was on the ball’.[2] Not surprisingly, some MI5 officers still refer to the Barbara Fell case as the ‘barbarous Fell case’.
It so happened that by the time Miss Fell was sentenced Hollis had taken highly secret steps to ensure that his old MI6 colleague, Kim Philby, a cold, calculating traitor who had betrayed masses of highly classified secrets during the war, should remain free from prosecution or public censure. Indeed, he would have been encouraged and assisted to pose as a loyal and much maligned public servant.
Following the ‘whitewash’ of Philby little had been done on his case. MI6 regarded it as conveniently closed and in MI5, Martin, the only figure who might have attempted to keep it alive, had been serving in Malaya. In April 1962, however, MI5 was forced to devote some effort and resources to it when Golitsin told Martin, then back in headquarters, about what the K.G.B. called the ‘Ring of Five’ – five British-born spies who had all been recruited at Cambridge before the war and had been insinuated into positions giving them access to secret information. He named Maclean and Burgess as two of the five and he knew that a third, who had been code-named ‘Stanley’, had first alerted the two to their danger. He was unable to identify Philby as ‘Stanley’ but he did reveal that certain K.G.B. operations against Arab states had involved ‘Stanley’ in the late 1950s. Until then MI5 had not appreciated Philby’s role in the Middle East, nor did it know that he was back in MI6’s employment.
When Martin returned to London, after interviewing Golitsin in the U.S., he suggested that Philby should be questioned again but Hollis insisted on having more evidence before he would move. Contrary to statements by apologists for Hollis that he pursued the Philby case with vigour, he did the reverse.[3] The K.G.B., on the other hand, moved with speed, as later inquiries were to show.
In May 1962 a K.G.B. officer of special significance travelled from Moscow to Beirut. He was Yuri Modin and it was the first time that he had moved out of the Soviet Union since his return there following his part in organizing the defection of Maclean and Burgess in 1951. There is little doubt in the minds of the MI5 officers who later learned of his visit that he saw Philby and warned him about Golitsin’s statement. It is possible that the K.G.B. Centre had simply assumed that Golitsin would reveal what he knew about Philby and sent Modin over purely because of this, but as the visit took place so soon after the information had reached MI5 headquarters, a deliberate leak from that source to the K.G.B. would seem more likely, especially in view of what was to happen a few months later.
Failing another K.G.B. defector with knowledge of ‘Stanley’ it seemed unlikely that further progress could be made but, quite by chance again, more definite evidence emerged as a result of an event in Israel which had been concealed until the publication of Their Trade is Treachery. Later in 1962, Flora Solomon, Philby’s old friend who was still living in London, was visiting the Weizmann Institute, Israel’s science research centre. Other people were present when, as she has since confirmed in her memoirs, she expressed anger at the way Philby was slanting his articles in The Observer against Israel and in favour of the most anti-Jewish Arabs.[4] Among the visitors who heard her outburst was Lord Rothschild, a wartime member of MI5 who retained contacts with the organization, as most former officers do. Mrs Solomon records that she exclaimed to Rothschild: ‘How is it The Observer uses a man like Kim? Don’t they know he’s a communist? You must do something.’ My informants, who were officers who had been involved with the Philby case, have assured me that she went further and said that Philby worked for the Russians. They already knew that he had been a communist. Rothschild urged her to repeat her statement to the British security authorities, and on her return to London, having been promised total confidentiality, she visited Lord Rothschild’s flat where she was introduced to an MI5 officer. She was later questioned at length by Arthur Martin, during which she recalled that in 1937, during one of Philby’s brief trips back to London while reporting the Spanish Civil War, he had confided to her that he was doing ‘important work for peace’ – the usual Comintern approach in an attempted recruitment – and urged her to join him. Mrs Solomon claims that she responded by saying that she had enough to do working for the persecuted Jews. My sources, however, insist that while she declined to commit herself she assured Philby that if ever he was desperate he could always come to her for help.
At that stage, as Mrs Solomon admits in her book, she knew that Philby had been a communist at Cambridge and had realized that he must still have been involved in 1938 when he told her that he was ‘in great danger’. She told Martin that her suspicions had been strengthened in 1940 after the fall of France, when Philby had assured her that the fascists would never be beaten without Russia’s help. She also knew that Philby had worked in Intelligence during the war and had moved to the Foreign Office, though she said she was unaware that he was in MI6.
Mrs Solomon excuses her failure to volunteer her knowledge about Philby earlier on the grounds that every public statement pointed to Philby’s innocence. Yet no further evidence had accrued to her between the ‘clearance’ of Philby in Parliament in 1955 and her outburst in Israel in 1962. It is a sad commentary that, having enjoyed such a satisfying life and career in Britain, she did not attempt to expose Philby until he was seen to be acting against the interests of Israel. In view of the publicity given to the Philby case in 1955 and his press conference claim to have no connection with communism, Mrs Solomon could hardly have been unaware that he was lying.
Mrs Solomon reveals in her memoirs that she was also interviewed later by Mossad, the Israeli Intelligence Service, which was especially interested in any operations by Soviet agents like Philby to assist Arab subversive activities. She claims that, as a result, there was a leak to an Israeli newspaper which I observed and which was the source of my knowledge about her connection with Philby’s exposure to MI5. Nothing could be further from the truth. The leak in the Israeli newspaper was the result of information which I gave to an Israeli journalist.
News of the windfall in the Philby case was given to Hollis. Whatever his immediate feelings might have been he did not betray them in any way, taking it with his usual deadpan calmness. He conceded that there was now hard evidence with which to confront Philby and, perhaps, to force a confession.[5] I have established from two of the people involved in the early deliberations that there was no intention in Hollis’s mind, or in the minds of any of the few who knew of the development, of prosecuting Philby, no matter what crimes he might admit to. It was made clear to the officer who eventually confronted Philby that the purpose of the exercise was to induce him to reveal his past activities and his contacts so that a damage assessment could be made and possible ‘repairs’ effected. Philby could be far too dangerous to too many people in the witness box, and a trial, with all its publicity, would be too embarrassing for all concerned, especially in view of the ‘clearance’ given in Parliament by Macmillan, who was still in office as Prime Minister. Nor was there ever any suggestion that Philby might be kidnapped in Beirut and brought back to Britain forcibly, all use of violence by the secret services having been outlawed by that time.[6]
As Philby had been an MI6 officer, White was involved in all the decisions and it was agreed that following the sentence of forty-two years’ imprisonment passed on George Blake after his confession, there was no likelihood that the wily Philby could be induced to return to London for initial interrogation, which would have to be done in Beirut. It was realized that Philby could simply refuse to be questioned, much less to confess, so it was decided to offer him the inducement of immunity to do so.
In this move, which then appears to have been unprecedented, Hollis was the effective motivating force, though it may have been first suggested by some other officer. The Attorney-General, the late Sir John Hobson, was formally approached and it was suggested that if Philby would provide checkable proof that he was prepared to co-operate fully with the security services he should be offered immunity to prosecution so that he could return to London safely for debriefing over several years.[7]
After being assured that Philby had been denied access to British secrets for eleven years, but not being told that he had since been employed by MI6 as an agent-runner, Hobson agreed that the offer could be made and would be binding. There was no doubt, by that time, that Philby must have sent many British and American agents to their deaths or to long imprisonment, so the granting of his immunity would have serious political repercussions if it should leak to the public. In 1963, however, both MI5 and MI6 were so confident that such secret matters could never leak, either to the media or to Parliament, that Hobson was fully reassured on that score. Further, the Macmillan clearance in Parliament still stood and would be allowed to stand even though Macmillan would have to be informed if Philby confessed, so the traitor would continue to wield a formidable libel threat against any adverse publicity if he returned.
The officer best fitted to carry out the interrogation was, undoubtedly, Arthur Martin, who had been associated with the case since Maclean had been suspect in 1950 and had been present at the previous interrogation by Milmo in 1951. He was also the officer most certain of Philby’s guilt. It was therefore understood in MI5 that Martin would be making the journey to Beirut and he began to prepare for it. Hollis, however, paid a personal visit to Sir Dick White and returned to inform Martin that an MI6 man would be going instead. There can be no doubt that White and his MI6 minions were anxious to keep the Philby affair ‘in house’ if they could, some of them being vulnerable in view of their championing of the traitor. Hollis may have suggested that MI6 should take over the case, being fearful of Martin’s zeal, as later events were to prove that he was. If the initiative for the change came from White, then Hollis offered no effective resistance, being in the habit of deferring to White to whom he owed his promotions.[8]
When Flora Solomon’s information reached MI6, Philby’s former friend Nicholas Elliott, then a senior figure in MI6, finally convinced himself that he had been fooled and betrayed over the years and was so angry that he volunteered to go out and confront him. White therefore elected him for the task. Hollis told Martin that he had agreed that Elliott was a good choice because, in view of his close relationship with Philby, he might be able to play on the traitor’s sense of decency. This was received with derision by Martin, and others in on the secret; they were also concerned that a man who had been friendly with Philby should be sent to try to ‘break’ him.
Elliott flew to Beirut early in January 1963 taking every precaution to keep his mission secret. Only seven other people, in MI6 and MI5, were supposed to know its purpose. It has been supposed that the C.I.A., which had a group in Beirut, had also been informed but I have established that it was not told until the interrogation had been completed.[9]
On arrival Elliott telephoned Philby from a flat, which had been hired and ‘milked’ for tape-recording, and invited him round for a drink. Philby accepted without questioning Elliott as to the reason for his visit and, on entering the flat, said, ‘I was half expecting to see you.’ Elliott wasted no time and informed Philby that new evidence concerning his guilt had reached the British authorities and neither White nor Hollis had any doubt about it. Elliott accused his former friend of betraying everyone who had trusted him and, believing that Philby might be ashamed of this, invited him to make a break with the past and confess his treacherous activities. Philby responded to the possibility that he might have any sense of shame by telling Elliott, in answer to a question, that for a Soviet communist as dedicated as himself family and friends were all in the discard.[10]
With minimum delay Elliott assured Philby that if he told the whole truth and then returned to Britain for a long debriefing, no action would be taken against him. Without waiting to hear what the new evidence was – an extraordinary omission in the circumstances – Philby admitted that he was a Soviet spy. As though to cover his first, revealing, remark about half expecting a visit from Elliott, he said, ‘This was bound to happen one day. There was bound to be a defector, a cipher clerk or a spy in place who would know about me.’
He then confessed that he had been a Soviet agent since 1934, when he had been recruited in Vienna, and that he, in turn, recruited Burgess. He confirmed that he had been the Third Man who had warned Maclean through Burgess. He also admitted having been responsible for preventing the defection of Volkov and for sabotaging the Anglo-American operations to infiltrate secret agents into Albania and into the Soviet Union – an admission calculated to sour British-American relations when the C.I.A. heard about it. He specifically denied that Blunt had been a spy, which was a blatant lie, and claimed that he knew nothing about any ‘Fifth Man’ of a ‘Ring of Five’. He did, however, go out of his way to throw false suspicion on an old MI6 colleague called Tim Milne, who at that stage he obviously disliked though they had been schoolfriends at Westminster.[11]
As MI5 was anxious to clear up the mystery of the Ring of Five’s Soviet controllers, Philby was asked if he could identify ‘Otto’. He claimed that while ‘Otto’ had never revealed his true name to him he had learned that it was Arnold Deutsch, a Comintern agent, whom he had met in Vienna. Philby was lying again for, while it was known that Deutsch had moved to London in 1934, following Philby’s return from Austria, he was definitely not ‘Otto’.[12]
Philby offered to write a summary for Elliott to take back with him to London but declined to accept the immunity proposal, saying that he needed more time to think about it. What he usually meant when he asked for more time was time to consult his Soviet controller to find out what Moscow would like him to do.
It so happened that such a controller was present in Beirut and waiting to be consulted. Modin had returned to Beirut shortly before Elliott’s arrival, presumably after being alerted about Flora Solomon’s evidence and the decision to send Elliott out to question Philby about it. This evidence was, of course, a much more dangerous threat than the relatively vague information previously supplied by Golitsin. The K.G.B. would not have relied on its local station chief to warn Philby for that would have told him that there had been a leak to Moscow, probably from a source in London, and that source would then have been at further risk of exposure one day.
Modin was the obvious choice for the task and there is little doubt in MI5 that he had brought an escape plan for Philby with him and that he stayed on to supervise it.
The day after his ‘confession’ Philby gave Elliott a two-page typewritten statement and signed it but repeated that he needed a few more days before making up his mind about returning to Britain. With White’s permission, Elliott then told the C.I.A. about the confession, speaking directly to James Angleton in Washington. Only then was the C.I.A. mission in Beirut told what had happened.[13] Elliott then left Beirut, taking the ‘confession’ and the tape-recordings with him. The MI6 station chief, Peter Lunn, took over responsibility for overseeing Philby’s return if he agreed to take up the immunity offer.
Because the windows of the flat where Philby had been interviewed had been left wide open, the traffic noise seriously interfered with the tape-recordings. MI5 was, understandably, appalled by this, which it attributed to MI6 inexpertise. By processing the tapes it managed to secure about eighty-five per cent of the conversation.
The Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, was informed about Philby’s confession and wrote in his diary: ‘We think we have at last solved the mystery of who “tipped off” Burgess and Maclean. It was a man, much suspected at the time, but against whom nothing could be proved – one Philby…In a drunken fit he confessed everything to one of our men…’[14]
Once again, a prime minister had been misinformed. Elliott has assured me that Philby was sober when he made his so-called confession. It would be instructive to know who passed on this misinformation to Macmillan, who was clearly uninformed about Philby’s agent-running position with MI6 for he also wrote in his diary, when referring to Parliamentary and press questions: ‘It was even insinuated that the Foreign Office were using Philby in the Middle East for secret work.’ It was – through its agency MI6.
Although Philby had confessed to being a traitor, he and his third wife, Eleanor, were invited to dine at the home of the First Secretary of the British Embassy, Glen Balfour-Paul, who presumably had not been told of the confession and believed Philby innocent. The traitor’s wife arrived but Philby did not.[15] He was on his way to Moscow, probably aboard a Soviet freighter, the Dolmatovo, registered in Odessa, which had been conveniently docked in Beirut. Modin may have been with him.
Macmillan wrote in his diary: ‘He has now disappeared from Beirut, leaving £2,000 in cash for his wife. Whether he will appear in Russia or not we do not know. Anyway it means more trouble.’
It was decided to delay the trouble for as long as possible by keeping the defection secret.
