Delphi Complete Works of Demosthenes, page 421
[31] But that was not his aim; he imposed this disability in the interests of you and of the State, for he knew — I say, he knew that of all states the most antagonistic men of infamous habits is that in which every man is at liberty to publish their shame. And what state is that? A democracy. He thought it would be dangerous if there ever happened to coexist a considerable number of men who were bold and clever speakers, but tainted with such disgraceful wickedness.
[32] πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν τὸν δῆμον ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ὑπαχθέντ᾽ ἐξαμαρτεῖν, κἀκείνους ἤτοι καταλῦσαί γ᾽ ἂν πειρᾶσθαι τὸ παράπαν τὸν δῆμον （ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ὦσιν ἔτ᾽ Ἀνδροτίωνός τινες αἴσχιον βεβιωκότες, οὐκ ἔστι λέγειν κακῶς τοὺς ἄρχοντας）, ἢ προάγειν ἂν ὡς πονηροτάτους εἶναι, ἵν᾽ ὡς ὁμοιότατοι σφίσιν ὦσι. τὴν οὖν ἀρχὴν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀπεῖπε μὴ μετέχειν τοῦ συμβουλεύειν, ἵνα μὴ φενακισθεὶς ὁ δῆμος ἐξαμάρτοι μηδέν. ὧν ὀλιγωρήσας ὁ καλὸς κἀγαθὸς οὗτος οὐ μόνον ᾤετο δεῖν λέγειν καὶ γράφειν οὐκ ἐξόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ταῦτα ποιεῖν.
[32] For the people may be led astray by them to make many mistakes, and such men may attempt either to overthrow the democracy completely, — for in an oligarchy, even if there are viler livers than Androtion, no one may speak evil of dignities — or to debauch the people, so that they may be as nearly as possible like themselves. He therefore absolutely forbade such men to take any share in the counsels of the State, lest the people should be deluded into some error. Disregarding all this, our honorable gentleman here thought fit not only to make speeches and proposals, though not entitled to do so, but even ventured to make illegal ones.
[33] περὶ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦ νόμου καθ᾽ ὅν, ὠφληκότος αὐτοῦ τοῦ πατρὸς τῷ δημοσίῳ χρήματα καὶ οὐκ ἐκτετεικότος, οὐκ ἔξεστι λέγειν οὐδὲ γράφειν τούτῳ, ταὐτὰ δίκαια λέγειν ἂν ἔχοιτ᾽ εἰκότως, ἐὰν φῇ δεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐνδεικνύναι. τότε γὰρ τοῦτο ποιήσομεν, οὐ μὰ Δί᾽ οὐχὶ νῦν, ἡνίκα δεῖ σ᾽ ἑτέρων ὧν ἀδικεῖς δοῦναι λόγον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ᾖ προσῆκον ἐκ τοῦ νόμου, καὶ νῦν δὲ δείκνυμεν οὐκ ἐῶντα γράφειν σε, οὐδ᾽ ἃ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔξεστι, τὸν νόμον.
[33] Again, with regard to the law which forbids him to speak or move resolutions, because his father owed money to the exchequer and has never paid it, you have a fair and reasonable answer to him, if he says that we ought to have laid an information against him. We will do that later, certainly not now, Androtion, when you have to render an account of your other crimes, but when it is proper to do so according to the law. For the present, we are content to prove that the law does not permit you to move resolutions, not even such as every other citizen may move.
[34] ὡς οὖν οὐκ ὦφλ᾽ ὁ πατήρ σου, τοῦτ᾽ ἐπίδειξον, ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἀποδρὰς ἐξῆλθεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου, ἀλλὰ τὰ χρήματ᾽ ἐκτείσας. εἰ δὲ μὴ ταῦθ᾽ ἕξεις δεικνύναι, οὐκ ἐξὸν γέγραφας: κληρονόμον γάρ σε καθίστησ᾽ ὁ νόμος τῆς ἀτιμίας τῆς τοῦ πατρός, ὄντι δ᾽ ἀτίμῳ σοι λέγειν οὐ προσῆκεν οὐδὲ γράφειν. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν νόμων οὓς παρεγραψάμεθα, οἶμαι δεῖν ὑμᾶς, ἄν τι φενακίζειν ἐγχειρῇ καὶ παράγειν οὗτος, ταῦθ᾽ ὑπολαμβάνειν ἃ διεξελήλυθ᾽ ἐγώ.
[34] Prove, therefore, that your father was not a defaulter, or that he left the prison, not by running away, but by paying his debts. If you cannot prove that, then you had no right to move your resolution; for the law makes you a partner in the disqualification of your father, and being disqualified you had no right either to speak or move. Also with regard to the laws which we have cited in court, I think that if he tries to cheat and mislead you, gentlemen, you must give him the reply that I have indicated.
[35] εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτῷ λόγοι πρὸς τὸ φενακίζειν ὑμᾶς εὖ μεμηχανημένοι, περὶ ὧν βέλτιον ὑμᾶς προακοῦσαι. ἔστιν γὰρ εἷς αὐτῷ τοιοῦτος, μὴ πεντακοσίους ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἀφελέσθαι τὴν δωρειὰν μηδ᾽ ὀνείδει περιβαλεῖν: ἐκείνων ἁγών, οὐκ ἐμός. ἐγὼ δ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἐμέλλετ᾽ ἀφαιρήσεσθαι τούτους μόνον, ἄλλο δὲ μηδὲν ὠφελήσειν τὴν πόλιν, οὐδὲν ἂν ὑμᾶς σφόδρα σπουδάζειν ἠξίουν: εἰ δὲ τῷ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι πλείους ἢ μυρίους τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας βελτίους εἶναι προτρέψετε, πόσῳ κάλλιον τοσούτους παρασκευάσαι χρηστοὺς ἢ πεντακοσίοις ἀδίκως χαρίσασθαι;
[35] On other points also he has arguments admirably calculated to deceive you, and it is better that you should be told of them beforehand. One of them runs like this: “Do not steal the reward from five hundred of yourselves, nor involve them in disgrace; they are on their trial, not I.” But, had you been going to deprive them of something without otherwise benefiting the State, I should not have asked you to show any great keenness in the matter; but if by this action you are going to convert more than ten thousand others into better citizens, what a far finer thing it is to make so many men honest than to confer an unjust favour on five hundred.
[36] ὡς δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἔστιν ἁπάσης τὸ πρᾶγμα τῆς βουλῆς, ἀλλὰ τινῶν, οἵπερ εἰσὶν αἴτιοι τῶν κακῶν, καὶ Ἀνδροτίωνος, ἔχω λέγειν. τῷ γάρ ἐστιν ὄνειδος, εἰ σιωπῶντος αὐτοῦ καὶ μηδὲν γράφοντος, ἴσως δ᾽ οὐδὲ τὰ πόλλ᾽ εἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον εἰσιόντος, μὴ λάβοι ἡ βουλὴ τὸν στέφανον; οὐδενὶ δήπουθεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γράφοντος καὶ πολιτευομένου καὶ πείθοντος ἃ βούλοιτο τὴν βουλήν: διὰ γὰρ τούτους ἀνάξια τοῦ στεφανωθῆναι βεβούλευκεν.
[36] But I am in a position to assert that the question does not concern the whole Council, but only Androtion and some others, who are the cause of the mischief. For should the Council receive no crown, who suffers disgrace, if he makes no speech and moves no resolution himself, and perhaps even does not attend most of the meetings? No one surely. The disgrace attaches to him who moves resolutions and meddles with politics and tries to impose his wishes on the Council; because it is through such men that the deliberations of the Council have proved undeserving of the crown.
[37] οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα πάσης ἔσθ᾽ ἁγὼν τῆς βουλῆς, ὅσῳ συμφέρει μᾶλλον ὑμῖν καταγνοῦσιν ἢ μὴ θεάσασθε. εἰ μὲν ἀπογνώσεσθε, ἐπὶ τοῖς λέγουσι τὸ βουλευτήριον ἔσται, ἐὰν δὲ καταγνῶτε, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰδιώταις: ἑορακότες γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν λεγόντων πονηρίαν τήνδ᾽ ἀφῃρημένην τὴν βουλὴν τὸν στέφανον, οὐχὶ προήσονται τούτοις τὰς πράξεις, ἀλλὰ τὰ βέλτιστ᾽ ἐροῦσιν αὐτοί. εἰ δὲ γενήσεται τοῦτο καὶ τῶν ἠθάδων καὶ συνεστηκότων ῥητόρων ἀπαλλαγήσεσθε, ὄψεσθ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνθ᾽ ἃ προσήκει γιγνόμενα. ὥστ᾽ εἰ μηδενὸς ἄλλου ἕνεκα, διὰ ταῦτα καταψηφιστέον.
[37] And yet, even if we grant freely that the whole Council is on its trial, reflect how much more advantage you will gain if you condemn Androtion, than if you do not. If you acquit him, the talkers will rule in the Council chamber, but if you convict him, the ordinary members. For when the majority see that they have lost the crown through the misconduct of the orators, they will not leave the transaction of business in their hands, but will depend on themselves for the best advice. If this comes to pass, and if you are once rid of the old gang of orators, then, men of Athens, you will see everything done as it ought to be. For this, if for no other, reason you ought to convict.
[38] ὃ τοίνυν ἕτερον δεῖ μὴ λαθεῖν ὑμᾶς, ἀκούσατε. ἴσως ἀναβήσεται καὶ συνερεῖ τῇ βουλῇ Φίλιππος καὶ Ἀντιγένης καὶ ὁ ἀντιγραφεὺς καί τινες ἄλλοι, οἵπερ ἐκεῖ δι᾽ ἑαυτῶν εἶχον μετὰ τούτου τὸ βουλευτήριον καὶ τούτων τῶν κακῶν εἰσιν αἴτιοι. δεῖ δὴ πάντας ὑμᾶς γιγνώσκειν ὅτι τούτοις ἐστὶ μὲν ἡ πρόφασις τῆς συνηγορίας τῇ βουλῇ βοηθεῖν, τῇ δ᾽ ἀληθείᾳ περὶ αὑτῶν ἀγωνιοῦνται καὶ τῶν εὐθυνῶν ἃς αὐτοὺς προσήκει δοῦναι τῶν πεπραγμένων.
[38] Now attend to another point that must not escape you. Perhaps Philippus will get up and defend the Council; perhaps too Antigenes and the checking-clerk and some others, who along with the defendant kept the Council-chamber as their private preserve, and who are the cause of the present discontents. Now you must all observe that their pretence is that they are supporting the cause of the Council, but really they will be fighting for their own interests, to support the audit which they have to render of their official acts.
[39] ἔχει γὰρ οὕτως. ἂν μὲν ἀπογνῶτε τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην, ἅπαντές εἰσιν ἀπηλλαγμένοι καὶ δίκην οὐδεὶς οὐδεμίαν μὴ δῷ: τίς γὰρ ἔτ᾽ ἂν καταψηφίσαιτ᾽ ἐκείνων, τὴν βουλὴν ὑμῶν ἐστεφανωκότων ἧς οὗτοι προέστασαν; ἐὰν δὲ καταγνῶτε, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ εὔορκ᾽ ἔσεσθ᾽ ἐψηφισμένοι, εἶτ᾽ ἐπὶ ταῖς εὐθύναις ἕκαστον τούτων λαμβάνοντες, ὃς μὲν ἂν ὑμῖν ἀδικεῖν δοκῇ, κολάσετε, ὃς δ᾽ ἂν μή, τότ᾽ ἀφήσετε. μὴ οὖν ὡς ὑπὲρ τῆς βουλῆς λεγόντων καὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀκούετε, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν παρακρουομένοις ὀργίζεσθε.
[39] For the case stands thus. If you dismiss this impeachment, they are all acquitted and not a single one of them will pay the penalty, for who henceforth would give his verdict against them when you have crowned the Council of which they were the leading spirits? But if you convict, in the first place you will have kept your judicial oath; and further, when you have each of these men before you at their audit, anyone whom you think guilty you will punish; and anyone who is not, then will be the time to acquit him. Do not, therefore, accept their words as spoken on behalf of the Council and of the general public, but be incensed against them as impostors defending their own interests.
[40] ἔτι τοίνυν Ἀρχίαν οἶμαι τὸν Χολαργέα （καὶ γὰρ οὗτος ἐβούλευεν πέρυσιν） ὡς ἐπιεικῆ δεήσεσθαι καὶ συνερεῖν αὐτοῖς. ἐγὼ δ᾽ οἴομαι δεῖν ὡδί πως ἀκούειν Ἀρχίου, ἐρωτᾶν αὐτὸν ταῦθ᾽ ἃ κατηγόρηται τῆς βουλῆς, πότερ᾽ αὐτῷ δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν ἢ κακῶς: κἂν μὲν φῇ καλῶς, μηκέτι τὸν νοῦν ὡς ἐπιεικεῖ προσέχειν, ἂν δὲ κακῶς, τί δὴ ταῦτ᾽ εἴα φάσκων ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι, πάλιν αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶτε.
[40] Again, I expect that Archias, of the deme of Cholargas, — for he too was a Councillor last year-will plead on their behalf in his character of respectable citizen. But I suggest that you should meet his plea in some such way as this. Ask him whether the conduct with which the Council are charged seems to him honorable or the reverse, and if he says “honorable,” pay him no longer the attention due to a respectable man; if he says “dishonorable,” ask him a second question: why did he let it pass, if he claims to be a respectable man?
[41] κἂν μὲν ἀντιλέγειν φῇ, μηδένα δ᾽ αὐτῷ πείθεσθαι, ἄτοπον δήπου νῦν λέγειν ὑπὲρ τῆς τὰ βέλτιστ᾽ οὐχὶ πειθομένης αὐτῷ βουλῆς: ἂν δὲ σιωπᾶν, πῶς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, εἰ, παρὸν ἐξαμαρτάνειν μέλλοντας ἀποτρέπειν, τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐποίει, νῦν δὲ λέγειν τολμᾷ ὡς δεῖ τοὺς τοσαῦτα κάκ᾽ εἰργασμένους στεφανῶσαι;
[41] If he says that he spoke against it but could persuade no one, surely it is ridiculous for him now to defend this Council that rejected all his excellent advice; but if he says that he held his tongue, is he not guilty of an injustice if he neglected his chance of dissuading them from the offence they were contemplating, and yet ventures now to say that having actually done so much evil they deserve to be crowned?
[42] οἴομαι τοίνυν αὐτὸν οὐδ᾽ ἐκείνων ἀφέξεσθαι τῶν λόγων, ὅτι ταῦτα πάντ᾽ αὐτῷ διὰ τὰς εἰσπράξεις γέγονεν, ἃς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ὀλίγους εἰσπρᾶξαι φήσει πολλὰ χρήματ᾽ ἀναιδῶς οὐ τιθέντας. καὶ κατηγορήσει τούτων, πρᾶγμα ῥᾴδιον, οἶμαι, τῶν μὴ τιθέντων τὰς εἰσφοράς, καὶ φήσει πᾶσαν ἄδειαν ἔσεσθαι τοῦ μὴ τιθέναι τὰς εἰσφοράς, εἰ καταψηφιεῖσθ᾽ αὐτοῦ.
[42] I expect too that Androtion will not refrain from pleading that all this has come upon him because of his success in collecting on your behalf large arrears of taxes, which a few citizens （so he will tell you） shamelessly neglected to pay; and he will denounce these men — undertaking an easy task, I think — [for not paying their property-tax], and will prophesy complete impunity for all who do not pay, if you give your verdict against him.
[43] ὑμεῖς δ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐκεῖνο ἐνθυμεῖσθε, ὅτι οὐ περὶ τούτων δικάσειν ὀμωμόκατε, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τὸ ψήφισμ᾽ εἶπεν, εἶθ᾽ ὅτι πάνδεινόν ἐστι, κατηγορίαν ποιούμενον ὡς ἀδικοῦσί τινες τὴν πόλιν, αὐτὸν ἀξιοῦν ὧν ἀδικεῖ μειζόνων ὄντων μὴ δοῦναι δίκην: πολὺ γὰρ δήπου μεῖζόν ἐστ᾽ ἀδίκημα γράφειν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἢ τὴν εἰσφορὰν μὴ τιθέναι.
[43] But I must first ask you, men of Athens, to reflect that the question you are sworn to decide is not this, but whether his proposal was in accordance with the laws. Next reflect that it is outrageous in one who charges others with violating the constitution to claim exemption from punishment for his own more serious violations; because it is obviously more serious to propose an unconstitutional decree than to fail to pay the property-tax.
[44] ὅτι τοίνυν οὐδ᾽ εἰ φανερῶς ἔμελλεν ἁλόντος τούτου μηδεὶς εἰσοίσειν μηδ᾽ ἐθελήσειν εἰσπράττειν, οὐδ᾽ οὕτως ἀποψηφιστέον, ἐκ τῶνδε γνώσεσθε. ὑμῖν παρὰ τὰς εἰσφορὰς τὰς ἀπὸ Ναυσινίκου, παρ᾽ ἴσως τάλαντα τριακόσι᾽ ἢ μικρῷ πλείω, ἔλλειμμα τέτταρα καὶ δέκ᾽ ἐστὶ τάλαντα, ὧν ἑπτὰ οὗτος εἰσέπραξεν, ἐγὼ δὲ τίθημ᾽ ἅπαντα. ἐπὶ μὲν δὴ τοὺς ἑκόντας τιθέντας οὐ δεῖσθ᾽ Ἀνδροτίωνος, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας.
[44] Then even if it were certain that after this man’s conviction no one would pay the tax or be willing to collect it, even so you must not acquit him, as you will see from this consideration. Upon the property-taxes from the archonship of Nausinicus — say three hundred talents or a trifle more — you have a deficit of fourteen talents, of which he levied seven; but I am assuming that he levied the whole amount. Now you do not need Androtion to deal with the willing payers, but with the defaulters.
[45] ἔστι τοίνυν ὑμῖν νυνὶ σκεπτέον, εἰ τοσούτου τιμᾶσθε τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους καὶ τὸ εὐορκεῖν: εἰ γὰρ ἀποψηφιεῖσθε τούτου φανερῶς οὕτως παρὰ τοὺς νόμους εἰρηκότος, δόξετε πᾶσιν τὰ χρήματα ταῦτ᾽ ἀντὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῆς εὐορκίας ᾑρῆσθαι. ἃ οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἰ παρ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ δοίη τις ὑμῖν, λαβεῖν ἄξιον, μή τί γ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ᾧ ἑτέρους εἰσπράττειν.
