Delphi Complete Works of Demosthenes, page 296
[8] Men of Athens, you must not let slip the opportunity that offers, nor make the blunder you have so often made before. When we returned from the Euboean expedition and Hierax and Stratocles, the envoys of Amphipolis, mounted this platform and bade you sail and take over their city, if we had shown the same earnestness in our own cause as in defence of the safety of Euboea, Amphipolis would have been yours at once and you would have been relieved of all your subsequent difficulties.
[9] καὶ πάλιν ἡνίκα Πύδνα, Ποτείδαια, Μεθώνη, Παγασαί, τἄλλα, ἵνα μὴ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα λέγων διατρίβω, πολιορκούμεν᾽ ἀπηγγέλλετο, εἰ τότε τούτων ἑνὶ τῷ πρώτῳ προθύμως καὶ ὡς προσῆκεν ἐβοηθήσαμεν αὐτοί, ῥᾴονι καὶ πολὺ ταπεινοτέρῳ νῦν ἂν ἐχρώμεθα τῷ Φιλίππῳ. νῦν δὲ τὸ μὲν παρὸν ἀεὶ προϊέμενοι, τὰ δὲ μέλλοντ᾽ αὐτόματ᾽ οἰόμενοι σχήσειν καλῶς, ηὐξήσαμεν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Φίλιππον ἡμεῖς καὶ κατεστήσαμεν τηλικοῦτον ἡλίκος οὐδείς πω βασιλεὺς γέγονεν Μακεδονίας. νυνὶ δὴ καιρὸς ἥκει τις, οὗτος ὁ τῶν Ὀλυνθίων, αὐτόματος τῇ πόλει, ὃς οὐδενός ἐστιν ἐλάττων τῶν προτέρων ἐκείνων.
[9] Once again, when news came of the siege of Pydna, of Potidaea, of Methone, of Pagasae, and of the rest of them — not to weary you with a complete catalogue — if we had at that time shown the required zeal in marching to the help of the first that appealed, we should have found Philip today much more humble and accommodating. Unfortunately we always neglect the present chance and imagine that the future will right itself, and so, men of Athens, Philip has us to thank for his prosperity. We have raised him to a greater height than ever king of Macedonia reached before. Today this opportunity comes to us from the Olynthians unsought, a fairer opportunity than we have ever had before.
[10] καὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τις ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δίκαιος λογιστὴς τῶν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἡμῖν ὑπηργμένων καταστάς, καίπερ οὐκ ἐχόντων ὡς δεῖ πολλῶν, ὅμως μεγάλην ἂν ἔχειν αὐτοῖς χάριν, εἰκότως: τὸ μὲν γὰρ πόλλ᾽ ἀπολωλεκέναι κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀμελείας ἄν τις θείη δικαίως, τὸ δὲ μήτε πάλαι τοῦτο πεπονθέναι πεφηνέναι τέ τιν᾽ ἡμῖν συμμαχίαν τούτων ἀντίρροπον, ἂν βουλώμεθα χρῆσθαι, τῆς παρ᾽ ἐκείνων εὐνοίας εὐεργέτημ᾽ ἂν ἔγωγε θείην.
[10] Men of Athens, let anyone fairly reckon up the blessings we have received of the gods, and though much is amiss, none the less his gratitude will be great — and rightly so: for our many losses in the war may be justly imputed to our own supineness; that we did not suffer these losses long ago and that this opportunity of alliance affords us some compensation, if we choose to accept it, this I for my part should put down as a signal instance of the favor of the gods.
[11] ἀλλ᾽, οἶμαι, παρόμοιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν χρημάτων κτήσεως: ἂν μὲν γάρ, ὅσ᾽ ἄν τις λάβῃ, καὶ σῴσῃ, μεγάλην ἔχει τῇ τύχῃ τὴν χάριν, ἂν δ᾽ ἀναλώσας λάθῃ, συνανήλωσε καὶ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι τὴν χάριν. καὶ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων οὕτως οἱ μὴ χρησάμενοι τοῖς καιροῖς ὀρθῶς, οὐδ᾽ εἰ συνέβη τι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν χρηστὸν μνημονεύουσι: πρὸς γὰρ τὸ τελευταῖον ἐκβὰν ἕκαστον τῶν πρὶν ὑπαρξάντων κρίνεται. διὸ καὶ σφόδρα δεῖ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, φροντίσαι, ἵνα ταῦτ᾽ ἐπανορθωσάμενοι τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς πεπραγμένοις ἀδοξίαν ἀποτριψώμεθα.
[11] I suppose it is with national as with private wealth. If a man keeps what he gains, he is duly grateful to fortune; if he loses it by his own imprudence, he loses along with it the sense of gratitude. So in national affairs, those who fail to use their opportunities aright, fail also to acknowledge the good that the gods have given; for every advantage in the past is judged in the light of the final issue. It is therefore our duty, men of Athens, to keep a careful eye on the future, that by restoring our prosperity we may efface the discredit of the past.
[12] εἰ δὲ προησόμεθ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τούτους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, εἶτ᾽ Ὄλυνθον ἐκεῖνος καταστρέψεται, φρασάτω τις ἐμοὶ τί τὸ κωλῦον ἔτ᾽ αὐτὸν ἔσται βαδίζειν ὅποι βούλεται. ἆρα λογίζεταί τις ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ θεωρεῖ τὸν τρόπον δι᾽ ὃν μέγας γέγονεν ἀσθενὴς ὢν τὸ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς Φίλιππος; τὸ πρῶτον Ἀμφίπολιν λαβών, μετὰ ταῦτα Πύδναν, πάλιν Ποτείδαιαν, Μεθώνην αὖθις, εἶτα Θετταλίας ἐπέβη:
[12] But if we leave these men too in the lurch, Athenians, and then Olynthus is crushed by Philip, tell me what is to prevent him from marching henceforward just where he pleases. I wonder if any one of you in this audience watches and notes the steps by which Philip, weak at first, has grown so powerful. First he seized Amphipolis, next Pydna, then Potidaea, after that Methone, lastly he invaded Thessaly.
[13] μετὰ ταῦτα Φεράς, Παγασάς, Μαγνησίαν, πάνθ᾽ ὃν ἐβούλετ᾽ εὐτρεπίσας τρόπον ᾤχετ᾽ εἰς Θρᾴκην: εἶτ᾽ ἐκεῖ τοὺς μὲν ἐκβαλὼν τοὺς δὲ καταστήσας τῶν βασιλέων ἠσθένησε: πάλιν ῥᾴσας οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ῥᾳθυμεῖν ἀπέκλινεν, ἀλλ᾽ εὐθὺς Ὀλυνθίοις ἐπεχείρησεν. τὰς δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ Ἰλλυριοὺς καὶ Παίονας αὐτοῦ καὶ πρὸς Ἀρύββαν καὶ ὅποι τις ἂν εἴποι παραλείπω στρατείας.
[13] Then having settled Pherae, Pagasae, Magnesia, and the rest of that country to suit his purposes, off he went to Thrace, and there, after evicting some of the chiefs and installing others, he fell sick. On his recovery, he did not relapse into inactivity, but instantly assailed Olynthus. His campaigns against Illyrians and Paeonians and King Arybbas and any others that might be mentioned, I pass over in silence.
[14] τί οὖν, ἄν τις εἴποι, ταῦτα λέγεις ἡμῖν νῦν; ἵνα γνῶτ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ αἴσθησθ᾽ ἀμφότερα, καὶ τὸ προΐεσθαι καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἀεί τι τῶν πραγμάτων ὡς ἀλυσιτελές, καὶ τὴν φιλοπραγμοσύνην ᾗ χρῆται καὶ συζῇ Φίλιππος, ὑφ᾽ ἧς οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἀγαπήσας τοῖς πεπραγμένοις ἡσυχίαν σχήσει. εἰ δ᾽ ὁ μὲν ὡς ἀεί τι μεῖζον τῶν ὑπαρχόντων δεῖ πράττειν ἐγνωκὼς ἔσται, ἡμεῖς δ᾽ ὡς οὐδενὸς ἀντιληπτέον ἐρρωμένως τῶν πραγμάτων, σκοπεῖσθ᾽ εἰς τί ποτ᾽ ἐλπὶς ταῦτα τελευτῆσαι.
[14] “Well,” some of you may say, “why tell us this now?” Because, men of Athens, I want you to know and realize two things: first, what an expensive game it is to squander your interests one by one; and secondly, the restless activity which is ingrained in Philip’s nature, and which makes it impossible for him ever to rest on his laurels. But if Philip adopts the principle that he ought always to be improving his position, and you the principle of never facing your difficulties resolutely, just reflect what is likely to be the end of it all.
[15] πρὸς θεῶν, τίς οὕτως εὐήθης ἐστὶν ὑμῶν ὅστις ἀγνοεῖ τὸν ἐκεῖθεν πόλεμον δεῦρ᾽ ἥξοντα, ἂν ἀμελήσωμεν; ἀλλὰ μήν, εἰ τοῦτο γενήσεται, δέδοικ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὥσπερ οἱ δανειζόμενοι ῥᾳδίως ἐπὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις τόκοις μικρὸν εὐπορήσαντες χρόνον ὕστερον καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀπέστησαν, οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς ἂν ἐπὶ πολλῷ φανῶμεν ἐρρᾳθυμηκότες, καὶ ἅπαντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ζητοῦντες πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ ὧν οὐκ ἐβουλόμεθ᾽ ὕστερον εἰς ἀνάγκην ἔλθωμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ κινδυνεύσωμεν περὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χώρᾳ.
[15] Seriously, is anyone here so foolish as not to see that our negligence will transfer the war from Chalcidice to Attica? Yet if that comes to pass, I am afraid, men of Athens, that just as men who borrow money recklessly at high interest enjoy a temporary accommodation only to forfeit their estates in the end, so we may find that we have paid a heavy price for our indolence, and because we consult our own pleasure in everything, may hereafter come to be forced to do many of the dfficult things for which we had no liking, and may finally endanger our possessions here in Attica itself.
[16] τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπιτιμᾶν ἴσως φήσαι τις ἂν ῥᾴδιον καὶ παντὸς εἶναι, τὸ δ᾽ ὑπὲρ τῶν παρόντων ὅ τι δεῖ πράττειν ἀποφαίνεσθαι, τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι συμβούλου. ἐγὼ δ᾽ οὐκ ἀγνοῶ μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦθ᾽ ὅτι πολλάκις ὑμεῖς οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ὑστάτους περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων εἰπόντας ἐν ὀργῇ ποιεῖσθε, ἄν τι μὴ κατὰ γνώμην ἐκβῇ: οὐ μὴν οἶμαι δεῖν τὴν ἰδίαν ἀσφάλειαν σκοποῦνθ᾽ ὑποστείλασθαι περὶ ὧν ὑμῖν συμφέρειν ἡγοῦμαι.
[16] Now someone may tell me that to find fault is easy and in any one’s power, but that it needs a statesman to expound the policy demanded by our circumstances. But I am not unaware, men of Athens, that if anything goes wrong, you often vent your disappointment, not on the responsible agents, but on those who happen to have addressed you last. I shall not, however, consult my own safety by keeping back what I believe to be for your true interests.
[17] φημὶ δὴ διχῇ βοηθητέον εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασιν ὑμῖν, τῷ τε τὰς πόλεις τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις σῴζειν καὶ τοὺς τοῦτο ποιήσοντας στρατιώτας ἐκπέμπειν, καὶ τῷ τὴν ἐκείνου χώραν κακῶς ποιεῖν καὶ τριήρεσι καὶ στρατιώταις ἑτέροις:
[17] I suggest then that the case calls for two distinct expeditions; one military force must be dispatched to rescue their cities for the Olynthians, and a second force, both naval and military, to ravage Philip’s territory. If you neglect either of them, I am afraid your campaign will prove abortive.
[18] εἰ δὲ θατέρου τούτων ὀλιγωρήσετε, ὀκνῶ μὴ μάταιος ἡμῖν ἡ στρατεία γένηται. εἴτε γὰρ ὑμῶν τὴν ἐκείνου κακῶς ποιούντων, ὑπομείνας τοῦτ᾽ Ὄλυνθον παραστήσεται, ῥᾳδίως ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκείαν ἐλθὼν ἀμυνεῖται: εἴτε βοηθησάντων μόνον ὑμῶν εἰς Ὄλυνθον, ἀκινδύνως ὁρῶν ἔχοντα τὰ οἴκοι, προσκαθεδεῖται καὶ προσεδρεύσει τοῖς πράγμασι, περιέσται τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν πολιορκουμένων. δεῖ δὴ πολλὴν καὶ διχῇ τὴν βοήθειαν εἶναι.
[18] For if you send a marauding expedition, he will stand on the defensive until he has made himself master of Olynthus, and then he will easily march to the relief of his own territory; or if you confine yourselves to helping Olynthus, he will know that his base is secure and will give close and undivided attention to his operations, until at last he overcomes the resistance of the besieged. Our expedition, you see, must be on a large scale and twofold.
[19] καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς βοηθείας ταῦτα γιγνώσκω: περὶ δὲ χρημάτων πόρου, ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, χρήμαθ᾽ ὑμῖν, ἔστιν ὅσ᾽ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων στρατιωτικά: ταῦτα δ᾽ ὑμεῖς οὕτως ὡς βούλεσθε λαμβάνετε. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα τοῖς στρατευομένοις ἀποδώσετε, οὐδενὸς ὑμῖν προσδεῖ πόρου, εἰ δὲ μή, προσδεῖ, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἅπαντος ἐνδεῖ τοῦ πόρου. ‘τί οὖν;’ ἄν τις εἴποι, ‘σὺ γράφεις ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι στρατιωτικά;’ μὰ Δί᾽ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
[19] Such are my views on the expeditionary force. With regard to the supply of money, you have money, men of Athens; you have more than any other nation has for military purposes. But you appropriate it yourselves, to suit your own pleasure. Now if you will spend it on the campaign, you have no need of a further supply; if not, you have — or rather, you have no supply at all. “What!” someone will cry, “do you actually move to use this money for military purposes?” Of course I do not.
[20] ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι στρατιώτας δεῖν κατασκευασθῆναι καὶ ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι στρατιωτικὰ καὶ μίαν σύνταξιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ τε λαμβάνειν καὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν τὰ δέοντα, ὑμεῖς δ᾽ οὕτω πως ἄνευ πραγμάτων λαμβάνειν εἰς τὰς ἑορτάς. ἔστι δὴ λοιπόν, οἶμαι, πάντας εἰσφέρειν, ἂν πολλῶν δέῃ, πολλά, ἂν ὀλίγων, ὀλίγα. δεῖ δὲ χρημάτων, καὶ ἄνευ τούτων οὐδὲν ἔστι γενέσθαι τῶν δεόντων. λέγουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς ἄλλοι πόρους, ὧν ἕλεσθ᾽ ὅστις ὑμῖν συμφέρειν δοκεῖ: καὶ ἕως ἐστὶ καιρός, ἀντιλάβεσθε τῶν πραγμάτων.
[20] Only it is my opinion that we must provide soldiers and that there must be one uniform system of pay in return for service. Your opinion, however, is that you should, without any trouble, just appropriate the money for your festivals. Then the only alternative is a war-tax, heavy or light, as circumstances demand. Only money we must have, and without money nothing can be done that ought to be done. There are other proposals before you for raising supplies; choose whichever of them you think expedient, and, while there is yet time, grapple with the problem.
[21] ἄξιον δ᾽ ἐνθυμηθῆναι καὶ λογίσασθαι τὰ πράγματ᾽ ἐν ᾧ καθέστηκε νυνὶ τὰ Φιλίππου. οὔτε γάρ, ὡς δοκεῖ καὶ φήσειέ τις ἂν μὴ σκοπῶν ἀκριβῶς, εὐτρεπῶς οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἂν κάλλιστ᾽ αὐτῷ τὰ παρόντ᾽ ἔχει, οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐξήνεγκε τὸν πόλεμόν ποτε τοῦτον ἐκεῖνος, εἰ πολεμεῖν ᾠήθη δεήσειν αὐτόν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐπιὼν ἅπαντα τότ᾽ ἤλπιζε τὰ πράγματ᾽ ἀναιρήσεσθαι, κᾆτα διέψευσται. τοῦτο δὴ πρῶτον αὐτὸν ταράττει παρὰ γνώμην γεγονὸς καὶ πολλὴν ἀθυμίαν αὐτῷ παρέχει, εἶτα τὰ τῶν Θετταλῶν.
[21] It is worth while, however, to observe and consider how Philip stands today. His present prospects are not so bright or satisfactory as they seem and as a superficial observer might pronounce them; nor would he ever have provoked this war had he thought that he would be bound to fight himself. He hoped that on his first entry he would carry all before him, and he finds himself completely mistaken. This unforeseen result confounds and discourages him; and besides there is the question of Thessaly.
[22] ταῦτα γὰρ ἄπιστα μὲν ἦν δήπου φύσει καὶ ἀεὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, κομιδῇ δ᾽, ὥσπερ ἦν, καὶ ἔστι νῦν τούτῳ. καὶ γὰρ Παγασὰς ἀπαιτεῖν αὐτόν εἰσιν ἐψηφισμένοι, καὶ Μαγνησίαν κεκωλύκασι τειχίζειν. ἤκουον δ᾽ ἔγωγέ τινων, ὡς οὐδὲ τοὺς λιμένας καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς ἔτι δώσοιεν αὐτῷ καρποῦσθαι: τὰ γὰρ κοινὰ τὰ Θετταλῶν ἀπὸ τούτων δέοι διοικεῖν, οὐ Φίλιππον λαμβάνειν. εἰ δὲ τούτων ἀποστερήσεται τῶν χρημάτων, εἰς στενὸν κομιδῇ τὰ τῆς τροφῆς τοῖς ξένοις αὐτῷ καταστήσεται.
