Disorder, page 44
26. On the role of British citizen-creditors in financing the war see James Macdonald, A Free Nation Deep in Debt: The Financial Roots of Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 2003), pp. 435–45.
27. Robert Colls, Identity of England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 124–6. For the role of the idea of ‘the people’s war’ in British perceptions of the Second World War see Angus Calder, The People’s War: Britain 1939–45 (London: Pimlico, 1992).
28. For an influential later version of this argument set in a broader Marxist framework see Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain (London: Verso, 1981).
29. Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century, revised edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), pp. 197–9. Lawrence R. Samuel, Pledging Allegiance: American Identity and the Bond Drive of World War II (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997).
30. Martin Luther King Jr, Speech in Atlanta, 10 May 1967, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/02/martin-luther-king-hungry-club-forum/552533/
31. See Gerstle, American Crucible, ch. 7. The most powerful statement of black nationalism is Malcolm X’s autobiography: Malcom X and Alex Haley, The Autobiography of Malcolm X (London: Penguin, 2007). (Originally published by Grove Press, 1965.)
32. Gerstle, American Crucible, pp. 349–57. As an example of the pessimistic take see Bruce D. Porter, ‘Can American Democracy Survive?’, Commentary 96 (November 1993): pp. 37–40, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/bruce-porter/can-american-democracy-survive/
33. Robert Kaplan sees the end of the draft in 1973 as bringing ‘the United States back to its roots as a weakly governed, brawling, fractious society’ comparable to what prevailed before the Civil War. Robert D. Kaplan, ‘Fort Leavenworth and the Eclipse of Nationhood’, Atlantic Monthly, September 1996, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1996/09/fort-leavenworth-and-the-eclipse-of-nationhood/376665/
34. Some intellectuals used the democratic excess argument to explain the American failure in Vietnam. David Runciman, The Confidence Trap: A History of Democracy in Crisis from World War I to the Present, updated edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), pp. 189–95.
35. Michael J. Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Jojo Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission (New York: New York University Press, 1975), p. 2.
36. Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy, p. 113.
37. Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy, p. 164.
38. Mark Blyth and Matthias Matthijs, ‘Black Swans, Lame Ducks, and the Mystery of IPE’s Missing Macro-Economy’, Review of International Political Economy 24, no. 2 (2017): pp. 210–11.
39. Meg Jacobs, Panic at the Pump: The Energy Crisis and the Transformation of American Politics in the 1970s (New York: Hill and Wang, 2017), p. 94.
40. Jacobs, Panic at the Pump, 33. Stefan Eich and Adam Tooze make a similar argument to mine here against the claim that it was a democratic excess that sustained inflation. Stefan Eich and Adam Tooze, ‘The Great Inflation’ in Vorgeschichte der Gegenwa: Dimensionen des Strukturbruchs nach dem Boom, edited by Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Lutz Raphael, and Thomas Schlemmer (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2016). In English at https://mk0adamtoozept2ql1eh.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/The_Great_Inflation_w_Adam:Tooze_2016.pdf
41. Meg Jacobs, Panic at the Pump, pp. 33–4. On the democratic strength of the idea that governments should stop price increases see Meg Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics: Economic Citizenship in Twentieth Century America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
42. The 1979 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto, http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1979/1979-conservative-manifesto.shtml
43. Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki, Crisis of Democracy, p. 9.
44. Scott Lash, ‘The End of Neo-Corporatism? The Breakdown of Centralised Bargaining in Sweden’, British Journal of Industrial Relations 23, no. 2 (1985): pp. 215–39.
45. Quoted Jacobs, Panic at the Pump, p. 35.
46. Quoted Jacobs, Panic at the Pump, p. 44.
47. James Schlesinger, ‘Will War Yield Oil Security?’ Challenge 34, no. 2 (1991): p. 30.
48. Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy, 13 November 1986, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-iran-arms-and-contra-aid-controversy-november-13%961986
49. Richard Nixon, Address to the Nation About National Energy Policy, 7 November 1973, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-about-national-energy-policy
50. Jimmy Carter, Address to the Nation: Energy and the National Goals, 15 July 1979, https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/speeches/energy-crisis.phtml
51. Jacobs, Panic at the Pump, ch. 5.
52. Jon Henley, ‘Gigantic Sleaze Scandal Winds up as Former Elf Oil Chiefs are Jailed’, Guardian, 13 November 2003, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2003/nov/13/france.oilandpetrol
53. On the use of offshore financing by the Christian Democrats see Andrea Binder, ‘The Politics of the Invisible: Offshore Finance and State Power, a Country Level Comparison’, PhD Dissertation submitted to Cambridge University, January 2019, pp. 81–3.
54. Address by President Eisenhower, 17 January 1961. https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/farewell-address/1961-01-17-press-release.pdf
55. Michael Howard, ‘War and the Nation-state’, Daedalus 108, no. 4 (1979): pp. 106–7.
56. On the importance of constitutionalism with a strong distrust of any claim to popular sovereignty and the later weight of this for the EU via the German Constitutional Court see Jan-Werner Müller, ‘Beyond Militant Democracy?’, New Left Review 73 (January/February 2012): pp. 39–47.
57. See Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
58. Friedrich A. Hayek, ‘The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism’ in Friedrich A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1948), pp. 255–72.
59. Craig Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 52–66.
60. See Eric O’Connor, ‘European Democracy Deferred: de Gaulle and the Dehousse Plan,1960’, Modern and Contemporary France 25, no. 2 (2017): pp. 209–24.
61. Wolfgang Streeck, ‘Progressive Regression’, New Left Review 118 (July/August 2019): p. 121.
62. See Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992).
63. On the advantages of finance to Western governments in the 1970s and 1980s see Greta Krippner, Capitalising on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). For the argument that debt staved off what would have been a full-scale crisis of capitalism and democracy in the 1970s see Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (London: Verso, 2014).
64. On the limited impact of open international capital flows on most European welfare states see Duane Swank, Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
65. For a comparative study of competitive tax reform see Duane Swank, ‘Taxing Choices: International Competition, Domestic Institutions, and the Transformation of Corporate Tax Policy’, Journal of European Public Policy 23, no. 4 (2016): pp. 571–603.
66. On why small democratic states drove corporation tax competition see Philipp Genschel, Hanna Lierse, and Laura Seelkopf, ‘Dictators Don’t Compete: Autocracy, Democracy and Tax Competition’, Review of International Political Economy 23, no. 2 (2016): pp. 290–315.
67. Philipp Genschel, ‘Globalization and the Transformation of the Tax State’, European Review 13, no. 1 (2005): p. 66.
68. Jacob Burckhardt, The Age of Constantine the Great (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 70.
69. On the place of tax havens in the world economy see Ronen Palan, Richard Murphy, and Christian Chavagneux, Tax Havens: How Globalization Really Works (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010); Gabriel Zucman, The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax Havens (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
70. On this point see Binder, ‘The Politics of the Invisible’, pp. 166–8. On the rise of offshore banking see Gary Burn, ‘The State, the City and the Euromarkets’, Review of International Political Economy 6 no. 2 (1999): pp. 225–61. Robert N. McCauley, Patrick M. McGuire, and Vladyslav Sushko, ‘Global Dollar Credit: Links to US Monetary Policy and Leverage’, January 2015, BIS Working Paper, no. 483, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2552576
71. Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, ‘Winner-Takes-All-Politics: Public Policy, Political Organisation, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States’, Politics and Society 38, no. 2 (2010): pp. 193–6.
72. Hacker and Pierson, ‘Winner-Takes-All-Politics’, pp. 157–9.
73. Hacker and Pierson, ‘Winner-Takes-All-Politics’, pp. 176–9.
74. Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics, pp. 267–8.
75. Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe C. Schmitter, ‘From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism: Organised Interests in the Single European Market’, Politics and Society 19, no. 2 (1991): pp. 133–64 For further discussion see Blyth and Matthijs, ‘Black Swans’, pp. 216–17.
76. James Macdonald in his history of the citizen creditor and its relationship to democratic politics sees the peacetime debt of the 1970s financed predominantly in international capital markets as itself a manifestation of the breakdown of nationhood and ‘a house divided into warring economic interest groups’. Macdonald, A Free Nation Deep in Debt, p. 471.
77. Wolfgang Streeck draws a distinction between a tax state, which is a Staatsvolk, and a Marktvolk, which is a debt state. The Staatsvolk rests on a national people of citizens and the Marktvolk on an international people of investors. But the concept of the people only makes sense in relation to a political community, not to banks, pension funds, and individuals with no sense of political commonality. Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time, pp. 80–6.
78. On the impact of falling inflation from the 1980s on creditor–debtor politics see Mark Blyth, ‘Will the Politics or Economics of Deflation Prove More Harmful?’, Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy 50, no. 2 (2015): pp. 115–16.
79. Blyth and Matthijs, ‘Black Swans’, p. 216. On the way in which private debt temporarily stabilized democracies from the 1970s see Colin Crouch, ‘Privatised Keynesianism: An Unacknowledged Policy Regime’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 11, no. 3 (2009): pp. 382–99.
80. Heath was, nonetheless, reliant on sixty-nine Labour MPs breaking their party whip to support the government.
81. Robert Saunders, Yes to Europe!: The 1975 Referendum and Seventies Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 63–76.
82. The clear constraints on parliamentary sovereignty in the British constitution before accession to the EC materialized around the Union and matters pertaining to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. For further discussion of this point see Helen Thompson, ‘Consent: The Dynamite at the Heart of the British Constitution’, Prospect, 9 June 2021, https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/essays/consent-british-constitution-referendums-brexit-europe
83. Streeck and Schmitter, ‘From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism’, p. 152. On the failures of European trade union federation see Streeck, ‘Progressive Regression’, pp. 122–4; Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe, pp. 52–66.
84. Streeck and Schmitter, ‘From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism’, pp. 134–5. For an argument that the EU was less conducive to business lobbying than the American republic see Christine Mahoney, ‘Lobbying Success in the United States and the European Union’, Journal of Public Policy 27, no. 1 (2007): pp. 35–56.
85. See Neil Fligstein, Euroclash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). On the class implications of cosmopolitan identity see Craig Calhoun, ‘The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travelers: Toward a Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism’, South Atlantic Quarterly 101, no. 4 (2002): pp. 869–97.
86. For a discussion of the implications of the difference between the Bundesbank’s legitimating authority and the ECB’s authority, and the implications for representation and legitimacy, see Hjalte Lokdam, ‘Banking on Sovereignty: A Genealogy of the European Central Bank’s Independence’, PhD dissertation submitted to the London School of Economics, 2019. For the argument that there was a broader anti-inflationary monetary consensus behind monetary union see Kathleen McNamara, The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
Chapter 9
1. Quoted in Jon Schwarz, ‘Jimmy Carter: The US is an “Oligarchy with Unlimited Political Bribery” ’, Intercept, 31 July 2015, https://theintercept.com/2015/07/30/jimmy-carter-u-s-oligarchy-unlimited-political-bribery/
2. Bernie Sanders, ‘Democracy Versus Oligarchy’, speech on 31 March 2014, https://www.commondreams.org/views/2014/04/01/democracy-vs-oligarchy
3. Bernie Sanders, ‘Bernie’s Announcement’, speech on 26 May 2015. Published as Ezra Klein, ‘Read Bernie Sander’s populist, policy-heavy speech kicking off his campaign’, Vox, 26 May 2015, https://www.vox.com/2015/5/26/8662903/bernie-sanders-full-text-speech-presidential-campaign
4. Quoted in David Frum, ‘If Liberals Won’t Enforce Borders, Fascists Will’, Atlantic, April 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/04/david-frum-how-much-immigration-is-too-much/583252/
5. Quoted in Ezra Klein, ‘Bernie Sanders, The Vox Conversation’, Vox, 28 July 2015, https://www.vox.com/2015/7/28/9014491/bernie-sanders-vox-conversation
6. CNN Politics, Transcript of Republican Debate in Miami, Full Text, 15 March 2016, https://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/10/politics/republican-debate-transcript-full-text/index.html
7. See Ivan Krastev, After Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017).
8. Matthew Goodwin and Caitlin Milazzo, ‘Taking Back Control: Investigating the Role of Immigration in the 2016 Vote for Brexit’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19, no. 3 (2017): pp. 450–64.
9. Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of the Second Senate of 5 May 2020–2 BvR 859/15, para 104, https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2020/05/rs20200505_2bvr085915en.html;jsessionid=8407F8BD54CB01E168426940040ADD26.1_cid386
10. Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 93.
11. Matt Qvortrup, ‘The Three Referendums on the European Constitution Treaty in 2005’, Political Quarterly 77, no. 1 (2006): p. 95. On the divisions among Gaullists see Benjamin Leruth and Nicholas Startin, ‘Between Euro-Federalism, Euro-Pragmatism and Euro-Populism: The Gaullist Movement Divided Over Europe’, Modern Contemporary France 25, no. 2 (2017): pp. 153–69.
12. Craig Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 225–7.
13. Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe, pp. 242–3.
14. On the gap between French politicians’ rhetoric on Europe and the difficulty political reality see Vivien A. Schmidt, ‘Trapped by their Ideas: French Elites’ Discourses of European Integration and Globalization’, Journal of European Public Policy 20, no. 4 (2006): pp. 992–1009.
15. Bundesverfassungsgericht, *57 Manfred Brunner and others v. the European Union treaty, para 55, http://www.proyectos.cchs.csic.es/euroconstitution/library/Brunner_Sentence.pdf
16. Bundesverfassungsgericht, *57 Manfred Brunner and others v. the European Union treaty, para 44. On this point in the Court’s judgment see Matthias Mahlman, ‘Constitutional Identity and the Politics of Homogeneity’, German Law Journal 6, no. 2 (2005): pp. 307–18.
17. Martin J. Bull and James L. Newell, Italian Politics: Adjustment Under Duress (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), pp. 14–15.
18. Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherstone, ‘Italy and EMU as a “Vincolo Esterno”: Empowering the Technocrats, Transforming the State’, South European Society and Politics 1, no. 2 (1996): p. 277.
19. Dyson and Featherstone, ‘Italy and EMU as a “Vincolo Esterno”’, pp. 278–9. Carli himself was old and seriously ill when the negotiations began. He was also a technocratic minister, who had been governor of the Banca d’Italia.
20. Martin J. Bull, ‘In the Eye of the Storm: The Italian Economy and the Eurozone Crisis’, South European Society and Politics 23, no. 1 (2018): p. 18; Dyson and Featherstone, ‘Italy and EMU as a “Vincolo Esterno”’: p. 295.
21. On the rise of the Northern League see Francesco Cavatorta, ‘The Role of the Northern League in Transforming the Italian Political System: From Economic Federalism to Ethnic Politics and Back’, Contemporary Politics 7, no. 1 (2001): pp. 27–40.
22. Wolfgang Streeck, ‘Markets and Peoples: Democratic Capitalism and European Integration’, New Left Review 73 (Jan/Feb 2012): pp. 68–9.
23. Quoted in Guardian Staff and Agencies, ‘The Euro has Screwed Everybody—Berlusconi’, Guardian, 29 July 2005, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jul/29/euro.italy
24. See Nicolas Jabko, ‘The Importance of Being Nice: An Institutionalist Analysis of French Preferences on the Future of Europe’, Comparative European Politics 2, no. 3 (2004): pp. 282–301.
25. Chirac had complained at one point during the latter stage of the Nice negotiations that ‘every solution presents horrendous problems.’ Quoted in ‘So That’s All Agreed Then’, Economist, 14 December 2000, https://www.economist.com/special/2000/12/14/so-thats-all-agreed-then
26. European Council Meeting in Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001, Annex 1, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20950/68827.pdf. For an account of the constitutional convention and subsequent treaty negotiations see Peter Norman, The Accidental Constitution: The Making of Europe’s Constitutional Treaty, second edition (Eurocomment: 2005).
