Disorder, page 43
18. Yack, ‘Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism’, p. 520.
19. See Alexandre Grandazzi, The Foundation of Rome: Myth and History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).
20. Quoted in Robert Tombs, France 1814–1914 (London: Longman, 1996), p. 370. On European states using foreign policy and empire for nation-building see Helen Thompson, Might, Right, Prosperity and Consent: Representative Democracy and the International Economy, 1919–2001 (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 32–6.
21. On French nation-building during the Third Republic via language and national education see Eugene Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernisation of Rural France, 1870–1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).
22. On the relationship between socialism in Germany and France and nationhood see Sheri Berman, The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe’s Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
23. Saul Dubow and Gary Gerstle, ‘Race, Ethnicity and Nationalism’ in A Cultural History of Democracy in the Modern Age, edited by Eugenio Biagini and Gary Gerstle (London: Bloomsbury, 2021), p. 151.
24. Will Kymlicka, ‘Modernity and Minority Nationalism: Commentary on Thomas Franck’, Ethics and International Affairs 11 (March 1997): pp. 171–6.
25. Michael Mann has argued that there is a strong historical relationship between democracy and ethnic cleansing. The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
26. On Lincoln’s imaginative refounding of the American nation in the Gettysburg Address see Garry Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words that Remade America (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992). For the ways in which the Civil War more generally recast American nationhood see James M. McPherson, The War that Forged a Nation: Why the Civil War Still Matters (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
27. Yack, ‘Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism’, p. 521.
28. On the politics of exclusion for subversion in the United States see Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century, revised edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), ch. 3.
29. See John Boyer, Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the Christian Social Movement, 1848–1897 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); John Boyer, Cultural and Political Crisis in Vienna: Christian Socialism in Power, 1897–1918 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
30. J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Political Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 77.
31. Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, edited by F.W. Walbank and trans. Ian-Scott Kilvert (London: Penguin 1979), p. 350.
32. Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, p. 350.
33. Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, p. 310.
34. Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, p. 311.
35. Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, p. 350.
36. Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, p. 350.
37. On the significance of this change see Jeffrey A. Winters, Oligarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 26–31.
38. Peter Fraser, ‘Public Petitioning and Parliament Before 1832’, History 46, no. 158 (1961): pp. 195–211.
39. For the politics of land in Britain since the 1970s see Brett Christophers, The New Enclosure: The Appropriation of Public Land in Neoliberal Britain (London: Verso, 2019).
40. Richard Johnson, The End of the Second Reconstruction (Cambridge: Polity, 2020), pp. 40–1.
41. See John Dunn, Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy (London: Atlantic Books, 2005); John Dunn, ‘Conclusions’ in Democracy: The Unfinished Journey 508 BC to 1993, edited by John Dunn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 250–60.
42. Income tax was introduced during the Civil War and repealed in 1872.
43. Winters, Oligarchy, pp. 227–9. For a political history of American income tax see John Whitte, The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986).
44. Scheidel, The Great Leveller, pp. 143–9.
45. See William H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1982).
46. Max Weber, ‘Parliament and Government in Germany’ in Weber, Political Writings, pp. 219–22; Max Weber, ‘The Profession and Vocation of Politics’ in Weber, Political Writings, pp. 331, 342–3.
47. Tomáš Sedláček, Economics of Good and Evil: The Quest for Economic Meaning from Gilgamesh to Wall Street (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 76–8.
48. James Macdonald, A Free Nation Deep in Debt: The Financial Roots of Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 2003), p. 373. This view was reinforced by the idea that debt had destructive consequences for the Roman Republic.
49. Macdonald, A Free Nation Deep in Debt, ch. 8.
50. This was strategy pioneered by Louis Napoleon to finance France’s participation in the Crimean War. On the emergence from the mid-nineteenth century of a new form of citizen creditors see Macdonald, A Free Nation Deep in Debt, pp. 377–464.
51. Quoted in Macdonald, A Free Nation Deep in Debt, p. 396.
52. Machiavelli, The Discourses, edited by Bernard Crick and trans. Leslie Walker (London: Penguin, 1970), pp. 385 and 385–7.
53. Machiavelli, The Discourses, pp. 201, 202.
54. For an interpretation of Machiavelli’s analysis that makes Machiavelli a supporter of the Gracchi’s redistributive agenda and a critic of their prudential approach to the problem by trying to resurrect old laws see John P. McCormick, ‘Machiavelli and the Gracchi: Prudence, Violence and Redistribution’, Global Crime 10, no. 4 (2009): pp. 298–305.
55. Gregory Ablavsky, ‘The Savage Constitution’, Duke Law Journal 63, no. 5 (2014): pp. 999–1089.
56. James Madison, ‘Federalist 63’ in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist: With Letters of Brutus, edited by Terence Ball (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003), p. 307.
57. Alexander Hamilton, ‘Federalist 1’ in Hamilton, Madison and Jay, The Federalist, p. 3.
58. Brutus, ‘Letter IV’ in Hamilton, Madison and Jay, The Federalist: With Letters of Brutus, p. 458.
59. See Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), ch. 6; Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), chs. 5 and 6; E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance, 1776–1790 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961).
60. The Omaha Platform. Available at http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5361/
61. See, for example, for different judgements, Thomas Frank, The People, No: A Brief History of Anti-Populism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2020); Barry Eichengreen, The Populist Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), ch 2.
62. On the importance of the producer class ethic to the American populists see Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion: An American History, revised edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 13–15.
63. Quoted in Kazin, The Populist Persuasion, p. 45.
64. Speech by William Jennings Bryan at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, 9 July 1896, http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5354/
65. Quoted in Kazin, The Populist Persuasion, p. 44.
66. Rogers M. Smith, ‘The “American Creed” and American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States’, Western Political Quarterly 41 no.2 (1988): pp. 235–6, 243–5; John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925, revised edition (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002).
67. Referendums did not in practice mean that corporate interests could be defeated by the democratic majority. Corporate and professional interests found means to use these direct elections to their own advantage. See Daniel A. Smith and Joseph Lubinski, ‘Direct Democracy During the Progressive Era: A Crack in the Populist Veneer?’, Journal of Policy History 14, no. 4 (2002): pp. 349–83.
68. Gary Gerstle begins his book—American Crucible—on American nationhood and the contest between the contradictory claims of civic nationalism and racial nationalism and the twentieth-century history of each with two chapters on Theodore Roosevelt.
69. For the argument that the Progressives were blind to class conflict in democratic politics see Shelton Stromquist, Reinventing ‘the People’: The Progressive Movement, the Class Problem, and the Origins of Modern Liberalism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006).
70. Kazin, The Populist Persuasion, p. 20.
71. On the importance for the New York banks of the dollar becoming an international currency see J. Lawrence Broz, The International Origins of the Federal Reserve System (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).
72. Liaquat Ahamed, The Lords of Finance: 1929, The Great Depression, and the Bankers Who Broke the World (London: Windmill Books, 2009), p. 56.
73. A 1917 act had already placed some limits on migration from Southern and Eastern Europe for the first time, but in practice they had proved ineffective. On the 1920s immigration laws and their relationship to American nationhood see Gerstle, American Crucible, pp. 95–122.
74. Quoted in Boyer, Cultural and Political Crisis in Vienna, p. 459.
75. On the history of tax havens see Ronan Palan, Richard Murphy, and Christian Chavagneux, Tax Havens: How Globalisation Really Works (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), chs. 4 and 5. On the history of Jersey as a tax haven see Mark P. Hampton, ‘Creating Spaces. The Political Economy of Island Offshore Finance Centres: The Case of Jersey’, Geographische Zeitschrift 84, no. 2 (1996): pp. 103–13. On how resistance to paying taxes by some among the rich took shape in Britain see Andrea Binder, ‘The Politics of the Invisible: Offshore Finance and State Power: A Country-Level Comparison’, PhD Dissertation submitted to Cambridge University, January 2019, pp. 72–4.
76. On the general problem of capital flight in democracies during the interwar years see The League of Nations (Ragnar Nurske), International Currency Experience: Lessons of the Inter-War Period (League of Nations, Economic, Financial and Transit Department, 1944), pp. 162–3. On the problems facing French democracy in the 1920s around taxation and capital flight see Christophe Farquet, ‘Capital Flight and Tax Competition After the First World War: The Political Economy of French Tax Cuts, 1922–1928’, Contemporary European History 27 no. 4 (2018): pp. 537–61. On the French financial and currency crisis and its eventual resolution see Ahamed, The Lords of Finance, pp. 247–69; Kenneth Mouré, The Gold Standard Illusion: France, the Bank of France, and the International Gold Standard, 1914–1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), chs. 4–5.
77. Winters, Oligarchy, pp. 230–2.
78. Quoted in Farquet, ‘Capital Flight and Tax Competition After the First World War’, p. 558.
79. Frederick Taylor, The Downfall of Money: Germany’s Hyperinflation and the Destruction of the Middle Class (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013), pp. 351–2.
80. See Daniel Tost, ‘German Monetary Mythology’, Handelsblatt, 31 July 2017, https://www.handelsblatt.com/english/bundesbank-birthday-german-monetary-mythology/23571490.html?ticket=ST-510167-ZyfyCkdvtOlJWndHWxNM-ap1
81. See Robert L. Hetzel, ‘German Monetary Policy in the First Half of the Twentieth Century’, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly 88, no. 1 (2002): pp. 4–8.
82. Gerald Feldman, The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics, and Society in the German Inflation 1914–1924 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 4.
83. Quoted Hetzel, ‘German Monetary Policy in the First Half of the Twentieth Century’, p. 11.
84. Quoted in Ahamed, The Lords of Finance, p. 462.
85. For a recent argument that treats Roosevelt as an economic populist and defends this kind of populism as necessary in an economic crisis see Dani Rodrik, ‘Is Populism Necessarily Bad Economics?’, AEA Papers and Proceedings 108 (2018): pp. 196–9.
86. Franklin Roosevelt, Inaugural speech, 4 March 1933, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/froos1.asp. On Roosevelt’s use of economic nationhood see Gerstle, American Crucible, pp. 128–43, 149–55.
87. Franklin Roosevelt, Speech Accepting the Democratic Party’s Re-Nomination for the Presidency, 27 July 1936, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/acceptance-speech-for-the-renomination-for-the-presidency-philadelphia-pa
88. Amy E. Hiller, ‘Redlining and the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation’, Journal of Urban History 29, no. 4 (2003): pp. 394–420.
89. Katznelson, Fear Itself; Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005).
90. William Childs, The Texas Railroad Commission: Understanding Regulation in America to the Mid-Twentieth Century (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2005), pp. 217–24. This conflation continued during the attempts to open up offshore exploration and production in the Gulf of Mexico. Tyler Priest, ‘The Dilemmas of Oil Empire’, Journal of American History 99, no. 1 (2012): p. 239.
91. For a history of the Texas Railroad Commission see Childs, The Texas Railroad Commission.
Chapter 8
1. Quoted in B. Bryan, ‘Trump wants to go after Amazon’, Business Insider, 28 March 2018.
2. https://twitter.com/ThierryBreton/status/1285548529113595904
3. On the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany see Peter H. Merkl, The Origin of the West German Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).
4. Jan-Werner Müller, ‘On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism’, Contemporary Political Theory 5 (2006): p. 282. Peter Graf Kielmansegg, ‘The Basic Law, Response to the Past or Design for the Future?’ in ‘Forty Years of the Grundgesetz’, German Historical Institute Occasional Paper, Washington, DC, 1990, p. 11, https://www.ghdc.org/fileadmin/publications/Occasional_Papers/Forty_Years_of_the_grundgesetz.pdf. On the importance of the German Constitutional Court see Justin Collings, Democracy’s Guardians: A History of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 1951–2001 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Michaela Hailbronner, Traditions and Transformations: The Rise of German Constitutionalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
5. Benn Steil, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).
6. See Diane Coyle, GDP: A Brief Affectionate History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).
7. Jürgen Habermas, ‘Yet Again: German Identity: A Unified Nation of Angry DM-Burghers?’ New German Critique 52 (January 1991): p. 86.
8. Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity, revised edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 7.
9. On post-war British economic nationhood see David Edgerton, The Rise and Fall of the British Nation: A Twentieth-Century History (London: Allen and Lane, 2018).
10. Helen Thompson, Might, Right, Prosperity and Consent: Representative Democracy and the International Economy 1919–2001 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), pp. 107–13.
11. See Nelson Lichtenstein, State of the Union: A Century of American Labor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), ch. 4.
12. Meg Jacobs, ‘The Uncertain Future of American Politics, 1940–1973’ in American History Now, edited by Eric Foner and Lisa McGirr (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011), p. 160.
13. Jacobs, ‘The Uncertain Future of American Politics, 1940–1973’, pp. 158–62.
14. William Childs, The Texas Railroad Commission: Understanding Regulation in America to the Mid-Twentieth Century (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2005), pp. 237–40.
15. Walter Scheidel, The Great Leveller: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 149–59.
16. Scheidel, The Great Leveller, pp. 152–3.
17. Scheidel, The Great Leveller, p. 166.
18. On post-war taxation see Sven Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American Approaches to Financing the Modern State (London: Yale University Press, 1993). There were ongoing constraints in the United States about the tax state. See Meg Jacobs and Julian E. Zelizer, ‘The Democratic Experiment: New Directions in American Political History’ in The Democratic Experiment: New Directions in American Political History, edited by Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak, and Julian E. Zelizer (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 276–300. On the importance of the wartime tax regimes to post-war taxation see Thomas Picketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University press, 2014), pp. 146–50.
19. Ian Kershaw, ‘War and Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe’, Contemporary European History 14, no. 1 (2005): p. 120.
20. Although there was always a pan-German party in post-war Austrian politics, no pan-German party participated in an Austrian government until the 1980s.
21. William Safran, ‘State, Nation, National Identity, and Citizenship: France as a Test Case’, International Political Science Review 12, no. 3 (1991): p. 221.
22. On the way that the very language of the French revolution and French nationhood had long provided a political discourse to support rebellions against the French Empire see Lorelle Semley, To Be Free and French: Citizenship in France’s Atlantic Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
23. Safran, ‘State, Nation, National Identity, and Citizenship’, p. 225.
24. Safran, ‘State, Nation, National Identity, and Citizenship’, pp. 226–31.
25. On the historians’ dispute see Maier, The Unmasterable Past. On how the issues around constitutional patriotism played out around unification see Jan-Werner Müller, Another Country: German Intellectuals, Unification, and National Identity (London: Yale University Press, 2000).
