Disorder, page 39
64. Anca Gurzu and Joseph J. Schatz, ‘Great Northern Gas War’, Politico, 10 February 2016, https://www.politico.eu/article/the-great-northern-gas-war-nordstream-pipeline-gazprom-putin-ukraine-russia/
65. Quoted in Younkyoo Kim and Stephen Blank, ‘The New Great Game of Caspian Energy in 2013–14: “Turk Stream”, Russia and Turkey’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 18, no. 1 (2016): p. 37.
66. Quoted in Gustafson, The Bridge, p. 380.
67. Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘The Obama Doctrine’, Atlantic (April 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/
68. Goldberg, ‘The Obama Doctrine’; ‘Emmanuel Macron in his Own Words (English)’, Economist, 7 November 2019. https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-in-his-own-words-english
69. Goldberg, ‘The Obama Doctrine’.
70. Quoted in Dan Roberts and Spencer Ackerman, ‘Barack Obama Authorises Airstrikes Against ISIS Militants in Syria’, Guardian, 11 September 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/10/obama-speech-authorise-air-strikes-against-isis-syria
71. Quoted in Zeke J. Miller and Michael Sherer, ‘President Obama Attacks Republicans for Paris Response’, Time, 18 November 2015, https://time.com/4117688/barack-obama-paris-attacks-republican/
72. On the relationship between dollar finance and the American use of extraterritorial sanctions see Daniel W. Drezner, ‘Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance’, International Interactions 41, no. 4 (2015): pp. 755–64.
73. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council, pp. 16 and 2.
74. Reuters staff, ‘Obama Thanks Putin for Role in Iran Deal’, Reuters, 15 July 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-russia-call-idUSKCN0PP2RI20150715
75. On the problem of using American military power to compel in the Middle East see Christopher Layne, ‘Impotent Power? Re-Examining the Nature of America’s Hegemonic Power’, The National Interest 85 (September/October 2006): pp. 41–7.
76. Quoted in Quint Forgey, ‘Trump Levels New Sanctions Against Iran’, Politico, 24 June 2019, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/24/donald-trump-iran-strait-of-hormuz-1377826
77. US Energy Information Administration, US Petroleum Imports: Total, and from OPEC, Persian Gulf, and Canada, 1960–2019, https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/imports-and-exports.php
78. For the argument that the United States should minimize its commitments in the Middle East but can’t escape the Persian Gulf see Mara Karlin and Tamara Cofman Wittes, ‘America’s Middle East Purgatory’, Foreign Affairs 98, no. 1 (January/February 2019): pp. 88–100. For a set of arguments that the change in the United States’ energy position does allow for a reappraisal of the military commitment to the Persian Gulf see Charles Glaser and Rosemary A. Kelanic, eds., Crude Strategy: Rethinking the US Commitment to Defend Persian Gulf Oil (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016).
79. Stephen F. Szabo, Germany, Russia and the Rise of Geo-economics (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), p. 3.
80. US Energy Information Administration, Today in Energy, 1 December 2020, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=46076
81. US Energy Information Administration, Natural Gas Data, Liquid US Natural Gas Exports by Vessel and Truck, https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/ngm:epg0_evt_nus-z00_mmcfM.htm
82. Sarah White and Scott DiSavino, ‘France Halts Engie’s US LNG Deal Amid Trade, Environment Disputes’, Reuters, 23 October 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/engie-lng-france-unitedstates/france-halts-engies-us-lng-deal-amid-trade-environment-disputes-idUSKBN27808G
83. Reuters staff, ‘In Shift, Merkel Backs an End to EU-Turkey Membership Talks’, Reuters, 3 September 2017, https://cn.reuters.com/article/instant-article/idUSKCN1BE15B
84. House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, UK-Turkey Relations and Turkey’s Regional Role, Twelfth Report of Session 2010–2012, 4 April 2012, paras, 135, 143.
85. Quoted in House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, UK-Turkey Relations and Turkey’s Regional Role, para 167.
86. House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, UK-Turkey Relations and Turkey’s Regional Role, p. 174.
87. Quoted in George Parker, ‘Turkey Unlikely to Join EU “Until the Year 3000”, Says Cameron’, Financial Times, 22 May 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/de1efd42-2001-11e6-aa98-db1e01fabc0c
88. Michael Peel and Richard Milne, ‘Macron Warns Turkey Not to Undermine NATO Allies’ Solidarity’, Financial Times, 28 November 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/7177e13e-1203-11ea-a225-db2f231cfeae
89. Quoted in Reuters staff, ‘Turkey’s Erdogan Says Talks with EU May End over Cyprus Sanctions’, Reuters, 12 November 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyprus-turkey-eu-idUSKBN1XM19C
90. Economist, ‘Emmanuel Macron in His Own Words’.
91. Economist, ‘Why Germany’s Army is in a Bad State’, Economist, 9 August 2018, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/08/09/why-germanys-army-is-in-a-bad-state
92. Quoted in Justin Huggler, ‘Nato “More Important Now than in the Cold War”, Angela Merkel Says in Rebuke of Emmanuel Macron’, Daily Telegraph, 27 November 2019, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/11/27/nato-important-now-cold-war-angela-merkel-says-rebuke-emmanuel/; quoted in Reuters staff, ‘Merkel Ally Calls for Better Franco-German Ties After NATO Row’, Reuters, 24 November 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-france-idUSKBN1XY0I6
93. Quoted in Guy Chazan, ‘US Envoy Defends Nord Stream 2 Sanctions as ‘Pro-European’, Financial Times, 22 December 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/21535ebe-23dc-11ea-9a4f-963f0ec7e134
94. Guy Chazan, ‘Merkel Faces Calls to Scrap Nord Stream 2 After Navalny Poisoning’, Financial Times, 3 September 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/81e7d355-e478-49fc-ba75-49f43cbfc74f
95. On Turkish moves in the Eastern Mediterranean see Economist, ‘A Row Between Greece and Turkey Over Gas is Raising Tension in the Eastern Mediterranean’, Economist, 22 August 2020, https://www.economist.com/international/2020/08/20/a-row-between-turkey-and-greece-over-gas-is-raising-tension-in-the-eastern-mediterranean
96. Quoted in Laura Pitel and David Sheppard, ‘Turkey Fuels Regional Power Game over Mediterranean Gas Reserves’, Financial Times, 19 July 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/69a222d4-b37c-4e7e-86dc-4f96b226416d
97. Michaël Tanchum, ‘The Logic Beyond Lausanne: A Geopolitical Perspective on the Congruence Between Turkey’s New Hard Power and its Strategic Re-Orientation’, Insight Turkey 22, no. 3 (2020): p. 51, https://www.insightturkey.com/commentaries/the-logic-beyond-lausanne-a-geopolitical-perspective-on-the-congruence-between-turkeys-new-hard-power-and-its-strategic-reorientation
Chapter 4
1. Corriere della Serra, Economia, ‘Trichet e Draghi: Un’Azione Pressante Per Ristabilire La Fiducia Degli Investitori’, https://www.corriere.it/economia/11_settembre_29/trichet_draghi_inglese_304a5f1e-ea59-11e0-ae06-4da866778017.shtml
2. Alan Crawford and Tony Czuczka, Angela Merkel: A Chancellorship Forged in Crisis (Chichester: Wiley Bloomberg Press, 2013), p. 14.
3. Marcus Walker, Charles Forelle, and Stacy Meichtry, ‘Deepening Crisis Over Europe Pits Leader Against Leader’, Wall Street Journal, 30 December 2011, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203391104577124480046463576
4. Quoted in Silvia Ognibene, ‘Italy’s Northern League Chief Attacks Euro, Says Preparing for Exit’, Reuters, 7 February 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/instant-article/idUKKBN1FR30Z
5. Quoted in Adam Tooze, Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World (London: Penguin, 2018), p. 438.
6. Peter Spiegel, How the Euro Was Saved, Kindle edition (London: Financial Times, 2014), ch. 3.
7. Helen Thompson, Might, Right, Prosperity and Consent: Representative Democracy and the International Economy 1919–2001 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), pp. 78–9.
8. Benn Steil, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 331–5. One part of this problem was made famous by the American economist Robert Triffin. Triffin insisted that Bretton Woods imposed an impossible burden on the United States since in requiring an American balance of payments deficit to provide a flow of dollars for international trade to grow, it would also require the Federal Reserve to use its monetary policy to defend the dollar’s value, and recession would ensue. Robert Triffin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960). But Triffin did not provide a persuasive explanation of why Bretton Woods broke down on two scores. First, even before Triffin articulated his paradox, the system had already generated a counter-action to the gold–dollar problem in the Eurodollar markets which was what put huge strain on Bretton Woods well before its end. Second, after 1965, American policymakers did not orient American fiscal and monetary policy towards maintaining dollar–gold convertibility. Michael D. Bordo and Robert N. McCauley, ‘Triffin: Dilemma or Myth?’, BIS Working Papers, no. 684, 19 December 2017, https://www.bis.org/publ/work684.htm
9. Bordo and McCauley, ‘Triffin: Dilemma or Myth?’, p. 5.
10. For a history of the Eurodollar markets see Gary Burn, The Re-Emergence of Global Finance (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Catherine R. Schenk, ‘The Origins of the Eurodollar Market in London: 1955–1963’, Explorations in Economic History 35, no. 2 (1998): pp. 221–38.
11. On the crucial importance of London to the early Eurodollar markets and its long-term significance see Jeremy Green, The Political Economy of the Special Relationship: Anglo-American Development from the Gold Standard to the Financial Crisis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020); Gary Burn, ‘The State, the City, and the Euromarkets’, Review of International Political Economy 6, no. 2 (1999): pp. 225–61.
12. Milton Friedman, ‘The Euro-Dollar Market: Some First Principles’, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, July 1971, pp. 16, 21, https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/review/71/07/Principles_Jul1971.pdf
13. Federal Reserve Board, Federal Open Market Committee, Memoranda of Discussion, 17 December 1968, pp. 20–22, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcmod19681217.pdf
14. Jeffry Frieden, Banking on the World: The Politics of American International Finance (New York: Routledge Revivals, 2016), p. 81.
15. Quoted in Francis Gavin, Gold, Dollars and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958–1971 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), p. 121.
16. Michael J. Graetz and Olivia Briffault, ‘A “Barbarous Relic”: The French, Gold, and the Demise of Bretton Woods’, Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 558; Columbia Law & Economics Working Paper No. 560 (2016), p. 13. For the French view of Bretton Woods and the case for a return to a gold standard from a leading adviser to de Gaulle see Jacques Rueff, The Monetary Sin of the West (New York: Macmillan, 1972).
17. Helen Thompson, Oil and the Western Economic Crisis (London: Palgrave, 2017), p. 94.
18. For the argument against the inevitability of the end of Bretton Woods see Harold James, ‘The Multiple Contexts of Bretton Woods’, Oxford Review of Economics Policy 28, no. 3 (2012): pp. 420–3.
19. Steil, The Battle of Bretton Woods, p. 25.
20. James, ‘The Multiple Contexts of Bretton Woods’, p. 424.
21. On the growth of the Eurodollar markets in the 1970 see Carlo Edoardo Altamura, European Banks and the Rise of International Finance: The Post Bretton-Woods Era (London: Routledge, 2017).
22. Thompson, Oil and the Western Economic Crisis, p. 96.
23. David Spiro, The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony: Petrodollar Recycling and International Markets (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 107–20; Andrea Wong, ‘US Discloses Saudi Holdings of US Treasuries for First Time’, Bloomberg, 16 May 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-16/u-s-discloses-saudi-arabia-s-treasuries-holdings-for-first-time
24. Spiro, The Hidden Hand, pp. 122–4, 148.
25. Samba Mbaye, New Data on Global Debt, IMF Blog, https://blogs.imf.org/2019/01/02/new-data-on-global-debt/
26. For some considered arguments that frame economic life since the 1970s around neoliberalism see David Harvey, A Brief History of Neo-Liberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Andrew Gamble, Crisis Without End?: The Unravelling of Western Prosperity (London: Palgrave, 2014); Daniel Stedman Jones, Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics, updated edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).
27. On the intellectual origins of neoliberalism in the aftermath of the Habsburg Empire’s fall see Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neo-Liberalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).
28. For a cogent argument that the 1970s represented the end of a century of material, technological and demographic conditions that drove a growth in American productivity that won’t return see Robert J. Gordon, The Rise and Fall of American Growth: the U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016).
29. For a similar concern for the material causes of the 1970 crisis see Adam Tooze, ‘Neo-liberalism’s World Order’, Dissent (Summer 2018), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/neoliberalism-world-order-review-quinn-slobodian-globalists. For discussion of the centrality of energy to the deregulation political agenda in the United States in the 1970s and early 1980s see Meg Jacobs, Panic at the Pump: The Energy Crisis and the Transformation of American Politics in the 1970s (New York: Hill and Wang, 2016). For a discussion of the relationship of dollar issues to liberalizing economic rhetoric see David E. Spiro, ‘The Role of the Dollar and the Justificatory Discourse of Neoliberalism’ in Counter-Shock: The Oil Counter-Revolution of the 1980s, edited by Duccio Basosi, Giuliano Garavini, and Massimiliano Trentin (London: I.B. Taurus, 2020), pp. 36, 49, 51.
30. Jacobs, Panic at the Pump, chs. 3–4.
31. Quoted in Jacobs, Panic at the Pump, p. 271.
32. Jacobs, Panic at the Pump, p. 109.
33. Perry Mehrling, ‘An Interview with Paul A. Volcker’, Macroeconomic Dynamics 5, no. 3 (2001): p. 443.
34. Graetz and Briffault, ‘A “Barbarous Relic” ’, p. 17.
35. Barry Eichengreen, Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 75.
36. Geoffrey Bell, ‘The May 1971 International Monetary Crisis: Implications and Lessons’, Financial Analysts Journal 27, no. 4 (1971): p. 88.
37. Quoted in James, Making the European Monetary Union, p. 87.
38. Quoted in EC: Heath-Brandt Meeting—Resumed (Possible Joint EC Float), 1 March 1973, UK National Archive. Available via the Margaret Thatcher Foundation: Britain & the Origin of the EMS.
39. Quoted in Callaghan Note of EMS Discussion (At Copenhagen European Council Dinner, 7 April 1978), UK National Archive. Available via the Margaret Thatcher Foundation: Britain & the Origin of the EMS, https://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/EMS_1978
40. Quoted in Transcript of Meeting of the Bundesbank Council, 30 November 1978; The National Archive, Schmidt Note of Remarks on EMS. UK National Archive. Available via the Margaret Thatcher Foundation: Britain & the Origin of the EMS.
41. Charles P. Kindleberger, ‘The Dollar Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow’, Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro Quarterly Review 155 (December 1985): p. 306.
42. Kiyoshi Hirowatari, Britain and European Monetary Cooperation 1964–1979 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 50.
43. Quoted in Catherine Schenk, ‘Sterling, International Monetary Reform, and Britain’s Applications to Join the European Economic Community in the 1960s’, Contemporary European History 11, no. 3 (2002): p. 367.
44. Schenk, ‘Sterling, International Monetary Reform’, p. 369.
45. Hirowatari, Britain and European Monetary Cooperation 1964–1979, pp. 48–9.
46. Harold James argues that it was only possible to get some EC monetary cooperation if Britain stayed out and left it to France and West Germany. James, ‘The Multiple Contexts’, p. 421.
47. For his own account of the Volcker shock see Paul A. Volcker with Christine Harper, Keeping at It: The Quest for Sound Money and Good Government (New York: Public Affairs, 2018).
48. Alexandre Reichart, ‘French Monetary Policy (1981–1985): A Constrained Policy, Between Volcker Shock, the EMS, and Macro-economic Imbalances’, Journal of European Economic History 44, no. 1 (2015): p. 15.
49. Jeremy Leaman, The Political Economy of Germany Under Chancellors Kohl and Schröder: Decline of the German Model? (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), pp. 26–30.
50. See Helen Thompson, The British Conservative Government and the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 1979–1994 (London: Pinter, 1996), chs. 2–5.
51. James, ‘Bretton Woods and its Multiple Contexts’, pp. 427–8.
52. On Plaza and Louvre and the failed attempt at mid-1980s exchange rate cooperation see C. Randall Henning, Currencies and Politics in the United States, Germany, and Japan (Washington, DC: Peterson Institution of International Economics, 1994); Yoichi Funabashi, Managing the Dollar from the Plaza to the Louvre, second edition (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 1989).
53. Spiro, ‘The Role of the Dollar and the Justificatory Discourse of Neoliberalism’, p. 41.
54. On how the French government reached the monetary union decision in 1988 see David J. Howarth, The French Road to European Monetary Union (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).
55. The fact that some, including Jacques Delors at the Commission, hoped that in time a European currency could offer an alternative to the dollar have led some—for example Barry Eichengreen, Exorbitant Privilege, p. 86—to stress dollar motives in the move. But it was the Deutsche Mark constraint and not the dollar constraint that was to the fore in 1987–88, and the French move immediately followed the Franco-German Council’s early demise.
