Sunday in Hell, page 67
Seven more civilians lost their lives on the installations they had gone to support, or where they normally worked as Federal employees. The Honolulu Fire Department lost three at Hickam Field: John Carriera, fifty-one, Samuel Macy, fifty-nine, and Harry Tuck Lee Pang, thirty. August Akina, thirty-seven, and Philip Ward Eldred, thirty-six, died at Hickam. Tai Chung Loo, nineteen, was killed at Pearl Harbor, and Daniel La Verne, twenty-five was killed at Red Hill.7
Civilian Medical Services Answered the Call
Months before 7 December, the Hawaii Territorial Medical Association and the four county medical societies had set up Preparedness Committees to plan and prepare the Territory of Hawaii and civilian physicians in case the United States entered the war. The Preparedness Committees were part of the M-day (mobilization day) plan activated the morning of the attack, when calls had gone out to doctors, nurses, and ambulance services.
Within minutes after the first bomb dropped on Pearl Harbor, hasty telephone calls to Honolulu officials set the well-planned civilian defense machinery in motion. The police switchboard officer was so skeptical of the first reports that he called the Pearl City station by radio to verify. Assured it was no hoax, he issued an alarm calling all police officers, police reserves, men with special badges, and even those on pension and retirement. They were desperately needed. Throughout the day unprecedented volume swamped ten men in a dispatch room usually staffed by three.
The first volunteer agencies to get into action were the medical and ambulance services of the Major Disaster Council. This council was an official organization of the City and County of Honolulu, formed in June 1941, as an outgrowth of several years of increasing concern over the possibility of wartime bombardment. The service established its office by 8:30 a.m., ordered litter frames installed in trucks volunteered as emergency ambulances. By 9:05 a.m., doctors and nurses were on their way to Tripler General Hospital at Fort Shafter in response to an Army request. By 9:15, eight first aid stations had reported in readiness, and five minutes later forty-five truck-ambulances were speeding to Hickam. At county, corporate and private hospitals, clinics and aid stations the response was gratifying, as doctors, nurses, volunteers and Red Cross workers tended to both military and civilian casualties who came in or were transported in for treatment.8
The plantation hospitals at Aiea, Ewa, and Waipahu received a total of more than 130 Navy casualties. The City-County Emergency Hospital received 104 patients between 8:36 a.m. and 8:17 p.m., The Queen’s Hospital emergency unit, fifty-three. Many attack victims were brought in dead or dying. About forty of the more critically injured were hospitalized at Queen’s, which, filled to capacity, hastily sent 100 of its 339 patients home to make room for the wounded. Leahi Home likewise discharged 105 of its 480 patients to provide beds for any further emergency.9
Most Army doctors rushed to the scenes of the bombings to provide field care for the wounded soldiers before sending them to Tripler. There, civilian doctors and nurses, Army nurses, and volunteer helpers performed most of the operating-room and ward duties. Appalling shortages and tremendous confusion arose as the seriously wounded arrived at Tripler in a steady stream until early afternoon. The entrance stairs to the hospital became spattered with blood.10
Not until late afternoon were sufficient supplies obtained from the Major Disaster Council, the Red Cross, civilian doctors’ offices, and from the Army itself, whose ample stocks were kept under lock and key, and were delayed by red tape. Until then, doctors doing major surgery borrowed scissors back and forth from one table to another. They ran out of operating gowns and worked in pajamas and underwear. They tied rags about their faces as masks, and for two or three hours had to operate without gloves.11
The Major Disaster Council had distributed two shipments of medical supplies to first aid stations before the war. A third allotment, which was still unpacked at the time of the attack, was distributed to hospitals and first aid stations by a hundred volunteers. Surgical instruments were sent to Tripler, where shortages became evident among the operating teams mobilized to meet the emergency. The Red Cross rushed 17,000 surgical dressings to Navy hospitals and a similar number to Tripler. The City-County Emergency Hospital loaned sulfa drugs to the armed forces. Unfortunately, the council’s supply of narcotics, stored in a safety deposit vault in compliance with federal laws, could not be obtained until 8 December.12
Most civilian physicians called were asked to come to Tripler, to which other Army hospitals, mostly Hickam’s new, smaller hospital, were sending patients because of limited local surgical capabilities, numbers of physicians, nurses, and available beds. Some were called into Queens Hospital, and other medical facilities designated in the prewar planning. Tripler’s doctors, nurses, corpsmen and orderlies, similar to other military hospital staffs were stunned and nearly overwhelmed by the initial flood of severely wounded which began to arrive that morning.
The response of Honolulu surgeons to a call from Tripler was immediate and en masse. By coincidence, many of them were assembled at the Mabel L. Smyth auditorium to hear Dr. John J. Moorhead, a visiting authority on traumatic [wound] surgery - the same lecturer Dr. Leonard D. Heaton, the surgeon from the Schofield Barracks was to have heard before a Japanese fighter made two passes down the street in front of his married officer quarters, just before 8:00 a.m. Dr. Moorhead began his lecture about 9:20, because some of the physicians had come in late, some, such as Dr. Arthur G. Hodgins, filled with excitement. No sooner did he begin his lecture with the scriptural quotation, “Be ye also ready, for in the hour that ye know not, the Son of Man cometh,” when the door was thrown open and Dr. Jesse Smith announced from the rear of the hall that surgeons were wanted at Tripler immediately. Dr. Moorhead and his entire audience answered the call. Eventually, many of them were asked to provide their remembrances of December Seventh.
Similar but not entirely typical of the fourteen civilian physicians’ recollections of that morning was Dr. Arthur G. Hodgins, a 1897 graduate of the University of Toronto and licensed in Hawaii in 1899 in the practice of obstetrics and gynecology. He was planning to attend the lecture by Dr. Moorhead. Dr. Hodgins drove from his home in Pearl City to Honolulu, nine miles distant. En route he could plainly see the attack in progress. When he arrived for the lecture shortly before 9:00, there was much curiosity, uncertainty and outright dismissal of reported observations among physicians waiting to hear Dr. Moorhead. With the notable exception of his apparently unwarranted criticism of Colonel Edgar King, the commander of Tripler Army Hospital, Dr. Hodgins’ recollections, taken in interviews and published in a six-part series, “Remembrances of December Seventh” in the Hawaii Medical Journal, 1947-48, are not unlike those of sixteen other physicians, most of whom went to Tripler to offer their services.
On the morning of December 7, 1941, he and his wife and his servants were at their place on “The [Pearl City] Peninsula” located next to the Pan American [Clipper Terminal] on the middle loch of Pearl Harbor. They had finished breakfast and he was waiting to bring his servants into town for the weekend when he heard the first bomb drop on Pearl Harbor. He rushed out and saw the dropping of the bomb and the anti-aircraft fire and the smoke beginning to rise from the other side of Ford Island about one mile away. About 8:15 to 8:30 they were ordered to get out, and he left with his servants for Honolulu. Near Aiea he picked up a sailor who told him that the city was under attack and that three of our ships were down and burning. Hodgins came to his office and unsuccessfully tried to call his wife, and then proceeded to the Mabel Smyth Memorial Building for the lecture of Dr. Moorhead. He arrived there shortly before 9:00 o'clock, and found several others of the medical profession there, including two Army medical officers from Schofield. He described what he had heard and seen, and the Army officers said they had just come by that way and there was nothing to it, and they went on into the meeting. Two other Army officers from Schofield came in and were immediately contacted by telephone and ordered to return to their quarters. Dr. Hodgins went into the hall and informed the first two medical officers from Schofield of the orders, but they paid no attention to him and sat still.
About five minutes after Dr. Moorhead began his lecture, Dr. Jesse Smith came in and announced that twelve operating surgeons were wanted at once at Tripler General Hospital. Dr. Sam Brown of Hilo, having no transportation, asked Dr. Hodgins to take him to Tripler. They had considerable trouble getting through, because everyone was taking to the road to see what was going on at Pearl Harbor. [Dr. Hodgins was seeing mostly military men voluntarily, or on telephone or radio recall, returning to their duty stations.] The first five surgeons to arrive at Tripler were Drs. Strode, R. 0. Brown, Sam Brown, Moorhead and Hodgins. They reached Tripler about 9:30 and were met by Major Spitler, who said, “They caught us with our pants down.” Subsequently Drs. Halford, Batten, Osorio, Black and others arrived. Dr. Hodgins and Dr. R. 0. Brown were directed to the Maternity floor by some Major. Dr. Halford and some of the others did most of the major surgery. When they went to get ready for surgery and had their clothes off, there were no operating suits, and he worked most of the day in his B.V.D.s. Later in the day someone found some pajamas for them to wear. They wore the same gown nearly all day and simply washed off their gloves between cases except when they got an occasional change of gloves. There was very little equipment. They had about three sterile towels for each patient, and their instruments were extremely limited. They each had two or three hemostats, and there was perhaps one operating saw in the house. There was plenty of sulfa drugs on hand but they had a great deal of trouble getting anesthetists, there being only two or three at the hospital, and consequently they did most of their surgery under local anesthesia. They were short of suture material and dressings. The Maternity department was very ill equipped to do the major surgery, so that they did not handle anything except shrapnel wounds and amputations.
They did not see Col. King the entire day.
He stated that the Army medical officers were acting as traffic officers, directing the ambulance drivers where to take patients, but that they made no apparent attempt to act as a triage to separate the urgent surgery from that less urgent. He said that no army surgeon did any surgery the first day.
Their first case was an amputation of a leg and the repair of a urethra torn by shrapnel. Dr. Brown, a urologist, desired to use a sound to make this repair, but they were unable to find one. Dr. Halford finally found a silver catheter but they were unable to use it, and Dr. Brown decided to drain the bladder supra-pubically. The patient was a fat man and they had only a single retractor to hold the wound open, and Hodgins had to use his finger to supply the deficiency. A catheter was fastened in place and that night the patient was brought back to be catheterized, but Dr. Hodgins didn’t know why.
On one occasion, apparently when the instruments had been reduced or changed, a man with a crushed arm was brought in which required amputation, and they had to refuse to do the amputation because of lack of instruments. “They were totally unprepared for any emergency such as that; Queen’s would have been better prepared.”
He stated that every operation was done by the civilian surgeons, and they cleared up most of the heavy work the first day, although there was some delay in getting to some of the patients of perhaps three to four hours. The blood and plasma was supplied by the local blood bank, and Dr. Fennel remained at the hospital giving the blood and plasma as rapidly as he could.
When Black got there he had to go back and get his own instruments.
The next day he returned to the hospital and offered his services and left his name and address for call, but was not called again.
They continued to work until about 4:00 p.m. He returned to the peninsula to find that his wife had packed up but the guard had refused her permission to leave. He talked the guard into letting them go to their sons in Dowsett Highlands, where they arrived at dark.
He advised that I see Mr. Al Castle, head of the Red Cross, about the work that they had done for about a year before the “blitz,” and that Col. King had done everything he could to discourage their work as being entirely unnecessary. He stated further that he thought Col. King had done more against the civilian hospitals in the city than any other individual; e.g. Queen’s Hospital was overcrowded and he would not allow them to put up a temporary structure to house about fifty patients because the hospital was in a danger zone. He demanded that “Queen's Hospital keep thirty beds vacant at all times for an emergency.” Again Leahi Home for Tuberculosis was overcrowded and had a waiting list, but was well equipped and staffed, but Col. King insisted on building another hospital at Wahiawa and manned by men who had not taken care of tuberculosis, instead of adding to Leahi. Asked if he thought there had been a marked increase in tuberculosis, he said No. He felt that the chlorination of the water was entirely unnecessary, as the water supply came from artesian wells and had never given any trouble.
When asked who were the men who deserve the credit for the medical civilian preparation, he said the Committee of Judd, Strode and others.
Dr. William Winter, who read Dr. Hodgins’ recollections in the series titled “Reminiscences of December Seventh,” wrote a letter to the editor of the Hawaiian Medical Journal and took strong exception to Hodgins’ characterization of Colonel King’s and the Army’s work at Tripler and in the civilian community.
To the Editor:
In connection with the article, “Reminiscences of December Seventh:” I wish to make a rather a strong statement.
According to the text of this article the late Dr. Hodgins saw fit to make the following remark under oath, “Col. King had done everything he could do to discourage their work [i.e., that of the Red Cross -Ed.] as being entirely unnecessary.” This appears on page 50 of the JOURNAL, Volume 7, Number 1, and has reference, I believe, to the work done by the Medical Preparedness Committee in conjunction with the American Red Cross.
I wish to state clearly and without fear of contradiction that the above quotation is as far removed from the truth as it is possible for a thing to be.
I can remember distinctly the tall gaunt figure of Col. King on the platform of the Mabel Smyth auditorium one Sunday morning in April, 1941. He was chewing what was alleged to be tobacco and he said this: “Gentlemen, it is highly probable that there will be a war in the Pacific in the not too distant future. I can conceive of a carrier-based raid directed against the island of Oahu which might easily result in 2,400 major casualties. Are you prepared to care for these casualties? I don't believe that you are.”
He then urged us to throw our whole-hearted support into the work of setting up medical aid stations. Dr. Robert B. Faus had already done considerable work in this direction, and Col. King urged that this work be continued. The question of equipment for these stations was a very difficult one. No funds were available from any source for such a purpose. Col. King knew this and told us, that although the United States Army could not supply us with funds, it could supply us with equipment, and that he would see to it that the Army did it, and it did. Thus much of the equipment in our medical aid stations came from Col. King.
Moreover, Col. King arranged for men from the various army services to address us on different subjects at our Sunday morning meetings. Each man who came to us was an expert in his own field. Men spoke on Chemical Warfare, War Gases, the Construction and Operation of Decontamination Units, Gas Masks, etc. This too came as a result of Col. King's interest.
Our Sunday morning meetings began in the latter part if March, 1941, and continued until the time of the attack. Col. King attended many of these meetings and was always most anxious to help us and was most generous with his counsel and advice.
Lastly, my own association with the preparedness program was sufficiently intimate for me to say beyond all peradventure of doubt that what Dr. Hodgins had to say concerning Col. King’s attitude toward medical preparedness is not true.
WILLIAM WINTER, M.D.
34, Young Hotel Bldg.
October 24, 1947
Dr. Homer Izumi’s and Dr. Harold Johnson’s experiences were markedly different than Dr. Hodgins.’
[Dr. Izumi] had come to Honolulu a few days before to complete preparations for moving to Honolulu and was staying with his friend Dr. Harold Johnson.
December 7, 1941, dawned bright and clear, and, highly optimistic about his plans, he packed to return home by the 8 o'clock plane. Dr. and Mrs. Johnson and their son Larry drove him to John Rodgers Airport, arriving there about 7:30. About 10-15 minutes after arriving they noticed clouds of smoke and heard gun fire over the Pearl Harbor area. A few planes were flying in the same vicinity and one was seen to burst into flames and plunge toward Pearl Harbor.
Directly overhead they also noted a flight of planes wheeling and circling in loop formation tit-tat-tatting at each other. In the course of all of its loops this formation swooped down to within about 150 feet of them and they noticed that one of the planes had red dot markers on its wings. Dr. Izumi remarked, “Gee, Harold, that looks like a Japanese emblem!” “Yeh, don’t they get realistic nowadays,” replied Johnson as he hoisted his boy Larry to his shoulders and said, “Look, Larry, look!”
Immediately after this event the Maui plane was announced and Dr. Izumi boarded it. Waving goodbye to his friends through the plane window, just as they were preparing to take off, he noticed someone running across the landing field, coming from the nearby Andrew Flying Service hangar and shouting something which immediately caused the farewell crowd gathered near the plane to run for their cars. Then the door of the plane was opened and all passengers were asked to get out. Dr. Johnson, who, like the rest of the farewell crowd had started to leave the airport, had returned by the time Dr. Izumi had disembarked. The cause for the sudden excitement was the fatal shooting of a man near Andrew's hangar, apparently from the firing of the planes which had just a few minutes before so closely zoomed overhead. [Unknown to Dr. Izumi, the man killed was the civilian flight instructor, Robert Tyce.]
