Sunday in Hell, page 24
The first of twelve B-17 crews of the 38th and 88th had quickly learned the hard way their fighter escorts weren’t American, the first of many costly surprises on and above the island of Oahu, and below the surface of the waters surrounding the island.47
Chapter 5
“AIR RAID, PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NOT DRILL.”
Any officer or non-commissioned officer who shall suffer
himself to be surprised…must not expect to be forgiven.
Major-General Sir James Wolfe
As aircraft in the first attack wave departed the Japanese Carrier Striking Force, the accompanying battleships and cruisers catapulted seaplanes into the air to patrol to the east, south and west of the carrier force. The entire surface force then turned south on their original course while the carriers were bringing up weapons-loaded aircraft from their hangar decks for the second attack wave.
At 0705 the carriers turned east into the wind a second time, and approximately ten minutes later began launching their aircraft in exactly the same order and using the same procedures as the first wave. One dive bomber from the carrier Hiryu didn’t take off due to engine problems, and soon after take off, two more Vals and a fighter turned back with engine malfunctions. By 0725 the second wave was airborne with 167 aircraft, winging its way toward Oahu. In just 90 minutes the Japanese had launched 350 aircraft toward their targets.
Japanese Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, Air Strike Mission Leader
Later, they launched 23 fighters to give combat air patrol coverage over the carrier force from 1000 until 1115 hours, and replaced them with 15 fighters from 1115 to approximately 1300, when the second wave was due to recover. For combat air patrol during the fleet’s withdrawal from the launch area between 1300 and 1730, they launched 18 for the first period, then nine for the remaining daylight hours. They held no aircraft in reserve for a third attack.
During the first wave’s approach to Oahu, a thickening 5,000-foot layer of clouds provided the aircraft protection from potential observers. At 0733 the cruiser Tone’s seaplane reported the Lahaina anchorage was clear, and at 0735 the cruiser Chikuma’s seaplane informed the approaching aircraft and their carrier formation that nine battleships, one heavy and six light cruisers were in the harbor. Three minutes later the same seaplane scouting Pearl Harbor reported the weather conditions all but perfect for the attack. Aside from the almost flawless execution of the operation during this phase, the only matters worth noting were the sunrise, which apparently bore a striking resemblance to the Japanese naval ensign (flag) and drew an appropriately mystical response from the mission leader, Fuchida, and as author H.P. Willmott wrote “- an almost surreal addition - the fact that as the Japanese aircraft approached Oahu, some of the aircrews tuned in the local radio station. It was playing a Japanese song.”
At 0740 hours, the first attack wave arrived off Kahuku Point. According to the Japanese plan of attack, if surprise was achieved, the Kate torpedo-bombers were to lead the assault. If no surprise, the dive bombers and Kate horizontal-bombers would lead in the hope they would attract the defenders’ fire and make things easier for the slower, more vulnerable torpedo-bombers. Fuchida would make the decision as to whether or not surprise had been achieved, and would fire one red flare to indicate surprise, and two if no surprise, which would determine the type aircraft to lead in the attack.
Japanese Aircraft Deployment, First Attack.
Assured of surprise, at 0740 he fired one flare, then noted that Lieutenant Masaharu Suganami, one of the fighter group leaders, must have failed to observe the signal because his planes didn’t take their proper formation. He paused for about ten seconds, and fired a second flare to alert Suganami, hoping the signal would be correctly interpreted. Lieutenant Commander Kakuichi Takahashi, leading the dive bombers, saw the second shot, and taking it for the double signal, accelerated immediately for his dive bombers’ attack run on Ford Island and Hickam Field. Lieutenant Commander Shigeharu Murata, leading the Kate torpedo bombers, saw what happened. Although he knew Takahashi erred, he had no choice but to lead his torpedomen to their target as soon as possible. Takahashi was well on his way, however, and bullets and bombs, instead of torpedoes, would be the first weapons to strike the blows on Oahu.
While Fuchida ground his teeth in angry frustration over the human error interjected into the precise tactical plan he and others had so carefully worked out, he soon realized that the order in which they attacked made little difference. Surprise was complete, and success assured. The only consideration remaining was degree.
Just northeast of Kahuku Point, the force formed into component formations, began changing altitudes, and turned toward the southwest to parallel the coast for a few miles. The 49 Kate horizontal bombers remained at their cruising altitude of 9,800 feet. The Vals climbed from their cruising altitude of 11,000 feet, to 13,000 feet. The Zekes, cruising and weaving back and forth above the Vals and Kates, at 14,000 feet, split into two groups, with 25 descending to 12,500 feet, and the remaining 18 continuing their descent to 6,500 feet. The 40 Kate torpedo bombers continued their descent from their cruising altitude of 9,200 feet to the lowest altitude possible, approximately 50 feet, as they closed on their targets. On reaching the Haleiwa area, the force split into two groups and took up separate headings toward their targets. The fighters were to race ahead of the Kates and Vals, and be in positions to sweep any enemy fighters from the air. The bombers assigned targets, necessary weapons loads against those targets, and direction of attack had been carefully coordinated, planned, mapped, studied and rehearsed.
Tactics for Surprise - and Deadly Weapons Loads
The Kates in both the first and second waves carried three different bomb loads. Forty in the first wave carried 800-kilogram (1,765 pounds), Type 91 torpedoes, one on each aircraft - specially modified with wood guidance fins for shallow water operation against the heavily armored Pacific Fleet combatants. Another 49 Nakajima Kates, the high-level bombers in the first wave, were loaded with 800-kilogram, specially modified, armor-piercing 16-inch naval shells, also for use against large ships. Thus, each high-level bomber in the first wave carrying the modified naval shell would have only one chance to hit its target.
The remaining 54 Kates, all in the second wave, carried a mixed load. Eighteen had two 250-kilogram (551 pound) bombs for land targets, and 36 carried one 250-kilogram bomb and six 60-kilogram (132 pounds) bombs, also for land targets. In addition all Kates carried a hand-operated, rear cockpit-mounted, 7.7-mm machine gun on a flexible mounting.
With a maximum speed of 235 miles per hour, Kates delivered their bomb loads primarily from the horizontal position, either at high altitude (around 10,000 feet) for those carrying the modified artillery shells, or at lower altitudes for those carrying smaller bombs, down to approximately 50 feet for those with torpedoes. Bombers with multiple bomb loads could drop them either singly, in pairs, or all at once depending on the targets attacked.
Fuchida had worked out a careful plan for the Kates in the first wave, to have the torpedo and high-level bomber forces each split to strike from two different directions simultaneously. Intending to increase the probability of a hit in delivering the single, 800-kilogram bomb from each Kate, he additionally instructed the high-level bombers to attack battleships tied up in pairs, rather than singly. He expected some of the ships to attempt escaping the harbor. To all the bomber crews he stressed the enormous additional benefit of sinking ships in the channel leading to the open sea, possibly blocking the entrance, and trapping the fleet inside the harbor.
The Val dive bombers in the first wave each carried a 250-kilogram land target bomb to strike airfields, and in the second wave, a 250-kilogram ordinary bomb for use against naval targets. Maximum speed was 240 miles an hour. In addition, each aircraft could carry two 60-kilogram bombs under the wings. Some eyewitnesses would later say they observed several dive bombers make multiple bomb runs, and these may have had the additional 60-kilogram bombs on board, although no Japanese records have been found supporting this claim. Dive angles during bombing attacks were an estimated 30-40 degrees with bomb release altitudes approximated 1,000 feet, and in some instances were as low as 300-400 feet. If additional dive bomb runs were made, they would probably be at shallower angles and lower release altitudes, appearing to ground or ship-based observers as “glide bombing.” Each Val had two fuselage-mounted, forward-firing 7.7-mm machine guns, 500 rounds per gun, and a hand-operated, flexible-firing, rear cockpit-mounted 7.7-mm machine gun. After completing its bombing runs, the aircraft could make repeated strafing attacks.
The Mitsubishi Type 0 carrier fighters, were the Japanese Navy’s best aircraft. On this morning, with a maximum speed of 310 miles per hour at 4,000 feet, they could outmaneuver anything stationed on Oahu. Armed with their two wing-mounted, rapid-fire 20-mm cannons, 60 rounds per cannon, and two 7.7-mm machine guns, 500 rounds per gun, mounted in the engine cowling, they also outgunned anything sent up against them. They each carried a centerline fuel drop tank to extend their range and time over the target area. Their primary mission was to protect the other aircraft against American fighters. After gaining air superiority, pilots would be free to attack targets of opportunity. They would meet little resistance and be largely free to wreak havoc on numerous targets.1
Fuchida, now solely in command of the Kate horizontal bombers, and the torpedo-bombers led by Lieutenant Commander Shigeharu Murata, continued toward Kaena Point. Before reaching the Point, Fuchida turned his formations further left, toward the south, staying west of the Waianae Mountains. These two groups continued in a wide turning arc, with the torpedo-bombers splitting again by turning more rapidly left, inside Fuchida’s formation, before attacking Pearl Harbor. Fuchida’s 49 horizontal bombers from the Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu swung south of the island, turning left toward their targets to make their bomb runs from southwest to northeast. Murata’s 40 torpedo-bombers, turning inside Fuchida’s force, split again with 16 from Soryu and Hiryu turning and descending east toward ships moored on the west side of Ford Island, and 24 from Akagi and Kaga swinging wide around and over Hickam, descending to attack Battleship Row, generally from southeast to northwest.
The group which first split from Fuchida’s Kates and turned south to fly down the center of the island was composed of Lieutenant Commander Shigeru Itaya’s Zeke’s, escorting various units including the Val dive bomber force under Lieutenant Commander Kakuichi Takahashi. After separating from Fuchida, Takahashi’s dive bomber force approached Wheeler Field from the north and slightly to the west, splitting into two more groups, 25 Vals from Zuikaku led by Lieutenant Akira Sakamoto targeted and further divided against Wheeler Field from the west and east, parallel with the runway and length of the parking ramp. Takahishi, seeing no evidence of air opposition, released the Zeke’s from their top cover mission while his 26 Vals pressed on beyond Wheeler. Shigeru’s 43 Zekes then accelerated, pushed ahead and split into three groups, 14 from Soryu and Hiryu to loop north and back toward the west and finally toward the south, to attack Wheeler. A second group of 11 from Zuikaku and Shokaku raced ahead and turned north toward Kaneohe - followed by 18 Zekes from Kaga and Akagi. Takashi’s 26 Vals from Shokaku, after continuing past Wheeler, turned further left, toward the east, then back to the south toward Pearl Harbor as they separated into two groups of 9 and 17 to attack assigned targets at NAS Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field.
To the west of Pearl Harbor, at 0749 Fuchida gave his own formation of Kate level-bombers the attack order “To, To, To”, the first syllable of totsugekiseyo, meaning “charge!” Four minutes later - and two minutes prior to the violent assault on the ships in Pearl Harbor - as Fuchida’s horizontal bombers were turning onto the final approach for their bomb run, his radioman sent out the famous “To-ra, To-ra, To-ra” signal, the Japanese word for tiger. The carrier force and the battleship Nagato, Admiral Yamamoto’s flagship in Japan’s Inland Sea, picked up the signal at 0755, apparently due to favorable weather and ionosphere conditions.
Two minutes after Fuchida’s command, “To, To, To,” at 0751, the torpedo-bombers, led by Lieutenant Commander Shigeharu Murata of the Akagi, split into their four component groups. Sixteen Kates from the Soryu and Hiryu turned and began descending to attack ships moored west and north of Ford Island, while those from Akagi and Kaga flew to the southeast, turning left and descending in a wide arc around and across Hickam Field to come generally southeast to northwest across the harbor against the battleships.2
The Sinking of the SS Cynthia Olson
At approximately 0830 ship’s time, 0730 hours Hawaii time, en route to San Francisco on northeasterly course, the SS Lurline’s Chief Officer, Edward Collins, stopped by the radio shack to have a chat with the officer of the watch, “Tiny” Nelson. Nelson was listening intently to communications traffic. Only a minute or so elapsed when Nelson began writing out a message on the typewriter. As he was listening and typing he called Collins’ attention to read it.
The message was an SOS, the international emergency signal, from the 2,140-ton steam schooner SS Cynthia Olson, a ship constructed by the Manitowoc Ship Building Company in Wisconsin, in 1919, and in 1941 operated in the lumber trade on the Pacific Coast. But on this day, en route from Tacoma, Washington since 1 December, she was under charter to the U.S. Army Transport Service, carrying lumber to Honolulu, Hawaii. This first message stated she was under attack by a surfaced submarine. The message was also picked up by a shore-based station on the Pacific Coast. The Cynthia Olson’s exchange with Lurline continued.
SS Cynthia Olson, first American flag-bearing merchantman sunk by the Japanese in World War II, a victim of submarine I-26. UDML
One of the cargo ship’s final messages to Lurline stated they were under torpedo attack, and Collins asked Nelson to confirm the word TORPEDO. The brief reply stated it WAS a torpedo. “Tiny” had heard an earlier Cynthia Olson transmission giving her position in latitude and longitude, and he estimated her position as approximately 300 miles, bearing five degrees true, almost due north of Lurline.
The day before sending the SOS, the Cynthia Olson, captained by Merchant Marine Master Berthel Carlsen, was 300 miles off San Francisco, under way at 10 knots, when unknown to her crew, the Japanese submarine I-26, submerged at periscope depth and searching for potential targets, spotted and began tracking her. Commander Minoru Yokota, captain of the I-26, had been ordered to accompany I-10 in reconnoitering the Aleutians, then after 5 December, to deploy to a point between San Francisco and Hawaii to report on American fleet units carrying reinforcements to Hawaii. Lastly, I-26 was to destroy enemy merchant shipping after hostilities began.
The mission’s duration sharply limited the big submarine’s available space, including her hangar, because she was crammed with food and other supplies. Because of her overstuffed hangar, cargo and supply space, she carried only ten, old sixth year torpedoes of the seventeen she was capable of carrying.
Imperial Japanese Submarine I-26. IJN
The submarine continued following the Cynthia Olson southwest during daylight hours, while I-26’s navigator plotted the schooner’s projected course. Yokota planned to surface at night, swing wide around her flank, pass her, and position his submarine along her projected course, to intercept and attack her at the moment hostilities were to begin on Oahu. The morning of 7 December, the submarine, having once more submerged to periscope depth prior to sunrise, intercepted the ship at exactly the projected point along her track. After Yokota established her nationality, I-26 surfaced, and fired a warning shot. Cynthia Olson’s radio operator sent an immediate SOS, and the crew swung out her lifeboats. A shore station in California picked up the SOS at 0938 Pacific time, which was 0738 Hawaiian time.
Carlsen and his crew must have been profoundly shocked when I-26 surfaced. The submarine was larger than their ship. Through binoculars the ship’s officers were seeing a Junsen Type B.1 scout submarine 356 feet long and 17 feet abeam, 2,584 tons, and sufficient height - 31 feet - to hangar a collapsible seaplane that could be launched from a forward mounted, compressed air catapult, although on this mission the seaplane was left behind. The sleek, fast submarine was more than 100 feet longer than the Cynthia Olson. The I-26 carried six forward torpedo tubes, an aft-mounted 140-mm (5.5-inch) deck gun, and two 25-mm antiaircraft machine guns.
The seaplane I-26 normally took on her sorties, weighed 3,500 pounds, carried a crew of two, a payload of 340 pounds, and a rear-mounted 7.7-mm machine gun. The relatively light wood and metal-framed, cloth-covered wings and tail aircraft, had a top speed of 150 miles per hour, but normally flew at speeds near 85 miles an hour. When readied for launch, the wingspan was 36 feet. The engine was a Hitachi Tempu 9-cylinder, 340 hp, and the floatplane could remain aloft a maximum of 5 hours with an operating radius of 200 miles.
From a range of approximately 1,000 meters, I-26 fired 18 rounds from her deck gun at the American ship, but the Cynthia Olson remained afloat. Twenty minutes after firing the first shot, I-26 received Commander Fuchida’s radioman’s signal, “To-ra, To-ra, To-ra,” submerged and fired a torpedo at the damaged target. The torpedo passed astern of the intended victim because the crippled ship was still making headway. The failure to hit Cynthia Olson with the single torpedo, caused Yokota to reassess his tactics. Only nine torpedoes left, and considerable time and distance remained on the assigned station off the United States’ west coast. Yokota surfaced I-26 again to open fire with her deck gun - this time with 29 more shells. The Cynthia Olson began settling. Yokota, concerned about a possible American air attack, decided the ship was sinking and I-26 departed after being in the area a total of approximately two hours.
