Suez 1956, page 15
Yet how could it be? What were these ‘national and moral ties’ that so galvanised Nasser? Jean Lacouture, a French journalist granted several interviews with the Egyptian leader, thought it was all an illusion. ‘What did the Muslims of Nigeria, Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey and Egypt have in common? Nothing. Nasser had more in common with Nehru and the Hindus of India than with Pakistan’s Muslims.’5
But Nasser’s grandiose dreams, taken altogether too seriously by friends and enemies alike, ran parallel with a more realistic vision of Egypt as an independent staging post between East and West. Nasser’s leaning towards neutrality was inspired by his bond with Pandit Nehru, India’s premier and foreign minister, and President Tito of Yugoslavia, who were seen as the founding members of the club of non-aligned states. From them Nasser learned that to succeed in international politics you did not have to make a hard and fast choice between communism and capitalism. Neutrality was a force every bit as strong and with greater popular appeal.
Nasser’s evolving philosophy was noted in Britain but aroused little immediate interest. Immune to Egyptian sensitivities, Eden pressed ahead with plans for a regional defence structure that put Britain, with American backing, at the centre. If this required an Iraqi-led coalition, so be it.
Foremost among the sceptics was Evelyn Shuckburgh, head of Middle Eastern affairs at the Foreign Office.
There is a difference of emphasis between the US and ourselves in this. They are vigorously pressing forward the Northern tier idea whereas we are not entirely convinced that this is wise having regard to Egyptian objections and the extreme instability of Arab opinion generally . . . No Middle East defence arrangement is likely to have much value unless it enjoys Egyptian support or participation, and we must therefore take account of Egyptian views as to how it should be organized . . . On the other hand, if Nuri does join the Northern tier, it may well be that the Egyptians will change their attitude in order not to be left behind in the queue for Western defence aid. In order words, if the American policy succeeds, it may be a great success but I think it is risky and may well fail. We must avoid being blamed for its failure.6
Shuckburgh put up another warning signal. In his view the first priority was a settlement of the Arab-Israeli issue which could not be achieved while both Egypt and Israel felt they were being sidelined. It did not pass notice in Tel Aviv that the Anglo-Egyptian agreement took no note of Israeli concerns. It was ‘almost as if ’, said Prime Minister Moshe Sharett, ‘Israel had no place among the countries of the Middle East’. Not only was Israel excluded from those countries that, under armed attack, entitled Britain to reactivate the Suez base, but Britain was also denied this right if Israel herself attacked one of the protected countries. The implication was that Egypt was free to deal with such events as it chose, which hardly accorded with Eden’s boast that he was re-establishing friendship with the Arab countries ‘without losing the friendship of Israel’.
Claims that Israel was already adequately protected by the 1950 Tripartite Agreement were greeted with a hollow laugh by the Zionist leadership. The agreement looked very well on paper, with the USA, Britain and France promising to come to the aid of Israel or any of the Arab countries should one side be attacked by the other. But even while Eden was telling the House of Commons that he knew ‘few if any international instruments which carry as strong a commitment as this one’, the jungle law of reprisal in Gaza and on the Jordanian-Israeli border went unchallenged by the tripartite signatories.
As for the Northern Tier, one of the rare points of agreement between Israel and Egypt was that both thought it a thoroughly bad idea. Israel claimed that it was only ‘liable to encourage Arab belligerent tendencies, foment aggressive ambitions and undermine the peace and stability of the area’. This was a line that neither America nor Britain was prepared to accept, but the fact remained that some effort had to be made to convince the Arab nation of Israel’s right to exist. Eden argued for the Northern Tier as a benefit to Israel, preparing the way for a settlement of all border issues.
An Anglo-American plan codenamed Alpha began to take shape. The idea was to satisfy Egyptian demands for a land link to Jordan and the rest of the Arab world by persuading Israel to surrender the Negev, a wedge of mountains and desert connecting, through the Gulf of Aqaba, to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. What in other circumstances might have been described as an endearing innocence characterised these diplomatic fumblings. For one thing, Nasser wanted much more if he were to sell an agreement to the Egyptian people. For another, the Negev was not just any old slice of arid land but an area with Jewish settlers, among them David Ben-Gurion. The first Israeli prime minister and soon to be prime minister again, Ben-Gurion had a vision.
He was firmly convinced that the wilderness of the Negev, empty of people, would one day become a vital centre of Israel development. The exploitation of potash, phosphates and other minerals would provide the basis of large industrial plants whose products would be carried over the desert to Eilat, and this route would serve as an ‘overland Suez Canal’. The bare Negev and the open Eilat seemed to him to offer the most fruitful development prospects for Israel.7
Even with an offer of economic aid for Israel, help in resettling Palestinian refugees and a guarantee of frontiers, Alpha was a non-starter, though negotiations dragged on until March 1956, when Evelyn Shuckburgh, who had led the way in projecting Alpha as the only hope for Middle East peace, allowed his frustration to spill out into a paper written for Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, his civil service chief at the foreign office.
The active effort to find a Palestine settlement by negotiation between Nasser and Ben-Gurion has been the (hidden) linch-pin of our Middle East policy. So long as these efforts had any prospect of succeeding we were able to avert our eyes from the basic dilemma in which we stood. The collapse of Alpha last week has removed the linch-pin. We now have nothing which we can offer the Israelis as an alternative to the terrible choice – either to attack soon or to be slowly strangled by the unreconciled Arab world, which grows stronger every day in wealth, self-confidence and Soviet arms. We are left without a Middle East policy of any kind.
With no settlement in sight and no prospect of peace:
The tension and despair of the Israeli position will grow rapidly and public opinion in the UK and US will find it impossible not to support and arm them, despite the appalling consequences of doing so . . . In fact, unless the Israelis commit an aggression, we are becoming daily more deeply committed to go to war against a Soviet-armed Arab world as soon as they feel strong enough or fanatical enough to attack Israel. Every time we refer to the Tripartite Declaration as an ‘obligation’ to defend Israel, we get ourselves more deeply in this position.8
Shuckburgh could see only two possible ways forward: either to impose settlement on Israel that required sacrifices of territory (a not very practical suggestion) or to seek the overthrow of Nasser in the hope of finding a more accommodating successor.
Kirkpatrick took the point. A long-time associate of Eden in his years as foreign secretary, Kirkpatrick was of the tough school of mandarins. It was to his credit that he had allied himself with the anti-appeasers in the 1930s, but whatever his other qualities as a quick and decisive thinker, it is hard to imagine anyone more unsuitable in charge of the Foreign Office at a period when Britain needed to adjust to a more modest role in world affairs. Knowing little of the Middle East, he was nonetheless quick to make sweeping judgements. ‘I don’t trust those Arabs,’ he told Macmillan, who shot back, ‘But you say that about every foreigner that is mentioned.’9 Having decided that Nasser was the foremost troublemaker in the Middle East, Kirkpatrick quickly adopted the Shuckburgh line that the Egyptian dictator had to go. It was an objective he pushed with Eden as the cautious foreign secretary and more successfully with Eden as the less cautious prime minister.
For the moment, however, the diplomatic initiative passed to Baghdad, where it was announced that Iraq and Turkey were about to sign a defence pact. American pressure on Britain to implement the Northern Tier proposal now intensified, while at a conference of Arab prime ministers held in Cairo from 22 January Egyptian opposition was made only too clear, prompting the British ambassador to report to London that ‘the unscrupulous propaganda in which the controlled Press and Radio and even Egyptian spokesmen at the conference table indulged, greatly shocked not only independent observers but also the majority of the Arab leaders taking part in the Conference’.10
In an attempt to dispel Egyptian fears, Eden suppressed his growing aversion to Nasser long enough to discover what a close encounter could achieve. In February, as part of a round trip to Bangkok for a meeting of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation, Eden stopped off at Cairo for an informal two-hour chat with Nasser. According to the foreign secretary’s dispatch to Churchill, Nasser was ‘forthright and friendly’, though ‘entirely negative on the question of an ultimate settlement with Israel’. While ‘very little progress [was made] on the subject of the Turco-Iraqi pact’, Nasser ‘made it plain that his interest and sympathy were with the West’.11
Eden had indeed made every effort to impress Nasser, showing off his knowledge of Arabic (he had an Oxford first in oriental languages) and presenting his host with a signed copy of the new canal base agreement. (One can imagine his silent response – ‘Just what I’ve always wanted.’) But it was more than Eden could manage to treat Nasser as an equal. The sensible opening would have been for Eden to present himself at a venue of Nasser’s choosing. He was, after all, the guest. Instead, the Egyptian leader was invited, though it was seen as more of a summons, to the British embassy, still the grandest building in Cairo and the highly visible reminder of the days of British domination. ‘What elegance,’ Nasser observed ruefully. ‘It was made to look as if we were beggars and they were princes.’
According to Woodrow Wyatt, who later interviewed Nasser for UK television, the Egyptian was kept waiting in the embassy drawing room.
Eden entered and called him Colonel Nasser, which he hated. He walked up and down in front of the seated Nasser and lectured him on British policy in the Middle East and where Egypt fitted into it. He invited no comment or discussion, and when his near-monologue was over looked at his watch: ‘I am afraid I must go now. I have to change for dinner. I thought you would like to know what our policy is. It’s been very nice meeting you, Colonel Nasser.’
Nasser said to me, ‘I know I’m not very important and Egypt is not very important, but I was hurt. The Russians sent me copies of secret correspondence with Washington. When I asked why, they said it was because Egypt is a very important country. I know it is only flattery, but at least they take the trouble to pretend to treat us as equals.’12
The image of a self-effacing Nasser being forced to endure a snobbish put-down was designed to win left-wing sympathy in Britain. But this was to impute too much blame to Eden. A more reliable version of the meeting was recorded by Mohamed H. Heikal, an Egyptian journalist with close links to Nasser. After drinks and social chat about Arab proverbs, the two leaders, advisers in tow, had dinner. The conversation turned to Middle East affairs, with Eden emphasising the unity of interest between Britain and the USA.
Finally, before the party broke up, Eden said he would like to get clear in his mind the conclusions he thought they had reached: ‘First, you appreciate the importance of the defence of the Middle East. Second, you have no objection to what Nuri [Iraq] is proposing to do provided he keeps it to himself.’ [i.e. not involve other Arab countries in a defence pact.] Nasser said yes to both. For all his sophistication and expertise Eden had throughout given the impression of being on the defensive. He was dealing with an entirely new breed of Arab leaders – revolutionaries who owed nothing to his country or government, single-minded in their aims and confident in their ability to implement them. It was obviously going to be quite an undertaking for Eden and his colleagues to take the measure of these new men.13
Back in London, and presumably forgetting his conversation with Nasser, Eden brushed aside objections to an early decision on Middle East defence. On 15 March, in the absence of an alternative plan – one that might have avoided the implied exclusivity of a regional grouping – cabinet approval was given to Britain joining the Turco-Iraqi Pact. By extension of existing treaties, Pakistan and Iran were soon drawn in to what now became known as the Baghdad Pact. With every justification historians have been hard on the Baghdad Pact. The motivation was all wrong. ‘The pact was to be the basis, allegedly, for uniting the Middle East states against the Soviet menace. In reality it was an attempt to fix another layer of prestige and credibility to Britain’s declining economic and military power.’14
The reaction in Cairo was predictably hostile. Choosing to see the pact as a conspiracy against Egypt, Nasser launched his own defence group incorporating Syria and Saudi Arabia with a joint Arab army under Egyptian command. The real strength of the alliance was almost entirely illusory, but appearances were all. The British ambassador in Cairo, Sir Ralph Stevenson, hastened to assure Nasser that the Baghdad Pact was not anti-Egyptian and that furthermore no attempt would be made to recruit other Arab states. Fortunately for Stevenson he retired before he had to eat his words. Later in the year it fell to Sir Gerald Templer, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to try to nudge Jordan into the Baghdad Pact.
Best known for a much-lauded success of British post-war colonial policy, Templer had won a decisive victory against communist insurgents in Malaya. He was a gifted, if short-tempered, field commander who was woefully ill-suited to a diplomatic mission, least of all one that depended on knowing the subtleties of Middle East politics. ‘Shouting and banging the table’15 to make his point that it was about time for Jordan to come off the fence, he delivered what he imagined was his coup de grâce with a broad hint that further prevarication would lead to a cut-off in the supply of arms.
News of the Templer meeting soon reached Nasser, who naturally assumed a double-cross. So too did Humphrey Trevelyan, the latest British ambassador in Cairo, who, like his predecessor, had been told to reassure Nasser that there were no plans to widen the scope of the pact.16 When the truth came out, Trevelyan’s protests to London were ignored. A stepping up of Egyptian propaganda in Jordan, backed by strategically placed pockets of Saudi money, brought predictable results – riots in the streets and the fall of the government. Nasser now took the lead in offering to supplant Britain as Jordan’s paymaster, the last thing that Eden wanted.
It was not only in relations with Egypt that the Baghdad Pact caused discord. Israel too was made increasingly nervous by the parcelling up of the Middle East into rival blocs that put the Jewish state at the centre of any conflagration. Hopes of a peace deal with Egypt had all but disappeared. Expectations had been raised when the combative Ben-Gurion had retired to his kibbutz to be succeeded by Moshe Sharett, a former career diplomat who was prepared to believe the best of his Arab neighbours. But in February 1955, Sharett was undermined by the failure of a plan by the Israeli secret service to force the British to stay in Egypt, and thus restrain Nasser, by creating the impression of political anarchy. Known as the Lavon affair after Pinhas Lavon, the maverick minister of defence who acted without reference to Sharett, a plot to fire-bomb public buildings went horribly wrong when, mistiming an ignition, a saboteur set fire to himself and was promptly arrested. More arrests followed, and on 25 July, there were reports in the Arab press of the rounding up of an Israeli espionage network responsible for arson attacks throughout Egypt. The subsequent trial led to two death sentences and six long prison sentences.
The embarrassment in Israel was acute. So too was the feeling that none of this would have happened if Ben-Gurion had remained at his post. Ever louder calls for his return persuaded Sharett to reshuffle his government. With the departure of Lavon, the way was clear for Ben-Gurion to take over as defence minister. But there was no letting up in the pressure on Sharett. A week after Ben-Gurion was restored to office, the Israeli army carried out a massive raid on Egyptian headquarters in Gaza. A reprisal for fedayeen attacks, the result was yet more violence along the border. Sharett’s appeal for moderation and restraint went unheard. Elections in July showed increased support for Ben-Gurion’s tough line. Three months later he was back as prime minister.
Immediately there was talk of Israel anticipating Egyptian aggression by mounting a preventive war. The arms race between Egypt and Israel took on a renewed intensity, with both sides ready to pay top prices for modern weapons. The defence arrangements initiated by Britain for the Middle East were looking increasingly irrelevant.
Battered and bowed by those it was said to protect, the Baghdad Pact was further weakened by a less than enthusiastic endorsement by one of its chief promoters. After the deal was done, the USA did some nimble backtracking. By refusing to store nuclear weapons in bases not under American control, the deterrent effect of the pact on Soviet aggression was all but lost. In a surprise attack Moscow would have been able to direct two nuclear strikes before a Western response could be mounted. But the US military’s proprietorial attitude towards the nuclear deterrent was secondary to the belated realisation that the pact found no favour in Israel and was strenuously opposed by the Zionist lobby in Congress.
If anything further were needed to prove that the Baghdad Pact was misconceived, it came a few years later with the acknowledgement that it was based on a misreading of Soviet ability to shape affairs in the Middle East.
[It] is strange to think now that we were very, very impressed with the threat of Soviet incursion into the Middle East, as there had been a Soviet incursion into Eastern Europe. We were building up defences against them everywhere else, and there was a huge, great gap in this area, as it seemed to us. And therefore what we must do was try and build up a defence system . . . against Russian incursion in that area. Now you can see that was a false fear, because Russian incursion into the Middle East was not stopped by any defensive system. It was stopped by the nature of Middle East opinion, Arab nationalism and so on, which was not clearly seen by us then.17
