1973, page 18
Allon had been promoting the idea of parallel talks on a partial agreement between Israel and Egypt and then on a comprehensive agreement. Cynics might say that this was his way of creating an oppositional position to Dayan’s. “Allon’s counterblow” was the term Ha’aretz used.32 However, it was important to Allon that this meeting take place; he left for London in the hope of meeting Kissinger there. “I felt sorry for Yigal when he left,” former Mossad chief Zamir testified.33 It is possible that coordinating the failure of Allon’s personal meeting with Kissinger was Golda Meir’s way of thwarting his initiative while avoiding another clash between him and Dayan. As noted, Allon was the only senior minister who thought political steps should be taken before the elections.
Immediately after Kissinger returned to Washington, he spoke to Dinitz by telephone and said, “I am really sorry that I missed Yigal Allon. Is he still in the area? Those idiots here did not tell you to ask him to wait.”34 In his report to the prime minister, Dinitz was more gentle, but added that “in addition, he asked [me] to let Rabin know that he was sorry that he had missed him.” This makes it clear that not only did Allon intend to speak to Kissinger, perhaps in order to propose a political initiative personally, but Rabin did as well.35 Rabin, ex-ambassador to Washington and former chief of military staff, had returned to Israel and begun his “basic training” in Israeli politics; the prime minister had declined to take advantage of his military and political experience and connections in the American government. He and Allon were troubled by Meir’s and Dayan’s stubbornness in maintaining the standstill, but remained distanced from the focus of decision-making.
The prime minister received two items of good news from Kissinger at the beginning of June. The first was a detailed report of his meeting with Ismail in Paris. The second, no less welcome, was transmitted by dispatch from Dinitz:
Robert had offered him the position of Secretary of State to replace Rogers…. It was intended that he would continue to administer the two roles…. He told me that this would be the first time in American history that the Secretary of State would be Jewish and that this would help us, as he would be able to delay initiatives of the State Department even before they found their way to the White House…. There is a possibility that he will request my assistance on the Hill [i.e., in Congress] to have his appointment approved.36
Meir and Dayan knew well that for the past half year Kissinger had been solely navigating US policy in the Middle East; now this would be official. No less important was the fact that Kissinger wanted Meir’s assistance in the political “give and take” so that his appointment would be confirmed by Congress. Three days later, Meir informed Dinitz that “she was committed to recommending Shaul [Kissinger] and to activating her friends on [Capitol] Hill.”37
But not all of the news was as encouraging for the prime minister. The leaders of the European countries, concerned about the danger of war in the Middle East, had something to say to Nixon before he began his series of meetings with the Soviets. British prime minister Edward Heath sent him a long and resolute letter that he stated also represented the views of French president Georges Pompidou and German chancellor Willy Brandt.38 In the letter, he excitedly called on the president, as Dinitz put it, “to use all of his influence to bring the Israelis to a change in their inflexible stance and to induce them to agree to declare their willingness to retreat to the international border with Egypt.” Kissinger passed on a copy of the letter to Meir in order to soften Israel’s position and to prepare her for the developments he intended to set in motion.
A number of days earlier, Chancellor Willy Brandt had visited Israel. In a private conversation, Meir had told him “that he could tell Sadat that he, Brandt, was convinced that we really want peace, that we do not want all of Sinai or most of Sinai.” It appears that Brandt understood Meir’s political language very well that she was willing to discuss peace with no preliminary conditions, except that Sadat would agree to give up Egyptian sovereignty on large sections of Sinai. The letter from the European heads of state to President Nixon also served to clarify to Meir that Brandt too had received the impression that her inflexible position was an obstacle to negotiation. Nixon acted accordingly. He avoided acceding to Meir’s request to speak to Sadat personally and sent a junior official, who transmitted Meir’s message as an emissary and did not try to mediate.39
Like the British, French, and Germans, the Soviets, who knew something about the Egyptian preparations for military action, were interested in preventing an armed clash in the Middle East. They transmitted messages to Israel regarding the escalating danger and the pressing need for an agreement via the Russian journalist Victor Louis. Louis had traveled to Israel to attend the International Press Institute conference, met with Gazit, director of the Prime Minister’s Office, and reported that, in Moscow, “there was fear that after the summit, perhaps due to Egyptian disappointment with its results, they would take extreme steps and drag the Soviets with them. This worries certain circles in Moscow who would not want such a development.” He added that “the Soviet Union was interested in persuading Egypt to enter discussions with Israel. The impression is that Egypt is ready to be coerced into going in that direction.”40
At the same time, since Kissinger knew that he was about to be appointed secretary of state, he began to prepare the groundwork for the moves he would initiate after the summit—if necessary, only after elections in Israel, but before that if possible. “The one area where Soviet policy seems most uncertain and confused is the Middle East,” began the memorandum he wrote to prepare the president for the summit discussions.41 In it, Kissinger estimated that Sadat and Ismail were still considering his proposal to conduct a peace process that would advance step by step on the basis of general principles he would propose to the Soviet Union as an understanding at the summit talks. He also assumed that the Soviets would allow him to direct developments as long as their image and respect as a superpower involved in the decision were maintained.
“Sadat continues to hold out the resumption of hostilities as his only choice if there is no diplomatic movement on a basis he considers acceptable…. The objective of a negotiation between Egypt and Israel is to find a way of reconciling Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai with security arrangements that will help lessen the danger of another war,” Kissinger clarified in the memorandum, explaining that this would happen only if the two sides compromised on their position. Israel would in the end reconcile itself to the diplomatic process, accepting full Egyptian sovereignty over Sinai, while Egypt would begin negotiations with no advance Israeli commitment on such recognition. The objective Kissinger posed to the president was to convince the Soviets at the summit to accept his approach for a graduated process based on the mutual document of principles upon which they had already agreed in May 1972 in Moscow and which had, until now, not been publicized.42 Kissinger hoped to make slight changes, to give it binding status by publicizing it as a summary of the summit talks, and to add a joint declaration regarding the superpowers’ opposition to military action, which would deter Egypt from that initiative.
“Let Them Talk about Any Subject in the World Except Us”
On June 14, Kissinger returned to Washington from Europe after taking an additional step toward an agreement in East Asia. “Now I can take my old time to settle the Arab-Israeli dispute. Can you start by going back to your 1967 borders? We’ll have another settlement. And then settle with the Palestinians,” he told the Israeli ambassador in a telephone call on the morning immediately after his return, in reply to a polite “How are you?” Dinitz did not appreciate Kissinger’s humor and replied ironically, “And then forty-seven [i.e., the 1947 borders].”43
After they clarified the missed opportunities for the meetings with Allon and Rabin (or the deliberate obstruction of those meetings), they went on to discuss the approaching summit. They focused on choosing between two possibilities: the first, agreeing to a previously decided understanding between Kissinger and the Soviet foreign minister, Gromyko, on a joint document of principles, the contents of which would not be popular with Israel; or the second, to gamble. In other words, the second alternative was to reach the meeting with no preliminary understanding and to leave the issue to Nixon and Brezhnev. In that case, either the summit would end well from Israel’s standpoint, with no understanding—“the document which we don’t like will disappear,” as Dinitz put it—or it would end badly, “if this remains in the hands of Brezhnev and the president.”44
Kissinger asked that the prime minister inform him by the next morning what Israel would prefer. He did not hide that, in his view, it was preferable to reach a preliminary understanding with Gromyko and said that the choice of a preliminary understanding did not obligate Israel to accept the document’s principles, only to agree to a negotiation process.45
The answer was returned immediately. From her sick bed, Meir directed Dinitz to prevent Kissinger from reaching an agreement with Gromyko based on the May 1972 understandings:
We completely oppose the ’72 document and if it is approved, we will consider it extremely harmful…. In our view, it is essential that there will be no document. We depend on you to find the proper way to convince Shaul to find ways to avoid the document…. There is no reason at present to reach a crossroads between us and them, which is liable to occur if this document or one like it is approved. The prime minister requests that Shaul do everything he can to disengage from this document.46
That evening, the three members of the prime minister’s “kitchen cabinet,” Meir, Dayan, and Galili, met to discuss Israel’s preparation for the summit. The next day, Dinitz received updated instructions:
You should tell Shaul [Kissinger] that, as you have already clarified to him, Israel entirely rejects the document. But in an attempt to respond to his request for comments and in the case that he nevertheless enters into negotiations on this document (not in our name or on our behalf) … we prefer that it is based on [UN Resolution] 242, to which we agreed at the time.47
Those present in the Prime Minister’s Office did not feel calm. An hour later, they sent Dinitz an additional message that contained nothing new—only a last effort to bolster him two hours before his meeting with Kissinger. The new message said, “Tell Shaul that the prime minister has been reinforced in her opinion that she must ask him to do everything he can so that no mutual document is composed. Shaul’s attempt to formulate a new document only proves to us how dangerous this matter is. We continue to reject the need for an understanding between the big ones [superpowers].”48
Kissinger and Dinitz met on Friday, June 15, at 11:05 Washington time, in the Map Room of the White House. After polite greetings, Kissinger, without pausing to discuss the political issue, opened with: “We have received a letter from Heath which I wanted to discuss with you because it applies great British pressure on you to return to the international lines. This is part of the international situation now.” Dinitz was surprised at the speed with which Kissinger, ignoring the accepted opening sentences, went straight to the point. Kissinger seemed to be making use of Heath’s letter, representing the French and the Germans as well, to soften up the Israeli position―to force Israel to relate realistically to the political situation and refer to the May 1972 document, which they had rejected out of hand. Perhaps Kissinger also wanted to hint at Israel’s dependence on him. The Israeli ambassador had to stop for a moment to organize his response and apologized, explaining that he had received the last update from the prime minister only twenty minutes before and was not properly ready to present what he had to say.49
Kissinger dropped the subject for a moment, perhaps giving Dinitz time to collect his thoughts, and asked, “Is the foreign minister in the picture?” It is doubtful that Dinitz was aware at the time of the significance of his immediate reply: “No, not at all. Just the prime minister. Maybe on some aspects of defense, she brings Dayan in, and Allon on general matters.”50 For many years Dinitz had closely and loyally accompanied Golda Meir in her work. It appears that, in his answer, he intended to elevate her status. But, for good or bad, he had accorded her the major responsibility for decision-making.
The pause Kissinger granted Dinitz enabled him to focus on the instructions he had received from the prime minister. After discussing the Soviet attitude to the situation and the implications of the Watergate affair on attitudes in Washington, Kissinger and Dinitz returned to discuss the document Kissinger thought could provide the basis for a summation of the Middle East discussion at the summit meeting and enable the initiation of negotiations. Dinitz presented the Israelis’ reservations at length; Kissinger made sure that he understood the prime minister’s points well. When they reached the border issue and Dinitz stated that “the 1967 boundaries certainly weren’t secure and recognized,” Kissinger, constantly alert, responded with alacrity, “They certainly weren’t recognized. But it is rather hard to maintain from the outcome of the 1967 war that they weren’t secure.”
In summary, Kissinger noted Meir’s request that the United States do everything in its power to reject the document, acknowledging that Israel did not accept the document or permit the United States to discuss it in Israel’s name. The report that Golda Meir heard about the private and personal discussion between Kissinger and Dinitz was meant to calm her:
He will not raise the subject at all on his part. He will try to avoid any discussion of the matter, but there is the possibility that Brezhnev will take Nixon aside and tell him “We must bring the Israelis to withdraw to the borders of 1967” and the president will shake his head or agree, and then Rogers and Gromyko will be instructed to deal with the matter. In such a case, Kissinger would have to intervene in order to salvage the situation. It would be best if he were to use the ammunition he has [referring to Israeli arguments against the May 1972 document]. He repeated that he would never say that he had received the arguments from us or give the impression that there was any agreement on our side…. He said that he would want to be in contact with me during the summit. He said that if they raised any of their considerations, he would want to let me know. He repeated that he would try to push aside the entire subject of the Middle East as much as he could but that his problem was that all the other issues were actually settled and that he was racking his brain trying to think of what they would talk about. I told him to let them talk about any subject in the world except for us.51
When they finished, Kissinger gave Dinitz a copy of Heath’s letter and showed him the last letter from Ismail—but only let him have a close look.52 That night, a telegram arrived at Meir’s office in which Dinitz reported on the June 10 dispatch from Ismail to Kissinger. “I have written it down from memory since Shaul only let me read it,” apologized Dinitz. The crux of the message was that the Egyptians understood that, until now, Kissinger had led them astray. Dinitz’s report to Meir stated that Ismail had informed Kissinger that the US position and its intentions were
in fact a retreat from its position as Egypt had understood it at the time of Hafez’s discussions with Kissinger. The government of Egypt considered that Kissinger was aiming for heads of agreement whose fundamental principle was how to lead to a total Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders. Now Egypt was no longer sure about United States intentions and viewed its present policy as a retreat.53
Dinitz also reported to the prime minister on Ismail’s ironic reference to Kissinger’s formula for a linkage between a partial and a comprehensive settlement. “The Israelis have said these things publicly without [our] having to ‘convince’ them.” At the end of his letter Ismail clarified what Sadat was expecting from Kissinger so that Egypt could decide on its continuing path:
Due to the ambiguity that envelops the American position, Mr. Ismail will appreciate it if Dr. Kissinger clarifies what he exactly means by “principles of a general nature which would permit the parties to start a process of negotiation,” which Dr. Kissinger proposes to discuss with the Soviet side. This will enable the Egyptian side to state its point of view in a precise manner.54
The opening ceremony of the summit was planned for Monday afternoon, June 18, in the White House garden. Brezhnev, who was not accustomed to long flights, had arrived in Washington on Saturday in order to rest at Camp David and prepare properly for the discussions. The preparations included informal talks with Kissinger. According to the program, Brezhnev and his entourage were supposed to move to Blair House, close to the White House, and working meetings would be held until Friday. Then the leaders would fly to San Clemente, California, where they would spend the weekend in additional discussion. On Monday, June 25, Brezhnev was due to leave the United States.
A few minutes before leaving for the White House garden to officially welcome the Soviet leader, Kissinger telephoned Dinitz and asked him to update Golda Meir with another calming message: “The Middle East issue will certainly not be raised before Wednesday and it is very possible that a situation will develop in which we will not have to discuss the 1972 document at all. He will keep me in the picture, and in the meantime asks that we contact Peter Rodman in order to get the paper Shaul has prepared based on our last conversation.”55
“Mrs. Golda Meir announced yesterday to the Labor Party that she was ready to continue as prime minister for an additional term,” read the report that day in Ha’aretz. What remained concealed from the public, and from political figures, was the fact that she was receiving a series of radiation treatments at Hadassah hospital, pretending to visit a sick friend. “It’s very exhausting, sometimes to death,” Meir said, sharing her secret with her close friend Yaacov Hazan, the leader of the Mapam Party. “I will get over it,” she added, and so she did. She continued to function as usual.56
