1973, page 17
Members of the government heard a report about war warnings and about the IDF’s preparatory steps on April 24. Dayan, Elazar, and Zeira all argued that the threat of war was intended to precede the Nixon-Brezhnev summit and the debate about the Middle East in the General Assembly of the United Nations. However, Dayan, who was the only one of the senior defense figures receiving full political and military information, took a clearer position: “Egypt, in my opinion, is on a path leading to war, whether this is being done consciously or unconsciously.” He surmised that after the summit and the debate in the General Assembly, both in June, “they will attempt to open hostilities…. I conclude that we must be ready for Syria to open fire.”6
On May 9, the day after Israeli Independence Day and a few days after Golda Meir quietly and modestly celebrated her seventy-fifth birthday with her family and friends, Meir went down to army headquarters in Tel Aviv. In the presence of Dayan, Zeira, and senior officers, she was shown IDF deployment plans for a war to be initiated by Egypt and Syria in the coming months. The plans were based on complete information gathered by intelligence with regard to the organization of Egyptian and Syrian army forces and how they would be deployed if war broke out. The chief of staff pointed out that this plan took into account a warning period of forty-eight hours, as well as considering the political necessity of avoiding calling the reserves early or initiating a preliminary preventive attack, and explained that the holding action would be accomplished by regular army forces. “The invaders will be taken care of by Arik [Ariel Sharon] and the tanks,” Dayan added, clarifying that the air force would be busy destroying rockets and planes. Only after they could count on freedom of action in the air would ground forces cross the canal to the west side.7
On May 14, the general staff met, with Dayan participating, for a discussion of the war objectives. They continued the discussion a week later, on May 21. Immediately after the first general staff meeting ended, Dayan, together with Elazar and Zeira, also met with past chiefs of staff and told them that Egypt and Syria intended “not to capture Europe, and not to take Sinai, nor the territories, but to set the political machine in motion. Their aim was not really to gain ultimate achievements but perhaps to create a different situation.”8 He made similar comments at a meeting of Central Command officers, arguing that Egypt’s and Syria’s preparations “tell us that they really want to threaten us. If they can achieve their aims only by the threat of war, so be it. If not, then they will renew the fighting.”9
At the end of the general staff discussion on May 21, Dayan summarized as follows:
In my role as minister of defense, I would like to summarize with the following eight points:
Take into consideration that there will be a renewal of hostilities during the second half of this summer.
The war will be renewed on the initiative of, or with a clear attack by, Egypt and Syria.
In the war … Egypt and Syria will participate and Jordan will not….
Considering what I said about Egypt and Syria beginning the war… we should take into account preparing for a preventive blow or a preliminary attack in the framework of renewal of their war….
If the Arabs renew the war, the IDF must now prepare a response that will lead them to a crushing defeat.
We must make preparations to cross the borders of these two states, both on the Egyptian and Syrian sides.
That the war will continue for a short time…. It is possible that the war could continue for some days and then there will be a Russian-American intervention that will necessitate a ceasefire.
Regarding oil: As there is liable to be a situation in which, as a result of international conditions, the Arabs will try to pressure the West with a halt in the oil supply … we must be less dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf. In other words, we must enlarge the oil fields in our possession, like the Morgan fields or others.10
Dayan analyzed the situation accurately. He did not need an intelligence appraisal about the probability of war. He had better information than the intelligence organizations did to formulate his own evaluation; he integrated military data with intelligence information that military intelligence did not have. Researchers who have not included this aspect of Dayan’s judgment and his evaluation of the circumstances in their investigations err when they determine that “Dayan tended to rely on Zeira’s intelligence evaluations.”11 As evidence for this conclusion, on April 13, in a discussion in his office, Dayan told Zeira, “I disagree with you. They will be ready to open fire with five or six divisions and Sadat will sleep well if twenty thousand of his soldiers are killed. In his thinking, that’s also a way of moving things forward.”12 Dayan’s estimation of the situation at this stage was correct and, as noted above, it required that the IDF prepare for war “during the second half of this summer.”13 His instructions to General Command were clear. Elazar even referred to them and confirmed that IDF planning “completely correlated with this summation.”14
The following day Dayan, who agreed with Zeira about the low probability of war in the coming weeks, explained his evaluation for the members of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee:
I am more stringent than the head of military intelligence. Not actually about timing…. I take a harder line than he does in view of the process. They are not releasing soldiers, nor are they decreasing the size of their army, and they are maintaining a state of constant tension, leading up to war…. And they are liable to experience a situation in which they will have difficulty in putting a stop to that …. Today I must tell myself, and you, and the army, that when the entire army is called up and making preparations and bringing in armaments from the Soviet Union and so on, and mobilizing in other places, that leads to a renewal of the fighting in one way or another…. We must take into consideration that, during the coming six months, the possibility of Egypt and Syria opening fire exists.15
Was Dayan surprised on October 6 at 14:00? Was Elazar surprised? We will discuss these questions in due course.
At this stage, one thing cannot be doubted: Dayan prevented any discussion in any political or military framework of what Israel would prefer, an agreement in accord with Kissinger’s outline—based on and as a continuation of Sadat’s initiative—or war, which he himself estimated would break out “during the coming six months.”16 The only person who attempted to move Dayan in the direction of the political track was the assistant head of General Staff, General Yisrael Tal. Without knowing about the alternative, during a General Staff discussion on May 21, Tal said to Dayan:
The evaluation of the military situation [regarding the objectives of the war] derives from national objectives … a total war—no matter who delivers the first blow, who wins, and what the scope of the victory, its chances of promoting our national objectives are minimal, if not nonexistent. And in contrast, there are many dangers: great human and material losses, negative effects on Israeli society itself, an undermining of the present line, and a worsening of our international status. In this situation, our goals should be both an effort to prevent the war with political activity, which is not in the IDF’s realm of responsibility, and military deterrence to the enemy’s use of force.17
In his reply to General Tal, Dayan hastened to direct his response to the military aspect of the question. “When you ask whether Israel wants war, it is correct that Israel does not want war…. But the question today is what we do if the Arabs make war against us. And what, in our view, the desired results of such a war are.”18 What Dayan had prevented his listeners in the General Staff from hearing—an examination of the political alternative—he did by himself. On his own initiative, he signaled to the United States with regard to the possibility of a peace agreement between Israel and both Jordan and Egypt. He intended that his position, which he secretly transmitted to the Americans via his close associate Gad Yaacobi, would give Sadat’s initiative a fitting response—emphasizing that these measures would be taken only after the Israeli elections.19
Dayan’s position as it was transmitted to the Americans can be summarized as follows: In Sinai, under Egyptian sovereignty, there would be no military presence and in the central sector, the mountains, an Israeli-Egyptian warning station would be set up. The airports would be run by third-party states. Dayan preferred a permanent Israeli military presence at Sharm el-Sheikh, but if the negotiations were positive, he would be willing to accept a demilitarized Sharm. There would be tiny border changes in northern Sinai up to the Rafiah junction and in the Eilat area. To that end, Dayan was willing to consider land transfers. Regarding annexing areas in Sinai, Dayan maintained, via Yaacobi, that the “oral law” of the Labor Party allowed for settlements over the international border that would be under Israeli administration but not Israeli sovereignty—a distinction he made clearly, making it understood that he was willing to compromise on this basis.
The American ambassador’s report on Dayan’s proposal ended with the conclusion that Dayan was presenting variable positions in accord with the changing political situation. In the words of the report:
He can shock the public with new ideas, when troubled by bellicose talk out of Cairo (or by us, when probing for an Israeli conciliatory gesture toward Egypt), he can take very tough line re Sinai. If the negotiating process between Israel and Egypt should ever get under way, Dayan would probably number among advocates of a hard opening position but might be prepared eventually to move farther than some Israeli leaders to achieve a successful outcome.20
This message was passed on to the Americans at the very time Dayan was stirring up emotions within his party by demanding a wide-ranging settlement plan, including settlements in Sinai and the Golan. Meir opposed this, but was forced to accept his demand in order to prevent Dayan from acting on his threat to resign if it was not fulfilled. In any case, the report was transmitted from the US embassy in Tel Aviv to the State Department; it is doubtful whether Kissinger knew about it.
On the Way to the Summit
In Egypt, the disappointing results of the second secret meeting between Kissinger and Ismail fanned the flames of possible war just before Brezhnev arrived in the United States. On May 23, Ha’aretz announced: “Sadat again speaks about a military action regardless of the cost. The objective—to clarify to the world that Egypt has a problem and that its demands are just.” Five days later, additional information appeared in Ha’aretz, relying on a report from the Beirut newspaper An-Nahar: “The army has been moved from the Cairo area to the Suez Canal front. Sadat has finally become convinced that war is the solution. He is conducting secret meetings with the Supreme Command.” At that time, Marwan also reported to his handlers regarding the massive movement of troops to the canal.21
A report published on June 15 in Ha’aretz, relying on the Cairo newspaper Al-Ahram, related that Sadat had visited Damascus and discussed the renewal of hostilities. The newspaper also saw fit to communicate that the visit had been secret and had continued for two days. This secret visit was also publicly reported by An-Nahar in Beirut. Its senior correspondent, Fouad Matar, also added that the war against Israel would begin in a concentrated air attack and include special actions.
Marwan, who met with his handlers from June 14 to 16, reported that Assad and Sadat had agreed to initiate the war in late September or early October. Was this information trustworthy? It might sarcastically be said that not a month had gone by without warning of an impending war—this time September and October were having their turn. However, in actual fact, this was the first time the heads of the Egyptian and Syrian armies had met to determine possible dates for opening fire. Those had centered on early September or early October, but did not include late September. In the military channel, Egypt and Syria were preparing for war according to a schedule that fit the time limit Sadat had dictated to the United States for achieving an agreement. Assad and Sadat met a number of times in Egypt and Syria; reports of these meetings did not always reach Israeli intelligence.22
At the end of May 1973, Kissinger celebrated his fiftieth birthday. After Dinitz presented him with a congratulatory letter from Prime Minister Meir at their June 2 meeting, Kissinger asked the ambassador whether he wanted to hear about the meeting with Ismail: “It won’t take more than five minutes.” From this conversation, Meir found out that Kissinger was intending to take advantage of his request for an answer from Ismail with regard to the defense arrangements in Sinai. This would show the Soviets that his secret dialogue with the Egyptians was continuing and serve as an excuse to postpone Soviet pressure to publicize common principles for a Middle East settlement at the coming summit meeting.23 As Dinitz put it in his report to Gazit:
With regard to the summit, [Kissinger] said that he hopes we may get out of this without a comprehensive discussion of Middle East affairs. If he succeeds in continuing to sabotage the technical preparations, the chances that the two leaders will be able to summarize new formulas will be minimized. At the moment, he is postponing Dobrynin [the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Kissinger’s contact person to the Soviet leadership, and liaison for the arrangement of the summit] with the argument that he is waiting to hear from Hafez. If he receives a reply from Hafez, we will have another talk about how to continue.24
However, despite the pessimistic atmosphere, Kissinger emphasized to Dinitz that “this time it is completely clear, at any rate, that the Egyptians are concerned only with themselves and don’t tie an agreement with them to the other Arab states.”25
In the meantime, Ismail also understood that Kissinger was using the discussion channel between them in order to gain time and avoid Soviet pressure. At the very hour Kissinger and Dinitz were meeting in Washington, Ismail, in Cairo, was transmitting to Kissinger his reactions to their meeting in Paris.26 In diplomatic yet resolute and clear language, he clarified to Kissinger that Egypt expected an agreement on principles from the United States, not a non-binding American declaration. He also informed Kissinger that Egypt had requested that the Soviet Union renew its involvement in the process, and that it would resume the discussion of Middle East matters at the coming summit on the basis of the May 1972 Soviet proposal. Regarding the discussion channel between him and Kissinger, Ismail’s answer was sharp and unmistakable—they would talk after the summit if the results created suitable conditions for continued discussion.
In a personal discussion with State Department representative Joseph Greene in Cairo, Ismail stated that, for Egypt, a state of no peace and no war was worse than war, even if it was clear to the Egyptians that they would be defeated in a military engagement. On the basis of similar declarations, Secretary of State Rogers received a memorandum from Department of State intelligence stating that the probability of war in the autumn was high.27 Because of the problematic relations between Kissinger and the State Department, Kissinger remained unaware of this memorandum. It is also doubtful that he was updated on Greene’s report from Cairo citing Sadat’s frustration at the United States’ attitude toward his initiative.28 The fact that Ismail had invited Greene—a representative of the State Department, which had been compartmentalized from the existence of the secret channel—for a discussion that was personal, not official, was a clear message to Kissinger about Ismail’s disappointment with the results of the discussions between them.
Despite this, Kissinger continued to try to maintain contact. It was important for him to present the impression at the summit that the channel was entirely under his control and that of the United States. During the next few days of early June, he sent Ismail two dispatches and requested his agreement for the United States to propose a version of a joint declaration at the summit that would enable the initiation of negotiations. Ismail, who was in no hurry to break off communications, responded immediately.29 In his reply, he explained that Egypt could relate to a proposal only after studying its wording. Kissinger did not reply until July 7—two weeks after the summit had ended!
At this point, Washington was devoting serious attention to the super-power summit, which would open about a week later. Intense preparatory discussions only began on June 14, after Kissinger returned from discussions on Vietnam.
By the Wayside
At their meeting on Saturday, June 2, Dinitz told Kissinger, “Your friend Yigal Allon will be coming…. He would like to see you at my house on a personal basis.” Kissinger proposed a joint breakfast on June 12 at 08:00 in Washington. “That’s a week before the summit and there is a chance that I will be free,” he added.
In the absence of written correspondence, we cannot know what Deputy Prime Minister Allon wanted to discuss privately such a short time before the summit. But Allon’s intentions can be understood indirectly from the exchange of messages between Dinitz and the office of the prime minister, which included reports about coordinating Allon’s meeting.30 On June 12, Dinitz was informed that “since Shaul is having thoughts about parallel or simultaneous negotiations, it is important that you inform him that we oppose parallel negotiations for a comprehensive settlement and an agreement about the canal at the same time, and that goes for the idea of discussions by two teams from each side as well.” Referring to these instructions, Dinitz replied on the following day: “The breakfast between Yigal and Shaul did not take place as Shaul has not yet returned from Paris…. I will return to the idea of parallel discussions when I meet with him on his return.”31
