1973, page 16
During the meeting, Kissinger transmitted to Dinitz the US-Soviet statement of principles regarding the Middle East from May 28, 1972, about which Israel had not known before this discussion, as well as the “statement of principles for a Middle East settlement” that the Soviets had given him in Moscow only a week earlier, on May 7. Kissinger knew that Israel would reject these documents, so he said that there was no need to relate them at present—they could wait until the summit which would take place on June 18. On the other hand, he requested that, before he left for Paris—in other words, within two days—the prime minister give him her analysis and comments with regard to Egypt’s position. Kissinger complained that “he was going to see Hafez for two days and wondered what they would talk about for such a lengthy period” and added that he wanted to continue to gain time, but had no new proposals.46 “If you could just give me some statement of your position on the connection between the interim and the overall. Can you give me some formal statement?” Kissinger pleaded with Dinitz and did not hesitate to stress again that time would not work in Israel’s favor. At that point in the discussion, Kissinger reached the crux of the issue: “Why couldn’t you take it in the form of security zones instead of annexation? Sovereignty would remain in Egyptian hands but you would be there in practice.”47
Dinitz remained loyal to his instructions and did not propose anything. “When a discussion begins everything can be discussed, but without prior conditions…. We won’t deceive Egypt by saying that we will not demand any change in the border,” he answered, almost contradicting himself.48
Kissinger was not satisfied with knowing what Israel would not demand. He wanted information about what Israel would accept: that is, what were its territorial demands for a full peace agreement? In his discussion with Dinitz, he focused on important points that he had not seen fit to discuss with Eban a day earlier. The conversation with Dinitz was as follows:
Kissinger: My estimate of what you want [as a final border] is a straight line west of el-Arish.
Dinitz: It might not be a straight line … but in general terms you are right…. In strategic terms we need sufficient depth to make it secure. But three-quarters of Sinai would go back.
Kissinger: Why couldn’t you take it in the form of a security zone instead of annexation?
Dinitz: On the borders, it entails a change in sovereignty [annexation]. That was a government decision.49
Again Kissinger despaired of receiving Israeli approval to advance his plan. Following the discussion, Dinitz reported to the prime minister that “he ended the discussion by saying that he would check with Ismail as to what could be done. At least he would make sure that Ismail did not leave in despair from the meeting with him in order to avoid reaching the point that contact would be severed.” In a strictly private conversation with Dinitz, Kissinger also added information about Watergate and about possible changes in the US government that might work to the detriment of Israel. In addition, he advised Israel to accept the proposal for a compromise on the pace of airplane supply, even if it wanted planes to be sent at a faster pace.50
Dinitz opened his report to the prime minister about this private conversation with a request: “From the private conversation with Shaul on May 13. Please make sure to strictly compartmentalize this telegram.”
He [Kissinger] began to talk about Watergate and the attempts to entangle him in the affair. He is innocent, but there are those, of course, who are interested in involving him. And this is connected to two areas: One of the people who was working with him left his office and was lent to Haldeman. Shaul had no control over him or knowledge of his deeds. The second “accusation” is that he saw intelligence material about the leaks, which was obtained by secretly listening in on newspaper reporters. Shaul argues that even though he naturally receives intelligence information, his job does not include clarifying how this material is obtained.
Regarding John Connelly, Kissinger said that Connelly’s present position as presidential advisor was “a partial and undefined role,” but as a result, he would try to delve into various areas and the danger was that one would be in the Middle East because of his oil interests. He repeated that he [Connelly] was no friend…. Shaul stated that it wouldn’t be a bad idea if they [Israeli emissaries] would apply pressure in order to neutralize him, and we decided on possible activity.
Shaul said that Schlesinger’s appointment to the Defense Department would benefit us. He [Schlesinger] was open and intelligent and although he [Kissinger] did not know Schlesinger’s specific views of the Middle East, he was a great improvement in comparison to Richardson.51
Kissinger’s threats indeed worked, to a certain extent. On the day following the meeting, Jerusalem reacted with new instructions. The letter to Dinitz began:
At earlier stages in the contacts between Shaul and Hafez, it seemed certain that benefit could be had in gaining time. Now, considering the reports, it seems that the development is liable to be dangerous—whether moving toward a split between Shaul and Hafez or whether due to negative content from the standpoint of Israel…. We are aware of the danger that the matter will be transferred to the care of the State Department…. It is important that Shaul acts to prevent a split with Egypt. Even if a split does occur, it is preferable that this does not happen before the summit.52
However, in contrast to what Kissinger asked for and expected to receive, Israel did not reevaluate its position. No new directives were forthcoming from Jerusalem that could supply Kissinger with something to hold onto. The only change was tactical. Instead of not presenting Kissinger with any “ideas” to advance, Israel would provide him with something so that he could maintain direct contact with Sadat, but would not give him a shred of information to connect between an interim settlement and a comprehensive one:
As Shaul asked if we could possibly give him a formula to connect between an interim and a comprehensive settlement, the prime minister suggests that he propose a formula as if it was his initiative. It could be in accord with what the prime minister raised on December 10, 1971, in a discussion with him. As an introduction to the proposal, it could be said that, in order to achieve peace according to Resolution 242, we agree to a settlement regarding the Suez Canal.53
Also included were Meir’s reasons for opposing a simultaneous discussion of a final settlement, along with an interim one, on the opening of the Suez Canal. Meir again ignored Kissinger’s question: Why did Israel insist on annexing territory? Why was it not satisfied with holding onto strategic points and security areas whose sovereignty would remain in Egyptian hands even though, in practice, Israel would maintain its presence?
The great fear in Jerusalem was that, at the meeting with Ismail, Kissinger would try to achieve the outline of an agreement. Gazit wrote to Dinitz:
Does he intend, already at his next meeting with Pohazy Hafez Ismail [the name used is a play on the Hebrew word for “reckless”], that this will be a subject for active attention, according to what was said in [Kissinger’s] letter to [Ismail] on April 12, 1973? … How does that correspond with his promise to us that he would not make any proposal to Pohazy and his friends before getting our approval?54
Israel was entrenched in its refusal to deal with a comprehensive settlement or to give Kissinger a green light to reach an understanding on principles with Ismail. Israel remained insistent even when Kissinger clarified that he intended to make an effort to continue the discussion toward a comprehensive settlement for a long period of time. The developments and changes in the Israelis’ attitude during the time Kissinger was preparing for his meeting with Ismail were manipulative only—tactics for additional postponement. Examining them helps us to understand why Kissinger defined the war that broke out five months later as “the culmination of a failure of political analysis on the part of its victims.”55
Kissinger’s Distress: “I Think We Ought to Waste Time So That There’s No Blowup”
In Washington, Kissinger and his staff were carefully planning the meeting with Ismail. Kissinger had asked Hal Saunders, a member of the National Security Council, to assemble all of the material necessary to conduct a wide-ranging investigation of the Middle East issue. On May 15 the documents had been supplied, including: an analysis of the US-Soviet understandings of May 1972 and suggestions for changes; comments on the May 1973 Soviet document; a document of principles for an agreement that, for each clause, presented the Israeli position, the Egyptian position, and proposals for bridging them; and a eight-page document containing discussion points on each of the issues expected to be brought up at the meeting.56 The seventh and last clause of the latter document—“the conduct of negotiations,” in reaction to Ismail’s proposal to formulate heads of agreement—recommended telling him: “We are still in the process of exploring whether it is possible to develop such principles or what they might look like if we can develop them. We want to reserve this judgment a bit longer.” This concluding sentence expresses the reality of the situation: in the absence of Israeli willingness to cooperate with Kissinger’s bid to advance negotiations, Kissinger had no choice but to take the risk and to continue to adopt delaying tactics.
Before he left for France, Kissinger met with Nixon in the Oval Office of the White House. Kissinger explained the aim of the meeting immediately, and the essence of his conversation with the president was as follows:
Kissinger: I think we ought to waste time so that there’s no blowup until the summit…. I’ve been talking to the Israelis. I think they’re moving a little, but not enough. But after I come back from talking to Ismail, Mr. President, we might review that situation.
Nixon: Yes, yes. We don’t want a war in the Middle East this summer on our conscience.
Kissinger: No, no, no! There’s a chance that that will happen, simply because of the Arab lack of logic.57
Kissinger shared his thoughts with the president on how to set the process in motion and bring Israel to simultaneously discuss an interim settlement and a comprehensive settlement and added, “If that would work, we could buy ourselves a year.” “That’d be great,” responded the president, who, from that point on, ceased focusing on the subject and did not react to Kissinger when he pointed out that the Russians had, in principle, agreed with Kissinger’s approach.58
The intelligence appraisal in Washington that Sadat’s threats, which had been intended to put political pressure on Israel, were liable to get out of control became stronger. The general evaluation was that it was unreasonable to expect a military confrontation in the coming weeks but that “the danger probably will rise if [the] Middle East debates in the UN Security Council (early June) and Nixon-Brezhnev summit (late June) pass without any results Sadat considers useful. The US and the USSR have some, but limited, leverage in the situation.”59
Kissinger and Ismail—Last Tango in Paris
On May 19, Kissinger met in Paris with Le Duc Tho, representing North Vietnam, for discussions on an end to the war. Ha’aretz reported that the meeting took place in a friendly atmosphere and went on for four hours and twenty minutes, and that the American and North Vietnamese delegations continued their discussion on the following day, but that Kissinger and Le Duc Tho were not present at the discussions for the first time since negotiations had begun a few years previously.60
Ismail, as well, had found his way to Paris. Disguised as a trip to meet French president Georges Pompidou and foreign minister Michel Jobert for political discussions, Ismail arrived in the French capital on May 16.61 On Sunday, May 20, between 10:15 and 15:20, he and Kissinger met south of Paris in an ancient house in Moulin St. Fargeau, near the town of Rochefort. Kissinger could not hide his wonder at the enchanting country simplicity of the house, whose American owners had invested large sums of money in its renovation and maintenance.62
As a political “supervisor” representing the State Department, Alfred R. Atherton, assistant secretary for Near Eastern affairs, accompanied Kissinger, who was forced into trickery in order to maintain the secrecy of the discussions. After the official discussion and lunch, Kissinger and Ismail went out into the pastoral garden and the caressing spring sun and continued their conversation privately.
After listening to Ismail’s doubts that the United States intended to apply the full force of its weight in order to achieve a peace agreement, Kissinger explained that the United States had no interest in leaving Israel in Sinai; it was interested in leading to an agreement, but progress toward this agreement would have to be made in stages—“step by step”—and with a slower schedule than the Egyptians expected. An interim agreement could not be achieved before 1974, and a comprehensive one only a year later. He said this even though he knew that the significance of his words might lead to great disappointment for the Egyptians or to an increase in the danger of an armed conflict, and might even end the communications channel between them. However, he left an opening for another round. He proposed to Ismail that Egypt and the United States exchange the agreement on principles for a general declaration, by the United States only, regarding a peace agreement in the Middle East. “The issue now is whether Sadat can accept the step-by-step approach with assurance of persistent White House involvement. Ismail frankly said he could not commit himself. He would have to talk with Sadat,” Kissinger later reported to President Nixon. Kissinger also asked for Egypt’s reaction to his interpretation of the concept of security arrangements as meaning an Israeli military presence in Sinai under Egyptian sovereignty.63
The results of the discussion were summarized in the report Kissinger transmitted in a short telegram at the end of the five-hour meeting. He reported that the official discussion had been less useful than the previous meeting, and that “the principal result of the meeting was [Ismail’s] agreement that in the meantime there would be no Egyptian military action to disturb the US-Soviet summit. We agreed to have another meeting after your talks with Brezhnev.”64
After Kissinger left, Ismail remained alone in the garden, his head in his hands. His sadness and despondency were visible to the few who saw him, one of whom was an American intelligence agent. There is no doubt that Sadat’s advisor well understood the significance of the delay in the political process. Kissinger received the following report from the CIA. He transmitted it to Dinitz who passed it on to Meir: “Hafez reported … that despite this, it was worthwhile to maintain contact with Shaul as, even if hostilities are renewed on the Egyptian front, it will be good for Egypt to have direct contact with the White House, in order to influence its direction.”65
Egypt and Syria continued to prepare for war. The top Israeli leadership, which was very well aware of this, also prepared for the expected conflict, both immediately and during the following months. At General Staff discussions led by Dayan in Tel Aviv on May 21, one day after Ismail’s meeting with Kissinger, it was decided to prepare for a war that would break out in the coming months.
5
Dayan: Gentlemen, Please Prepare for War—June–August 1973
“I must add and greatly emphasize: Throughout the years of my government’s term of office, we have not wasted nor have we rejected any possibility of serious contact between us and our neighbors regarding peace and the way to achieve it…. I hereby state to the Knesset: We have agreed to any proposal which has had any measure of reasonable seriousness, even if it had little chance…. For as long as this government remains in office, [it] will initiate and will accept open or confidential contacts, guided by the effort to expedite peace.”
—Prime Minister Golda Meir, speaking from the Knesset podium, July 25, 19731
“Gentlemen, please prepare for war.” With this instruction to the IDF, Moshe Dayan ended a series of discussions with the defense leadership that had begun immediately after the meeting at the prime minister’s home on April 18. These discussions were later expressed practically in an IDF plan for war prepared under the code name “Blue-White.”2 The plan included establishing new armored units and armored infantry units; obtaining a new supply of tanks, artillery, and military bridging equipment; bringing forward and adding reserve exercises to serve as a replacement for large-reserve mobilization; and camouflaging such a step.
As Meir, Dayan, and Galili had agreed, other government ministers received no report regarding the political developments in process—not about Sadat’s initiative, not about the diplomatic alternative to initiation of hostilities, and not about Kissinger’s request to promote this alternative. In addition, in private discussions Dayan and Meir did not refer to the political alternative at all, but only dealt with questions of how to relate to the possibility of war. “I think that is what they are planning,” Meir said. Dayan added, “The Egyptians are on the road to war. Sadat has taken that road and at some point he will reach it.”3
Despite focused warnings from Marwan and others about the initiation of hostilities in May, the minister of defense, the head of military intelligence, and the head of the Mossad all correctly evaluated that the probability of war breaking out was low at that time.4 On April 17, at a meeting of Northern Command officers taking place at Kibbutz Yifat, Dayan stated that the period in which the Arabs had hoped to achieve their aims by political means had ended, and now they were planning to renew the fighting in order to change the existing situation. He initiated three conferences with IDF officers in each command. The birth of “Blue-White” took place on April 20, when Dayan requested that the army chief of staff “determine a schedule for … [an operational] program … just in case it is needed.”5 Chief of Staff David Elazar was not surprised by these instructions. A day earlier, in an evaluation of the situation, he had already determined that war preparations were necessary on two fronts to deal with the possibility of an Egyptian attempt to cross the Suez Canal and a Syrian attack on the Golan Heights. He also determined that this should be done even if the probability of hostilities breaking out was low.
