When China Rules the World, page 60
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[62] Bin Wong, China Transformed, Chapter 5; Mark Elvin, The Retreat of the Elephants: An Environmental History of China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), Chapters 1–4; Elvin, ‘The Historian as Haruspex’, p. 87.
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[63] Bin Wong, China Transformed, p. 49.
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[64] Robin Blackburn, ‘Enslavement and Industrialisation’, on www.bbc.co.uk/history; Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, Chapter 6, especially pp. 274-6.
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[65] Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, pp. 7, 11.
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[66] Ibid., p. 283; also pp. 206-7, 215, 264-5, 277, 285.
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[67] C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 62–71, 92.
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[68] Perdue, China Marches West, p. 538.
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[69] ‘The capabilities of the Qing to manage the economy were powerful enough that we might even call it a “developmental agrarian state”’: ibid., p. 541.
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[70] Ibid., p. 540.
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[71] Bin Wong, China Transformed, p. 138.
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[72] Ibid., p. 149.
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[73] Ibid., pp. 147-9.
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[74] Elvin, ‘The Historian as Haruspex’, pp. 98-9; Fairbank and Goldman, China, pp. 180-81; William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 525-9.
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[75] Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, p. 249.
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[76] ‘The source of Chinese weakness, complacency, and rigidity, like the Industrial Revolution itself, was late and recent, not deeply rooted in China ’s traditional culture.’ Perdue, China Marches West, p. 551; also p. 541.
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[77] Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing , p. 27.
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[78] Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 79.
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[79] Perdue, China Marches West, p. 538.
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[80] Bin Wong, China Transformed, p. 47.
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[81] Charlotte Higgins, It’s All Greek to Me (London: Short Books, 2008), pp.77-8.
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[82] Ibid., p. 21. Also Deepak Lal, Unintended Consequences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), p. 73.
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[83] Lal, Unintended Consequences, p. 76; Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, p. 82.
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[84] Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, p. 201; Elvin, ‘The Historian as Haruspex’, pp. 85, 97, 102.
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[85] Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, pp. 291-3.
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[86] Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 343.
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[87] Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, p. 469.
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[88] Ibid., p. 12; Lal, Unintended Consequences, p. 177.
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[89] Norman Davies, Europe: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 1259, 1266-7, 1282-4.
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[90] Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1941-1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2004), p. 33.
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[91] Göran Therborn, European Modernity and Beyond: The Trajectory of European Societe: 1945–2000 (London: Sage, 1995), pp. 24, 68–70.
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[92] Ibid., p. 68.
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[93] Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, p. 260.
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[94] Therborn, European Modernity and Beyond, pp. 21-4.
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[95] Not fundamentalism, however, which unusually originated in the United States.
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[96] Ibid., pp. 21-4, 68, 356.
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[97] Alan Macfarlane, The Origins of English Individualism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), p. 196, quoted by Lal, Unintended Consequences, p. 75.
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[98] Göran Therborn, Between Sex and Power: Family in the World, 1900-2000 (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 119-23; also pp. 108-12.
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[99] The old white settler colonies enjoyed a very different relationship with Britain to that of the non-white colonies, and this was reflected in their far greater economic prosperity; Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris: OECD, 2006), pp. 184-5.
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[100] Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), pp. 48–53; Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire 1875-1914 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), Chapter 3.
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[101] Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, pp. 57-9, 70–73.
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[102] Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, pp. 127-8.
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[103] Niall Ferguson, ‘ Empire Falls ’, October 2006, posted on www.vanityfair.com, pp. 1–2.
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[104] Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, p. 65.
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[105] Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, p. 397.
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[106] Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, pp. 68-9.
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[107] Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, p. 262; Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris: OECD, 2006), p. 114.
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[108] Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China, 2nd edn (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), pp. 229-34.
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[109] Elvin, ‘The Historian as Haruspex’, p. 104.
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[110] For a more positive view of the impact of colonialism, see Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (London: Penguin, 2004), pp. 365-81, especially pp. 368-71.
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[111] Therborn, European Modernity and Beyond, p. 40.
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[112] Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, p. 431.
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[113] Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, pp. 182, 397-8, 409.
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[114] Quoted in Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing , p. 3.
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[115] Therborn, European Modernity and Beyond, pp. 5–6. Apart from the European and American passages through modernity, there are two other types. The third is that represented by East Asia, where local ruling elites, threatened by Western colonization, sought to modernize their countries in order to forestall this threat: the classic example of this is Japan. (The East Asian model will be the subject of the next chapter.) The fourth type concerns those countries that were successfully colonized and which were obliged to modernize after finally achieving national independence. History suggests that this last category has faced by far the biggest problems.
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[116] Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? America ’s Great Debate (London: The Free Press, 2005), pp. 44- 5.
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[117] Ibid., p. 40.
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[118] Ibid., pp. 53-4.
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[119] Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, p. 301.
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[120] Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, p. 261.
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[121] Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation: America and the World 1600-1898 (London: Atlantic Books, 2006), Chapter 11; Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (London: Allen Lane, 2004), Chapter 1; Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, p. 58; Eric Hobsbawm, ‘America’s Neo-Conservative World Supremacists Will Fail’, Guardian, 25 June 2005.
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[122] G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition: Essays on American Power and World Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), pp. 6–8.
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[123] Alastair Bonnett, The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics and History (London: Palgrave, 2004), Chapter 1; Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, pp. 69–72; John Gray, False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism (London: Granta Books, 1998), p. 125.
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[124] Bonnett, The Idea of the West, p. 25.
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[125] J. M. Roberts, The Triumph of the West (London: Phoenix Press, 2001), p. 291. See McNeill, The Rise of the West, pp. 806-7, however, for a more cautious view.
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[126] Interview with Chie Nakane, Tokyo, June 1999.
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[127] Michio Morishima, Why Has Japan ‘Succeeded’: Western Technology and the Japanese Ethos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 20.
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[128] The first constitution, adopted in AD 604, for example, was an overwhelmingly Confucian document; ibid., p. 26.
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[129] Ibid., pp. 10, 34.
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[130] Ibid., pp. 35-6, 7.
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[131] Ibid., pp. 9, 32, 34.
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[132] Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (London: Secker and Warburg, 1947), pp. 68-9.
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[133] David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (London: Little, Brown, 1998), Chapter 22.
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[134] Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, p. 61; Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation (New York: Vintage, 1990), p. 74.
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[135] Morishima, Why Has Japan ‘Succeeded’, pp. 14–15, 45; Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, pp. 61-4.
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[136] Morishima, Why Has Japan ‘Succeeded’, pp. 53-4; Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, p. 61; Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, pp. 355-6.
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[137] Endymion Wilkinson, Japan Versus the West: Image and Reality (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 54; G. C. Allen, A Short Economic History of Modern Japan (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1962), pp. 20–21.
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[138] Morishima, Why Has Japan ‘Succeeded’, pp. 68-9.
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[139] Ibid., pp. 41-2, 74-5, 89–93.
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[140] Ibid., pp. 70–71, 75, 90; Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, p. 77. For a fuller discussion of this period see, for example, Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, Chapter 23.
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[141] Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation: America and the World 1600-1898 (London: Atlantic Books, 2006), p. 328.
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[142] Wilkinson, Japan Versus the West, pp. 57, 61.
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[143] Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, pp. 72-3.
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[144] Morishima, Why Has Japan ‘Succeeded’, p. 85.
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[145] Ibid., pp. 74, 78, 89; Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, pp. 73-4.
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[146] ‘Modernization was created by a state without a class struggle’: interview with Peter Tasker, Tokyo, June 1999.
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[147] Kosaku Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 123. Also, Chie Nakane, Japanese Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970).
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[148] Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan , p. 128.
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[149] Interview with Peter Tasker, Tokyo, June 1999; interview with Tatsuro Hanada, Tokyo, June 1999.
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[150] Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan , p. 2; Wilkinson, Japan versus the West, pp. 44-5.
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[151] Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan, pp. 12–20; interviews with Kosaku Yoshino, Tokyo, June 1999 and June 2005.
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[152] Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, p. 10.
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[153] Ibid., pp. 47-8, 55.
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[154] Van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power, p. 160.
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[155] Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, pp. 98-9.
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[156] Deepak Lal, Unintended Consequences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 12–13, 91-3, 148; Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, pp. 103, 113-15, 122, 166, 171, 222-4.
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[157] Suicide Rates (World Health Organization, 2007). The rates for women are 12.8 for Japan, 4.2 for the US, 3.3 for the UK and 6.6 for Germany.
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[158] Morishima, Why Has Japan ‘Succeeded’, pp. 86, 107-17; van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power, Chapter 6.
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[159] Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimension of Authority (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 179; van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power, pp. 213, 221.
