The Darker Nations, page 51
42. It should be pointed out that China’s rust belt in its interior is home to high rates of unemployment; that those industrial centers, if they function, do so because of the iron rice bowl set out by the military; and that China’s resilience obscures these long-term problems for its economic fundamentals. Liu Yingqiu, Chinese Economy Is in the Second-Highest Growth Period (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Publishing House, 2002); Meng Xianfan, Chinese Women and Reform (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Chinese Women’s Press, 1995).
43. Robert Wade and Frank Veneroso, “The Asian Crisis: The High Debt Model versus the Wall Street-Treasury-IMF Complex,” New Left Review 228 (March–April 1998): 9.
44. The work of Fred Bergsten is at the center of this: “APEC and World Trade: A Force for Worldwide Liberalization,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 3 (May–June 1994): 20–26;”The Case for APEC: An Asian Push for World-Wide Free Trade,” The Economist, January 6, 1996, 41; and “Globalizing Free Trade,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 3 (May–June 1996): 105–20. The work of Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN) is a direct contradiction to Bergsten, and BAYAN’s protests in Manila made it clear that trade liberalization would be a disaster for the nations and peoples of East Asia. The collapse came as no surprise to them. See Bello and Rosenfeld, Dragons in Distress.
45. François Godement, The Downsizing of Asia (London: Routledge, 1999), 93–94. The best analyst of the Asian financial flu is Kwame Sundaram Jomo, Tigers in Trouble: Financial Governance, Liberalisation, and Crises in East Asia (London: Zed, 1998), and his useful edited collection Paper Tigers in Southeast Asia? Behind Miracle and Debacle (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 2001).
46. Kuan-Hsing Chen, “America in East Asia: The Club 51 Syndrome,” New Left Review 12 (November–December 2001): 75.
47. The tendency toward an “Americanization” of the elite vision is detected in Singapore as well. Michael Barr, “Beyond Technocracy: The Culture of Elite Governance in Lee Hsien Loong’s Singapore,” Asian Studies Review 30, no. 1 (2006): 1–18.
48. “Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the NUS Society Lecture, 19th March 2005,” National Archives and Record Centre, Singapore.
49. See Lionel Jospin, Le monde comme je le vois (Paris: Gallimard, 2005).
50. In this regard, I found Benjamin Barber’s suggestions for “a civic nexus across all boundaries” and the creation of a “civic bulletin board across national boundaries” to be truly naive; those who can access such technologies have little interest in the type of global democratic institutions that he imagines. Without an engagement with the state, which remains the mainstay of local democracy, such fantasies will be deeply elitist. Benjamin Barker, McWorld vs. Jihad: Terrorism’s Challenge to Democracy (New York: Ballantine, 1995), 277, 287.
51. Quoted in Godement, The Downsizing of Asia, 107. See also Syed Hussein Alatas, Corruption and the Destiny of Asia (Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia: Prentice Hall, 1999), 112–13. “Asian society never puts the individual values above the societal values. Societies are always more important than individuals. I think that this value will save Asia from the greatest calamities.” Lee Kuan Yew, 40 Nian Zhenglun Zuan: Selections from 40 Years of Political Writings (Singapore: Lianhe Zaobao Press, 1993), 502. The South Korean democrat who would become president three years later, Kim Dae Jung, replied to Lee Kuan Yew in terms of the need for political reform in East Asia as a value that was not inimical to East Asian society but necessary to its democratic modernity. Kim Dae Jung, “Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Anti-Democratic Values: A Response to Lee Kuan Yew,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (November–December 1994): 189–94. The discussion of Asian values is fairly widespread in Singapore. See Seong Chee Tham, “Values and National Development in Singapore,” Asian Journal of Political Science 3, no. 2 (December 1995): 1–14. In Asia broadly, see Khoo Boo Teik, “The Value(s) of a Miracle: Malaysian and Singaporean Elite Constructions of Asia,” Asian Studies Review 23, no. 2 (June 1999): 181–92.
52. One could argue, as Michael Backman suggests, that these value are not ancient Singaporean but actually Victorian. Michael Backman, “Asians and Victorian Values,” Far Eastern Economic Review, March 30, 2000, 32.
Mecca
1. Quoted in “Islam against Nationalism,” The Economist, June 2, 1962, 903; Abdullah M. Sindi, “King Faisal and Pan-Islamism,” in King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia, ed. Willard Beling (London: Croom Helm, 1980), 186.
2. Sindhi, “King Faisal,” 191.
3. I am mindful of Natana J. Delong-Bas’s detailed account of the complexity of Sheikh Muhammed ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and how she shows that only after his death did his interpretation of Islam become reactionary. My own interest in Wahhabi Islam is not in its original state but in what it becomes by the 1950s and onward. Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
4. Gerald de Gaury, Faisal: King of Saudi Arabia (London: Barker, 1966), 166.
5. Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Harvey Cox, Fire from Heaven: The Rise of Pentecostal Spirituality and the Reshaping of Religion in the Twenty-First Century (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1996); Toyin Falola, Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1998); David Laitin, “The Shari’ah Debate and the Origins of Nigeria’s Second Republic,” Journal of Modern African Studies 20, no. 3 (1982): 411–30. Less dramatic, because of the lack of an effective world Jewish or world Hindu population, has been the rise of settler Judaism (for Israel) and Hindutva (for India). I am interested in Juan Sepulveda’s notion of “indigenous pentecostalism,” where Chilean indigenistas threw off the elitist Catholic and Methodist clergy for a spiritual experience that they could define and control. Whereas this is perhaps true in an institutional sense, my analysis follows the promotion of religious thought in opposition to, rather than in conversation with, secular anticolonial thought. Juan Sepulveda, De peregrinos a ciudadanos: breve história del cristianismo evangélico en Chile (Santiago: Fundación Konrad Adenauer, Facultad Evangélica de Teologia, Comunidad Teologia Evangélica, 1999).
6. The basic facts are in Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People’s History (London: Zed, 2002).
7. Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 114–16.
8. Sarah Yizraeli, The Remaking of Saudi Arabia (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 1997), 169.
9. Mustafa Mahmud, Marxism and Islam (Cairo: n.p., 1984), 21. The Iranian sociologist Ali Shariati is equally disposed toward an engagement with Marxism, even as he vehemently opposes Communism. Ali Shariati, Marxism and Other Western Fallacies (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1980). Shariati’s populism is stark, for instance, when he notes, “Whenever in the Qur’an social matters are mentioned, Allah and al-nas [the people] are virtually synonymous.” Ali Shariati, Islam and Revolution (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), 55.
10. Nasser was not averse to the incorporation of Islam into his agenda. “Our religion is a socialist religion,” he said. “In the Middle Ages, Islam successfully implemented the first socialist experience in the world.” Quoted in Paul Balta and Claudine Rulleau, La vision Nassérienne (Paris: Sindbad, 1982), 131.
11. David Long, The Hajj Today (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979), 76.
12. al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, 107.
13. Saïd K. Aburish, Nasser: The Last Arab (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004), 146; Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia (London: Saqi Books, 1998), 336–37; Saïd K. Aburish, The Rise, Corruption, and Coming Fall of the House of Saud (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994).
14. Quoted in Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, 357.
15. Aburish, The Rise, 130.
16. Quoted in Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 61, 63–65.
17. In 1953, the CIA returned the Shah to the Peacock Throne. In Jordan, the CIA assisted King Hussein in 1957 to overthrew his country’s popular cabinet (filled with Arab socialists and Communists, many of whom were Nasserites). When Lebanon fell to the nationalist tsunami, the CIA gave support and eventually the U.S. Marines landed to take charge of Beirut. All this was the outcome of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); John Badeau, The American Approach to the Arab World (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).
18. Wilbur Crane Eveland, Ropes of Sand: America’s Failure in the Middle East (London: W.W. Norton, 1980), 244; Aburish, The Rise, 161.
19. Ethan Nadelmann is quite possibly right to suggest that the Saudis and the Jordanian monarchy conjured up the WML to circumvent a U.S. overture to the Egyptian government. Ethan Nadelmann, “Setting the Stage: American Policy toward the Middle East, 1961–1966,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 14 (1982): 448.
20. Georges de Bouteiller, “Le Ligue Islamique mondiale: une institution tentaculaire,” Défense Nationale 37 (February 1981): 73–80; Jacob Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Mushirul Haq, “The Rabitah: A New Tradition in Panislamism,” Islam and the Modern Age 9, no. 3 (1978): 55–66; and Reinhard Schulze, Islamisher Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert: untersuchungen zur geschichte der Islamischen Weltliga (Mekka) (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1990).
21. For the story of the first congress, see Arnold J. Toynbee, “The Proclamation of Sultan Abdul-Aziz bin Sa’ud as King of the Hijaz and the Islamic Congress at Mecca (1926),” in Islam and International Relations, ed. J. Harris Proctor (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1965).
22. James P. Piscatori, “Islamic Values and National Interest: The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia,” in Islam in Foreign Policy, ed. Adeed Dawisha (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 40.
23. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), 36.
24. Quoted in Sindhi, “King Faisal,” 188.
25. The ibn Saud clan posed as chiefs of Islam at home, as they became famously mischief men abroad: the Saudi royals “should have more fear of God,” said one of the Islamists. “On the one hand they pray but in the other they pick up the bottle.” Mai Yamani, Changed Identities: The Challenge of the New Generation in Saudi Arabia (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 2000), 39.
26. Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, 396.
27. Ibid., 454; Fareed Mohamedi, “The Saudi Economy: A Few Years till Doomsday,” Middle East Report 185 (November–December 1993): 14–17.
28. For the roots of the religious police, see al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, 49–58. For their modern manifestation and links to the radical Islamist rhetoric and institutions, see ibid., 153–55; Ayman al-Yassini, Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 70.
29. Quoted in Sindhi, “King Faisal,” 193.
30. Quoted in Kabul Times, May 28, 1978.
31. The story of the formation of this alliance is in Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004).
32. Quoted in “Oui, la CIA est entreé en Afghanistan avant les Russes,” Le Nouvel Observateur, January 15–21, 1998.
33. For an excellent appraisal, see Stephen Kotkin, Steeltown USSR: Soviet Society in the Gorbachev Era (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
34. Thane Gustafson, Crisis amid Plenty: The Politics of Soviet Energy under Brezhnev and Gorbachev (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).
35. Abdul Hameed Nayyar, “Madrasa Education,” in Education and the State: Fifty Years of Pakistan, ed. Pervez Hoodbhoy (Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1998), 226.
36. Quoted in Owen Bennett-Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Delhi: Penguin, 2002), 260.
37. In Sudan, for instance, the WML enabled the establishment of the Islamic Charter Front (1964) of Hasan al-Turabi, later the leader of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood. John Voll, “The Evolution of Islamic Fundamentalism in Twentieth-Century Sudan,” in Islam, Nationalism, and Radicalism in Egypt and Sudan, ed. Gabriel Warburg and Uri Kupferschmidt (New York: Praeger, 1983).
Conclusion
1. “Address by Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, Chairman of the South Commission, at the Commission’s Inauguration Ceremony, 2nd October 1987” (Geneva: South Centre, 1987).
2. World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 51.
3. The Challenge of the South: The Report of the South Commission (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 148.
4. The fifteen are Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, India, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Senegal, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe.
5. Quoted in Kripa Sridharan, “G-15 and South-South Cooperation: Promise and Performance,” Third World Quarterly 19, no. 3 (September 1998): 357–74.
6. Quoted in ibid.
7. The Challenge of the South, 274–75.
INDEX
Note: Page numbers in italics refer to illustrations.
Aadha Gaon (Half a Village) (Raza), 174–75
Abbas, Ferhat, 124, 292n4
Abd al-Aziz, Prince Nawwaf ibn, 265
Abdulaziz, Prince Talal bin “Red Prince,” 265–66
Abdul-Rahman, Aisha, 53–55, 58, 60
Aborigines Protection Society, 18
Acheson, Dean, 48, 71–72
Advani, L.K., 218
Afghanistan, 170, 274; CIA in, 272, 273; jihadist groups in, 273; land reform in, 272; Marxist control of, 209, 271–72; Soviet invasion of, 210, 272–73
‘Aflaq, Michel, 159
Africa: colonialization of, 3–4, 9, 13, 17–19, 82, 324n19; guerrilla warfare in, 111, 112, 309n32; independent states in, 33; Marxism-Leninism in, 209; military coups in, 138, 144–45, 147; and négritude, 81, 82; NEPAD, 280–81; postcolonial nation-building in, 128–29, 145; single-commodity nations in, 227; unity for, 18, 23–24. See also specific nations; Third World
African National Congress, 144
Afro-Asian Conference, Bandung (1955). See Bandung conference
Afro-Asian movement, formation of, 15
Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Conference (1957), 52–53, 87
Afro-Asian Women’s Conference, Cairo (1961), xvi, 50, 57–61, 304–5n43
Afro-Malagasy Union, 70
Ahluwalia, Montek, 212
Aidit, Dipa Nusantara, 152–54, 162
Ait Ahmed, Hocine, 124
Alawi, Mortesa, 21
Al-e Ahmad, Jalal, 78–81, 88–89, 90–92, 303n20
Algeria: Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté, 4–5; boundary wars, 167; Charter of Algiers (1964), 123, 126, 128, 131; Communist Party in, 120–21, 123, 130, 158, 315n38; Constitution of (1963), 123; Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in, 5, 52, 98, 119–27, 130, 315n35; independence of, 112, 119–21; March Decrees in, 125; military coup in, 130–32, 147; Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques in (MTLD), 119; NAM summit meeting in (1973), 132, 219, 254; nation-building in, 122–29; oil in, 131, 189; as one-party nation, 123–27, 128, 131, 132; social unrest in, 130; at war with France, 5, 6, 43, 110, 119–21
Ali, Mohammad (Albania), 319n51
Ali, Mohammed (Pakistan), 38
Ali, Tariq, 208
Allende, Salvador, 147, 240
Alliance for Progress, 134, 137, 142
Amer, Hussein Sirri, 51
Americas Watch, 238
Amin, Idi, 83
Andean Pact (1969), 70
Anderson, Benedict, 268
Anderson, Robert, 266
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 75
Angola: Cuban aid to, 112, 209; independence of, 112, 210; Movimento Popular de Libertação de (MPLA), 103; as Portuguese colony, 18
Annan, Kofi, 240–41, 339n55
Antarctic Treaty (1959), 221
APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana), 26, 88
Arab League, 25, 265
Arab nations: anti-British sentiment in, 98–99; anti-nationalism in, 267–68; armed revolutions in, 51–52, 262–63; and Cold War, 98–100; disunity of, 24–25; Eisenhower Doctrine in, 266; vs. Israel, 167, 188; nuclear reactors in, 160; oil in, 179–88, 263–64, 266, 269–70; and OPEC, 184–90. See also Islam; specific nations
Arab Revolt (1916–37), 25
Arab Socialism, 52, 148, 158, 184
Aramco (Arab-American Oil Company), 183, 264, 266, 269
Arbenz Guzmán, Jacobo, 106, 137, 142
Argentina, 62–63, 66, 156, 215
‘Arriyah, Rawiyah, 60
Arusha Declaration (1967), 191–93, 195, 199
Arusha Initiative (1980), 243–44
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), 211, 252
Asia: colonialization of, 9, 13, 249; culturalism in, 258–59; economic crisis in, 255–59; global cities of, 247–48, 249, 252, 253; guerrilla warfare in, 112–13; independent states in, 33, 48; liberalization of financial markets in, 256–57; military coups in, 138; “new Asia,” 165–66; technological development in, 254, 255; “Tiger” economies of, 215, 222, 245–49, 252–56; unity in, 27, 211, 252, 256; World War II in, 249. See also specific nations; Third World
