Overreach, page 56
93.Over the next several years, the newspaper’s reputation and its readership was decimated by the departure of many editors and journalists and the fusion of censorship and market pressures. Maria Repnikova and Kecheng Fang, “Behind the Fall of China’s Greatest Newspaper,” Foreign Policy, January 29, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/29/southern-weekly-china-media-censorship/.
94.An internal version of Xi Jinping’s speech on August 19, 2013, was published by China Digital Times, November 9, 2013, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/2013/11/%E7%BD%91%E4%BC%A0%E4%B9%A0%E8%BF%91%E5%B9%B38%E2%80%A219%E8%AE%B2%E8%AF%9D%E5%85%A8%E6%96%87%EF%BC%9A%E8%A8%80%E8%AE%BA%E6%96%B9%E9%9D%A2%E8%A6%81%E6%95%A2%E6%8A%93%E6%95%A2%E7%AE%A1%E6%95%A2/. Interestingly, the initial reporting on the speech by Xinhua and People’s Daily was quite mild and didn’t mention a “public opinion struggle,” but the PLA Central Political Office issued a more hard-line interpretation, highlighting Xi’s call for a “public opinion struggle” with Western ideas. One brave commentator wrote in the China Youth Journal that the concept of “public opinion struggle” made many people uneasy because it harkened back to the bad old days of the Cultural Revolution. Nevertheless, Xinhua, People’s Daily, Global Times, and many provincial leaders publicly endorsed the PLA’s tough line, which they must have assumed reflected the true intentions of Xi Jinping, its commander in chief. See Qian Gang’s exegesis of the reporting on Xi’s speech, “Parsing the ‘Public Opinion Struggle,’ ” in China Media Project, September 24, 2013, http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/09/24/34085/.
95.Qian Gang, “Parsing the ‘Public Opinion Struggle,’ ” China Media Project, September 24, 2013, https://chinamediaproject.org/2013/09/24/parsing-chinas-public-opinion-struggle/.
96.Ya-Wen Lei, The Contentious Public Sphere: Law, Media and Authoritarian Rule in China (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), 174.
97.“Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation,” ChinaFile, November 8, 2013, https://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation.
98.Zhuang Pinghui, “China’s Top Party Mouthpieces Pledge ‘Absolute Loyalty’ as President Makes Rare Visits to Newsrooms,” South China Morning Post, February 19, 2016, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1914136/chinas-top-party-mouthpieces-pledge-absolute-loyalty. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/10/20/national/all-chinese-journalists-ordered-to-censor-supportive-stances-toward-japan/.
99.“All Chinese Journalists Ordered to Censor Supportive Stances Toward Japan,” Japan Times, October 20, 2013, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/10/20/national/all-chinese-journalists-ordered-to-censor-supportive-stances-toward-japan/.
100.Xi Jinping, “Explanation of Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Several Issues in Perfecting the Socialist Market Economy,” People.cn, November 15, 2013, http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/n/2015/0720/c397563-27331312.html.
101.Guo Jing, “Xi Jinping Inspects Tencent, Asking Pony Ma How Many Followers He Has on Weibo,” Chinanews.com, December 14, 2012, http://goo.gl/Bc2p4.
102.Cate Cadell, “China Harvests Masses of Data on Western Targets, Documents Show,” Washington Post, December 31, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/china-harvests-masses-of-data-on-western-targets-documents-show/2021/12/31/3981ce9c-538e-11ec-8927-c396fa861a71_story.html.
103.Rogier Creemers, Paul Triolo, and Graham Webster, “Xi Jinping’s April 20 Speech at the National Cybersecurity and Informatization Work Conference,” New America Foundation (blog post), April 30, 2018, https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/translation-xi-jinpings-april-20-speech-national-cybersecurity-and-informatization-work-conference/.
104.“Xi Jinping: Explanation of the ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Several Major Issues of Comprehensively Deepening Reform,’ ” Xinhua, November 15, 2013, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/15/c_118164294.htm.
105.Rogier Creemers, Paul Triolo, Samm Sacks, Xiaomeng Lu, and Graham Webster, “China’s Cyberspace Authorities Set to Gain Clout in Reorganization,” New America Foundation (blog post), March 26, 2018, https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/chinas-cyberspace-authorities-set-gain-clout-reorganization/.
106.Charlotte Gao, “ ‘Double-Faced’ Lu Wei Jailed for 14 Years for Bribery: China’s Former Internet Czar Accepted the Judgment in Court and Said He Would Not Appeal,” The Diplomat, March 27, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/double-faced-lu-wei-jailed-for-14-years-for-bribery/.
107.“Fighting Online Rumors Will Protect Free Speech,” Xinhua, China Daily, September 10, 2013, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-09/13/content_16969273.htm.
108.Didi Tang, “China’s Latest Tactic: Confessions on State TV,” South China Morning Post, November 6, 2013, https://www.yahoo.com/news/chinas-latest-tactic-confessions-state-152812863.html.
109.Josh Rudolph, “Translation: Essay by Missing Property Tycoon Ren Zhiqiang,” China Digital Times, March 13, 2020, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2020/03/translation-essay-by-missing-property-tycoon-ren-zhiqiang/.
110.Steven Lee Myers and Amy Chang Chien, “Chinese Journalist Detained after Criticizing Government-Sponsored Blockbuster,” New York Times, October 8, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/08/world/asia/luo-changping-china-battle-at-lake-changjin.html.
111.Iris Deng and Tracy Qu, “China’s Internet Censors Are Taking Down Top Influencers for Not Being Good Enough Socialists,” South China Morning Post, December 16, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/3159947/chinas-internet-censors-are-taking-down-top-influencers-not-being-good.
112.Gao Yu, Ding Gang, Dave Yin, Qin Jianhang, and Timmy Shen, “Coronavirus Whistleblower Li Wenliang Dies of the Disease,” Caixin, February 7, 2020, https://www.caixinglobal.com/2020-02-07/coronavirus-whistleblower-dies-101512456.html.
113.Yanzhong Huang, “Xi Jinping Won the Coronavirus Crisis: How China Made the Most of the Pandemic It Unleashed,” Foreign Affairs, April 13, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-13/xi-jinping-won-coronavirus-crisis.
114.“Persistence Is Victory,” China Media Project, May 5, 2022, https://chinamediaproject.org/2022/05/05/persistence-is-victory/.
115.David Stanway and Jennifer Rigby, “Dropping zero-COVID Policy in China without Safeguards Risks 1.5m Lives – Study,” Reuters, May 10, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/china-medical-experts-say-zero-covid-strategy-buys-time-vaccinate-more-people-2022-05-10/.
116.Xu Wen, Cui Xiaotian, Dong Hui, Zhang Yukun and Li Leyan, “Five Things to Know about China’s Plans for Regular Mass Covid Testing,” Caixin Global, June 3, 2022, https://www.caixinglobal.com/2022-06-03/five-things-to-know-about-chinas-plans-for-regular-mass-covid-testing-101894513.html.
117.Arjun Neil Alim, Edward White, and Andy Lin, “China Digs In for Permanent Zero-Covid,” Financial Times, June 8, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/d3f3b52c-e4bb-40c2-b2e9-afc2b22f0c19.
118.“China will Surely win Anti-COVID War in Shanghai, With Time-Tested Epidemic Control Policy: Top Leadership” Xinhua, May 6, 2022, https://english.www.gov.cn/news/topnews/202205/06/content_WS62747913c6d02e533532a4de.html.
119.Lingling Wei, “China’s Forgotten Premier Steps Out of Xi’s Shadow as Economic Fixer,” Wall Street Journal, May 11, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-premier-li-keqiang-xi-jinping-11652277107.
120.Phoebe Zhang and Guo Rui, “China Tightens Curbs on Overseas Travel as Part of Covid-19 Battle,” South China Morning Post, May 13, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3177536/china-tightens-curbs-overseas-travel-part-covid-battle.
121.Chen Pengduo, Fan Qiaojia, and Wang Xintong, “Some Chinese Colleges Won’t Let Students Graduate without Proof of Employment,” Caixin Global, June 8, 2022, https://www.caixinglobal.com/2022-06-08/some-chinese-colleges-wont-let-students-graduate-without-proof-of-employment-101896541.html.
Chapter 10
1.Susan Shirk, “Giving Away Advantage: Donald Trump and Beijing,” Global Asia, December 27, 2017, https://www.globalasia.org/login_guide.php?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.globalasia.org%3A443%2Fbbs%2Fboard.php%3Fbo_table%3Darticles%26amp%3Bwr_id%3D9242.
2.“In the UN, China Uses Threats and Cajolery to Promote Its Worldview,” The Economist, December 7, 2019, https://www.economist.com/china/2019/12/07/in-the-un-china-uses-threats-and-cajolery-to-promote-its-worldview.
3.According to Bob Davis and Lingling Wei, Superpower Showdown: How the Battle between Trump and Xi Threatens a New Cold War (New York: HarperCollins, 2020), 167, the China strategy was laid out in a ten-page memo drafted for the Trump transition by Matt Pottinger, a former journalist who joined the Trump National Security Council and eventually became the deputy national security adviser.
4.Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, and David E. Weinstein, “Who’s Paying for the US Tariffs? A Longer-Term Perspective,” AEA Papers and Proceedings 110 (2020): 541–546.
5.Josh Rogin, Chaos under Heaven: Trump, Xi, and the Battle for the Twenty-First Century (New York: HarperCollins, 2021), 358.
6.Davis and Wei, Superpower Showdown, 164.
7.Davis and Wei, 164.
8.Davis and Wei, 164.
9.Davis and Wei, 24–27.
10.“Editorial: The Establishment of An Unreliable Entity List System Sends Two Major Signals,” Global Times, May 31, 2019, https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnKkMDG.
11.Lingling Wei, “Chinese Leaders Split over Releasing Blacklist of U.S. Companies,” Wall Street Journal, September 21, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-leaders-split-over-releasing-blacklist-of-u-s-companies-11600708688.
12.Semiconductor Industry Association, “Taking Stock of China’s Semiconductor Industry” (SIA white paper, July 13, 2021), https://www.semiconductors.org/taking-stock-of-chinas-semiconductor-industry/.
13.Scott Kennedy, “Beijing Suffers Major Loss from Its Hostage Diplomacy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 29, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/beijing-suffers-major-loss-its-hostage-diplomacy.
14.Davis and Wei, Superpower Showdown, 307.
15.Kennedy, “Beijing Suffers Major Loss.”
16.“In a Red Dress, Meng Wanzhou Landed and Delivered a Moving Speech,” Guancha, September 26, 2021, https://www.163.com/news/article/GKQBGAQ10001899O.html.
17.See the footage of Meng singing Ode to the Motherland with the welcoming crowd at the airport, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=owm5ptbM2NA&ab_channel=CCTV%E4%B8%AD%E6%96%87%E5%9B%BD%E9%99%85.
18.Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (speech delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 18, 2017), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf.
19.“Communiqué of the 6th Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee,” Xinhua, November 11, 2021, https://peoplesdaily.pdnews.cn/china/full-text-communique-of-6th-plenary-session-of-19th-cpc-central-committee-236004.html.
20.“Put People’s Life Safety and Health First (Key Choices in the New Era),” People’s Daily, November 2, 2021, https://wap.peopleapp.com/article/6348610/6238053?mc_cid=0e9e722c33&mc_eid=7b33e85a9e.
21.Davis E. Sanger, “Biden Defines His Underlying Challenge with China: ‘Prove Democracy Works,’ ” New York Times, March 27, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/26/us/politics/biden-china-democracy.html.
22.Rogin, Chaos under Heaven, 338.
23.“The Many Times Trump Has Praised China’s Handling of the Coronavirus Pandemic,” CNN, May 19, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/21/politics/trump-china-praise-coronavirus-timeline/index.html.
24.Peter Martin, China’s Civilian Army: The Making of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 220.
25.Carolyn Kormann, “The Mysterious Case of the COVID-19 Lab-Leak Theory,” New Yorker, October 12, 2021, https://www.newyorker.com/science/elements/the-mysterious-case-of-the-covid-19-lab-leak-theory.
26.“Most Americans See China as Having Dealt Poorly with Covid-19,” Pew Research Center, July 30, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/07/30/americans-fault-china-for-its-role-in-the-spread-of-covid-19/pg_20-07-30_u-s-views-china_0-02/.
27.Alice Miranda Ollstein, “Politico-Harvard Poll: Most Americans Believe Covid Leaker from Lab,” Politico, July 9, 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/09/poll-covid-wuhan-lab-leak-498847.
28.Sarah Wheaton, “Chinese Vaccine Would Be ‘Global Public Good,’ Xi Says,” Politico, May 18, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/18/chinese-vaccine-would-be-global-public-good-xi-says-265039.
29.Yanzhong Huang, “Vaccine Diplomacy Is Paying Off for China,” Foreign Affairs, March 11, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-03-11/vaccine-diplomacy-paying-china.
30.“China Shows Its Image as a Responsible Country Promoting International Cooperation in the Fight against the Epidemic,” People’s Daily, November 12, 2021, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2021-11/12/nw.D110000renmrb_20211112_4-02.htm.
31.In a 2021 survey by the Carter Center, 77 percent of respondents believed that China is viewed favorably internationally. See “The Pulse: Chinese Public Opinion,” U.S.-China Perception Monitor, https://uscnpm.org/the-pulse/. Surveys by Haifeng Huang from 2020 and 2021 show that the Chinese public overwhelmingly overestimates China’s soft power and global popularity, and that correcting such misperceptions with additional information “moderates Chinese citizens’ evaluations of China and its governing system and lowers their expectations for the country’s external success.” Haifeng Huang, “Triumphalism and the Inconvenient Truth: Correcting Inflated National Self-Images in a Rising Power” (unpublished paper).
32.Xi Jinping, “Communiqué of 6th Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee,” Xinhua, November 11, 2021, http://www.news.cn/english/2021-11/11/c_1310305166.htm.
33.Yaoyao Dai and Luwei Rose Luqiu, “China’s ‘Wolf Warrior’ Diplomats Like to Talk Tough,” Washington Post, May 12, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/05/12/chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomats-like-talk-tough/.
34.Keith Zhai and Yew Lun Tian, “In China, a Young Diplomat Rises as Aggressive Foreign Policy Takes Root,” Reuters, March 30, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-diplomacy-insight/in-china-a-young-diplomat-rises-as-aggressive-foreign-policy-takes-root-idUSKBN21I0F8.
35.“Sino-US Diplomats’ Twitter Scolding War Resumes, and China’s Diplomacy Becomes More ‘Wolf-Warrior’-like,” BBC, July 17, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/world-49012321.
36.“Western Pride and Prejudice Must Stop,” Global Times, editorial, July 17, 2019, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1158237.shtml.
37.Zhai and Tian, “In China, a Young Diplomat Rises.”
38.Daniel C. Mattingly and James Sundquist, “When Does Online Public Diplomacy Succeed? Evidence from China’s ‘Wolf Warrior’ Diplomats,” unpublished paper, July 29, 2021, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/51cdc7e5e4b0d7474642bcb0/t/61030573b20c60377a1282ec/1627587958755/China_Public_Diplomacy_v4.pdf.
39.Martin, China’s Civilian Army, 9.
40.Glenn Kessler, “Biden’s Repeated Claim He Is ‘Traveled 17,000 Miles with’ Xi Jinping,” Washington Post, February 19, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/02/19/bidens-repeated-claim-hes-traveled-17000-miles-with-xi-jinping/.
41.Ashley J. Tellis, “Hustling in the Himalayas: The Sino-Indian Border Confrontation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 4, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/04/hustling-in-himalayas-sino-indian-border-confrontation-pub-81979.
42.Tellis, “Hustling in the Himalayas.” Also see M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Sovereignty Obsession, Beijing’s Need to Project Strength Explains the Border Clash with India,” Foreign Affairs, June 26, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-06-26/chinas-sovereignty-obsession.
43.Davis and Wei, Superpower Showdown, 302.
44.Matthew M. Burke and Aya Ichihashi, “Tokyo Again Protests to Beijing about Incursions Near Senkaku Islands in East China Sea,” Stars and Stripes, January 21, 2021, https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/tokyo-again-protests-to-beijing-about-incursions-near-senkaku-islands-in-east-china-sea-1.659294.
45.See the graph compiled by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as of October 31, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20190929161826/https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000465486.pdf.
46.“On March 17, 2021, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian Held Regular Press Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 17, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1861952.shtml.
47.Junnosuke Kobara, “Japan Defense Spending Tops 1% of GDP for Fiscal Year,” Nikkei Asia, November 27, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-defense-spending-tops-1-of-GDP-for-fiscal-year.
48.“Philippines Throws Support Behind AUKUS Pact,” Radio Free Asia, September 21, 2021, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/pact-09212021152655.html.
49.Derek Grossman, “Duterte’s Dalliance with China Is Over,” The Rand Blog, November 2, 2021, https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/11/dutertes-dalliance-with-china-is-over.html.
50.J. Michael Cole, “China Ends ‘Median Line’ in the Taiwan Strait: The Start of a Crisis?,” National Interest, September 22, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-ends-%E2%80%98median-line%E2%80%99-taiwan-strait-start-crisis-169402.
51.William Langley, “PLA Warplanes Made a Record 380 Incursions into Taiwan’s Airspace in 2020, Report Says,” South China Morning Post, January 6, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3116557/pla-warplanes-made-record-380-incursions-taiwans-airspace-2020.
52.This pattern occurred during leadership transitions during the US–Soviet Union Cold War, according to Li Chen and Odd Arne Westad, “Can Cold War History Prevent U.S.-Chinese Calamity?,” Foreign Affairs, November 29, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-11-29/can-cold-war-history-prevent-us-china-calamity.
