Overreach, page 53
5.IMF, China Pathfinder Data.
6.“Chinese Markets Continue to See Foreign Investment Outflows in April,” Reuters, April 22, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinese-markets-continue-see-foreign-investment-outflows-april-2022-04-22/.
7.“Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy toward China,” Hudson Institute, October 4, 2018, https://www.hudson.org/events/1610-vice-president-mike-pence-s-remarks-on-the-administration-s-policy-towards-china102018.
8.“China Is Evading U.S. Spies—and the White House Is Worried,” Bloomberg, November 9, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-10/china-under-xi-is-tough-target-for-cia-spies-hurting-biden-s-beijing-policy.
9.Lucian W. Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn, and Hain, 1981).
10.Financial Times, “China’s Long March to National Rejuvenation,” editorial, September 30, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/d45119de-e11f-11e9-b112-9624ec9edc59.
11.Han Bing, “Xinhua’s International Commentary: The US Fair Competition Is Not Fair,” Xinhua, October 27, 2021, http://www.news.cn/world/2021-10/27/c_1128000834.htm.
12.CGTN, “Full Text of Xi Jinping Keynote at the World Economic Forum,” January 17, 2017, CGTN America, https://america.cgtn.com/2017/01/17/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum.
13.Xi Jinping, “Pursuing Sustainable Development in a Concerted Effort to Build an Asia-Pacific Community with a Shared Future,” APEC CEO Summit, November 11, 2021, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1919060.shtml.
14.Yang Jiechi, “Innovations in China’s Diplomatic Theory and Practice under New Conditions,” August 16, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1066869.shtml; in Chinese, see http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t1066866.shtml.
15.For example, Zhang Baijia, “If History Is Any Guide,” China-US Focus, April 11, 2019, https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/historical-lessons-and-future-implications-for-evolving-china-us-relations.
16.Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 214.
17.Snyder, Myths of Empire, 18.
18.Jessica L. P. Weeks, Dictators at War and Peace (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 19.
19.Bonnie Glaser, “Obama’s Legacy in U.S.-China Relations: A Conversation with Evan Medeiros,” China Power Podcast, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 29, 2016, https://www.csis.org/podcasts/chinapower/obama’s-legacy-us-china-relations-conversation-evan-medeiros.
20.For example, “Xi Jinping Visits Army at Shenyang Military Region,” CCTV, August 30, 2013, http://tv.cctv.com/2013/08/30/VIDE1377861846506982.shtml; “Xi Jinping Visits Navy Force Stationed at Sanya,” People’s Daily, April 12, 2013, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0412/c64094-21107967.html. In these visits in 2013 Xi wore the teal military office uniform.
21.“Xi Jinping: Do a Good Job in Preparing for Military Struggle at a New Starting Point and Resolutely Complete the Mission Entrusted by the Party and the People,” Xinhua, January 4, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2019-01/04/c_1123949395.htm.
22.Sophie Beach, “Leaked Speech Shows Xi Jinping’s Opposition to Reform,” China Digital Times, January 27, 2013, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2013/01/leaked-speech-shows-xi-jinpings-opposition-to-reform/.
23.Joseph Fewsmith, Rethinking Chinese Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021). Fewsmith notes that the 19th Central Committee brought in the largest turnover of military members in the history of post-Mao China—76 percent of the full members and 83 percent of the alternates were new.
24.Dean Cheng, “Xi Jinping and His Generals: Curiouser and Curiouser,” War on the Rocks, January 18, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/xi-jinping-generals-curiouser-curiouser/.
25.Data calculated using official data from the annual report of defense budget during the plenary sessions of the National People’s Congress.
26.“China’s National Defense in 2008,” State Council Information Office, January 20, 2009, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-01/20/content_1210224.htm.
27.Li Xueyong, Li Xuanliang, and Mei Shixiong, “Xi Jinping Attends Plenary Meeting With PLA and Armed Police Force Delegations,” Xinhua, March 12, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2019-03/12/c_1124227000.htm.
28.James Mulvenon, “Xi Jinping Has a Cool New Nickname: ‘Commander-in-Chief,’” China Leadership Monitor, no. 51, Fall 2016, https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm51jm.pdf.
29.Shi, “China’s Complicated Foreign Policy.”
30.Yingxian Long, “China’s Decision to Deploy HYSY-981 in the South China Sea: Bureaucratic Politics with Chinese Characteristics,” Asian Security 12, no. 3 (2016), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14799855.2016.1227322.
31.Carl Thayer, “4 Reasons China Removed Oil Rig HYSY-981 Sooner Than Planned,” The Diplomat, July 22, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/07/4-reasons-china-removed-oil-rig-hysy-981-sooner-than-planned/.
32.Thayer, “4 Reasons.”
33.ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Current Developments in the South China Sea, May 10, 2014, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/24th-AFMs-Statement-on-SCS.pdf.
34.“China’s Military Told ‘to Follow Xi Jinping’s Instructions,’ ” India Today, September 21, 2014, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/china-military-told-to-follow-xi-jinping-instructions-293684-2014-09-21; “Who Sabotaged Chinese President Xi Jinping’s India Visit?,” Forbes, September 23, 2014, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericrmeyer/2014/09/23/who-sabotaged-xi-jinpings-india-visit/?sh=74eb180d70fa.
35.Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “New Fleet on the Block: China’s Coast Guard Comes Together,” Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2013, https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CJB-17380.
36.The Maritime Safety Administration under the Ministry of Transport remained separate.
37.Some of the ships of the Fisheries Law Enforcement, Maritime Anti-Smuggling Police, and Border Defense Coast Guard were already equipped with desk-mounted guns and water cannons. Ryan D. Martinson, “From Words to Actions: The Creation of the China Coast Guard” (paper, China as a “Maritime Power” Conference, July 28–29, 2015, Center for Naval Analysis, Arlington, Virginia), https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/creation-china-coast-guard.pdf.
38.“The Coast Guard Law of the People’s Republic of China,” according to the Ministry of Defense, 2020, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/sec_env/ch_ocn/index.html.
39.Nguyen Thanh Trung, “How China’s Coast Guard Law Has Changed the Regional Security Structure,” CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, April 12, 2021, https://amti.csis.org/how-chinas-coast-guard-law-has-changed-the-regional-security-structure/.
40.Tai Ming Cheung, “The Chinese National Security State Emerges from the Shadows to Center Stage,” China Leadership Monitor, September 1, 2020, https://www.prcleader.org/cheung.
41.Hu Jintao, “Unswervingly Advance along the Path of Chinese Characteristics, Struggle to Complete the Building of a Well-Off Society in an All-Round Way” (Report to the Eighteenth Chinese Communist Party National Congress, November 8, 2012), People’s Daily, November 9, 2012, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2012/1109/c1001-19529890.xhtml, quoted in Cheung, “Chinese National Security State Emerges from the Shadows.”
42.Matt Ho, Holly Chik, and Echo Xie, “China’s National Security Commission Met in Secret Amid Coronavirus Pandemic,” South China Morning Post, June 29, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3091101/chinas-national-security-commission-met-secret-amid-coronavirus.
43.Cheung, “Chinese National Security State Emerges.”
44.Chinese Academy of Social Science researcher Zhang Jie describes three phases in Chinese dispute strategy as a function of how policymakers balance the two desires for sovereignty and stability. She says that during first period, prior to 2009, China “self-consciously strived not to let its claims harm relations with other states.” During 2010 and 2011, the policy “oscillated” between assertive action and restraint. And a third phase, in 2012, began a period of “proactivity.” Zhang Jie, “The Huangyan Island Model and the Shift of China’s Maritime Protection Policy,” Southeast Asian Studies, no. 4 (2013), https://edu.wanfangdata.com.cn/Periodical/Detail/dnyyj201304003, quoted in Ryan Martinson, “China’s Great Balancing Act Unfolds: Enforcing Maritime Rights vs. Stability,” National Interest, September 11, 2015, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-great-balancing-act-unfolds-enforcing-maritime-rights-13821.
45.People’s Daily, July 2014, quoted in Martinson, “China’s Great Balancing Act Unfolds.”
46.Feng Zhang, “Chinese Thinking on the South China Sea and the Future of Regional Security,” Political Science Quarterly 132, no. 3 (2017): 435–466, http://bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/uploads/2017-09/feng_zhang-2017-political_science_quarterly.pdf.
47.Liu Linlin, “Asia-Pacific Geopolitics in Transition, Says CASS Report,” Global Times, December 27, 2012, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/752551.shtml.
48.Yun-han Chu and Yu-tzung Chang, “Xi’s Foreign-Policy Turn and Asian Perceptions of a Rising China,” Global Asia 12, no. 1 (Spring 2017), https://www.globalasia.org/v12no1/focus/xis-foreign-policy-turn-and-asian-perceptions-of-a-rising-china_yun-han-chuyu-tzung-chang.
49.According to Linda Jakobson, “Xi Jinping was reportedly made head of a new ‘Office to Respond to the Diaoyu Crisis’ soon after the Japanese government’s announcement. State counsellor Dai Binguo, China’s top diplomat for the past five years, as well as several senior military officers were assigned to this task force.” See Linda Jakobson, “How Involved Is Xi Jinping in the Diaoyu Crisis?,” The Diplomat, February 8, 2013, https://thediplomat.com/2013/02/how-involved-is-xi-jinping-in-the-diaoyu-crisis-3/. This office was probably part of the working group that Xi chaired.
50.Jeremy Wallace and Jessica Chen Weiss, “The Political Geography of Nationalist Protest in China: Cities and the 2012 Anti-Japanese Demonstrations,” China Quarterly 222 (June 2015): 403–429.
51.“Beijing Evening News Says ‘Nuke Japan,’ ” China Digital Times, September 12, 2012, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2012/09/beijing-evening-news-says-nuke-japan/.
52.Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, “Choppy Weather in the China Seas,” Le Monde Diplomatique, December 2012, https://mondediplo.com/2012/12/08chinaseas.
53.Ai Weiwei, September 15, 2012, https://twitter.com/aiww/status/247122153756041216.
54.“Hu Jintao States China’s Position on Relations with Japan, Diaoyu Islands,” September 9, 2012, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/diaodao_665718/t969863.shtml.
55.Jakobson, “How Involved Is Xi Jinping?” The Diaoyu Islands small group may be the same as the Maritime Rights Protection leading small group that Xi Jinping was put in charge of.
56.“Xi Slams ‘Purchase’ of Dialyu Islands,” China.orgncn, September 19, 2012, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2012-09/19/content_26574964.htm.
57.“Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks,” International Crisis Group, April 8, 2013, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/51b830571.pdf.
58.“China Officially Labels Senkakus a ‘Core Interest’,” Japan Times, April 27, 2013, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/04/27/national/china-officially-labels-senkakus-a-core-interest/.
59.Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 41, Spring 2013, June 4, 2013, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM41MS.pdf.
60.“What’s Really at the Core of China’s ‘Core Interests’?,” ChinaFile, April 30, 2013, https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/whats-really-core-chinas-core-interests.
61.“On April 26, 2013, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying Presided Over Regular Press Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cejm/chn/wjbfyrth/t1035595.htm, quoted in Michael Swaine, “Chinese Views on the South China Sea Arbitration Case between the People’s Republic of China and the Philippines,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 51 (Fall 2016); also see “White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development,” The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, September 6, 2011, http://www.scio.gov.cn/tt/Document/1011394/1011394.htm.
62.“Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks.”
63.Caixin, September 17, 2012, quoted in Jessica Chen Weiss, Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 214.
64.Alessio Patalano, “What Is China’s Strategy in the Senkaku Islands?,” War on the Rocks, September 10, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/what-is-chinas-strategy-in-the-senkaku-islands/. The patrols into the territorial waters of the Senkakus had begun on an occasional basis in December 2008.
65.Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson, “From Management Crisis to Crisis Management? Japan’s Post-2012 Institutional Reforms and Sino-Japanese Crisis (In)stability,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 5 (2017): 604, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2017.1293530.
66.“Announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the People’s Republic of China,” China Daily, November 23, 2013, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-11/23/content_17126618.htm.
67.Bonnie Glaser, “China’s Maritime Rights Protection Leading Small Group—Shrouded in Secrecy,” Asia Maritime Security Initiative, Center for Security and International Studies, September 11, 2015, https://amti.csis.org/chinas-maritime-rights-protection-leading-small-group-shrouded-in-secrecy/.
68.“General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Road to Growth,” Study Times, July 28, 2017, http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2017-07-28/doc-ifyinryq6629735.shtml, quoted in Mai and Zheng, “Xi Personally Behind Island-Building in the South China Sea.”
69.Feng Chunmei, Sun Maoqing, Li Xuanliang, and Li Guowen, “Take the Road of Scientific Development and Build the Great Wall of Steel In The Sky,” Xinhua, November 1, 2009, quoted in Jun Osawa, “China’s ADIZ over the East China Sea: A ‘Great Wall in the Sky’?,” Brookings Institution, December 17, 2013, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinas-adiz-over-the-east-china-sea-a-great-wall-in-the-sky/.
70.Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “U.S. Japan, Korea Defy New China Air Defense Zone, Biden to Rebuke Beijing; PRC Move Drives Korea, Japan Together,” Breaking Defense, November 26, 2013, https://breakingdefense.com/2013/11/chinas-new-defense-zone-drives-korea-japan-together/.
71.Jessica Chen Weiss and Allan Dafoe, “Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China,” International Studies Quarterly 63, no. 4 (2019): 963–973, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/63/4/963/5559531?redirectedFrom=fulltext.
72.“Kerry Warns Beijing over Air Defense Zone for South China Sea,” Reuters, June 4, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-usa-china/kerry-warns-beijing-over-air-defense-zone-for-south-china-sea-idUSKCN0YR01D.
73.Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Zack Cooper, John Schaus, and Jake Douglas, “Counter-coercion Series: Second Thomas Shoal Incident,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, CSIS, June 9, 2017, https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-2nd-thomas-shoal/.
74.Carl Thayer, “A Closer Look at the ASEAN-China Single Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct,” The Diplomat, August 3, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/a-closer-look-at-the-asean-china-single-draft-south-china-sea-code-of-conduct/.
75.Swaine, “Chinese Views regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute.”
76.PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “China’s Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and Interests in the South China Sea Shall Not Be Affected by Arbitration Award,” July 16, 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/wjbxw_1/t1382766.htm.
77.“What China Has Been Building in the South China Sea,” New York Times, October 27, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-in-the-south-china-sea.html.
78.Helene Cooper and Jane Perlez, “White House Moves to Reassure Allies With South China Sea Patrol, but Quietly,” New York Times, October 28, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/28/world/asia/south-china-sea-uss-lassen-spratly-islands.html.
79.Gregory B. Poling, “The Conventional Wisdom on China’s Island Bases Is Dangerously Wrong,” War on the Rocks, January 10, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/the-conventional-wisdom-on-chinas-island-bases-is-dangerously-wrong/.
80.Lyle J. Goldstein, “The South China Sea Showdown: 5 Dangerous Myths,” National Interest, September 29, 2015, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-south-china-sea-showdown-5-dangerous-myths-13970.
81.“Sansha and the Expansion of China’s South China Sea Administration,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, CSIS, May 12, 2020, https://amti.csis.org/sansha-and-the-expansion-of-chinas-south-china-sea-administration/.
82.Bonnie S. Glaser and Lisa Collins, “China’s Rapprochement with South Korea: Who Won the THAAD Dispute?,” Foreign Affairs, November 7, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-11-07/chinas-rapprochement-south-korea.
83.Victoria Kim, “When China and U.S. Spar, It’s South Korea That Gets Punched,” Los Angeles Times, November 19, 2020, https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-11-19/south-korea-china-beijing-economy-thaad-missile-interceptor.
84.The Chinese side made the most of these promises by publicizing them as “Three Noes,” but the Moon government insisted that it had just affirmed South Korea’s long-standing position. South Korea’s foreign minister had offered the same three assurances in response to a parliamentary question the same day the compromise with China was announced. “China’s foreign ministry appears to have co-opted her statement, implying that it had been part of the bilateral agreement.” Glaser and Collins, “China’s Rapprochement with South Korea.”
