The Market Mind Hypothesis, page 56
Portfolioism applies these finance concepts to the mind in general. An important application, already encountered, is “psychurities” as the mind’s version of finance’s securities.
Let me explain. By holding securities in their portfolio investors are able to adapt to states of the world. Specifically, each (sub)portfolio is structured to replicate a strategy to respond to an event, ultimately aimed at gaining a reward or hedging a risk. For example, a (sub)portfolio of commodity (e.g. gold) related securities hedges the risk of inflation. The extent of the investor’s skill determines any so-called excess return above the return of some benchmark. The MMH interprets this for our cognitive setting and specifically translates securities as “psychurities” for our mind-as-market. Similarly then, psychurities represent our mind~body assets, varying from emotions to thoughts, that allow us to adapt psychophysically to states of the world. For example, a psychurity can be a single psychological adaptation: its activation or trigger is event-dependent or, in finance terms, ‘state contingent’. Just like finance’s “pure securities”, such a psychurity embeds a contingent claim, or payoff. To wit, the ‘derivatives’ in your psychurities portfolio allow you to ‘derive’ (contingent) value from an experience, even though you have no direct sensory exposure to the underlying aspects. What counts, for example, is how objects appear to us. So, although you only see one side of an object (e.g. a tomato), you experience it in 3D. “Whole objects and detailed scenes are embraced in experience, despite facts about the limits of sensory uptake that might appear to make this problematic” (Ward 2012, p. 737.) Portfolioism suggests that the mind forms a multi-layered complex of psychurity-portfolios. This is further discussed in Section C3, as well as Chapter 8.
Here portfolioism applies the above finance concepts—including excess return—particularly to consciousness, centred on valuation of experiences. This is motivated by the following. What is missing in current cognitive theories, especially on consciousness, is the recognition of the importance of value when paying attention as information is dually realised. In investment terms, what is the net-present-value (or NPV) of such attention, seen as investment? This brings me to a more general point. While I hope to detail this in future work, I submit here—in the context of uncertainty, but also Brentano’s intentions, Gibson’s affordances, Heidegger’s possibilities, and so on—that option theory is very applicable to psychophysical exchanges in the mind-as-market. Many of our experiences can be seen as possible (contingent) payoffs for attention (e.g. following previous decisions, etc.) Notably, and in portfolioism terms, they can be considered (and thus valued) as options on the underlying (often dormant or unconscious) psychurities, with a strike price, premium, and various related variables, known as ‘greeks’ (delta, theta, vega). This allows us, at least to some extent, to interpret conscious qualities quantitatively. Notably, top-level valence—which specifies whether experiences are positive, negative, or neutral—is captured in returns. This leads to the following interpretation of consciousness which builds on earlier comments, particularly in the section on mind (A3).
Cognitive NoteConsciousness (according to portfolioism)
What consciousness is to the brain can best be compared to what value is to assets. Specifically, value is in the “I” of the beholder, who happens to hold a portfolio of values. Bottom-up, exchanges and other ‘market’ activity in the physical brain leads to mental states that are valued via self-awareness. Top-down, as in ‘downward causation’, this reflexively works back on the brain, e.g. through its plasticity. Consequently, neural correlates of consciousness (i.e. between the brain and consciousness) can change, just like the correlations between assets and securities.
Consciousness is thus the mind~body’s valuation system, the (public) market where mental prices are realised, say due to the exchanges between your S1 and your S2. While this is not limited to such cases let’s connect these internal values with external values, e.g. when you buy that much-desired object. With Harman’s separation still fresh in our memory, we take our cue from Simmel (in turn, echoing Hegel): The object of attention, “which is characterized by its separation from the subject, who at the same time establishes it and seeks to overcome it by his desire, is for us a value. The moment of enjoyment itself, when the separation of subject and object is effaced, consumes the value” (Simmel, 1907, p. 63; emphasis added). At that moment you exercise your option and the amount of attention you pay can be considered its exercise price in return for the value. More to the point: the subject consumes the value as owner of a portfolio of S1, S2, and other mind~body assets. This brings us to returns.
In markets, a key conscious activity is discounting news which ‘realises’ all information via prices. Specifically, via the usual market forces (like demand~supply) investments (by way of trades) lead to changing values in prices (e.g. PNow and PBase) that generate profits and losses, known as returns. The mathematical default is lognormal returns, i.e. as a function it reads ln(PNow/PBase).
In the mind’s case, conscious experiences are the multisensory real-time ‘returns’ for actively ‘investing in the now’,37 i.e. the payoffs for paying attention while employing your eyes, ears, skin, S1, S2, etc., and committing memory. To be clear, “now” is relative in that returns occur over (continuous) time; price changes have temporality. This suits experiences as well: “for information to become conscious [i.e. to be realised], some amount of time needs to pass, so that normally there is no way the brain can ‘in an instant’ reach the kind of state that supports conscious experience” (Clark, 2009, p. 978). The amount of attention paid stands for the active allocation, or weight, in a portfolio. For example, this can be relative to the previous allocation or relative to another mind~body portfolio. Each portfolio of psychurities has a bespoke mandate, including (e.g. evolutionary imposed) constraints. Within those portfolios, different sensory modalities are governed by different exchanges, both internal and external of the overall mind~body portfolio. In section C6 I will discuss ownership in broader terms.
To further clarify, I am not discussing the measurements of these returns, say, via some “instrument, a psychophysical machine, continually registering the height of pleasure experienced by an individual, exactly according to the verdict of consciousness” (Edgeworth, 1881, p. 101). Rather, I’m discussing the (dynamics between) market-type complementarities that are behind the generation of these returns as such “verdict[s] of consciousness”.
Returns have two properties, the yang and yin of valuation:
Quantitative, as a result of objective valuation via access processing: returns are (symbolically38) numerical across all senses, making it a uniform property. All tactile sensations (e.g. pressure, temperature, pain) can in principle be expressed numerically, as can all visual (e.g. light, colour) and all other experiences. For example, externally some “news” shifts my attention and I now experience seeing 0-24-186 (i.e. a blueish colour), feeling 30 ᵒC (i.e. a warm glow), etc. Internally, of course, these numbers are converted into the currency of the particular mental location. Again, this quantification also allows, for example, comparing, scaling, selecting, sorting, and other numerical operations. Moreover, it facilitates valuation across minds because we all are subject to the same Market Mind Principle.
Qualitative, as a result of subjective valuation via affective processing: returns are, in principle, of different kinds depending on salience, the particular type of sensation. This makes it a unique property. For example, a tactile return (hot coal’s heat as you move your hand towards it) is different from a visual return (hot coal’s redness as you focus your vision on it).39 The unique property is what is valued subjectively. Consequently, the traditional ‘value in the eye’ (or ear, nose, skin) of the beholder becomes the ‘value of the I’ of the beholder. In your case it receives its own valuation by you, signifying its personal worth to you (again, paid for by attention). Still, each is just one value in your overall portfolio. Also, returns can be subjectively valued in a cross-sectional (or factorial) sense. An example is via valence, like pleasant/unpleasant, good/bad, and indifferent/neutral.
Per portfolioism, returns can be combined, resulting in a composite portfolio-experience that differs from any of its original constituents and synergistically merge them, depending on their respective weights. For example, the excitement of a roller-coaster ride is experienced as a mix of visual (height), tactile (air), and auditory (scream) sensations. Returns also form patterns and, depending on their source, can be frequencies, rhythms or vibrations.
The base price (PBase) is, metaphorically, like the end quote from your previous utility provider before you switched. It stands for the final score of any particular sensation that last lost your attention. In other words, it was the exit price for which you traded-in the previous instance of attention because the value of the (expected) return of your new experience is bigger than paying the amount of fresh attention as exercise price of your option. A shift in attention is thus an exchange taking place between experiences, which itself is liminal. Your experience of the redness of the rose is replaced by the greenness of the grass, each with its own price. In comparison, if something keeps your attention, like the sound of Miles Davis’ trumpet when driving, you ‘keep your other options open’ (i.e. you do not exercise them) and instead enjoy the return from Miles’ music while keeping track of its real-time price quotes (quantified in, e.g., frequencies), like a cognitive ticker tape. You exchange it if the (expected) price of another experience “jumps at you”, for example because some risk appears that makes you pay attention to the road as a hedge. After all, that’s what options are for.
Therefore we should think of experiences as returns that can be compounded (i.e. combined vertically, e.g. over time) as well as diversified (i.e. combined horizontally, e.g. across senses). Streams of consciousness as value streams within our mind’s market-portfolio, as it were. Importantly, like financial returns conscious returns can be negative, are mostly non-linear, and their correlations can break down. Also, the return from paying attention to that particular red tomato is idiosyncratic. Usually we quickly stop paying it attention, implying we do not value it enough, because its colour is static (like a stale price loses market interest, i.e. no ‘news’ or ‘volatility’). And then there is the ultimate conscious return: the Aha-experience (as enlightenment in the extreme case) is pure alpha—or excess return—due to discovery, the most active form of investing mental capital, i.e. the unknown has no benchmark (except perhaps zero, because there was nothing before).
The endogenous numerical nature of experiences thus also embeds their duration or temporality: the amount of time undergoing them, to the point of influencing the experience of time itself, i.e. intrinsic time. (See also, Holm and Madison, 2013).
So, your “I” is very much participating in the mind’s valuation process. However, while “I” has ownership of your psychurities, it overestimates its role and is overconfident in its competence. In short, “I” believes it is the overall manager of your fund-of-funds, the “God” of your market portfolio. “I” is familiar with the memory portfolio, a particular sub-portfolio that is active in your mind’s private market. While “I” regularly gets insight in the mind’s exposure to some of the holdings of the memory portfolio, it does not fully manage it. Apart from memories “I” knows the memory portfolio also owns warrants, for example, which are a particular form of options which hold the right to buy (into) your experiences. One key criterion which raises the probability of these rights being exercised is the level of volatility in your payoffs. If exercised, and by physical settlement, the experience concerned will, from then on, be held as a memory in the memory portfolio. Other (exotic) mind derivatives allow but also force temporary exposure to those memories, again paid for by attention. This often upsets “I” as it has no full control over such trades.
Finally, as I said, all prices are denominated in the currencies of their locations of origin (externally you can think of these as symbolically called ᵒC, Pascal, RGB, HEX, etc.). This means, for example, that there are currency conversions and other ‘currency effects’ when returns are combined, or assets are “cashed-in”. These types of settlements mostly occur in the back-office, and we are not aware of them.
To conclude and summarise:
This is my attempt to bridge—to the extent possible—cognition and consciousness by moving away from raw computation. Among my cues here are the observations from Koppel and Zaloom regarding ‘calculations’ by traders (see subchapters 1.2, respectively 7.2). Whatever investment’s calculation entails, it certainly is experiential. This is then applied and interpreted through the mind-as-market. Importantly, psychurities’ returns do not lose or negate their phenomenal payoff. Interpreting Kim in terms of portfolioism, as “felt qualities” they are indeed “the only things that ultimately matter to us” (2005, p. 12).
The nature of consciousness is value. James’s “stream of consciousness” is the stream of ‘cash flows’, i.e. mental returns, that are instantly valued. When we talk about “rich” experiences the economic association is not coincidental. Their value is in the “I” of the beholder. More technically, it is the valuation of the information that is dually realised, concentrated in numbers: numbers from axes, gradients, indices, and scales associated with the objects of our attention. Valuation generates the (multi-currency) prices in the internal market of the mind. That is, we experience these (changing) prices in “return” for paying attention. Linking this to options, respectively statistics by paraphrasing Kant, the options of experience offer the (subjective) probabilities for the objects of experience.
Just like returns in markets (and by extension portfolios) cannot, e.g. causally, be reduced to any specific ‘fundamentals’, conscious returns cannot be reduced to specific ‘physicals’. Both shortcomings are due to the entwined exchanges taking place within (and between) markets, respectively within (and between) minds.
Moreover, just like financial returns have a real (economy) impact, conscious returns are not epiphenomenal. While they are ‘just’ changes in numbers to an observer, as experienced by “I” they reflexively feedback on “I”s physical substrate. This has implications for epiphenomenality, supervenience, etc.
Chalmers’s (1996) description of consciousness as dual realisation of information received criticism that his “information” was ill-defined. By interpreting that information as prices resulting from exchanges in the (4E) mind-as-market, the MMH clarifies this:40 experience is the realisation of psychurity prices including their valuation as the phenomenal aspect. In other words, the mind-as-market explains that exchanges (spawning psychurity prices) form the relation between—thereby connecting—the phenomenal personal level and the physical subpersonal level. The market-as-mind then extends this to the collective intersubjective level. This multi-level price discovery as self-organisation principle of the mind transcends (or simply bypasses) many of the related issues, like internalism~externalism.
To make my position on consciousness crystal clear: even if we know the price of everything, without consciousness we understand the value of nothing.
Note: of course, number is just a concept with names (e.g. twenty, four, etc.), forms (e.g. 1, 3, 6, III, V, X, etc.), and other related signs (e.g. <, >, ∞, etc.) which allow us to symbolically quantify and qualify mind~matter changes.
The mind~body’s ability to discount news, inspired by markets as informationally efficient, is key to what Chalmers called the “double realisation” of information:
Whenever we find an information space realized phenomenally, we find the same information space realized physically. And when an experience realizes an information state, the same information state is realized in the experience’s physical substrate … We might even suggest that this double realization is the key to the fundamental connection between physical processes and conscious experience. We need some sort of construct to make the link, and information seems as good a construct as any. (Chalmers, 1996, pp. 284–286)
Information is realised both physically and phenomenally: “We might put this by suggesting as a basic principle that information (in the actual world) has two aspects, a physical and a phenomenal aspect” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 286; emphasis added).41 Earlier, this was also recognised by David Bohm. As part of “our subjective experience”:
there is a kind of active information that is simultaneously physical and mental in nature. Active information can thus serve as a kind of link or bridge between these two sides of reality as a whole. These two sides are inseparable, in the sense that information contained … on the mental side, is at the same time … a physical activity. (Bohm, 1990, p. 282)
