At Our Wits' End, page 8
Overall, Clark finds that social status across history is around 0.75 heritable, its heritability is the same now as it was in Medieval England, and sudden shocks that might raise social status very quickly—such as winning the Lottery—wear off within a few generations. This implies that ability is required to maintain wealth and a person of low ability who is born into a wealthy family will likely squander his or her inheritance. This movement towards the mean, in terms of surnames and status, implies that something is being selected for in all classes, and this is likely intelligence, though Clark doesn’t look directly at this trait. Interestingly, Clark finds the same results in countries that are far more egalitarian than Britain, such as Sweden. Dividing between the surnames of the higher nobility, the surnames of the untitled nobility, Latin surnames (historically adopted by the highly educated non-noble), geographical surnames (e.g. Berg), and the lowest status surnames (those ending in ‘son’), Clark finds a similar pattern to England. Those with noble and Latin surnames are still over-represented at the top universities, amongst the richest, and in the top professions, and the heritability of social status is about 0.75.
So, even in Medieval England, social status was 0.75 heritable, roughly the same extent to which intelligence is heritable. Something allowed the children of the poor, who by the randomness of genetics were much more intelligent than their parents, to move up the hierarchy, become rich, and have lots of surviving children. Clearly, the best candidate for this would be high intelligence as this is a highly significant predictor of socioeconomic success. It is also strongly heritable. Another candidate would be high ‘Conscientiousness’, a personality trait which is also heritable, as we will see in Chapter Five. The Medieval world created conditions whereby those who did not become rich would not pass on their genes and you became rich if you had the necessary intelligence and personality-type, which a minority of people born outside the elite always did, just by genetic chance.
All societies had social mobility, even India with its formerly rigid caste system.[55] The highly intelligent, born to poor families, would gradually rise to the top, even if it took a few generations. The rise would often be slow, due to nepotism, but where there was a crisis—such as many noble families being killed off in the Black Death or the Wars of the Roses or a power vacuum created, such as by the Dissolution of the Monasteries—then social ascent could be dramatic. Indeed, precisely because medieval society was less meritocratic, intelligence and diligence were likely more equally distributed across social classes, meaning there were always people from modest backgrounds who could socially ascend. In an extreme meritocracy, intelligence will be concentrated in the higher classes and because it is highly heritable there will be very little social mobility.[56] Poor boys could also move swiftly up the hierarchy by being so obviously able, at school for example, that it would be impossible to hold them back.
British psychologist Richard Lynn has explored the various ways they could rise further.[57] These ways included becoming successful merchants; lawyers, clergymen (many of whom had illegitimate children), administrators (such as the stewards of feudal estates), and soldiers, and this was the case throughout Medieval Europe.[58] These paths to riches would all require high intelligence. Likewise, notes Lynn, highly able females could socially ascend via advantageous marriages, with the wooing of a high status male being likely to involve a high degree of intelligence (even if this was not what attracted the high status male to the much lower status female). A minority of women, however, if they became widows, could start to become wealthy in their own right. In addition, females could rise in status by becoming the mistresses of high status males. As we have discussed, the resultant children would generally be raised in the father’s household and be relatively well provided for. In the 17th century, about 11% of males reached a higher ‘rank’—English society was composed of a series of ranks that were based around a combination of wealth and lifestyle—than their fathers.[59]
Social mobility was plainly significant and it is clear from looking at the routes via which it occurred—the law, administration—that intelligence would have been the guiding factor. The history of Early Modern England is littered with men from ‘modest’ backgrounds who reached great heights, especially (as already mentioned) in the wake of social crises, such as the War of the Roses.[60] Henry VIII’s chief minister in the first part of his reign was Cardinal Thomas Wolsey (1473–1530). He was the son of an Ipswich butcher. Wolsey excelled at school and went to Oxford to train as a priest. He eventually became chaplain to the Archbishop of Canterbury and, in this position, he came to the attention of Henry VII, to whom he also became chaplain. His rise continued under Henry VIII and by 1515 Wolsey was Lord Chancellor.[61] Wolsey’s own protégé, who effectively succeeded him, was Thomas Cromwell (c.1485–1540), the son of a blacksmith and brewer, from Putney Heath, a place now on the outskirts of London, then notorious for highwaymen. He ran away to the Continent and became a mercenary soldier and administrator, fluent in many languages. By 1512, he was a London attorney and by 1516 he was working for Wolsey. By 1534, Cromwell was the king’s chief minister.[62]
Social mobility from relative poverty to wealth happened in all societies, and intelligence is a significant factor behind this mobility. In 1825, in England, 20% of men with working class fathers entered middle class professions.[63] It has been found that 31% of Chinese mandarins—civil servants, selected for their intelligence and diligence through competitive examination—between 1371 and 1904, came from ordinary backgrounds.[64]
Illegitimates
So, in pre-industrial England, wealth predicted fertility and the way you obtained or maintained wealth was partly through high intelligence. At the other end of the social scale Lynn observes that there is evidence that those who had particularly low intelligence would be especially likely to not pass on their genes. In general, illegitimacy—especially in the form of single motherhood—is associated with low status and, so, low intelligence. It has been calculated that in the US white American single mothers have an average IQ of 92, whereas it is 105 for women who are childless or married with children. We have seen that education level is a proxy for intelligence. Research from the USA has found that women with no high school education are 20 times more likely to end up as single mothers than are women with a high school education.[65]
In pre-industrial Europe there was no welfare state. Indeed, this generally didn’t develop until the second half of the 20th century. As such, single mothers would tend to abandon unwanted babies. In Ancient Rome they were placed in sewers, in the hope, perhaps, that a passing Samaritan might take pity.[66] In the early 19th century, in London, it was not uncommon to see dead babies in the streets or in rubbish dumps. By the 18th century, the number of abandoned babies was so great in many European cities that orphanages were established to house them. In 1741, the Thomas Coram hospital for foundlings was opened in London. However, due to the lack of wet nurses, 71% of these foundlings were dead by the age of 15, whereas it was roughly 40% in the general population. Due to insufficient wet nurses, foundlings were malnourished and acutely vulnerable to infectious disease.[67] Thus, in pre-modern societies, notes Lynn, illegitimate children of single mothers, who would have been of low intelligence, suffered very high mortality. Each generation, this would have acted to stop genes for low intelligence spreading through the population.
1 For more discussion on the evolutionary origins of rape, see: Thornhill, R. & Palmer, C.T. (2000) A Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
2 Darwin, C. (1981) The Descent of Man, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 259.
3 For an introduction to evolutionary psychology, see: Workman, L. & Reader, W. (2014) Evolutionary Psychology: An Introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4 Miller, G. (2000) The Mating Mind: How Sexual Choice Shaped the Evolution of Human Nature, New York: Anchor Books.
5 Nesse, R.M. (2007) Runaway social selection for displays of partner virtue and altruism, Biological Theory, 2, pp. 143–155.
6 See Wilson, D.S. (2002) Darwin’s Cathedral, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
7 See Salter, F. (2007) On Genetic Interests: Family, Ethnicity and Humanity in an Age of Mass Migration, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
8 Arden, R. & Adams, M. (2016) A general intelligence factor in dogs, Intelligence, 55, pp. 79–85.
9 Woodley of Menie, M.A., Fernandes, H. & Hopkins, W. (2015) The more g-loaded, the more heritable, evolvable, and phenotypically variable: Homology with humans in chimpanzee cognitive abilities, Intelligence, 50, pp. 159–163.
10 See Waal, F. de. (2007) Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex Among Apes, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
11 The following was originally discussed by Lynn in his book Dysgenics. Here we summarise his arguments and expand upon them. See: Lynn, R. (2011) Dysgenics: Genetic Deterioration in Modern Populations, 2nd ed., London: Ulster Institute for Social Research.
12 See: Chagnon, N. (1968) Yanomamö: The Fierce People, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
13 Of course, it should be stressed that a high status male is not necessarily the same thing as a caring male. Females, indeed, may actually trade ‘provision’ for ‘status’ in a potential partner. But, overall, the qualities which lead to males having high status, such as intelligence, will also render them more caring in the sense of being more cooperative and socially skilled, as we have already discussed.
14 Buss, D. (1989) The Evolution of Desire: Strategies of Human Mating, New York: Basic Books.
15 See Chagnon, N. (1968) Yanomamö: The Fierce People, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
16 Darwin, C. (1871) The Descent of Man, p. 368.
17 Howell, N. (1979) Demography of the Dobe !Kung, New York: Academic Press.
18 See Murdock, G.P. (1967) Ethnographic Atlas, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
19 Siskind, J. (1973) To Hunt in the Morning, Oxford University Press, pp. 95–6, quoted in: Kuznar, L. (1997) Reclaiming a Scientific Anthropology, Walnut Creek, CA: Sage Publications, p. 77.
20 Chagnon, N. (1968) Yanomamö: The Fierce People, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, p. 93.
21 Buss, D. (1989) The Evolution of Desire: Strategies of Human Mating, New York: Basic Books.
22 Moran, E. (1979) Human Adaptability: An Introduction to Ecological Anthropology, Belmont, CA: Duxbury Press.
23 See: Cochran, G. & Harpending, H. (2009) The 10,000 Year Explosion: How Civilization Accelerated Human Evolution, New York: Basic Books.
24 Betzig, L.L. (1986) Despotism and Differential Reproduction: A Darwinian View of History, Hawthorne, NY: Aldine.
25 Betzig, L. (1986) Despotism and Differential Reproduction: A Darwinian View of History, Hawthorne, NY: Aldine.
26 Dickemann, M. (1979) The ecology of mating systems in hypergynous dowry societies, Social Science Information, 18, pp. 163–195.
27 Daly, M. & Wilson, M. (1983) Sex, Evolution and Behavior, Boston, MA: Willard Grant Press.
28 Lynn, R. (2011) Dysgenics, London: Ulster Institute for Social Research.
29 Stirland, A.J. (2005) The Men of the Mary Rose: Raising the Dead, Stroud: The History Press.
30 Wooding, L. (2015) Henry VIII, London: Routledge, p. 263.
31 Ross, C. (1974) Edward IV, Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, p. 10.
32 Mayhew, M. (2015) The Little Book of Mary, Queen of Scots, Stroud: The History Press.
33 See: Selin, G. (2016) Priestly Celibacy: Theological Foundations, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press.
34 Gorman, M. (1998) Abortion and the Early Church: Jewish, Christian and Pagan Attitudes in the Greco-Roman World, Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers.
35 E.g. Senanayake, P. (2012) Selection of contraception: What guides a woman, in Snow, R. & Hall, P. (eds.) Steroid Contraceptives and Women’s Response, New York: Springer.
36 For a more detailed discussion of this process, see: Meisenberg, G. (2007) In God’s Image: The Natural History of Intelligence and Ethics, Kibworth: Book Guild Publishing.
37 Carlton, K. & Thornton, T. (2011) Illegitimacy and authority in the north of England, 1450–1640, Northern History, XLVIII, I.
38 Staves, S. (2014) Daughters and younger sons, in Brewer, J. & Staves, S. (eds.) Early Modern Conceptions of Property, London: Routledge, p. 210.
39 Carlton, K. & Thornton, T. (2011) Illegitimacy and authority in the north of England, 1450–1640, Northern History, XLVIII.
40 Strype, J. (1721) Ecclesiastical Memorials, Volume III, London: S. Richardson, Ch. 12.
41 Findlay, A. (1994) Illegitimate Power: Bastards in Renaissance Drama, Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 41.
42 Bradford, S. (2005) Lucrezia Borgia: Life, Love and Death in Renaissance Italy, London: Penguin.
43 Clark, G. (2007) A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 87.
44 Clark, G. (2007) A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 87.
45 Skipp, V. (1978) Crisis and Development: An Ecological Case Study of the Forest of Arden 1570–1674, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
46 Pound, J. (1972) An Elizabethan census of the poor, University of Birmingham Historical Journal, 7, pp. 142–160.
47 Weiss, V. (1990) Social and demographic origins of the European proletariat, Mankind Quarterly, 31, pp. 126–152.
48 Grassby, R. (2002) The Business Community in Seventeenth Century England, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 309.
49 Wrigley, E. & Schofield, R. (1989) The Population History of England, 1541–1871, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 264.
50 For further discussion of the nature of these social ranks, see: Dutton, E. (2015) The Ruler of Cheshire: Sir Piers Dutton, Tudor Gangland and the Violent Politics of the Palatine, Northwich: Leonie Press, Ch. 2. As we have already mentioned, the ranks were a combination of wealth and lifestyle, rather like modern day social class. So, usually a ‘yeoman’ was not as wealthy as a ‘gentleman’, but this wasn’t necessarily the case. Someone who lived in genteel poverty was more likely to be regarded as a gentleman than a very wealthy farmer who was frugal and did some labour himself. According to the social historian Mary Abbott, ‘In 1613, the church wardens of Great Burstead, Essex, rejected Edmund Blagge’s claim to be a gentleman because “the gates of his house were not greasey with giving alms to the poor”’! Abbott, M. (1993) Family Ties: English Families, 1540–1920, London: Routledge, p. 72.
51 For example, the British broadcaster Michael Parkinson, British politician Ann Widdecombe, and Tony Blair’s wife Cherie Blair have all reported having been approached to be in the programme. However, the programmes about their ancestors were never produced because their ancestors were simply too uninteresting. See: Holmwood, L. (21 July 2009) Michael Parkinson: My family was too dull for Who Do You Think You Are? Guardian, [Online], https://www. theguardian.com/media/2009/jul/21/michael-parkinson-who-do-you-think-you-are; Alexander, E. (3 July 2014) Cherie Blair’s family too boring for Who Do You Think You Are show: ‘My ancestors weren’t very interesting’, Independent, [Online], http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/cherie-blair-s-family-too-boring-for-who-do-you-think-you-are-show-my-ancestors-weren-t-very-9581451.html; Widdecombe, A. (2012) Strictly Ann: The Autobiography, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
52 Frost, P. & Harpending, H. (2015) Western Europe, state formation, and genetic pacification, Evolutionary Psychology, 13, pp. 230–243.
53 Dutton, E. & Madison, G. (2017) Execution, violent punishment and selection for religiousness in medieval England, Evolutionary Psychological Science, 4, pp. 83–89.
54 Clark, G. (2014) The Son Also Rises: Surnames and the History of Social Mobility, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
55 Sorokin, P. (1927) Social Mobility, New York: Harper.
56 See Herrnstein, R. & Murray, C. (1994) The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life, New York: Free Press.
57 Lynn, R. (2011) Dysgenics, London: Ulster Institute for Social Research.
