The German Aces Speak, page 16
I suppose that my opposition to the SS taking over the Luftwaffe, or at the very least the jet program, had ruffled a few feathers. I had also been recorded discussing many of the problems with various leaders regarding our industry, operations, and the like. I would imagine that lack of National Socialist spirit was coming through too much. You must also understand that ever since the July 20 plot, life in Germany had changed forever. Everyone was under suspicion. That was not the time to stand out as someone who challenged authority. I even heard that Himmler tapped Göring’s phone, but I do not know if that is true. I would not be surprised if this were the case. Göring was probably tapping Himmler also.74 Speer told me his phones were tapped for certain.
The Fighters’ Revolt was the last straw for Göring, and the men also spoke with Generaloberst Robert Ritter von Greim.75 He was a gentleman of the old school, the senior fighter pilot next to Göring in Germany, and the man we hoped would replace our boss. Greim understood the real world; he was no fool. Although he was not a fervent National Socialist, he did have many positive political connections, and he was one of the few senior Luftwaffe officers who were held in high regard by Hitler, Himmler, and even Göring. He really wanted to help, and in fact he did succeed Göring as the Luftwaffe chief in April 1945, when Göring was dismissed by Hitler.
Lützow was the spokesman as always; he was a great leader and a true knight, a gentleman. He was also a very serious person, and in all the years that I knew him I can probably count the number of times I ever saw him laugh on one hand. However, Lützow was a cold pilot, very unemotional, even on the radio in combat he was the calmest person I ever knew, even in a fight. It was as if he never exhibited any emotion except anger, and ironically, this was usually directed at Göring, and never the enemy. He was never angry in combat, and he never hated his enemies.
The meeting that is today called the Fighters’ Revolt almost occurred by accident, and there were actually two meetings. This final meeting also ended my career, as well as the careers of many others. The fact that others and I were still alive afterward still puzzles me to some degree, because I was not even present at that meeting, but I was being constantly informed. I have to say that for all his faults, it was Hitler who actually saved my life, and possibly that of Lützow as well.
When all the men present were approached by Göring, he [Lützow] told Göring that if he interrupted, which he always did so that he could show his importance, nothing would get accomplished. Lützow, Neumann, Steinhoff, Trautloft, and others and I, had voiced our grievances many times, but since I was not invited to this meeting, Hannes Trautloft, along with Lützow, kept me informed as to their recommending that Göring step down for the good of the service.
Basically, the meeting started with Lützow providing a proper picture of the war, our condition, the enemy situation, and all of these kinds of details. He even gathered a folder containing all the statistics I had compiled and given to Trautloft, who was inspector of day fighters. It was a very thick and impressive folder, containing the names of every lost pilot, wounded pilot, dead pilot, aircraft losses, their units, the reasons for the damage or destruction, fuel availability, allotments for fuel and ammunition, replacement pilots, enemy aircraft destroyed, victories per round fired, enemy action and aircraft reports, everything you could imagine.
The purpose of the meeting was to make certain that Göring understood without question our condition. It was also stated by Lützow that it had come to our attention that Hitler was not being given the proper data from the front, which we supplied to Göring. The greatest problem besides losing pilots and aircraft was the lack of fuel and oil. Our refineries, depots, and even the rail traffic transporting these critical items were primary targets for Allied raids.76
As Lützow, Neumann, [Oberst Günther Freiherr] von Maltzahn, Rödel, [Hans-Heinrich] von Brüstelin, and Steinhoff were in the first part of the meeting, Trautloft was in the hallway on the phone with me. He would enter when called in, carrying the bulky dossier, and give his report. He could clearly hear what was going on, and he was giving me the actual dialogue as he heard it. I was on the other end of the line in my office, listening to his commentary, and I could not believe what I was hearing. I could even hear Lützow and Göring myself through the phone as their voices rose during the argument, even with the door closed.
Much of what started this heated argument was the inaccurate information Hitler had been receiving, either from Milch or Göring, but I knew that Milch also sent his reports through either Göring or [Nicolaus] von Below, Hitler’s Luftwaffe adjutant, often directly to von Below to make sure Hitler received them. Not even Milch trusted Göring, and for good reason. Göring had done many of the same things with Milch, who was a Hitler favorite, and Göring would halt or edit information that made himself look bad, incompetent, or perhaps even foolish. The fates of Udet and Jeschonnek were still fresh in many minds, including mine. I am certain that these events were vivid in Milch’s mind as well.
Whenever Hitler called, or just happen to speak to me about certain facts, I was often stunned at the questions or comments. Often I was completely unaware of what he was talking about, and when he said, “the Reichsmarschall stated that . . . ,” or something to that effect, and I almost always knew it was rubbish, and I told him so. I never told him that Göring had been the source of the unreliable information, or that I even told him anything. I just let Hitler think he was informing me of new information, which was actually the case more often than not.
I also set Hitler straight on many of the inaccuracies as related by Göring to him; the majority of this information was the exaggerated strengths of the fighter or bomber forces on the various fronts, so that Hitler would feel that he still had a great air arm. Land generals also did the same inflations regarding their forces. Hitler listened intently and hung on every word, making his usual mental notes. I knew that he was taking stock of all my data, and by the look on his face, he was not pleased.
I could tell quite easily that Hitler knew he was being misled by some of his senior generals and field marshals. I think this was why he had little difficulty calling in field grade leaders and asking them specific questions, knowing that these officers would not lie to him. They had no reason to, but their bosses certainly did. They did this to reduce the level of their own personal responsibility, as a measure of self-preservation. Failure at the top was not a very healthy way of serving Germany back in those days. There were a few exceptions, such as von Manstein, [Heinz] Guderian, [Günther] von Kluge, [Wolfram] von Richthofen, [Hasso] von Manteuffel, [Wilhelm Ritter] von Leeb, and others. They were men who always gave the real situation, and for most of them it cost them their careers.
It was this very situation, this meeting being conducted, where I suppose the chickens came to roost, when Lützow had a long list of Göring’s well-documented lies and direct misrepresentations to Hitler. Göring, caught in the open, went completely mad, and I could clearly hear this on the phone without Trautloft saying anything. Göring told Lützow to take his dossier of lies away, and he would speak to Hitler about it. That was when Trautloft told me what happened next. Steinhoff stood, addressed Göring, and told him that he had his own folder from his time as commodore of both JG.77 in Italy, and more recently, JG.7.77
Steinhoff proceeded to point out several major flaws in the original reports given through the chain of command, which were supposed to go through Milch to both Göring and then Hitler. Steinhoff had proof in Göring’s own hand that he had changed facts and figures, and had failed to provide von Below with the proper information to submit to Hitler. Göring stated that this was a serious offense, and Steinhoff stated, “Yes, and this is why you should step down for the good of the service,” which was the same argument Lützow had made. I could hear the shouting so loudly, I felt as if I were in the room.78
Göring told Steinhoff that his endless muttering was meaningless, that he knew the truth. Steinhoff argued that he was wrong, and could be proven to be wrong. The fact that Göring did not court-martial us, or even kill us, meant that Hitler probably had already had enough of Göring, and even he knew that it would leak out and look very bad if so many highly decorated and successful pilots were to just disappear, let alone stand public trial.
I was under no illusions. Later Hitler allowed me to form JV.44 as a way of saying “thank you” for past service, and if I died, then I fell for the nation in battle and I was no longer a problem. Same with Trautloft, Lützow, Steinhoff, and even poor Edu Neumann, who was only there at my request.
You must understand that after the July bomb plot that failed to kill Hitler, the level of paranoia emanating from Berlin was so heavy one could feel it. The Gestapo made many visits to front commands, even rear commands. I had more than one visit from these fellows, who were hoping to ferret out dissent. They were still executing people who were believed to be involved with [Claus] von Stauffenberg.
Now, Göring had his own plot against us. We were not violent; we simply wanted steady, competent, and consistent leadership, which he did not, and could not, provide. Well, Göring knew that the fighters did not respect him. He did not have their loyalty, and we knew that we could not count on Berlin doing anything to help us, so we were alone. At least it was now out in the open, with no pretenses.
Well, at the end of that meeting I was fired as general of the fighters, Steinhoff was banished from Germany and sent back to Italy, and Göring told Lützow that he was going to be shot for high treason, and that he would see to it personally. All of this Trautloft told me on the phone. Apparently, Göring’s final comment as the men left was his stating that he would “have Galland shot first to set the example.”
I heard this all through the phone, and can say that hearing that did not make me feel very comfortable. Well, at the very least I was out of a job, and as I hung up the phone with Trautloft, I was not sure if I even had a future. My family had lost two of four sons already. That was a high price to pay. I was not sure if my mother was ready to lose a third. Speer called me, and then he visited, and he informed me that he had a special relationship with certain persons in the SS who thought a lot of me. In fact, Speer went to see Hitler on my behalf, and I was assigned an SS bodyguard, just in case Göring tried anything.
I should mention why Felix Steiner thought a lot of me. When he was in Russia, his unit was in a very horrid battle against Soviet tanks and troops, heavily outnumbered. Three Luftwaffe fighter pilots, low on fuel, still stayed to strafe and attack the enemy, buying him time to get his reserve force and additional tanks into the battle. The three pilots saved a lot of his men from death, or worse.
He later sent the unit commander and me thank-you letters, and wanted to recommend these pilots for decorations for bravery. Even his men on the ground could see that they were taking heavy hits from enemy ground fire, but they stayed. Only one of these pilots survived, and that man was Assi Hahn. Hahn received the Oak Leaves to his Knight’s Cross, and Steiner was repaying me for his life and the lives of his men. He was truly an honorable man, and I know that it was he who kept us informed, and somewhat protected, although he never made any mention of it.
My replacement was Gordon Gollob, and he was not well liked across the board. Although he was a good pilot, very brave, and with the Diamonds, he had no character. Gollob was also well known for being a great National Socialist, even from the early days. However, he was still not Göring’s first choice. Hajo Herrmann was also being considered, and he would have been a better selection, despite his career of being a bomber pilot. Herrmann was a very brave and accomplished leader, and I think he would have been a better choice. He also supported me with the Me-262 program.
When I was released as general of the fighters, Göring was still preparing a coup against me, which I also learned from Trautloft and a couple of others who thought well of me. He had been in Milch’s office and overheard the telephone call when Milch was speaking with Dieter Peltz. Trautloft and I had a wonderful working relationship, and I also had a reasonably decent relationship with Milch, and in his defense he called Lützow and informed him of the events when he could not reach me.
Later, I was called into to meet with Hitler, without Göring being informed or invited, and informed that Göring had issued a warrant for my arrest on charges ranging from dereliction of duty, conspiracy, incompetence, to insubordination. He stopped short of treason, which would have been too hard for anyone to swallow, which Hitler said to me himself. The other charges were just as difficult to believe as well, but make no mistake, I was in great danger, especially with the shadow of the July 20 bomb plot still very much alive, and Himmler seeing my removal as a way to gain control over the jet program. Hitler did not trust Göring not to try arranging an “accident” of some sort to get rid of me. Hence the bodyguard.
Later, perhaps a week afterward, Göring ordered me to Karinhall again and formally fired me, and said that he had rescinded the arrest order due to my service to the nation. I knew better, as I had heard from Milch and Speer, even Kammhuber, that Hitler himself had dismissed the charges, even before I met with Hitler, who told Göring he “was mad for even trying such a thing.”
That was when, during our private meeting, Hitler said that he would let me do what I wanted. Of course, Göring was unaware that I knew all of this information. It was actually amusing to have him try and make me think he changed his own mind. Well, then, I was dismissed and stripped of my professional duties as general of the fighters. He never had any idea that Hitler and I discussed him and this particular situation.
Also, regarding the warrant and dismissal, Peltz did not know that I already knew, or that Trautloft overheard and told me, or that Lützow had already been informed by me, that when Hitler learned of this, he ordered Göring to stop the actions against me. I told no one until after the war about that private meeting with Hitler. Then Hitler ordered my replacement [Gollob] to be posted immediately, but he kept his word and still allowed me to form my own 262 unit, basically allowing me to keep my rank but reducing my responsibilities.
I think that if Göring had not failed Hitler so many times, and had maintained his respect in Hitler’s eyes, I would have been killed. Problems had a tendency to just disappear in Germany at that time. I find it quite ironic that the very man who is so despised today, and was the creator of so much suffering, was the very man who saved my life.
If I were to name the men I knew and respected, that would be a long list. Of all the names you could mention, I think perhaps the greatest leader was still Mölders. All the rest still living are still very good friends of mine, but we are old men now, and life is not as fast as it was in the cockpit. However, as their leader, I also made many mistakes. I could have done better. I was young and inexperienced with life, I guess.
It is very easy to look back retrospectively and criticize yourself. However, at that time it was very difficult. My situation was that I had to fight with Milch, Göring, and Hitler in order to accomplish what they wished, but without their support, if that makes any sense. Göring was a thorn in my side, and Hitler simply destroyed our country, and many of the others functioned without any regard for the welfare of others.
I was happy again, although I knew the war was lost. I was then able to choose all the pilots I could find who would join me, with Steinhoff’s assistance, and almost all had the Knight’s Cross or higher decorations. It was our badge. This was the beginning of March 1945, when I created Jagdverband 44.
I made Steinhoff my recruiting officer, and he traveled to all of the major bases, picking up pilots who wanted to once again feel a sense of adventure. The first confirmed victory over a fighter for JV.44 was on April 4, 1945, when Eduard Schallmoser miscalculated an attack and crashed into the tail of a P-38. This was perhaps not the best of beginnings, but it at least showed we had determination.
We had most of the greats, like Gerd Barkhorn, Walter Krupinski, Johannes Steinhoff, Heinz Bär, Erich Hohagen, Günther Lützow, Wilhelm Herget, and others. I tried to get Erich Hartmann, but he wanted to stay with JG.52. That decision would prove very costly for him at the end of the war. We were finally stationed at Munich-Reim, and on March 31 flew the first of several missions, and later we were very successful using the R4M rockets, which we fired at bomber formations. During my first attack with rockets, Krupinski was on my wing, and we witnessed the power in these rockets. I remember that I shot down two Martin B-26 Marauders.
By the middle of April we were very hard pressed to receive fuel, and even ammunition was hard to come by. Our supplies were not coming, and there was a great bureaucracy strangling our operations. On April 10, I was again summoned to see Göring, this time at the Obersalzberg, and to my astonishment, he greeted me as if we were old friends. There was none of the arrogance and pompous, critical attitude I had known for almost five years.
During our conversation, my boss explained, almost as if an apology, that I had been right all along. When he dismissed me and shook my hand, I think he wanted to say he was sorry, but not even at that point of contrition could he summon the words. The last time I saw him, he simply said, “Good luck.” I guessed that the arrest warrant was still a dead issue by that time.
Then, on April 23, I received a telegram that Göring had been dismissed by Hitler, and even charges of treason were given as the cause. I called the men together and told them, and I also told them that von Greim was the new Luftwaffe commander. If this had been in 1942 or 1943, there would have been great parties thrown. But at that time, as the war was crashing down around us, it made little difference. At least I knew now that I had an even more free hand with my fighter pilots.79 My greatest concern, ironically, was for Macky Steinhoff.
Barkhorn, Schallmoser, Fährmann, Klaus Neumann, Krupinski, and I were taking off on a mission shortly after our base had been attacked, with several of us trying to catch a B-17 formation on April 18. Steinhoff’s 262 hit a crater made from a bomb. His jet lifted into the air but without sufficient takeoff speed, then he nosed in and exploded. The fire exploded the rockets and ammunition as the kerosene-based fuel engulfed him. He managed to stagger out, a human torch, and I cried, because I knew he was a dead man. Even though my gear was already up, I could look back and see the smoke.
