The German Aces Speak, page 12
Remember that this was in 1943, and given the problems we were having, I could think of a far better way to utilize our men and material, let alone our other assets. I think that this discussion, along with many other ideas regarding propaganda, simply showed that, despite the publicly accepted perception, just how much Hitler, Göring, and the other top Nazis feared a revolt and losing their power. However, there were many events that occurred long before this, which would both assist, but also harm me where Göring was concerned.
One of the most memorable events was in January 1942.17 I was called into a meeting with Göring, among many others, and there was a problem for which I was being consulted. We had three ships that needed to return to Germany, and this was not an easy issue. The British Royal Navy controlled the seas, especially the North Sea and the English Channel, and the Royal Air Force controlled the skies for the most part. This was largely due to our Luftwaffe being sent en masse to the Soviet Union for and after Operation Barbarossa, as well as our commitments to North Africa.
I looked at the problem and saw the charts. I knew that the only way to get the ships through safely was to present a superior overlapping air umbrella to our enemy. However, we did not have the numbers. This forced me to improvise accordingly. Göring called me into a meeting and said I had to be there the next day.
When I arrived at this meeting, almost every branch of the military was represented, and included navy admirals Erich Raeder, Wilhelm Canaris, Karl Dönitz, and their staff officers. From the Luftwaffe there was myself, Göring, Generalfeldmarschall Erhard Milch, and Generalleutnant Dietrich Peltz, and from the signals branch, Generalleutnant Wolfgang Martini.18
I had my best officers join me after this major meeting, which lasted almost seven hours. The navy was concerned about losing the ships, and it was stated to me by Göring, personally, that Hitler himself wanted to know the plans by the next day. You must understand that planning a major combined naval and air operation is not like planning a football match. Just the logistics alone, regarding fuel, ammunition, pilot assignments and availability, and serviceable aircraft available, were a nightmare, so I gave that responsibility primarily to some outstanding officers on the Channel front, as well as subsequent leaders.
These were mainly Josef Priller, Gerd Schöpfel, and others. At that time we only had two day fighter units stationed there, which were JG.26 and JG.2, but I also contacted the night fighters and informed Wolf Falck of what was about to happen. I did this by secure telephone, as radio transmissions were not the most secure method. I then went to France and met with them all, and after that meeting we had a plan.
I informed Göring that all was in order. I was then given the responsibility and authority to launch the operation in conjunction with Raeder, and I commanded the fighter cover for the famous Channel Dash by the battle cruisers Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen in February 1942. I had thought about it for two days and had little sleep, and even discussed the problems I expected with a few of my staff officers and their respective pilots, and then I organized a rotation of various fighter wings to fly top cover for the ships, an air umbrella to protect them from British air attacks.
I also had to coordinate the flak units along the coast, create the communications table, confirm fuel allotments, ammunition, everything. I did not want to lose my men and fighters to our own anti-aircraft fire, so organizing that was a major issue as well. In this capacity I spoke with Josef Kammhuber, who had managed to organize the flak units to work in conjunction with Wolf Falck’s night fighters.19
It was primarily the responsibility of JG.2 and JG.26, each of which rotated a squadron from the time the ships entered the English Channel, flying with drop tanks. I had at least thirty fighters in the air at any one time over the ships, and each group was replaced by a new formation before they left their station. We also had twin-engine Me-110 fighters just to keep any British bombers away.
This mission lasted for an entire day, as we had to make certain that the pilots could protect the ships from enemy bombers. The British came and they made a good show of it. We managed to keep the ships from receiving any real damage from the air. There was some damage from mines, however, but the Luftwaffe fighters shot down many British planes, and not a single major hit was made on the warships from the air.
That was a great success story that made me proud, and I was called to Berlin where Hitler, Göring, Josef Göbbels, and the entire General Staff, along with Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodl, were present. Göbbels saw this as a chance to create a massive propaganda program, while all the others just congratulated each other. I found it all sort of unnecessary and just another job that had to be done. I saw the value of giving the German people good news, but Göbbels, although a master of manipulation, was, in my mind, not a very honorable character, and I detested him personally.
I had also been handling a request from Wolfgang Falck, who we all called “Father of the Night Fighters.” I had many discussions with my old friend regarding the night fighters. In 1940, Falck’s airfield in Denmark was under constant British night bombing, ever since they had decided that daylight bombing was not a great idea. This was after the two disastrous RAF bomber missions to Wilhelmshaven in December 1940. Falck came to the conclusion that he had taken enough punishment. He devised a plan, flew a few missions of his own, and then decided to write an operational feasibility study. Göring had approved his concept in theory, and Falck had Udet assist him in proving it.20 This was done long before I was ever general of the fighters.
By the time I was involved, after my appointment in November 1941, I was then briefed on the night fighter development. Göring had allowed me to read the initial report that Falck had sent to Berlin.21 I must admit that I was initially opposed to the concept, simply due to the fact that I thought that logistically it would drain away assets and pilots from the day fighter force. I possibly have many flaws, but I was always able to admit when I was wrong. I eventually saw the potential of Falck’s idea, and then I assisted him with bringing Kammhuber around. I knew that the method had its merits, and I discussed this with Göring who was already aware of it. I have to admit he was very enthusiastic, and even Hitler nodded his approval.22
Despite this, I was a victim of my own success, and I was once again placed in a desk job, and later in 1942 I was promoted to generalleutnant when I was thirty and a half years old, based mostly I believe on my competence, but I was still unhappy about it. I would have rather continued flying. There were many positives and negatives to holding this position. I had the authority to arrange things and oversee all of the technical deployments, new equipment, weapons, and even enhance the training program to some degree. The bad part was that I also had only two people to really answer to, Hitler and Göring, and on occasion, Erhard Milch.
Not even Milch challenged my decisions, although I had to send all of my ideas and plans up the chain of command through him. He did ask questions, but he knew when he was out of his depth. This was especially true after Generaloberst Hans Jeschonnek committed suicide, and Milch really became the primary liaison between the Luftwaffe and Göring, who in turn, of course, answered to Hitler.
Milch was not a bad sort, but he was a bureaucrat who loved the political intrigues that I could not tolerate. He had been perhaps the most instrumental person in creating the Luftwaffe as early as 1934, and it was his blueprint from which the air arm was created.23 I had many meetings with Milch, and not all of these were on good terms, I can assure you. But I know that he respected my opinions, and he truly listened to my ideas. He was a very intelligent man, and a very dedicated member of the [Nazi] Party. He had been very instrumental in the early days of the Reich in supporting Hitler and the party with obtaining funds and securing the political support of the main business and factory owners.24
As time went on, despite my ability to work with Milch, this arrangement proved to be a very uncomfortable situation. Göring was always trying to stay in Hitler’s good graces, and this was often at the expense of the fighter arm. Göring was never able to accept personal responsibility, which was his greatest character flaw, and we lost all respect for him.25 He was always looking into any topic that he could bring to Hitler’s attention, anything that would take Hitler’s mind off of Göring’s problems. It was like he was trying to start fires for Hitler to see, so that he would not take notice of his own home burning down.
This became an interesting development when I was informed that the Gestapo were investigating certain German pilots for possibly being Jewish. This was brought to me by Johannes Steinhoff in person, and we had to see Milch about this. I did not know for sure, but there were rumors that Milch was Jewish.26 This may explain why he wanted to help these brave men who had shown such courage and been successful. Milch managed somehow to get Göring to convince Heinrich Himmler to abandon the witch hunt.27
Well, being in this position, it was a big responsibility, and you could never get what you needed. Our fighter force was small, and we received no understanding from Göring. I was not alone in this. I received reports, complaints, and requests from all of the senior fighter leaders from all over Europe and Africa. This included everything from fuel, ammunition, and better maps to inquiries on new weapons, access to new and upgraded aircraft, even requests for replacement pilots.
Göring was a great sportsman at heart. One of his great enjoyments was to have the pilots on leave, or just on layover for business, stay at his great estate at Karinhall. He had his own game preserve, with all manner of wild game. We really enjoyed the hunting at his estate and lodge at Rominten, and I had these excellent Belgian shotguns I used for birds. Göring also kept a small arsenal of hunting weapons, every caliber and model, for any type of game. The times I spent there, when we were on good terms, were in fact some of the best days in my life, or at least during the early years of the war.
To be fair, Göring was a great hero in the First World War, receiving the Pour le Mérite and flying with the great aces Oswald Boelcke, Ernst Udet, Manfred von Richthofen, and he later commanded the Flying Circus after Richthofen’s death. However, after speaking with some of the pilots he flew with, they did not think much of him as far as being a leader, or even a good tactician. Losses in the unit rose under his command as their success dwindled, and he had a tendency to blame others for his errors. I was to learn that this characteristic was not to change.
Following his being wounded in the Putsch of 1923, he became addicted to morphine. I never knew much about drug addiction, and I never knew Göring before his problem with drugs started. I only knew him afterward. Early in the war he was quite enthusiastic, charismatic, and energetic. This began to change in 1943, right after Stalingrad, and he really changed after we lost North Africa and Sicily. This was the time where he began to place blame on everyone except himself, and it started a very miserable period in my life.
Udet told me about this collective opinion of Göring when Mölders and I had recently been decorated with the Oak Leaves and Swords, as he knew Göring during the Great War. Theo Osterkamp also knew him, and he did not have a high opinion of him either, but in true gentlemanly fashion, “Uncle Theo,” as we called him, would never say anything directly prejudicial against Göring or anyone. The same opinion of Göring was held by Eduard von Schleich and Robert von Greim. They could not stand him either.
This opinion of Göring was not to change in my war. I was actually not that surprised when he allowed Falck to start his unit, as Göring always liked new ideas and audacious leaders. I could only assume that if the night fighters were successful, it would be one more great idea that he would claim was his own and present it as such to Hitler. He did that sort of thing. Later I was proven to be correct, and I made certain that Hitler knew where the genius really originated.
Yes, Göring had many problems, but he was basically an intelligent man, although not creative, and well educated from the aristocracy. However, he had many weak points in his life, and he was always under pressure from Hitler, yet he never contradicted him or corrected him on any critical point. That was where he made his greatest mistakes.
This weakness in the face of Hitler increased as the war dragged on, along with his drug addiction, until he was nothing. As far as our Luftwaffe was concerned, he was even less and should have been replaced. I cannot think of a single fighter leader who knew him who had a positive opinion of him.28 Of course, we now know long after the war that he was also involved in the terrible activities regarding the Jews and others. He was also a major policy maker regarding the occupied territories, and he made many great mistakes.29
I can say with confidence that Göring had his troubles. He could not really understand the nature of modern warfare—the increased speeds of aircraft, the evolving tactical and even strategic situation—and he was always calling me for advice on even the simplest of matters. Once I gave him the solutions to his problems, he would take these ideas to Hitler as his own, and I was even told that he was telling Hitler that he had to give me instruction on these very matters. This was to make Hitler confident in him. After Stalingrad, where Göring lost much of his credibility, I found myself being drained of my knowledge, and also being blamed for the shortcomings of the fighter force. I could almost understand Jeschonnek and Udet taking their respective courses.30
In 1942, Göring sent me on an inspection tour of all Luftwaffe units. I went to Russia, Ukraine, France, Holland, Denmark, Norway, North Africa, and the Balkans. I inspected the men and aircraft, and this was as much a fact-finding mission and checkup on the morale of the men as anything else. I surprised my old friend Edu Neumann, who was at that time kommodore of JG.27 in Libya. He knew I was coming, but not when.
I had read the many reports and heard several pilots talk about this young fellow named Hans-Joachim Marseille. Steinhoff had fired him when he was his commanding officer in France the year before, and I heard that a few senior officers had their various opinions of him. There was even the rumor that an army general wanted him court-martialed, due to something involving his wife and daughter. I really did not want to know any more about that, as I was no angel myself.
Marseille was much like my lost friend Helmut Wick, who died in 1940, as both were very rebellious, and just wanted to fly. Marseille was not much of a stickler for the rules. He was hardly, if ever, seen in a proper uniform, and Neumann even told me that if it were not for his great success as a fighter pilot, he would have fired him also, mainly for being undisciplined.
Steinhoff told me stories of some of his exploits that made me laugh until I cried, such as the time Marseille stole his staff car, picked up several girls, and was so drunk he had the local mayor’s daughter drive him back to the base, in Steinhoff’s car. He was supposed to fly that morning, so naturally he was in no condition to fly even if he were sober. He was exhausted from his time with the girls.
Once, Marseille had gone into town to collect some of the enlisted men who were late returning to the base. These were mechanics and ground staff. He was also late returning with these men. Another officer was sent to find him and the missing enlisted men. The report, as I understood it, was that Marseille was drunk and had managed to fall out of a young lady’s window. I believe it was the same girl who was involved in the driving incident, but I am not certain.
I met Marseille for the second time in the desert during my visit to the North African front. I had first met him when he received the Oak Leaves. I arrived in a Ju-52 and had to go to the latrine. Marseille and I met and we spoke, and I also met others in the unit. I congratulated him on the award of the Swords as he was going to Berlin to receive them. I was the person, as general of the fighters, who recommended him to Göring for the Diamonds award, after Neumann sent me the unit report, and after his seventeen victories in a single day in Libya. I found him very boyish and free spirited, but not completely immature, do not get me wrong, but he really marched to his own drum. He never even mastered the salute properly, but he was a very gifted pilot. I have to admit, he was not shy at all about his lifestyle. He played his banned American jazz music so loudly that I was sure the British could hear it in Egypt.
Marseille would have never had a great career in the Luftwaffe, or rose to great rank, but he could have cared less. He just wanted to fly, and he looked at the war as a great sporting event. He also had a great hunting instinct, but this was tempered by a deep sense of chivalry. He was known to have notified the British that one of their pilots was down and wounded, after he scored the kill. He did not believe that a man should die on the ground if he survived combat. That was the kind of man he was, and Neumann told me about that event during my visit. I read the after action report about the whole affair. Göring even mentioned to me how gallant he must be to do such a thing, and then he banned anyone from doing it again.
I had also heard the reports from some of those senior officers who were less than pleased with Marseille’s lack of conformity to regulations, especially regarding his friend Matthias. He was a black South African, actually Marseille’s self-appointed assistant. He cooked, cleaned, and did almost everything except work on his aircraft. Marseille taught him how to play chess and speak fairly good German, and his servant taught him better English.
This fellow Mathias bartended the unit parties and did Marseille’s laundry. They were obviously great friends. I suppose you could probably understand that, during those days, and with the rules and racial codes we were expected to live by, such a friendship would have been impossible anywhere else except in the war zone, especially in Europe. That fact is an unfortunate legacy we Germans will always live with. However, Marseille broke all the rules, and did so with a smile. He lived his life as if he was immortal.
