The Fix Is In, page 27
Could the NBA give such star players and their teams an easier passage through the playoffs? Many NBA critics have declared that star players like Jordan and Bryant were given more latitude than should be normally allowed during a game—that extra space was needed to allow them to shine as brightly as they have. If true, such space was granted to them solely by the referees. Either the referees looked the other way, ignoring certain calls against the star player, or they were too quick with the whistle against the star player’s opponent. All such options opened the floor up for the star to have his way and aid in his, and by extension, the league’s success. The difference between a charging call and a blocking foul in the NBA may be defined in the league’s rule book, but it’s open to interpretation out on the court at full speed. Most NBA fouls are strictly judgment calls. It’s very easy for a referee to overlook a foul and whistle something that didn’t really occur because of the pace of the game. If everything is on the level, it’s hard to fault the referees for goofs made because of the frenzied pace.
Thanks to the federal case against former NBA referee Tim Donaghy, we now know that not everything was indeed on the level during some NBA games. Through his lawyer Donaghy has leveled accusations, which if they prove to be true, back up this notion 100 percent.
In a letter sent through his lawyer to the court Donaghy claimed, “In 2004, Team 1 was playing a game against Team 2, which was officiated by Referees A, B, and C. Tim [Donaghy] did not officiate that game, but spoke to Referee B by telephone, who confirmed that Referee A had spoken with Team 1’s general manager that day. Referee B told Tim that Referee A planned to favor Team 1 at that night’s game. Indeed, the referees called 25 personal fouls on Team 2, and far fewer on Team 1.” Another nugget provided by Donaghy stated, “Tim explained that league officials would tell referees that they should withhold calling technical fouls on certain star players because doing so hurt ticket sales and television ratings. As an example, Tim explained how there were times when a referee supervisor would tell referees that NBA Executive X did not want them to call technical fouls on star players or remove them from the game. In January 2000, Referee D went against these instructions and ejected a star player in the first quarter of the game. Referee D later was reprimanded privately by the league for that ejection.”
Apparently, during the investigation Donaghy spilled the beans on every dirty thing the NBA does. Donaghy wasn’t making these accusations as a form of revenge against the league. The league didn’t drop him into the FBI’s lap; the NBA allowed him to ref games and would have continued to allow his career to flourish had the feds not intervened and arrested him. He was most likely telling the truth, hoping to save himself some jail time, which is not an unreasonable thing given the circumstances. Donaghy explained the cozy relationship between referees, teams, players, and league executives. He also explained the subtle ways the league had referees manipulate the outcomes of games.
Former NBA referee Tim Donaghy told federal investigators that the NBA intentionally alters the outcomes of their own games for ratings and money. So, why didn’t the feds investigate the NBA for its actions? Because it is not against the law. The NBA and every other league for that matter can legally alter the outcomes of their games.
Donaghy pointed to two prime examples: the first round playoff matchup between the Houston Rockets and Dallas Mavericks in 2005 and the Conference Finals between the Los Angeles Lakers and Sacramento Kings in 2002.
In the case of the Rockets-Mavericks matchup, Donaghy said, “Team 3 lost the first two games in the series and Team 3’s owner complained to NBA officials. Team 3’s owner alleged that referees were letting a Team 4 player get away with illegal screens. NBA Executive Y told Referee Supervisor Z that the referees for that game were to enforce the screening rules strictly against that Team 4 player. Referee Supervisor Z informed the referees about his instructions. As an alternate referee for that game, Tim also received these instructions. The referees followed the league’s instructions and Team 3 came back from behind to win the series. The NBA benefited from this because it prolonged the series, resulting in more tickets sold and more games televised.”
Jeff Van Gundy was the Rockets’ coach in that series, and according to Donaghy, Van Gundy was fined $100,000 after the series ended for “not disclosing the name of the official who had informed him [Van Gundy] of the behind-the-scenes instructions.” Apparently the NBA was concerned that there was a leak within the league and wanted to keep such damaging information from becoming public. Of course, when confronted with this tidbit while working as a member of ABC’s broadcasting team for the 2007-2008 NBA Finals, Van Gundy backed away from what he had said regarding the officiating for that series. A wise move for someone wanting to remain employed within the NBA.
As for the 2002 Lakers-Kings series, Donaghy stated that the league wanted the matchup to reach a pivotal Game 7 instead of ending in Game 6. So what happened? The frustrated Kings watched as the Lakers were awarded 27 free throw attempts in the fourth quarter alone while the Kings attempted only nine in that same time span. This game has been called by many longtime NBA reporters as the worst officiated game in NBA history. Even the announcers for NBC calling the game were shocked by the seemingly blatant actions of the referees on the court. The Kings saw their best defensive option against the Lakers’ Shaquille O’Neal, Scot Pollard, foul out in just 10 minutes of play. The Kings’ other center, Vlade Divac, also fouled out in the fourth quarter on ticky-tack calls. With both of the Kings’ centers out of the game, O’Neal was able to destroy the Kings under the basket. Even so, with 12 seconds left in the game, the Kings were down by just one point. As the Lakers attempted to inbound the ball, Kobe Bryant clearly elbowed the Kings’ Mike Bibby in the face while trying to get open. Yet somehow it was Bibby who was called with the foul. Bryant sank his free throws and the Lakers won Game 6 by a final score of 106-102. The Lakers then won Game 7 over the Kings and ultimately the NBA Championship that season.
The more one digs through the NBA’s recent past, the more such shenanigans seem to come to light. A prime example may just be the 2001 NBA Eastern Conference Finals between the Milwaukee Bucks and the Philadelphia 76ers. Both teams had finished first in their respective division. During the course of their seven-game series, all of the calls went the 76ers’ way. The Bucks were called for 43 more fouls than the 76ers while also being called for 11 technical fouls compared to two for the 76ers. The Bucks also were tagged with four flagrant fouls (none for the 76ers), one of which suspended Bucks center Scott Williams for Game Seven. Here’s the strange part: at that time in NBA history, there was a point system amassed by the league for counting intentional and flagrant fouls. When a player’s tally reached 12 points, he was automatically suspended for a game. In Game Six, Williams accrued his 11th point. The NBA reviewed Williams’ flagrant foul and decided it wasn’t a one-point flagrant foul, but a two-point flagrant thus giving Williams 12 points and instantly suspending him for Game Seven.
Rumors abounded that should the Bucks complain to the media regarding the situation, the NBA threatened to penalize the Bucks their first-round draft pick in the upcoming draft. This was after the Bucks franchise as well as both Bucks head coach George Karl and guard Ray Allen had already been fined a grand total of $85,000 for saying that the NBA would rather see the 76ers in the Finals against the Lakers rather than the Bucks. Allen was quoted as saying, “I think there’s no question. The league, as a marketing machine, the bottom line is about making money. It behooves everybody for the league to make more money, and the league knows that Philadelphia is going to make more money with L.A. than we would with L.A.” Needless to say, the 76ers won Game Seven by the score of 108-91.
While Donaghy didn’t point out the 76ers-Bucks series or any of the other NBA playoff series that seemed to always have the ball bounce the NBA’s way, what was the case for Donaghy doesn’t necessarily translate into an accusation against the entire league. At the same time, it proves the obvious—referees can indeed control the outcome of games. In fact, Donaghy may not be the only referee the FBI was after. Reports from ESPN claim that federal investigators were questioning former NBA referees about longtime referee Dick Bavetta. Bavetta has been with the NBA since 1975 and was one of the referees on the court during that pivotal Game Six in 2002 between the Kings and Lakers. While asking about certain games Bavetta officiated, what the feds were after wasn’t completely known. What seems to be certain was that while commissioner David Stern denies any and all allegations made by Donaghy, the feds took a keen interest in what he had to say.
Hypothetically, if the NBA was pre-armed with such damning knowledge of their referees’ gambling indiscretions, instead of firing all of their referees—as their collective bargaining agreement calls for—it could easily have used that information against them. Perhaps it wouldn’t even need to reach those depths for such a thing to transpire. The league’s referees have always worked hand-in-hand with their employers, including subjecting themselves to both self- and league-imposed reviews and rankings. The NBA chooses and pays only their best referees to oversee its most important games of the year, the playoffs, based on those reports. Tim Donaghy was once deemed one of the NBA’s best and was assigned such playoff work. Donaghy claimed that even the league’s review and ranking system was manipulated. He stated that the league-mandated observers who attended games to monitor referees’ calls were not as anonymous as they were supposed to be. In fact, referees were aware of the observers and maintained good relations with them to receive positive reports. It is likely that the NBA’s best were really those most willing to bend to the league’s will. Couldn’t that make bonus pay for playoff work bribe money? If everyone involved, including referees, stand to prosper, then why does “the call” from the higher-ups even need to be made?
But to quell all such rumors and accusations, in October 2008, the NBA released the “Report to the Board of Governors of the National Basketball Association.” Known as the Pedowitz Report, the league’s “independent investigation” into the Donaghy mess was led by lawyer Lawrence B. Pedowitz. In typical league-mandated investigative fashion, Pedowitz’s report found Donaghy acted alone and that all other officials in the NBA were doing exactly as they were supposed to according to NBA rules (never mind the facts about all those referees gambling). While Pedowitz and his team had unfettered access to league documents and employees, they had none of the power that the FBI had over Donaghy. None of the 50+ NBA officials they interviewed were under oath. Supposedly, any ref found lying to Pedowitz and his crew could have instantly lost employment with the NBA, yet how could liars be ferreted out in such an investigation? What incentive did any of the referees have to reveal truth in the event they did know of conspiracies to fix within the NBA? Every referee’s livelihood and credibility would have been destroyed with such a revelation. As interconnected as Pedowitz’s report claims the NBA’s brotherhood of referees is, it wouldn’t be such a stretch of the imagination to believe they could have communicated with each other before, during, and after this investigation.
What’s even worse, Pedowitz’s main focus wasn’t proving/disproving Donaghy’s accusations. The report mainly existed as a “compliance review.” While they did attack, and in their opinion refute Donaghy’s accusations, the main purpose of the report was to belay future problems of the same kind. Team Pedowitz boasts how the NBA made most of their resultant suggestions part of the league’s daily operations, but so what? Many of their recommendations merely tweaked and clarified rules the league already had. The report also suggested that the league, its officials, and each team communicate more effectively so that incidents could be quelled before they escalated. Again, so what? The league supposedly had observers watching referees, the referees watching themselves, the home office reviewing game video, and its security division watching over everyone. And still Tim Donaghy did what he did without getting caught by any of them. As transparent as this all seems to me, most everyone goes along with the NBA’s way of doing business without questioning it. Sports reporters should be hammering the NBA on a daily basis in an attempt to expose league manipulations. A prime example of reporters overlooking an owner’s shenanigans came in the middle of the NBA’s 2008-2009 season, when the Portland Trailblazers sent out a league-wide email signed by its president Larry Miller that warned the rest of the league not to sign their player Darius Miles off of waivers. Why? If Miles played in another two games, the team would have to pay him $18 million over the next two seasons and it would count against the Trailblazers’ salary cap. While everyone within the NBA acted outraged, Miller defended his actions and unsurprisingly, the NBA officially said it would do nothing to punish the franchise. One would think the Trailblazers’ rivals would do the exact opposite of Miller’s request and pick Miles up, simply to put the screws to the franchise. While league officials and lawyers began to get involved in the ongoing affair, no other team picked up Miles. Is that common practice within the NBA? It reeks of the collusion charges that were correctly filed against MLB in the mid-1980s, yet within the sports reporting world, barely a word was written on this matter.
Reporters could also be hounding Tim Donaghy in prison to get more of his story. They should be calling for Commissioner Stern to step down and every owner to come clean about how the NBA does business with the TV networks. They should be digging for the truth. Instead, sports leader ESPN would rather celebrate the Lakers’ latest championship (and the revenues the network reaped with the resurgence in ratings) instead of stepping back and questioning how the Lakers managed to get there in the first place.
THE NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE
The National Hockey League gets little of the respect it deserves in the sporting world. Founded in 1917, the league is the second oldest in professional sports, predating both the NFL and NBA. Its championship trophy, the Stanley Cup, has been fought over even longer, dating back to 1893, 10 years before the first World Series. The NHL’s fabled “Original Six” teams—the Montreal Canadiens, Toronto Maple Leafs, Chicago Blackhawks, Boston Bruins, New York Rangers, and Detroit Red Wings—while not truly being the first six teams in the NHL, all can trace their origins to the 1920s or before. Despite all of that history, many Americans just can’t get into the sport of hockey. Few books are written about the subject, its playoff schedule receives scant television airtime, and the league itself gets minuscule media attention. As a result, many people no longer even consider the NHL to be a major sports league. On August 9, 1988, the NHL made headlines across both the United States and Canada. The NHL’s greatest player, Wayne Gretzky, who at the age of 27 had just led his team, the Edmonton Oilers, to their fourth Stanley Cup championship in five seasons, was traded to the Los Angeles Kings. This was not just a monumental trade, it was a true piece of sports history.
Despite playing in the remote outpost of Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, Gretzky was the most recognizable face in the NHL. His star power and talent seemed unmatched. He was breaking long-standing scoring records with each game and season he played. As flashy as he was on the ice, Gretzky was just the opposite off it. He appeared humble, reserved, and possessed a solid respect for those who came before him in the NHL. That is why he was labeled “The Great One.”
People who didn’t follow hockey knew Wayne Gretzky’s name. His number 99 Edmonton Oilers jersey was available nationwide in the United States at a time when hockey jerseys weren’t normally found in retail stores. There was a Wayne Gretzky hockey doll, something of a cross between a Barbie doll and an old-school G.I. Joe action figure. In 1983, Canada issued a Wayne Gretzky dollar coin which was actual legal tender at the time. He was the perfect superstar; easy to hype and readily exploited. With him in their control, the NHL possessed its greatest marketing weapon in years, which is exactly why the league needed to get him out of Edmonton.
More than 20 years later, questions remain surrounding the trade. For his own part, Gretzky maintains that he had nothing to do with the trade. Despite the fact that he had just married Janet Jones, then a rising Hollywood actress just a month before, Gretzky claimed to have not wanted to leave Edmonton. Born and raised in Canada, Gretzky wanted to finish his career right where he started it. If we’re to believe Gretzky’s version, the Oilers ignored their star’s wishes and sent him packing to sunny California.
The Edmonton Oilers’ owner Peter Pocklington told a different tale. He claimed that he often received trade offers for Gretzky but always rejected them, knowing full well who Gretzky was and what he meant to the franchise. It was Pocklington’s contention that Gretzky approached him with the L.A. trade offer. Assuming Gretzky’s days in Edmonton were numbered due to the automatic free agency clause in every NHL player’s contract (that wasn’t due to kick in for four more years, when Gretzky was 31 years old), Pocklington bent to his star’s wishes to ensure the team got something out of Gretzky’s inevitable departure. As he told Canada’s CBC television, “My first love is to the team, not Wayne Gretzky.”45 Pocklington claimed that some 20 minutes prior to the press conference announcing the deal, he pulled Gretzky aside, giving him a final opportunity to back out of it before it was too late. But Gretzky was determined to go to L.A. Rumors abounded that Pocklington was cash-strapped at the time from other bad financial decisions (in fact, he would sell the Oilers in 1998, file bankruptcy in 2008, and be arrested by the FBI for bankruptcy fraud in 2009) and needed to deal Gretzky not for the three players or three first-round draft picks that were included, but for the $15 million in cash attached to the transaction.
Both sides sound as if they were attempting a certain amount of damage control regarding the situation. Gretzky didn’t want to soil his squeaky-clean reputation and be made the heavy, demanding an exit out of Canada for the bright lights of Hollywood that came attached to his new starlet wife. Pocklington couldn’t afford to infuriate his fan base and admit to shipping off not just the Oilers’ top player, but perhaps the greatest player the game had ever seen, for a few extra bucks. Not to the likes of the Winnipeg Jets (another Canadian team seeking Gretzky at the time), but to an American team, no less. Each camp had much riding on the deal, as the trade angered many Canadian citizens. Their national game had just lost its greatest home-grown hero. It went so far as New Democratic Party House Leader Nelson Riis attempting to force the Canadian government to step in and stop the trade.
