The Big Fella, page 19
But the most serious incident in the ramifying conflict between Lang and his caucus stemmed from his appointment of A. D. Kay, an Independent MLA, to the Metropolitan Meat Industry Board at a salary of £1500 (an MLA’s allowance was £875). Kay was an eccentric extrovert with enough flair and wit to have become in the early 1920s the most popular of the versatile Domain orators who entertained interested Sydneysiders on Sunday afternoons. His means of support were obscure, but were meagre enough and probably derived from mysterious conservative funds available to ‘anti-revolutionary’ propagandists. The unpredictability of the proportional representation system, allied with his notoriety, enabled him to win the fifth North Sydney seat at the 1925 elections. Determined to maintain his increased standard of living, he decided to vote for the government in vital divisions, and was thus classified as one of its supporters for purposes of replacement in parliament should he quit his seat. Kay had polled 5126 votes in 1925; Arthur Tonge, Labor, followed him with 3338. When Kay resigned on 28 July 1926 Tonge succeeded him, taking the seat at the beginning of the next session, 22 September.
There were some noteworthy features of Lang’s initiative. The Herald stressed its realization that a new dimension had accrued to the rough-and-tumble of New South Wales politics when it observed that Bavin was right when he had declared ‘Some time ago … that the Lang Government was deliberately eliminating all moral considerations from its policy’.356 This aspect moved several Labor Party branches to condemn Kay’s appointment.357 The Meat Industry Employees’ Union revealed that Lang had departed from his new-found sensitivity to trade unions: its secretary was critical and said, ‘We were never consulted in any way’.358 But the essential element of Kay’s unexpected translation to the abattoirs was Lang’s unjustified distrust of his parliamentary colleagues which, aggravated by Willis, had stirred one of his elemental characteristics—his crippling self-doubt which made him vulnerable to the teeming gossip of politics.
In trying to unravel the complexities of the Kay affair, it is important to remember that the rumours about attempts of Nationalists to suborn some Labor MLAs had been brought to light at the beginning of December 1925. So there is only a little substance in that part of Lang’s own explanation of the incident when he says, ‘In early 1926 the political heat was on’ and goes on to mention ‘Family Endowment’ (which did not become a sore point until 1927), and ‘Workers’ Compensation Insurance’ (which was not an issue until June 1926).359 Lang knew that ‘four members’ were supposed to be the targets of phantom bribers, it is thus hard to see that replacing Kay with Tonge would have made any real difference to Labor’s security in the Legislative Assembly. In fact, with Skelton voting regularly with the government as well as Kay, and with the Opposition much more affected by absenteeism than Labor, there had been no difficulties in having legislation passed in the Lower House. The government was safe there.
The chronology of Lang’s account in I Remember is indeterminate. And it has to be considered with his evidence, and the general evidence, given at a select committee set up by the Legislative Assembly on 28 September 1926, and chaired by H. V. Evatt, to consider the Labor Daily’s new allegations (in July-August 1926) of bribery.360 In his book Lang relates that C. H. Hay, under-secretary of the Premier’s Department, had ‘heard’ from a prominent, and inebriated, Nationalist that £20 000 was available ‘to buy four’ Laborites.361 This detail checks with the Labor Daily’s charges of 1 December 1925, although Hay was not mentioned then. Refusing to name Hay, Lang gave somewhat similar evidence to Evatt’s committee, which did not concern itself with the December 1925 furore. It is possible that Lang was confused by the proliferating rumours extending over a period of at least eight months, and conflated their minutiae. Of course, he may well have been lying about Hay’s information which, in any case, emerged from a lushed social occasion. When the charges of corruption were revived by the Labor Daily in late July and early August 1926 their objective was to remove the heat of criticism from the Kay appointment:362 and the new amounts available to venal Labor MLAs were said to be between £60 000 and £65 000.363
But the renewed allegations brought to breaking point Lang’s deteriorating relationship with his caucus. They also affected the public credibility not only of Lang, but also of the government, for by the end of August it was clear that they had no substance. The publication of Evatt’s select committee’s report on 11 November was to confirm what was well known by then, that the four Labor members—revealed as Cahill, Davies, Gosling and J. M. Tully—were not potential renegades and that the Nationalists had not contemplated bribing them or any other Labor MLA: the committee revealed that a resourceful and habitual rogue, P. H. Farley, had tried to take advantage of the thick fog of rumours to make some money for himself, but had failed.
Caucus meetings on 10 and 24 August 1926 discussed the Labor Daily’s accusations, especially those in a leading article published on 4 August. Q. S. Spedding, the editor, and Farley were present and questioned on 10 August—Farley was believed to be a main source. Despite their close association with the paper, both Lang and Willis said they knew nothing of the editorial, though Lang mentioned the leak from the sodden member of the National Consultative Council, and claimed ‘that a member of the Caucus had dined at the Hotel Australia with people who were hostile to the Labour Party’.364 Caucus was amused to hear that up to £65 000 was supposed to be obtainable from the Nationalists, but were angry at the slur cast on all its members by the Labor Daily, and demanded an apology from the paper ‘and a statement that the thing was quite unfounded’.365 Neither was forthcoming.
By the end of August Lang was so concerned about press stories of dissension that he was forced to deny them; he told a Domain meeting that ‘There was no want of harmony in any shape or form between himself and the Ministry, or between the Ministry and the Labour party in Parliament’.366
But there was serious disaffection, and it spread in early September after the pre-sessional caucus meeting had been fixed for 14 September. The Herald reported that it was known ‘more than a week ago that a section of the Parliamentary Labour party strongly opposed Mr. Lang continuing the leadership’; and said that the group planned to nominate Loughlin against the premier and had sought the help of ‘an ex-member of Parliament and a well-known [MLC]’. When ‘heads were counted’, the malcontents were said to have a doubtful number of sixteen with them and the report concluded that the effort was ‘abortive’.367 In I Remember, Lang refers to the parliamentarians’ plotting but gives the credit for initiating the moves to Molesworth, Murray, MLC, a friend of Loughlin, J. F. Higgins, MLC, and brings in Bailey for good measure.368 But the main source of opposition to Lang was firmly based in caucus, with Loughlin and Goodin the first among a large group that was having some difficulties in organizing their moves, mainly because Loughlin was not enthusiastic about becoming leader. Eventually he made up his mind to take on Lang and on 13 September he announced his challenge.369
Loughlin told caucus he would resign as minister for lands and gave as his reasons for his actions, ‘first, the need for safeguarding the good name of the party; and, second, the attack on the constitutional organisation and procedure of the movement’. He developed his first point by condemning both the December 1925 and the more recent attacks of the Labor Daily on the integrity of the MLAs, and the failure of the executive to investigate the accusations. He linked his second point to ‘Threats of a special conference, which … would modify the control of the movement, and … pave the way for Communist control of the organisation’. Loughlin recalled his work at the April conference which had nullified ‘the Communist drive’, and he appealed for co-operation from the ‘sane elements which comprise the great bulk of the industrial movement’.370
The statement reflected Loughlin’s almost obsessive concern about the ‘reds’, and his belief that Lang was relying too much on them through Willis and Baddeley in his efforts to control his cabinet and caucus. Loughlin’s reference to ‘sane industrial elements’ showed that the problem of defining the ‘reds’ was still difficult in late 1926. The ‘special conference’ was connected with the progress of work of redrafting the Party’s rules: as information was progressively discovered, it became known that Willis and Voigt had been working hard on the committee set up by the April conference: the AWU feared that its remaining influence on the executive was at risk, and it retaliated by raking over the ‘redness’ of Willis and his bright secretary.
Thus the efforts of some MLAs to depose Lang were merged with the divisions on the executive and confused with the wider issue of ensuring that the ban on members of the Communist Party was securely enforced. Moderate trade unionists and reformist parliamentarians found it hard to resist labelling their opponents as Communists. And when Garden entered the ring they seemed to have real cause for alarm. Since January Garden had given several indications that he wanted to be back in the mainstream of the labour movement: on 14 September it was reported that the executive of the Labor Council ‘openly declares that [Lang’s] downfall would be a disaster’, and that ‘many union officials not identified with the Red Section are not at all pleased with the alliance between Messrs. Lang and Willis and the supporters of Mr. Garden’.371 This ‘alliance’ would have been a characteristic example of Garden’s wishful thinking. It is hard to conceive that Willis, let alone Lang, would have moved very close to the Labor Council’s secretary. But, windy as it was, that fragment of Trades Hall gossip would have been temporarily convenient to the premier as well as frightening to his opponents.
Against this tempestuous background the MLAs met to vote on the leadership on the morning of 14 September 1926. The storm was intensified by a ‘requisition’ signed by forty trade union secretaries ‘demand[ing] that the Caucus meet a deputation’ from them. Garden was involved in the operation, but it was signed only by members of the Party, including militants and moderates, among them Seale, Graves, O’Reilly, E. C. O’Dea (Shop Assistants), Heffron (Stewards), Kilburn (Bricklayers), Thomas Falkingham (Boilermakers) and Dan Rees (Miners). Seale headed a large delegation which was not admitted to the caucus meeting, but its pressure was felt by Lang’s antagonists. The premier’s courting of the non-parliamentary Labor section continued to pay off. He also had the peripheral backing in the corridors of the House of McIntosh, an inveterate pursuer of political patrons. Lang was distraught, but was buoyed up by his non-caucus backers. In caucus it was touch and go. Three members were absent, including McTiernan, whose vote for Lang was obtained by wireless from the ship on which he was returning from England. Finally, in the afternoon, the vote was tied at twenty-three each. In the excitement a new ballot was suggested, but frenzied recourse to the rules did not immediately settle the issue.
When the meeting was resumed next day O’Reilly, Falkingham and two other union secretaries were allowed to address caucus. ‘The rules and constitution were quoted repeatedly’, and eventually F. M. Burke’s opinion was accepted that, as Lang had not been deposed as required by Rule 9, he should remain leader. ‘Two eminent counsel’, one of whom was J. A. Browne, of Ne Temere debate fame, had concurred in that interpretation. Loughlin was re-elected unopposed as deputy leader. He and Lang shook hands. Mutch replaced Lang as director of the Labor Daily. Significantly, Gosling, a keen follower of Lang, lost the chairmanship of the Party to Connell by twenty-six to thirteen.372
As it was in 1924 when Mutch came within one vote of replacing Lang as leader of the Labor Party, in 1926 the main reason for his even narrower escape was his deficiencies as a parliamentary leader, which were even more exposed by the demands on him as premier. Now, his disloyalty to his colleagues, and his unjustifiable willingness to claim for himself, and to allow his non-parliamentary followers to claim for him, virtually all the credit for the admirable record of the government, gave added offence to many ministers and MLAs. His self-absorbed tactics had bisected both cabinet and caucus—five of the eleven ministers in the Legislative Assembly voted against him.
But there were associated factors. Lang says that ‘Loughlin’s chief support came from what we called the Intelligentsia’, and he lists, with Loughlin, five other schoolteachers who voted against him—Alldis, Connell, Dunn, Goodin and C. H. Murphy;373 Evatt could be added to this group who with others, as Minahan put it, were appalled at Lang’s behaviour and ‘coarse expressions’. Eleven rural members were against him, only four for him—which reflected partly the mixed reception the workers’ compensation legislation had received in the country. On the other hand, twelve suburban MLAs supported him, with eight opposing. All three Sydney (electorate) members were against him.
Lang’s main support came from the MLAs returned by mining electorates. Of the four Newcastle members, only Connell voted against him; Wollongong was in the Wollondilly constituency, and its two members were for him; Sturt included Broken Hill, and its two seat-holders supported him. Lang’s gain of seven of the eight mining areas’ representatives reflected the strong organizing of Baddeley and Willis. Other ‘red’ or militant influences are not discernible, for only Baddeley had been a major union official (he had resigned in 1922 as president of the Miners’ Federation). Practically all of the MLAs belonged to unions (both Lang and Loughlin to the Clerical Association), but these links were tenuous; nevertheless, the presence at Parliament House of so many vocal unionists, including moderates, as the caucus was meeting probably swung some support to Lang. Of the four alleged potential traitors, Cahill had suffered most, and was the only one of them to vote against the premier. Fifteen of the Catholics in the caucus were for Lang; thirteen against him.
The handshake of the Labor protagonists settled nothing. Their partnership of three years had grown increasingly incongruous, with the generous, genial and trusting countryman, Loughlin, never reaching rapport with the scheming suburbanite, Lang. However, it is very doubtful that Loughlin would have pulled the Party together. The metropolitan and mining Labor trade unionists, of whatever degree of ideological fervour, had to be accommodated. Lang, unlike Loughlin, was prepared to accept them all, except avowed Communists, and was shrewd enough to see that he could benefit from their mutual divisions which, he realized, would give him the upper hand in using them and would nullify their attempts to manipulate him. The dead heat in the leadership stakes actually improved Lang’s power potential. But it certainly kept the Labor Party seething, and lowered it further in public esteem.
The AWU was the only important union not pleased with Lang’s retention of the premiership. Fortuitously, the union improved its position on the executive on 13 September when G. T. Anderson, a Langite, resigned ‘as a protest against the A.L.P. executive in not dealing with the bribery charge against members of Caucus’.374 The ravelled nature of Labor conflict was further illustrated on 15 September by a Trades Hall meeting, headed by Heffron, which denounced the ‘black treachery’ of those who were seeking to depose Lang and proposed that Seale be asked ‘to call a special conference to consider the position’.375 Concurrently, Garden again revealed his special talent for confusion by announcing that he had resigned from the Communist Party and would seek readmission to the Labor Party.376 Several of Garden’s many opponents objected to his return, and invoked Rule 4 to show that his parliamentary bid as a Communist in 1925 had made him ineligible for four years.377
The case of Garden requires further discussion. Drawing on the work of Irwin Young, some historians have stated that Garden ‘made a deal’ with Lang, dated variously late in 1925 or 1926, and was readmitted to the Labor Party in 1926 or 1927.378 It is true that Garden realized early in 1926 that Lang’s general political notoriety and high reputation in the labour movement, allied with the continuing loss of influence of the Labor Council and the evident sterility of the Communist Party, made it expedient for him to change his ways and edge towards the premier. Politically and personally Lang and Garden were incompatible, and Lang had always disliked him. Yet, although Garden’s support was not essential to Lang, it could be of some minor use to him. The premier had the backing of many powerful Labor Party trade union officials by 1926, notably Seale, O’Reilly, Oscar Schreiber, Graves and R. A. King, and was being cultivated by Beasley. At the same time Garden remained the secretary of the Labor Council, and, while apt to explode with embarrassing revolutionary utterances, was generally popular and efficient enough. Moreover, he had political ambitions and could see advantages, as he lost his Communist faith, in ingratiating himself with Lang.379
Garden grasped his chance during the Labor Party turmoil that surrounded Loughlin’s challenge to Lang. But he was kept in his place outside the Party while Trades Hall support was mobilized for the premier. Naturally he associated with many Labor unionists, and was friendly with Seale: he also had several bitter enemies among them. He made no deal with Lang, who correctly said in 1956: ‘[Garden] owed his power to his position as Secretary of the Labor Council … I never trusted [him] at any stage’.380 Certainly Lang did nothing to obtain a remission of the four years Labor ban on Garden. He was not readmitted until early January 1929.381 He was never a secret Communist after 1926, but he retained his flair for alarming many of his colleagues and most of his opponents with his fiery rhetoric.
