The Big Fella, page 16
With compulsory voting operating for the first time, the conservatives easily won the elections. The Nationalists and Country Party, nationwide, polled 1 551 760 votes (53.20 per cent), winning fifty-one seats out of seventy-five, to the Labor Party’s 1 313 627 (45.04 per cent) and twenty-three seats. In New South Wales, out of twenty-eight seats, the Nationalists won twelve with 501 375 votes (44.63 per cent); the Country Party five with 101 283 votes (9.01 per cent); and the Labor Party won eleven seats with 520 385 votes (46.32 per cent). The result shocked Lang. Although there were several reasons for Labor’s defeat, the voters’ distrust of Communism was beyond argument, especially at the Federal level, where issues of security and defence were more closely involved than in State elections. Lang had to exert himself still further against the extremists.
His early nominations to the Legislative Council had left a sediment of discontent. The AWU remained affiliated to the Party, and Buckland, a crony of Bailey and very much in his mould, was on the executive; he had accentuated the dissension there, though Lang and Willis retained a precarious majority.274 In cabinet, and to a degree in caucus—where he attended occasionally on invitation—Willis’s prickliness and radicalism had induced additional instability which Lang did nothing to allay. The question of holding the postponed 1925 annual conference had become difficult in view of Buckland’s effective continuance of the struggle waged by the AWU and its ‘red’ allies against Willis, Lang, Magrath and Tyrrell. The decision to abandon the conference, allegedly because of the Federal elections, reflected Lang’s fears that his opponents would control it.275 Just before the elections reports had spread of cabinet unrest because of unequal sharing of work and responsibility, and of disagreements between the premier and Loughlin.276
Again Lang had attracted a multitude of troubles. But the Legislative Council provided him with an ideal way out. It continued to scrutinize legislation carefully. During October it had paid particular attention to any bill not mentioned in Lang’s policy speech, claiming that he had not received a mandate for these items—generally an unreasonable attitude but consistent with the Council’s style and structure. Lang instinctively sensed that this was a challenge to a contest he could not lose, whatever the result. He responded in his habitual pugnacious style, hoping to deflect criticism as he planned to rally all Labor individuals and factions to him. Already his ministry’s administrative decisions and legislative programme had received much industrial and some rural approval. A campaign to abolish the Legislative Council, which would give an exciting form to the most enduring Labor shibboleth, was an obviously opportune move to consolidate the labour movement good will he had gained and to force all Party malcontents to line up behind him. Even if he were to be defeated, he would be seen as the first Labor premier to lead an assault on the stronghold of the Party’s enemies.
On 14 October 1925 the Upper House had deleted the adult franchise section of the local government (amendment) bill.277 Lang reacted firmly. ‘I have no desire to precipitate a political crisis’, he said, ‘or to at present enter into a fight with the Legislative Council … [but] I am determined that neither Tories in the Assembly nor the diehards in the Council shall defeat [our legislation]’.278 On 15 October the Council amended the abolition of capital punishment bill.279 Caucus demanded that the government should arrange sufficient appointments to abolish the chamber. Lang said he would not be satisfied with less than twenty new nominations, but ‘a large section of caucus’ wanted thirty-five, to make sure of abolition.280 And Lang had written to the executive seeking its help in organizing the Labor men already in the Council to honour their pledge to vote for its extinction: at that stage about three hundred Party members had applied for nomination.281
Lang was cautiously preparing the ground for his attack. Yet there was grave doubt about his knowledge of the number and reliability of the existing Labor MLCs, and ambiguity about his resolution to seek a sufficient number of new members to get rid of the Council. His tentative figure of twenty new members was impracticable for abolition, but was appropriate to the delicate negotiations he would have to carry on with the governor. It was the appearance of determination to remove the chamber that mattered to Lang, not the reality of the attempt. The obvious lack of information of the Party executive about the number of Labor MLCs, and their work, added to the surrealism of the proposed abolition.
As Lang continued his reconnaissance in October, he provoked Carruthers into an analysis of the membership of the Council. Carruthers stated accurately that there were seventy-four MLCs and claimed, probably correctly, that seventy of them were active;282 but he was wrong in saying that thirty-nine of them had been nominated by Labor premiers, including Holman. Of the seventy-four MLCs, Labor premiers had nominated twenty-eight and non-Labor premiers forty-six. And it was by no means certain how many of the Labor-appointed members were still in the Party.283 Farrar was one of them, and he had been in Fuller’s cabinet in 1922-25. Sir Joynton Smith, Sir Allen Taylor, J. A. Browne and H. M. Doyle had not been members of the Labor Party when nominated by McGowen in 1912. Lang contended that there were ‘about 22—pledged and unpledged’ Labor MLCs, of whom only seventeen were pledged.284 This confusion confirmed the ignorance of Lang about the composition of the Upper House. In fact, in October 1925 there were twenty-six pledged Labor men in the Council. Whether they were still in the Party and how strictly they regarded their pledge were other matters. Farrar, who had actually been pledged twice, had long since disregarded his. The voting pattern of several others was unpredictable.
As the Federal elections campaign intensified in late October and early November the abolition question receded in public interest and discussion. But it surfaced after Labor’s decisive loss. And in late November Lang linked abolition with the need for the Party to cleanse itself of all traces of the ‘red’ taint. In association with his executive majority, and with Loughlin and Lazzarini, he began a move that aimed at the eradication, not only from the Labor Party but also from the Labor Council, of both Communists and their sympathizers.285 At the same time Lang was careful to stress that Labor was ‘essentially a working-class [party] … and the unions contain the best that Australian industrialism has to offer’. The new comprehensive drive against the ‘reds’ held risks of alienating Laborites, including cabinet ministers, who sincerely believed that all radicals, providing they did not belong to other parties, were welcome in the Labor Party.286 It also had repercussions for the annual conference that would certainly be held in 1926.
But Lang grasped the nettle. The public had to be assured, despite the malevolent ‘Nationalist Press’, that ‘The Trades and Labour Council (sic) has no more power over the unions or the A.L.P. than a provincial debating society’.287 He went further to say that Bruce, having retained office, would continue to take no action against Communists. Lang claimed it was clear that ‘the Nationalists and Communists have a secret understanding to assist each other in discrediting and, if possible, destroying the labour movement’, and, in desperation, said, ‘If the electors cannot now see through things, then free education is failing in its mission’.288
On 24 November Lang had written to Governor de Chair.289 He stated that after ‘careful inquiries’ the ministry had concluded ‘that they cannot rely upon the support of more than 20 members of the Legislative Council. This support is quite inadequate’. The ministry, he said, advised the appointment of twenty-five additional MLCs. The memorandum traversed details of the government’s control of the Legislative Assembly, the defeat of ‘Four important Bills’ in the Council, appointments since 1917, and argued that ‘The number of Legislative Councillors is a matter of Ministerial responsibility’. It was a placatory communication that accepted that the governor may have had a power to dissent from advice but that the circumstances of the case did not provide ‘Sufficient cause’ for the power to be exercised.
Lang respected the formalities of the occasion, and understood the difficulties produced for de Chair by the advice. And McTiernan, who was advising him, was well versed in the peculiar constitutional issues involved—the prerogatives of the governor and the role of the British Dominions Office. But Lang may not have known that the extra twenty-five, added to his earlier three appointments, would have given him twenty-eight, the number Holman had had appointed in 1916-20—the largest batch for any premier since the beginning of responsible government. But what he did know was that an extra twenty-five pledged Labor members was not enough to abolish the Council. He told the governor:
The appointment of at least 25 persons … is necessary to give the Government … a fair opportunity to have Government Business transacted there. Upon the appointment of this number … the Members whom the Government may expect to represent its views and support it in that Chamber would still be much in the minority.290
Lang was experiencing the results of twenty-six years of the Labor Party’s inattention to its relationship with its MLCs. In a real sense he was reaping the benefit of that neglect: twenty-five new members would have helped the passage of the government’s legislation without really threatening the existence of the Upper House.
Twenty-five extra MLCs would have increased the membership of the Upper House to ninety-nine, nine more than that of the Lower House (giving it the greater number for the first time). On 20 October Lang had stated that Labor had ‘about 22—pledged and unpledged’ supporters in the Council. Obviously twenty-five more would not have given the Party a majority in a House of ninety-nine. The thirty-five favoured by caucus would have done so—provided the governor would have agreed to such an unprecedented number.
Even twenty-five shocked de Chair. Against Lang’s opinion, but in accordance with his own view of his relationship with the Dominions Office, he sought London’s advice. On 3 December the governor informed Lang that he had been told that ‘the question should be settled between the Governor and Ministers’. The fencing went on in Sydney. De Chair wanted to know if the government proposed to abolish the Council and if an additional twenty-five MLCs would destroy its ‘value as a deliberative and revising chamber’. Lang replied on 4 December that the government had not considered the question of abolition (which was literally true) and that the extra men would not put an end to the Council’s examination of legislation.
On 4 December the governor said he would appoint fifteen new members. Lang demurred. Eventually ‘under protest’ on 17 December de Chair agreed to twenty-five. On 21 December, after further discussion with the Dominions Office, he confirmed that decision.291
During the month’s negotiations with the governor, Lang had resumed his public attack on the Legislative Council. On 8 December he justified the use of ‘the gag’ in the Assembly because of the obstructionist tactics of the Opposition, and asserted that it was clear that Bavin was correct when he ‘serenely announced that everything they were unable to do in the Assembly would be done by their henchmen in the Nominee Chamber’.292 Indeed the Council was rapidly readjusting, under the force of the new phenomenon provided by an assiduous reforming ministry, from a substantially effective House of review into one that modified its scrutiny with an aroused awareness of the social and economic interests that its majority represented. The days of leisurely impartiality were over. But much turmoil was in store.
The advice to the governor to summon twenty-five new MLCs remained, surprisingly, a well-kept secret. Caucus was unaware of it. There were no leaks to the press, though the Herald had it ‘from an authoritative but unofficial source’ that twelve would probably be appointed and take their seats in January 1926. Trade union leaders expressed dissatisfaction about the rate and nature of legislative action, and the Labor MLAs were anxious to appease them before the 1926 conference. Lang pointed out that the Council had rejected preference to unionists and important amendments to the fair rents bill. He asserted that ‘A small band of reactionary nominees … were playing the part of wreckers of democratic institutions’.293
The Labor caucus met on Saturday 19 December 1925 to select the nominees. By then the 300 early aspirants had been reduced to 147—a number large enough to express the latent Party feelings that abolition, even if attempted, might perhaps not succeed and to reflect the knowledge that the status and privileges of an MLC were for life. Lang asked caucus to reduce them to thirty-five, though he knew that only twenty-five positions were available. But the MLAs did not know that, and they cheered Lang, and sang ‘For He’s a Jolly Good Fellow’. On Monday 21 December the Herald reported the meeting and said ‘It is understood that the 35 nominees will be submitted to the Governor this morning’; the Labor Daily, at this consummative stage, was a little better informed, and said that ‘Although 35 names were selected … it is not expected that more than 25 will be appointed’, adding, ‘This will be sufficient to ensure the safety of the Government’s legislation in the Upper House’.294 Lang did what was required of him and presented twenty-five names to the Executive Council and they were duly approved on 21 December.295
When the correct news broke, the press reported that the Upper House had been ‘swamped’, and in parliament Bavin claimed that the ‘Constitution … had been entirely revolutionised’, and he demanded that the official papers be tabled before the Christmas break. The correspondence was published in the morning newspapers on 24 December, and on that information Bavin made a less vehement, but very telling, attack on the appointment of so many MLCs; this time he argued that Clause 6 of the Governor’s Instructions gave him the right to dissent from ministerial advice in certain circumstances. From a less conservative view of the constitutional position, Evatt made an equally effective reply; revealing the lack of information of caucus about the full details of the appointments, he admitted that, like Bavin, he had only read about them that morning. Evatt summed up the process as ‘a triumph for the principle of self-government in every portion of the British Commonwealth of Nations’. McTiernan disposed of Bavin’s claim that the ministry had no electoral authority for its action by stating that ‘The Government interprets its [own] mandate’.296
The appointments papers were ordered to be printed officially on 24 December. They were not available until after the Christmas period. In the meantime the public debate continued; subdued by the holidays, it was centred on the large number of new MLCs. The fact that caucus had wanted ten more was also swamped. Lang was seen by the Party as having had a great victory. And so he had. He had equalled Holman’s record number of twenty-eight appointments. But Lang had done in six months what had taken Holman five years. He drove home his achievements by pointing out on 24 December that the government had enacted twenty-eight bills, some amended by the Upper House, including the forty-four-hour week, the widows’ pensions and the rural workers’ accommodation; that the new MLCs had already helped to pass the railway amendment bill (restoring the rights of the 1917 strikers); but added that six important bills had been ‘maimed and emasculated beyond recognition by the nominee House’.297
Lang had had the expert assistance of McTiernan in the intricate negotiations with the governor over the nomination of Labor MLCs. Concurrently he had the help of Tyrrell, especially, and Loughlin in trying to rid the Party of the ‘red’ influence of the Labor Council. Tyrrell was secretary of the Municipal Employees’ Union and in August it had quitted the Labor Council. In November he gave notice of motion to the Labor Party executive ‘That the A.L.P. refuse affiliation to any union which is linked up with the Trades and Labour Council (sic)… while the … Council remains affiliated with the Third International’.298 If carried, the ban would have affected many unions, including the AWU, the Waterside Workers’ Federation and the Australian Railways’ Union; and would have reduced the number of delegates at the 1926 conference of unions opposed to Lang, Willis, Magrath and Tyrrell. On the executive the AWU revitalized its liaison with the minority. The militancy issue was now becoming more confused, and interpreted not so much as an attack against the ‘reds’, however defined, but against the ‘industrialists’, the trade unionists who were also members of the Labor Party. Willis, Magrath and Tyrrell were perceived as having joined the politicians, as in fact they had, although not in caucus. Loughlin’s role in the activity added sharpness to this picture of a complicated struggle.299
The AWU, with Buckland prominent, shrewdly capitalized on the ferment, although its long-term objectives still did not include sharing power with extremist trade unions. The AWU published a statement objecting to efforts being made to have certain ‘Big Business’ men retained in the list of three hundred prospective MLCs being examined by the executive; ‘Such intriguing is extremely prejudicial to the A.L.P.’, it argued—an attempt to increase its revived influence by using its representation on the executive to criticize the processing of selections for the Upper House.300 Tyrrell moved his motion on the executive on 4 December, saying that the ‘reds’ had cost Labor the Federal elections and that trade unions had to choose between the Party and the Labor Council; but strong countervailing views were expressed that unions would not accept dictation on the exclusion of militants.301 Loughlin circularized the unions supporting Tyrrell, but both were strongly opposed by J. F. O’Reilly, a member of the executive, secretary of the Hairdressers’ Union and a Catholic; Tyrrell’s resolution, O’Reilly said, would ‘create a great split in the industrial and political Labour movement’, adding that, ‘Mr Loughlin … is a great champion of the rights of the man on the land …(but] he knows very little about the industrial movement’.302
Willis intervened with a proposal for an All Australian Trade Union Congress to meet and consider ‘the Communist issue’. The rejection of the idea by the executive on 18 December on Buckland’s motion showed conclusively that Lang’s main industrial backers had lost much of their influence. At the same meeting Tyrrell’s plan to ban from the Labor Party unions affiliated to the Labor Council was referred to a committee, effectively defeating it.303
