Red Sun Setting, page 5
The Japanese ships continued on to Batjan, just south of the island of Halmahera, where they arrived on the 11th. The run to Biak was scheduled to be made on the 15th. This time the troops were to be landed at all costs, and the big guns of the heavy ships were to be used in a smashing bombardment of U.S. positions on the island.
But fate, and the U.S. Fifth Fleet, were again to stall the reinforcements for Biak. On the 11th and 12th TF 58 planes pounded Saipan and Guam. The Japanese now realized they had been outfoxed; the Americans were aiming for the Marianas, not the Palaus. At 1830 on 12 June Admiral Toyoda ordered the start of A-GO. Operation KON, although only “temporarily” called off, was never resumed.15
Admiral Ozawa’s Mobile Fleet began moving out for the fateful meeting in the Philippine Sea.
chapter 3
Operation Forager
AT MAJURO, where the waters of the lagoon shimmer from the darkest cobalt to the brightest emerald, TF 58 awaited the moment to sortie for the invasion of the Marianas. The months of wrangling about which course of action to follow were over, and the day for the assault was drawing near.
The invasion of the Marianas, with the first target to be Saipan, was set for 15 June. The landings on Guam and Tinian would follow as the situation dictated. Forager would be one of the largest operations of its type mounted in World War II. Over 127,500 troops (built around four and one-half reinforced divisions) would be carried by 535 combat vessels and auxiliaries. The logistics alone were awesome. All the men and material had to be shipped from Guadalcanal, Eniwetok, or Pearl Harbor—the latter being about 3,500 miles from Saipan.
One of the striking features about Forager was its timing. In just a little under a two-week period, three major attacks were launched at opposite ends of the earth. On 4 June Rome was entered by elements of the United States Fifth Army. On the 6th came the mightiest assault of them all—the Normandy landings. Finally came the landings on Saipan on 15 June. In this short space of time, hundreds of thousands of American soldiers, sailors, and airmen opened the drives that eventually led to the destruction of the Axis powers. These three massive operations, coming so close together, were an amazing demonstration of American strength, particularly in logistics. It was a demonstration of power, strategic and tactical, that may never be seen again.
Commanding Forager was Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Commander Fifth Fleet. In intellectual ability Spruance was “unsurpassed among the flag officers of the United States Navy.”1 There were two attack forces under Spruance’s command, designated for the assaults on Saipan/Tinian and Guam. The Southern Attack Force (TF 53), under the command of Rear Admiral Conolly, staged out of the Guadalcanal area. When the Japanese Navy came out to fight, the Guam landings were postponed; TF 53 took little part in the Battle of the Philippine Sea.
Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner commanded the Northern Attack Force (TF 52), as well as TF 51, the Joint Expeditionary Force. Task Force 52 staged out of the Hawaiian Islands. The makeup of the two Attack Forces was one of the reasons why TF 58 was involved in the Marianas assault. Although TF 58’s main job was to attack and destroy enemy ships, planes, and troops, it also had the responsibility of protecting the invasion groups from attack. The Northern and Southern Attack Forces were covered by a group of old battleships (primarily used for shore bombardment) and a number of escort carriers; it was thought these might not be sufficient to handle a full-scale naval action.
Admirals Raymond A. Spruance and Chester W. Nimitz.
The time had finally come for TF 58 to depart Majuro and set course for the Marianas. Japanese reconnaissance planes missed the sortie by one day, being over Majuro at midday on the 5th. On 6 June the ships weighed anchor and slowly steamed out the lagoon entrance. It was a magnificent sight. Task Force 58 was such a huge force—seven fleet and eight light carriers, seven fast battleships, three heavy and seven light cruisers, and sixty destroyers—that it took almost five hours for this aggregation to clear the lagoon.
Commanding TF 58 was Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher. The task force was divided into four task groups. Task Group 58.1 was commanded by Rear Admiral J. J. “Jocko” Clark, and had the carriers Hornet, Yorktown, Belleau Wood, and Bataan. The four carrier air groups—2, 1, 24, and 50, respectively—had 267 planes spread among them.
Rear Admiral Alfred E. “Monty” Montgomery commanded TG 58.2. His task group had the carrier Bunker Hill with the ninety-three planes of Air Group 8, the Wasp with Air Group 14’s eighty-nine planes, the Monterey with twenty-nine Air Group 28 planes aboard, and the Cabot with Air Group 31 ’s thirty-three aircraft.
Rear Admiral John W. “Black Jack” Reeves, Jr., led TG 58.3. His force had the veteran carrier Enterprise plus the Lexington, San Jacinto, and Princeton. Air Group 10 on the “Big E” had sixty-nine planes. Air Group 16 on the “Blue Ghost” had ninety-four planes. The two light carrier air groups, 51 and 27, had thirty-two and thirty-three aircraft on board, respectively. (The Princeton VF-27 planes were unique in having “sharks’ mouths” painted on the cowls of the Hellcats. VF-27 was probably the only Navy squadron during the war to carry such colorful and exotic designs on its planes.)
Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher and his chief of staff, Captain Arleigh A. Burke.
VF(N)-101 Corsair night fighters are among the aircraft clustered on the Enterprise’s deck during the Forager operation.
The last task group, TG 58.4, was the smallest in TF 58. Rear Admiral William K. “Keen” Harrill had only three carriers under his command. The Essex had Air Group 15 aboard with its ninety-nine planes. On the Langley was Air Group 32 with thirty-two aircraft. The Cowpens had the thirty-two planes of Air Group 25.
The 902 planes carried on the flattops of TF 58 made that force a formidable one indeed. Most of the fighters were the superb F6F-3 Hellcats. Three radar-equipped F4U-2 Corsairs were on the Enterprise for night operations. The majority of the dive bombers were the new SB2C-1C Helldivers (known as “2Cs” or “Beasts” to their pilots). The venerable SBD-5 Dauntlesses would be making their final appearance with the fast carriers during this operation. Both the Enterprise and Lexington would have Dauntlesses as their dive bombers, and the York-town, surprisingly, would have four SBDs listed among her complement of forty-four dive bombers. The torpedo planes would be the efficient TBF/TBM Avengers.
Besides the striking power of its aircraft, TF 58 fairly bristled with 5-inch/38-caliber, 40-mm, and 20-mm guns. An Essex-class carrier held over eighty of these weapons. The other vessels also carried a vast number of these guns. An enemy plane attempting to attack TF 58 would have to brave an awesome display of firepower.
One vital weapon that TF 58 and the entire U.S. Navy used effectively during the war was radar. During the coming action ship-borne radar (coupled with some excellent direction by the TF 58 fighter director officer and the task group FDOs) provided valuable information that was used to help decimate the attacking Japanese formations.
After TF 58 cleared Majuro, some planes that had been sent ashore for training or to provide extra Combat Air Patrol (CAP) returned to their carriers. At 1630 the task groups rendezvoused near Lat. 7°22’N, Long. 170°57’E and congealed into TF 58. Initially a course of 225 degrees was taken up, heading indirectly for Point Roger where the task force was to fuel from the oilers of Service Squadron 10. Point Roger, an arbitrary fix, had been picked to be the fueling rendezvous because it was considered to be outside the range of enemy search planes from Truk and Marcus.
On the 7th and 8th all the air groups flew training missions, and the ships held gunnery drills. For the Yorktown’s Air Group 1 these missions were very useful, for Forager would be its first operation. Carrier operations are always hazardous, even during training, and operational losses are not rare. The task force suffered a pair of such losses on the 8th, when the Bunker Hill lost an SB2C-1C and the Cabot an Avenger.
On 8 June TG 58.7 (the battle line), which had been operating separately, was disbanded and the big-gun ships and their escorting vessels distributed throughout the other task groups. At 1400 course was changed to 330 degrees. Later that afternoon the oilers of TG 50.17 joined, and the next day TF 58 fueled. The oilers were divided between the task groups, with the Sabine fueling the ships of TG 58.1, the Platte and the Guadalupe with TG 58.2, the Caliente with TG 58.3, and the Cimarron and Kaskaskia with TG 58.4. The fueling took about ten hours as the ships headed east.
Vice Admiral Mitscher, sitting facing aft on the Lexington’s flag bridge as was his custom (it was said he didn’t like the wind in his face) ended the fueling about 1530 and turned his force toward the Marianas. The Indianapolis, carrying Admiral Spruance who had been visiting facilities on Roi and Eniwetok, joined TG 58.3’s screen about 1400.
Mitscher fully expected to be picked up by snoopers from Saipan or Guam on either the 11 th or 12th, and that TF 58 would have to fight its way in. Mitscher’s chief of staff, Captain Arleigh “31-Knot” Burke, and assistant chief of staff, Captain Truman Hedding, were not too keen about being discovered. Normal American carrier tactics had prescribed a dawn fighter sweep of enemy airfields. Following this plan, the attack would be made on the morning of the 12th. If the task force was discovered a day or two before this (and it was), the Japanese would obviously be waiting for just an attack and would try to throw a punch of their own before the Americans could send in planes.
Weather forecasts, however, had indicated that it would be possible to top off the task force’s destroyers while headed west on 11 June. If this forecast held up, it meant that TF 58 would be within fighter range of the Marianas on the 11th, and the Americans might still get the jump on the enemy.
Task Force 58’s air operations officer, Commander Gus Widhelm, and his assistant, Lieutenant Commander John Myers, came up with a trio of plans to help achieve surprise. In Plan Gus, several destroyers were to be detached from the force and sent twenty miles ahead of the leading task groups to provide radar surveillance, fighter direction, and rescue chores. Plan Johnny called for a maximum-range fighter sweep of the four important islands on the afternoon of the 11th, rather than the planned sweep on the morning of 12 June. The third plan, Jeepers, was named after an oft-used expression of gunnery officer Lieutenant Commander Burris D. Wood. It would bring the regular morning bombing strikes back into operation for 12 June.
Spruance provisionally accepted the three plans, provided TF 58 was not spotted on 10 June. Mitscher was not about to be put off, saying, “Recommend Plan Johnny to be carried out regardless contact. Enemy has assembled considerable number dive bombers and fighters on fields. Plan is to try to prevent coordinated attack on our carriers while planes are on deck fueled and armed. Believe unscheduled operation will be most disturbing. We have left over 200 fighters to protect fleet while Plan Johnny effective. Believe expenditure fuel is warranted. Hope Plan Jeepers will take care of any planes that may be flown in during night.”2 Spruance concurred and the plans went into effect.
Aboard the fifteen carriers of TF 58 the pace quickened as crews scrambled to get the planes ready for the strikes. Each flight deck was a kaleidoscope of color that formed, broke apart and reformed again as the red, yellow, blue, and green-shirted deck crews went about their jobs. Occasionally the whine of an elevator would stand out from the general monotone of noise, as it brought up another plane from the hangar deck, where it had been checked and readied for battle. The deck crews or a small tractor would then pull and push the plane into position on deck.
On the edge of the flight deck or in strategic locations on the carrier’s islands, the lookouts and gun crews took little notice of the commotion going on around them. Their attention was focused outward, away from the ship, for they were in enemy waters and a Japanese plane could suddenly appear out of that cloud over there or out of the sun shining directly overhead.
Bogeys began popping up with increasing frequency on the 10th. Several encounters with enemy planes occurred during the day primarily by land-based long-range search planes. VB-108 and VB-109 PB4YS shot down three enemy planes, including two Bettys, only 50 to 65 miles west of the task force. A Princeton fighter got into the act late in the afternoon by dropping another Betty, also 50 miles west. The day was not without loss to the Americans. In the morning an Essex night fighter crashed near the task group, and the pilot was not recovered.
11 June came up a beautiful day. Unfortunately, it was also the kind of day a group of ships the size of TF 58 could be seen by snoopers miles away. And TF 58 was seen.
Lieutenant (jg) Charles A. Sims, a Japanese language expert on the Lexington, monitored transmissions from an enemy plane about mid-morning that made it quite plain that TF 58 had been sighted. More evidence of the presence of snoopers was provided by the smoke trails of the enemy aircraft as they were shot down by CAP Hellcats. Several Emilys, Bettys, and Helens, plus a sprinkling of other planes went down around TF 58. One of the Emilys destroyed by Yorktown fighters near a pair of picket destroyers provided some information. The destroyer Burns picked up two survivors, charts, and mail from the debris of the crashed plane. The unlucky flying-boat had been evacuating personnel from Buin to Saipan, via Truk, when it stumbled into TF 58’s path.
The 8 June forecast held up and the destroyers were able to be topped off while TF 58 headed west. The fueling was completed by 0900, three hours earlier than had been figured. The task force was able to draw almost fifty miles closer to the target than had been expected. Under Plan Gus the destroyers moved out to take their positions in a picket line. At 0937 Mitscher ordered Plan Johnny into operation, advancing the launch time one hour.
The sweep was set to go at 1300. Clark’s TG 58.1 would hit the Guam and Rota airfields, while the other task groups would take on Saipan and Tinian. On the carriers the planes were already spotted for takeoff. The Hellcats would go in alone, escorted only by a few SB2CS or TBFs for rescue work. In the cockpits the pilots sat ready for the command to start engines. Although everyone appeared to be outwardly calm, an atmosphere of tension permeated the ships.
At 1300 TF 58 was in the vicinity of 13°45’N, 148°50’E and about 192 miles from Guam and 225 miles from Saipan. Over the loudspeakers came the command, “Start engines!” Tentatively at first, one engine began to turn over, then settled into a throaty roar. It was quickly followed by the sound of other engines running up. Soon the flight decks were throbbing with the deep bellow of the Hellcats’ engines.
The deck signalmen now took over, signalling each plane into takeoff position. On some carriers the Hellcats would be launched by catapult; on others the fighters would roll down the deck. Under the wings of each plane was a plane handler ready to pull the chocks from in front of the wheels when the plane was guided forward. When the chocks were pulled the handler crouched, rolled or crawled away from his plane. To stand up could mean quick death to an unwary sailor.
As each Hellcat moved into takeoff position, the head signalman started whirling his hand over his head in a tight circle. The pilot ran up his engine and went through his final check. When everything was okay, the pilot nodded to the signalman. Still twirling his hand over his head but in a larger circle, the signalman finally snapped his arm down and pointed forward. With brakes released, the fighter started to roll forward slowly, gradually picking up speed. After takeoff the pilot began a slight turn to starboard and began climbing toward the rendezvous.
The fifteen carriers launched a deckload strike of 213 Hellcats (many carrying bombs), with ten Helldivers and Avengers joining in. Three planes had to return with mechanical problems. Following the launch, TG 58.1 broke off to proceed independently to Point Attic, its launch position for the next day’s strikes.
A little over an hour after launch the fighters were in sight of their targets. Scattered low clouds dotted the area, but visibility was good. The Bataan, hampered throughout the operation by a balky forward elevator that could only be used in an emergency—and then only at slow speed—sent twelve VF-50 Hellcats against Rota. Little activity was noted on the island, but the 3,262-ton Kinposan Maru, a trawler, and a number of trucks on the airfield were strafed.
Sixteen Hornet and eight Belleau Wood fighters, with two SB2CS supplying rescue support, attacked Agana field on Guam. No enemy planes were seen airborne when the attackers arrived but the flak was relatively heavy. The enemy fighters did show up, but “as usual, no difficulty was encountered in destroying the enemy once he was found.”3 VF-2 from the Hornet tangled with over twenty-five Japanese planes which tried popping out of clouds against the Hellcats strafing the field. The tactic didn’t work and the “Rippers” wound up claiming twenty-three planes destroyed, including three Zekes and a Jack shot down by the squadron commander, William A. “Bill” Dean. Dean reported that the Jack, a new arrival from Japan, burned as easily as a Zeke. Fighting 2 did lose Lieutenant (jg) Howard B. Duff, Jr., when he was shot down by flak and had to ditch off Port Apra. Although he was seen to get out of his plane and swim away, he was not recovered.
Over Orote field the fifteen depth-charge or fragmentation-cluster-carrying Hellcats of VF-1 and four VF-24 fighters were met with intense antiaircraft fire. The flak didn’t stop the attackers, however, and the Yorktown planes claimed three enemy planes shot down and four damaged on the ground. All four of the Belleau Wood pilots scored, getting two Zekes and two “Tojos.”
The heaviest fighting of the day took place over Saipan and Tinian, where the other three task groups had sent their planes. Task Group 58.2 was assigned the airfields on Tinian and sent fifty-five fighters and two Helldivers against the targets. The Bunker Hill sent sixteen, and the Monterey twelve Hellcats against Gurguan field. They met no air opposition and only one antiaircraft gun was firing. A division of VF-8 fighters also attacked the field after runs on the Ushi Point airfield.
Monterey Avengers are guided into position for launch against targets on Tinian, 11 June 1944.
