The Idea of Ancient India, page 31
Ambedkar, the Neo-Buddhists, and
Ancient Buddhism
The most important source of the resurgence of Buddhism in modern India has been an internal socio-political one, and consists of the conversion of sections of the Scheduled Castes or Dalits, the modern representatives of communities which suffered centuries of oppression and marginalization in caste society as ‘Untouchables’. This process is inextricably linked with Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (1891–1956) and the dramatic event that took place in Nagpur in the state of Maharashtra in western India on 14 October 1956, the year when the 2,500th anniversary of the Buddha’s parinibbāna was celebrated in various parts of South and Southeast Asia. On that day, in a large open field—later known as the Diksha Bhumi—Ambedkar took Buddhist vows, along with 400,000 of his ‘Untouchable’ followers, publicly declaring their conversion to a new faith.
Although Buddhist conversions are generally associated with Ambedkar, it is important to note that the Buddhist revivalist movement in India had a background and precursors.13 The Maha Bodhi Society, founded by the Ceylonese Anagarika Dharmapala in 1891, was an institution which contributed greatly towards generating an international interest in Buddhism within and outside India. But there were other institutions and individuals as well. For instance, in 1891 Kripasharan set up the Bauddha Dharmankur Sabha, which was very active in Bengal.14 In South India Pandit Iyothee Thass (1845–1914) established the Sakya Buddhist Society (also known as the South Indian Buddhist Association), and spearheaded a social protest movement among Paraiya labourers which spread through the labour diaspora to South Africa and Burma.15
Ambedkar had declared in 1935 that although he had been born a Hindu, he would not die one. But he took a long time to reach the decision to lead his community into the Buddhist fold, and it was a decision that was simultaneously personal and political. Ambedkar’s personal interest in Buddhism is said to have been sparked off by a book on the life of Gautama Buddha given to him by one of his teachers in Bombay in 1908. But as a political leader of India’s ‘Untouchables’, Buddhism was neither his first nor his only choice, and he carefully weighed it against other options such as Sikhism, Christianity, and Islam. A combination of several factors gave Buddhism an edge for being chosen as the religion of salvation for India’s oppressed and marginalized millions—the fact that the Buddha’s teaching could easily be mined for messages of egalitarianism, rationality, and ethics; its international presence; its deep roots in Indian soil (this was very important for Ambedkar); and the fact that in the mid-20th century, there were actually very few Buddhists in India. The field was more or less clear—the new converts would not have to contend with any strong, entrenched ecclesiastical elite.16 His opponents called the mass conversion at Nagpur a political stunt; most of his own political advisors and colleagues were against the idea, but Ambedkar’s stature was such that that they all fell in line.
From the point of view of this chapter, several things seem especially significant about the Nagpur conversion ceremony. A replica of the Sanchi stūpa was prominently displayed on the dais, a reminder of Buddhism’s long, grand heritage in ancient India. The sentiment of pan-Buddhist internationalism was palpable. The dignitaries seated on the dais included D. Valisinha, the General Secretary of the Maha Bodhi Society.17 Ambedkar took his vows from a Burmese bhikkhu named U. Chandramani, apparently the oldest Buddhist monk in India at the time. After the event, messages of congratulations flowed in from prominent individuals from other Buddhist countries, such as the Prime Minister of Burma.18 Ambedkar had appropriated ancient Indian Buddhism, linked it with modern, internationalized Buddhism, and transformed it into something new, something he himself called Navayāna (‘the new vehicle’). The strong element of anti-Hindu sentiment and protest that accompanied the ceremony was very evident from the vows taken by Ambedkar and the other converts.19 Early Buddhism had to a large extent adjusted itself to existing social hierarchies and created in the saṅgha an island of equality in the midst of a very unequal world; it had also co-existed with the Hindu cults without undue acrimony. In the 20th century, in Ambedkar’s hands, Buddhism blended with strident social protest and political assertion, and took on a sharp anti-Hindu stance.
True religion, in Ambedkar’s view, was an important aspect of society, one that was necessary to maintain the moral basis of both individual and community. In his opinion, the Buddha, like Marx, put forward a doctrine aimed at radically transforming society. But Ambedkar went on to argue that while both Marx and the Buddha put forward a call for social equality, Buddhism was superior to Marxism because of the peaceful, democratic means it advocated to achieve this end.20 Ambedkar’s book, The Buddha and his Dhamma, was completed just before he died, and was published posthumously in 1957. Written in pithy, lively point-form, this book presented his final and most detailed understanding of the Buddha’s life and ideas. He asserted that there was a fundamental difference between the western notion of religion and the idea of dhamma in Buddhism; the latter was preeminently social and moral, and its purpose was to reconstruct the world. True dhamma (saddhamma) is that which breaks down barriers between man and man, which maintains that worth and not birth is the measure of man, and which promotes social equality. Ambedkar described the confusion about what constituted the core of the Buddha’s teaching as in large part a result of the misreporting of his ideas by monks. He asserted that the touchstone of ascertaining whether a particular interpretation of the Buddha’s teaching was correct or not was whether that interpretation was logical and rational. He denied that the four noble truths made Buddhism a pessimistic doctrine. He scoffed at the hagiographical explanation of the Buddha’s disenchantment with worldly life as a result of witnessing the ‘four sights’ in Kapilavastu. As for the role of the saṅgha, he asserted that the bhikkhus should be servants of society.21
Ambedkar clearly saw himself as an agent for the revival of a once-great Indian religion and wanted his book to inspire and ignite the reader to change his destiny. The Buddha and his Dhamma ends with prayers for the return of the Buddha to his native land and for the spread of his dhamma. Not everyone was impressed. A review of the book in Mahabodhi, the journal of the Maha Bodhi Society in Calcutta, described it as a dangerous book, and remarked that it should have been titled Ambedkar and his Dhamma.22
Ambedkar used the term ‘neo-Buddhists’ to refer to the Scheduled Caste converts. The prefix ‘neo’ was apt for two reasons—they were new converts to the religion, and the religion they embraced was in fact a new interpretation of Buddhism, one with a strong element of social and political protest. Indian neo-Buddhism differed from Buddhisms in other parts of the world in many fundamental ways, including in its religious ideas and social orientation. It was essentially a lay Buddhism, one in which lay leaders predominated and monks played a very insignificant role. During the 1950s and 1960s the majority of the converts came from two groups among whom Ambedkar enjoyed an especially strong following—the Mahars of Maharashtra (who had traditionally been service providers in villages—watchmen, removers of cattle carcasses, wall-repairers, etc.) and the Jatavs of Agra (largely employed in shoe-making) in Uttar Pradesh. Ambedkar also invented a new myth of origin for the neo-Buddhists, one which connected them directly with ancient India and ancient Buddhism. His hypothesis (put forward in his essay, The Untouchables, published in 1948) was that the 20th century ‘Untouchables’ were the descendants of the Buddhists of ancient India, ‘broken men’ who stuck to their religion and to beef-eating, and who were reduced to their pathetic position due to the machinations of the Brahmins.
The mass conversion of Dalits to Buddhism does not, however, seem to have had a massive or sustained legacy after Ambedkar, and today the vast majority of the Scheduled Castes in India are in fact not Buddhist. There have been a few episodes of conversions of members of Scheduled Caste and Tribe groups, including some well-publicized ones, in recent times. For instance, on 27 October 2002, a small number of Dalits publicly converted to Islam, Buddhism, and Christianity at a ceremony held in Gurgaon, near Delhi. The organizers were the All-India Confederation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Organisations and the Lord Buddha Club.23
On 4 November 2004 a Diksha (conversion) ceremony was organized in Delhi by the All India Confederation of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes Organizations and the Lord Buddha Club. The number of conversions that took place on that day is debated. It seems that about 20,000 people eventually took their vows, but the organizers allege that the police had prevented as many as 50,000 people from entering the city. In fact, the rally was originally supposed to be held in the centrally located Ram Lila grounds and the venue had to be shifted to the more out-of-the-way Ambedkar Bhavan due to police insistence that it would create a law and order problem.24
One of the biggest post-Ambedkar conversion rallies took place on 28 May 2007 when it was reported that about 50,000 (100,000 according to some sources) Dalits and tribals converted to Buddhism at Mahalaxmi Race Course in Mumbai, on the fiftieth anniversary of B. R. Ambedkar’s death and the Nagpur Diksha. The ceremony was organized by an organization called the Babasaheb Ambedkar Pratishthan, and was apparently also supposed to be a show of strength by a Dalit leader of Maharashtra named Ramdas Athawale (alias Udit Raj), who sought to establish his credentials as the true torch-bearer of Ambedkar’s legacy.25 A Dalit writer named Laxman Mane, who had organized a smaller conversion of some 140 tribals at Nagpur in 2006, was also involved. Monks from several countries were present on the occasion. The Dalai Lama was scheduled to attend, but for some reason did not make an appearance.
On the whole, it is evident that mass conversions of Dalits and tribals to various religions (mainly Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam) are not as frequent or substantial as certain Hindu groups who have spear-headed moves towards the passing of strict anti-conversion laws in some states maintain. This is in spite of the fact that according to law, Scheduled Caste converts to Buddhism and Sikhism do not lose their special privileges after conversion, whereas converts to Christianity and Islam do.
Various reasons have been cited for the sparseness of Buddhist conversions in the post-Ambedkar era. Although Adele Fiske’s study was based on data collected in 1966–1967, its conclusions are still relevant. There is the very loose structure of Buddhist organizations, the lack of co-operation and coordination among them, political in-fighting, a weak financial and personnel base, and the absence of a charismatic leadership transcending local, regional, and caste boundaries. Connected to the last point is the fact that neo-Buddhism is basically a lay religion, one in which the saṅgha has little presence or importance (Ambedkar’s attitude towards the saṅgha was one of suspicion and distrust). There is a lack of interest among young neo-Buddhists to don monastic robes, and the training facilities for monks or baudhacharyas (laypersons who can officiate at life-cycle rituals) are weak.26
Instead of looking towards religious conversion, Scheduled Castes today seek more direct gains through political positioning both within parties with a wide social base or through association with political parties that explicitly have a Dalit base. The electoral successes of the Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh are illustrative of the latter trend. Although the fortunes of this party were significantly diminished in the 2009 national elections, there is no doubt that today, in their quest for social justice and advancement, groups low in the caste hierarchy seek salvation through politics rather than through religion. Political parties, for their part, can no longer ignore the Dalits.
Tibetan Buddhism in India and Its Links with Ladakh, Lahaul, and Spiti
The second major facet of the increased visibility of Buddhism in 20th and 21st century India has its source in political processes in India’s neighbourhood. In ancient times Tibet was home to the Bon religion. According to tradition, Buddhist influences started making their impact there from the reign of King Songsten Gampo in the 7th century. Tibetan Buddhism was strongly influenced both by Indian Buddhism and by the autochthonous Bon traditions. Buddhism was transmitted to Tibet by many Buddhist monks, the best known among whom were the Indian monks Śāntarakṣita, Padmasambhava, and Atisa. The various Tibetan sects identified themselves as belonging to the Mahāyāna stream with respect to their philosophy and religious practice, and were strongly influenced by Buddhist tantra (known as Vajrayāna or Mantrayāna). The ‘dark period’ of the 9th and 10th centuries was followed by a revival in the 11th to 15th centuries, during which time the major Tibetan sects such as the Nyingmapa, Kagyu, Sakya, and Geluk took shape.27
The exile of Tibetan Buddhism from Tibet and its refuge in India was a 20th century phenomenon, and was a direct outcome of the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1949 and the subsequent Chinese crack-down on Buddhist monastic institutions. In 1959, ten years after the invasion, Tenzin Gyatso, the fourteenth Dalai Lama and the chief spiritual leader of the Tibetan Buddhists, fled to India along with about 85,000 followers. Subsequent to that event, a Central Tibetan Administration, functioning as a government in exile, was established. It continues to function, with headquarters at McLeodganj in Dharamsala in Himachal Pradesh. The internationalization of Tibetan Buddhism was thus a result of its forced exile from its homeland.
With the help of the Indian government, the United Nations High Commission for refugees, and various foreign donors, the Tibetan refugees were ultimately settled in fifty-two settlements spread across ten Indian states (apart from thirty-five settlements in Nepal and seven in Bhutan). The largest numbers of refugees were located in five settlements set up between 1960 and 1974 in the southern state of Karnataka. The new settlers mainly devoted themselves to agriculture (they also took to agro-based industries and handicrafts) and established monasteries and schools. The biggest settlement of Tibetan refugees is the Lungsung-Samdupling settlement in Bylakuppe, Karnataka. Starting off with a population of 3,000, this now consists of seven villages or camps, with an average of 30 families in each camp.
Over 8,000 Tibetans live in Dharamsala, which is also the official residence of the Dalai Lama. The Tibetan government in exile has set up a library and archives of Tibetan works, and has made efforts to promote the study of Buddhist philosophy and Tibetan language and culture, including the study of traditional Tibetan medicine, astrology, and handicrafts. Several monasteries and nunneries are located in the town.
Although physically concentrated in India, the Tibetan diaspora has an international spread. The Department of Information and International Relations of the Government in exile places the Tibetan diaspora at about 111,170. Of these, 85,000 live in India, 14,000 in Nepal, 1,600 in Bhutan, and 1,540 in Switzerland. About 640 Tibetans are scattered across other countries of Europe, 110 in Scandinavia, 7,000 in the USA and Canada, 1,000 in Taiwan, 220 in Australia and New Zealand, and 60 in Japan. Thus, in contrast to the neo-Buddhist movement, which has an essentially Indian perspective, Tibetan Buddhism has acquired a strong international flavour. This has led to a greater international visibility of the Tibetan Buddhists in India, a highlighting of the ancient Indian Buddhist heritage, and of the fact that India is the original homeland of Buddhism. A corollary to the substantial international exposure that Tibetan Buddhism has received and the interest it has attracted is that the second half of the 20th century has seen the creation of a Buddhist following beyond Asia in Europe and America, one that is notable not so much for its numbers as for the high-profile celebrity status of some of its members.
The international awareness and sympathy that the Tibetan cause enjoys today has much to do with the current Dalai Lama. He has travelled to over sixty-two countries, meeting many dignitaries and heads of state (most recently President Obama of the United States), and has received numerous international awards including the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize for leading a non-violent struggle for the liberation of Tibet. He was awarded the Congressional Gold Medal—the highest civilian honour in the United States of America—in 2006. Although he has visited Japan, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, and Taiwan, the maximum number of foreign visits made by the Dalai Lama have been to the United States and Germany. Devotees from various countries come to seek his blessings and guidance in Dharamsala. Through his discourses, visits, and various kinds of initiation ceremonies held in different parts of the world, the Dalai Lama has personally played an important role in highlighting the plight of the Tibetan refugees and strengthening the international profile of Tibetan Buddhism.
While the scale of international, especially western, attention that Tibet has received in recent years may appear novel and unprecedented, it is important to remember that this attention is part of a longer-term engagement. Donald S. Lopez Jr has pointed out that Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism have long been a focus of European desire and fantasy. In the 18th and 19th centuries, western scholars considered ‘Lamaism’ (the term they used for Tibetan Tāntric Buddhism) as a corrupt version of the original pristine faith. The mid-20th century Tibetan diaspora led to a significant shift in attitude and perspective. Buddhism started claiming American and European converts and became internationalized. Now, because of Tibet’s seclusion, Tibetan Buddhism came to be considered as more authentic than that of any other land, and became an object of academic inquiry in western universities. This academic inquiry had an urgency about it, as its practitioners saw themselves as engaged in a rescue operation to save a culture that stood on the brink of extinction.28 Lopez has also elaborated on the creation of a new sort of myth about Tibet as a perfect, ethereal, idyllic world before the Chinese invasion. In this new mythologizing, Tibet is seen as a spiritual panacea for a materialistic western world.29
