In Isolation, page 11
This existential line offers a striking image of the fundamental ideas evolving here in the Donbas. The initial wave of imperialists who rallied for a “Novorossiia” from Odesa to Kharkiv with Strelkov at the helm was replaced by a calculating, pragmatic leadership cadre with Oleksandr Zakharchenko as its central figure. Strelkov’s units, now cloaked in legend as “modern-day bogatyrs,” 80 were very quickly replaced with private military companies and nameless people like the notorious Wagner Group, MAR, E.N.O.T., and the Moran Security Group.81 Soon enough, the remains of the former ideology-driven soldiers of fortune were found blown up in their own cars, with a bullet through the head right in downtown Donetsk, or eliminated like the notorious Troia battalion.82
By the way, that sensational event was only reported in the Ukrainian media. An incident of such an unbelievable scale, where over 100 men were wiped out in the DPR, did not make it to any local TV channel or the “republican” press. The only coherent description of what happened was in a letter from Evgenii Shabaev,83 a Russian official representative of the Donetsk “Republic” 84 to “DPR leader” Oleksandr Zakharchenko, demanding an explanation for the “massacre in Ozerianivka.”
It turned out that around a hundred men from the Troia battalion vanished in the most predictable way possible and in line with the best traditions of the local steppe: in bags. According to Shabaev, Russian patriots packed ninety-two of these patriotic bodies in plain black bags and moved them in two trucks in an unknown direction. There are few reasons not to believe him. His bold demand for an explanation had barely reached Zakharchenko when Shabaev suddenly was no longer the official spokesman of the Donetsk “Republic” in Russia and was persuaded to go into early retirement if he didn’t want to join the ranks of the “Trojans.”
The Prizrak battalion 85 and a slew of other LPR and DPR units are in a similar position. Their members are being dismissed in droves and sent on indefinite leave. Funding for the largest military corps, also, is far from ideal: the average pay for rank-and-file soldiers dropped from 360 US dollars per month in 2014 to 240 in 2015 and has sunk to 110–240 now, depending on the unit and the assignment. In other words, the idealistic believers in “Novorossiia” have been displaced by the enterprising advocates of “special regions” who see an opportunity for making money, which has totally confused the locals about the difference between the notion of a “republic” as part of Russia, and an autonomous region, as part of a “neighboring state,” as the DPR boss himself described Ukraine in his latest press conference.
It’s true that the back-and-forth of flirting with Kyiv and making forceful statements in favor of the DPR’s independence, coupled with the “republican” leadership’s lack of any evident strategic plans, the parceling out of key business sectors to the military elite, and, finally, the merciless crackdown on all dissent, have seriously undermined Zakharchenko’s initial image as a kind-hearted strongman who held the people of the Donbas—portrayed as a hapless old woman in propaganda posters around Donetsk—to his breast. This has also cast a shadow on all the well-known militants loyal to him in Donetsk, especially the Somalia unit and its notorious commander Givi who not only avoided supporting Troia when it was being wiped out, but openly questioned the heroism and merits of its men.
Naturally, all this inspires some hope for the prospects of Ukraine, though, truth be told, one should not be too optimistic. The idea that Russia might fall apart in a few months because of plummeting oil prices, or that it might once and for all forget its satellite “republics” in the conflict zone, pushing them through the door of the Minsk accords and to the feet of the Ukrainian state, might present too high a price for Ukraine. It seems that Kyiv’s politicians have failed to comprehend the key message of this war: the conflict in the Donbas is not a budget calculation or the result of someone’s revenue predictions, based on a realization that the cost of maintaining an army here exceeds the income from the factories that have been cannibalized for scrap or the coal that has been shipped to Russia. Such considerations will never persuade Moscow to stop its war in the Donbas.
Indeed, a quick economic assessment shows that the cost of a week of Russia’s presence in the “republics” does not compare to the minuscule income that the “local government agencies” manage to squeeze out of the few remaining businesses in the occupied territories, in taxes and other, less above-board, charges. This war is a long-term, well-devised metaphysical project whose roots bear no relation to the economic cost of keeping a Motorola and a Givi in Donetsk, or paying miserly pensions to the “republican” pensioners. Reinforcing the rigid chain of command of a military dictatorship, engaging in active propaganda, expanding local media, establishing an “Academy of Interior Affairs” 86 that trains those who just yesterday were Ukrainian students, proselytizing in schools and DPR-owned enterprises, and deepening economic relations with Russia—all this signals that the next two to three months will determine what the entire year will be like. As the key and only actor in this war, the Kremlin will, once again, determine the course of history, while, once again, all we will be able to do is adjust, however awkwardly, to Moscow’s initiatives.
In fact, the collapse of Mr. Zakharchenko’s image is not worth getting excited about. The Donbas mentality flip-flops between deep bowing and complete indifference to those who get shoved aside by someone stronger. When Strelkov, who had managed to become a legend in just a few months, left Donetsk, many people, including the militants, were in shock and thought that the Donbas was once again being thrown under the bus. But if Strelkov left without saying goodbye, Zakharchenko came in without saying hello, never explaining who he was and where the previous legend had vanished to. Dinner was served and the locals ate it. The same will happen if Moscow decides to replace Zakharchenko with someone less reserved: “The Donbas is at work” 87; don’t ask unnecessary questions.
What is often referred to as the X factor should not be forgotten in the Donbas, either. The idea that the Kremlin completely controls the DPR and the LPR is not entirely correct. Clearly, Mozhovyi,88 the Troia and Odesa battalions, and a number of kazaki units that were summarily dealt with not that long ago represented deviations from the preset algorithm of actions. It’s not even really about them.
“Eliminations” in working with local staff have been an integral part of the young pseudo-states since the time of Girkin and his trip from Slov’iansk to Donetsk, where Khodakovskyi’s militants were lying in wait at one of the bases, ready to shell their own. The militants refer to these events as “work issues”—provided that they aren’t the ones who end up in the black bags. There is an important point here. Purging inconvenient units is not really part of the Kremlin’s complicated plan. In an environment where every competitor has a battalion backing him, the arms trade that has been thriving since the massacre at Ilovaisk 89—part of it extending to the Caucasus, according to some sources—and the schemes that “filter out” supplies from Russia in the form of kickback “taxes” paid to top people in the “republic”—both require a certain amount of well-armed support. Today, the DPR has only two such competitors: Khodakovskyi and Zakharchenko. Whenever someone pops up talking about Holy “Novorossiia” and has plans to “clean up the Donbas,” the opportunity presents itself to yet again for one group to weaken its partner in russkii mir without leaving traces that would attract the attention of Moscow. It was not a coincidence that it was Khodakovskyi’s men who carried out the search at the Troia headquarters. They were, in fact, performing a reconnaissance for an assault, which Zakharchenko must have been aware of because he had attempted to prevent the search in the first place.
In other words, this is about your basic criminal underworld that has grown to the scale of a state based on a common ideological platform coming from the Kremlin. This means that the tactics of the local capos could easily prove more resilient than any overall strategy, even if it leads to a radical shift toward the Minsk accords.
As for the latter, we can now firmly declare that all the actors in this theater of the absurd are on the same page. Nobody—not the ideology-driven “republicans,” not the small pro-Ukrainian element, not the militias, not the top leadership that at least nominally supports the Minsk process—seriously believes that the accords’ provisions can be implemented. So far, even the initial agreements for a full ceasefire have failed repeatedly. What’s more, Donetsk is busily preparing for “republican” elections, with ready-made candidates for the post of mayor and predetermined quotas based on who gets the top prize. Needless to say, Ukrainian laws and Ukrainian political forces will have no part in this process. Instead, they will yet again shake their heads at the treacherous terrorists who are violating Minsk.
In all fairness, the local people won’t have much to do with this process either, and not just because, in essence, totalitarianism has been established in their “free country.” Most residents of Donetsk had their fill after the previous election experience, when the city was plastered with ads saying that it was time for people to take the future into their own hands and cast a ballot for a “happy Donbas.” Then suddenly it became clear that the election was off, canceled quietly, without explanation, the way the founders of the DPR have preferred to do things.
Only minor details remain on the sidelines of all the geopolitics: the homeless old people who have been swarming Donetsk stores again lately; the Donetskites who still think of themselves as Ukrainians and continue to believe that there should be no shame in living in their home city; those who can’t leave for a variety of reasons; and, in general, all those whom the last two years have cast onto the shallow banks of history when the rest of the country adopted the extraordinarily unenlightened conviction that what has happened is exactly what everyone here wanted.
In 1967, Columbian writer Gabriel Garcia Marques first published his novel One Hundred Years of Solitude. In it, each of his characters, no matter what they did or didn’t do, ended up surrounded by a solitude in which they spent the rest of their lives. Seven hundred days ago, the Donbas started drawing this circle around itself with its own hand, but it’s clearly being completed by outside hands today.
February 5, 2016
Dzerkalo Tyzhnia
From left to right: DPR “defense minister” Vladimir Kononov, Donetsk-born Russian singer Iosif Kobzon, and the commander of the Somali battalion Mykhailo Tolstykh (Givi) on Russian holiday known as the Defender of the Fatherland Day, February 23, 2015. Tolstykh was assassinated in February 2017.
The War in the Donbas
2016
January 1
Separatist and Russian forces resume the shelling of Ukrainian positions using weaponry that is explicitly banned by the ceasefire agreements; ten Ukrainian servicemen die.
February 24
Ukrainian positions at the Butivka coal mine are shelled.
April 30
A new agreement for an immediate ceasefire is reached by the members of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine (comprising representatives of Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE).
June 29
The first major battle at the strategic town of Svitlodarsk takes place.
September 1
Another agreement for an immediate ceasefire is reached by the members of the Trilateral Contact Group.
September 21
An agreement requiring the withdrawal of troops and equipment at Zolote (deadline October 1), Petrivske (deadline October 7), and Stanytsia Luhanska is signed by the members of the Trilateral Contact Group.
October 16
The leader of the separatist Sparta battalion Arsen (Arsenii) Pavlov (“Motorola”) is assassinated in his apartment building in Donetsk.
October 19
A meeting of the Normandy Format participants takes place in Berlin, Germany.
December 24
An agreement for an immediate ceasefire is reached by the members of the Trilateral Contact Group.
December 26
Ukrainian activists begin a blockade of railway communications with the occupied areas of the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts.
What Comes Next?
Losing the Donbas breadbasket somehow did not end up destroying Ukraine. It turns out that the old lady is somehow managing just fine without us, the businesses of the big eastern oligarchs still exist, even under the DPR, and for the political elites, the occupation has proved to be a trump card that always draws a tear from the eyes of those who still believe in anything. After nearly two years, the refugees have settled into a new life and put down roots in new cities—and many of them have nothing material left in the DPR at this point. Today, most Ukrainians quite justly are more worried about their loved ones in the trenches than about having the Ukrainian flag fly over backward, pro-Soviet Makiїvka.
Sure, there are still some Andreievs, Ivanovs, Vasins, and other dinosaurs of the pre-tricolor era who have become exhibits in a museum you look at without understanding what they are trying to communicate. We keep them in our “thoughts and prayers,” just as we do for the people of Crimea. As a nice gesture, we might even arrange another little blockade, as if to say, we are sparing nothing in the fight for your cause, beleaguered patriot of Ukraine, and at some point in the distant future, we will surely reclaim what is ours. In fact, it is nothing more than a delaying tactic, a largely ineffectual response to Moscow’s well-planned maneuvers.
In a certain sense, we have become hostage to the impoverished—compared to the Russian version—propaganda that Ukrainian public opinion has managed to come up with: broadcasts around the clock about “victory” and reassuring repetitions that “everything is going to be great” that fog the critical faculties in assessing the real state of affairs.
And the real state is rather different. The prospect of taking Crimea back has been postponed until the death of Putin himself—which makes all these blockades a bit like shooting at a train with a slingshot. Meanwhile, returning the Donbas through military means will be impossible without making a complete wasteland—another Nagasaki—of all the occupied cities. The Minsk accords have no chance of raising the blue-and-yellow flag over the Donetsk Oblast State Administration (ODA) again, as “republican” government agencies and propaganda spread their roots ever more deeply, having engendered a kind of reflexive gratitude among locals, even in the face of widespread shortages, blockades, and sky-high food prices.
What’s more, Russian propaganda has not lost one iota of its effectiveness, despite the complete screw-up with the false story of the crucified little boy.90 No doubt, small crucifixes with babies will continue to please the eye of the unquestioning fans of the ideology of Great Russia. Indeed, an entire generation of the latter is coming of age: while valiant Kyiv promises for the eighty-fourth time in the last two years to launch a television channel for the occupied territories, a generation of Zakharchenkites, Komsomols, and young members of the Prizrak brigade is already growing up to write little verses to Uncle Liosha, aka Oleksii Mozhovyi. Will it be any surprise, really, when, in five years’ time, this “poor kid, who’s simply been brainwashed,” takes up arms, together with thousands of other freshly-baked militiamen, to take vengeance for a father, a brother, or “Holy Russia”?
It’s obvious that the winds of the Apocalypse have not been enough, so far, to resolve the conflict in the Donbas. It is equally obvious that there are not enough people here like me, people who feel the secret urge either to act to free Ukraine or who blame themselves for whatever happens. But those who have stayed are not the main victims of the easy sleep of our chocolate king,91 who has managed finally to stop the endless flow of blood but leave the situation suspended in mid-air, all while assuring everyone of the positives of the situation, as if this were the final answer. The main victims are our Ukrainian fighters, who sit a yard below ground in freezing temperatures and wait for God knows what. These boys are the ones who have the right to ask the key question: How much longer, and what next?
Some may deny that there are also people sitting in the trenches on the other side, but this isn’t entirely the case. The fact of the matter is that the mindset of the “republican” fighters is completely different from the Ukrainian army. Most of the tricolor trenches are filled with marginalized people for whom the coming of the war changed nothing, for the most part—men who had no future prior to the conflict and have nothing to lose now, either. The image of soldiers of fortune who live one day at a time and converged on the Donbas rightly reflects the current situation in the “republican” guards, brigades, and units. These are not people who left prestigious work and a fancy car in the garage of a nice house and are waiting impatiently for the situation to be resolved so that they can go home again. On the contrary, their life is the war, and they are prepared to keep sitting in those trenches forever. Of course, the Ukrainian army is not a bunch of knights in shining armor, but compared to the “republican” forces, their overall composition is much closer to the societal norm.
“The ATO will last a few hours, not a few months.” That statement, coming from the lips of our president, filled many people, including me, with a naive hope; we associated that promise with a future “free” life. But what we got in reality was two years of never-ending battles, my continued dispatches from this parallel world, and a Donbas split between the local warlords, the late Mishka “Kosyi,” 92 Rynat,93 “Zakhar,” 94 on the one hand, and those making money by bringing fresh boxes of Roshen chocolates into Donetsk in spite of any blockade. Meanwhile the locals, munching on the chocolates as before, still believe that they have a say in what is going on around them. What remains for those who are holding on to their country even more strongly than the state itself and have no desire to leave their homes for the sole purpose of making things easier for someone in Kyiv? “Hey, drop us a line sometime.” That’s what our government’s commitment to the future sounds like.
