Blood Cries Afar, page 1
For Marie
SEAN McGLYNN is the author of the acclaimed By Sword and Fire: Cruelty and Atrocity in Medieval Warfare (2008), which has been published in four languages. He has contributed to a number of books and authoritative reference works, including The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology and is a regular contributor to BBC History, History Today and the leading historical journals. He has studied and researched at King’s College London, London School of Economics and Cardiff University. He lectures for Plymouth University at Strode College and the Open University. Future projects include two books: Medieval Generals and for The History Press, Kill Them All! Cathars, Crusaders and Carnage: The Warfare of the Albigensian Crusade (2013).
CONTENTS
Title Page
Dedication
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
Introduction Warfare and Medieval History
1 Enemies: The Angevin-Capetian Struggle
2 The Conquest of Normandy, 1200–1204
3 War, Politics and the First Invasion Attempt, 1205–1213
4 The Battle of Bouvines, 1214
5 Magna Carta, Civil War and the Countdown to Invasion, 1215
6 The Invasion of England, 1216
7 The Battle for England, 1216–1217
8 The Last Campaign, 1217
Notes
Bibliography
Plate Section
Copyright
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This book has been a long time in the making. Whether it has been Bismarck’s events being stronger than the plans of men or P.G.Wodehouse’s Fate lurking around the corner with a piece of lead piping in its hand, circumstances have meant that I have left people waiting. I am painfully aware of this. My apologies to them all. That I did finish the book is in no small part due to a generous grant from the Society of Authors which came at a particularly crucial time; I am delighted to express my gratitude and appreciation to the Society.
In my first book I acknowledged my teachers over the years and medievalists who kindly invited me to speak at seminars and conferences. Here I should like to make mention again of Peter Coss for his understanding and learned insights and John Gillingham, whose work continues to be influential on my own. I would also like to thank Chris Harper-Bill: it was as an undergraduate in one of his lectures that I first learned of the little-known invasion of 1216 and became fascinated by it. I am very grateful to those scholars who, often a very long time ago now, have been gracious enough to provide me with unpublished papers of talks and advanced copies of articles relevant to this book. Tony Moore has been very kind in this respect. I have also benefited from Louise Wilkinson’s research, and I am thankful to David Carpenter for directing her work my way. John Gillingham and Alexander Grant have also forwarded papers and useful comments. Special mention must go to Keith Stringer, whose work on the Scottish angle has been such a great help, and to the generosity of David Crouch and Stewart Gregory for an advanced look at their work on the wonderful new edition of The History of William Marshal; David Crouch’s notes have proved invaluable. I have also benefited from a correspondence on national identity with the late Henry Loyn. My sincere apologies if I have unintentionally omitted others: as I say, it has been a long time. Looking ahead, I owe thanks to John France for directing me towards my next project.
In the work environment, I would like to pay tribute to past colleagues for their help and support: Joe Martin, Jo Sharrock, Dave Bates and Steve Ryan in Bristol; Lara Price in Bath; and Jackie Duff at the Open University. And the same gratitude of course extends to my current colleagues who make my place of work so enjoyable: Andy Pickering, Stephen Page, Katherine Dray and Eddie Daughton. The students have been – and are – a delight to teach. At The History Press, Shaun Barrington has been an ideal editor to work with.
On the personal front, I still owe much to some wonderful friends acknowledged in my previous book: Robert Purves (always welcome on these shores); Steven Forrow (I have forgiven you – almost – for leaving London); Dr Anthony Cross (who, when not immured in the ivory towers of Oxford University, is encouraging me onwards in Bath); and the stalwart Stephen ‘Gui’ Rigby (with whom I put the world right and laugh at the folly of it all). New mentions this time around are: James, Meinir and (my goddaughter) Olwen Ottaway; Neil Trodden, whose detective work ensured we re-established contact; Michael Owen, who keeps me in touch with developments in the modern world; and my learned friend Glenn Renshaw, with whom over the years I have shared many hours of illuminating and productive debate on matters historical, social, cultural and political.
On the family front my thanks go to Liz, Dave, Josh, Jamie and Erin, not least for doing such a great job in looking after Mum. My mother remains a constant source of support, help and friendship and I will always be grateful to her. Sam, Maddy and Jenny have shown great humour, patience and understanding during my endeavours and at my being shut away in the study; you remain inspirational and the next one is for you. Finally, my love and thanks to Marie: even greater than her considerable assistance in helping with the translations of the Old French sources has been her practical help and support that have allowed me time and space to write. Her courage and resolve in overcoming serious adversity is remarkable and demonstrates that bravery is not merely present on the battle-field. This book is dedicated to her.
ABBREVIATIONS
AB Anonymous of Béthune, Histoire des Ducs de Normandie et des Rois d’Angleterre, ed. F. Michelet, Paris, 1840
AM Annales Monastici, ed. H.R. Luard, Rolls Series, 1864–69
ANS Anglo-Norman Studies [formerly Proceedings of the Battle Conference], 1979–
ANW Strickland, M. (ed), Anglo-Norman Warfare: Studies in Late Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman Military Organization and Warfare, Woodbridge, 1992
BC Barnwell Chronicler, Memoriale Walteri de Coventria, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols, RS, 1879–80
EHR English Historical Review
HWM History of William Marshal, ed. A. Holden, D. Crouch and S. Gregory, Anglo-Norman Text Society, 2002–2006
JMMH Journal of Medieval Military History, eds B, Bachrach, C.J. Rogers and K. de Vries, Woodbridge, 2002–
MGH SS Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores
MP Mathew Paris, Matthei Parisiensis, Monachi Sanctii Albani, Chronica Majora, ed. H.R. Luard, RS, 1884–9
OEMW Rogers, C.J. (ed), Oxford Enclyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology, Oxford, 2010
RC Ralph of Coggeshall, Radulphi de Coggeshall Chronicon Anglicanum, ed. J. Stevenson, RS, 1875
Recueil Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France, Paris, 1734–1904
Rigord Rigord, Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton, ed. H.F. Delaborde, Paris, i, 1882
RS Rolls Series
RW Roger of Wendover, Rogeri de Wendover Liber Qui Dicitur Flores Historiarum [The Flowers of History], ed. H.G. Hewlett, RS, 1886–7
TCE Coss, P. and Lloyd, S. (eds), Thirteenth Century England, Woodbridge, 1985
WB i William the Breton, Gesta Philippi Augusti in Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton, ed. H.F. Delaborde, Paris, 1882
WB ii William the Breton, Philippidos, in Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton, ed. H.F. Delaborde, Paris, 1882
INTRODUCTION
WARFARE AND MEDIEVAL
HISTORY
‘War,’ as defined by Clausewitz, ‘is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.’ This will is usually a political objective, hence Clausewitz’s more famous, but also more controversial, dictum that ‘War is nothing but the continuation of politics, with a mixture of other means.’ He amplifies this verdict in the clarification: ‘War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.’1 This is better known to us rendered as ‘War is the continuation of politics by other means.’ Although not all conflicts can – or should – be explained in such terms (some arising from emotional and irrational origins), this interpretation is basically sound and judicious; it is particularly apposite to the Middle Ages. Beyond the political objectives, we must also unearth the financial ones: these are rarely buried deeply but are frequently obscured by the noble ideals and moral justifications proclaimed by the warring protagonists. Politics means power means money. It is only rarely dangerous that too much cynicism is harmful to the process of historical interpretation; it is usually the case that the more cynical one is the closer one arrives at the historical truth. As I am forever telling my students, to really understand History you have to pick up the stone and see what is crawling underneath. As this book deals with warriors and not saints, it will adopt such an approach; but if these pages contain very few altruists, they do contain many brave men performing heroic acts in pursuit of their masters’ objectives, however questionable their causes or motivations.
What Clausewitz applies to the modern world is equally germane to the medieval one. Medieval warfare was about land: its political and military control, the economic exploitation of its resources, the geographical implications it possessed for both security and offence, and the power and prestige it afforded its lord. Where these matters could not be satisfactorily resolved through marriages and inheritance, the resort to war was always a ready option. However, going to war was not always undertaken with the primary goal of subjugating an opponent to the belligerent’s will: often – as before and since – its intent was to unite a people against a common enemy, to direct attention away from domestic problems and to reinforce a leader’s authority among his own subjects. To confuse issues, these objectives could be combined with, and disguised by, genuine attempts at achieving grand designs at an enemy’s expense. History is replete with examples of this, the medieval period offering no shortage of illustrations: King Henry V of England made spectacular military inroads against the French during the early fifteenth-century phase of the Hundred Years War, bringing political success both abroad and at home, thereby underpinning support for his shaky Lancastrian regime following Richard II’s usurpation.2 In John’s reign, however, foreign wars abroad had the opposite effect, not least because they were so unsuccessful; where a leader’s aim did not coincide with those of his more powerful subjects trouble at home was inevitable. The military intentions of medieval commanders were thus the same as generals from any historical period, but it would be wrong to deem them as the only ones that mattered: the aspirations of the medieval individual also demand consideration, even if, unlike today’s electorates, they were unable to influence war-planning through the ballot-box.
Then, as now, military objectives were determined by the political environment; the purpose of this book is to demonstrate how military events determined, and were determined by, the political environment in England and France in the early thirteenth-century. Magna Carta, for example, a political and historical achievement of John’s reign, was a low point for John and a manifestation of his military under-achievement. Special emphasis will be placed on how political failure for King John meant both political and military success for his Capetian enemies. The course of human history is sign-posted by military events. What would have been the history of Britain and Europe in the second half of the twentieth century had the British lost the Battle of Britain and the Russians lost on the Eastern Front? What of English history and the future British Empire had the Spanish Armada succeeded in 1588?3 What if, in 1066, King Harold had not had to fight his great victory against the Norsemen at Stamford Bridge, just three weeks before his defeat in an extremely close-run battle at Hastings? And what if, during this battle, the formidable Anglo-Saxon shield wall had not chosen to break formation at a critical moment to pursue the Normans?4 The French invasion of 1216 came extremely close to being a repeat of the conquest in 1066. Thus wars, and how they were fought, are crucial to our understanding of history.
This book explores and analyses the military activity during the French invasion of England in 1216 and the military events that led to this invasion (events for which a different outcome may easily have meant no invasion at all) and the profound consequences these had for the belligerents – and non-belligerents – involved. Such a study perforce concentrates on how engagements were fought, on explaining and detailing the methods of medieval warfare. The period under scrutiny here, and especially the invasion itself, provides an accurate and revealing portrayal of warfare between two Christian powers in western Europe during the Middle Ages; that is to say, a clearly political power struggle between enemies who shared religious, chivalric and social values.5 The Angevin-Capetian conflict from 1202 to 1217 encapsulates nearly all the elements of medieval warfare in western Europe at this time, from the strategies and tactics of princes and commanders to the roles of individuals, whether soldiers or non-combatants, who fought and died both heroically and wretchedly. That these events have previously not received either a systematic military analysis or a monograph will hopefully afford this study some value.
Beyond the grand political and military schemes there are at least two other important reasons why wars took on such significance in the Middle Ages. One is the role of the monarch. Kingship was expected to be feudal and judicial, theocratic and religious, chivalric and martial: rex as judex, sacerdos and miles (the king as judge, priest and knight).6 Medieval society was, after all, violent; the feudal agreement expected a lord to protect his people, which necessarily demanded ability in the military sphere and the employment of violence to bring about peaceful ends. A king poor in the profession of arms was prone to popular mockery, lack of respect and, crucially, loss of confidence by his subjects. In England the reigns of John, Henry III, Edward II and Henry VI are testimony to this. Such kings had to hope (in vain) for peace on the domestic and international scenes and, more realistically, for competent leaders of their armies. A mediocre king might get by on the latter; a poor one would not. We shall see how loss of military credibility could lead to loss of political credibility, initiating a vicious circle that could be broken only by a string of successes. When armies were evenly matched, political leadership could make all the difference.
The other main reason why war was so important to medieval history is too large to be addressed here in any detail: as Philippe Contamine explains, war in medieval history is ‘an explanatory factor and is the product of a whole cultural, technical and economic environment’. In other words, medieval society was organised for war and can be understood only in the context of war. ‘Medieval warfare,’ therefore, ‘is a massive and hence impossible subject.’7 Its impact on the political environment will be considered, especially the effects of the Angevin-Capetian conflict on nascent nationalism in England and, to a lesser extent, France, arguing that, contrary to most modern opinion on this issue, a form of nationalism did exist at this time.8 Some attention will be given to the military organisation of England and France in the early thirteenth century, but the focus will remain on military activity in the field: what happened, how and why. Even a narrative of such events should suffice to impress upon the reader the sheer enormity of time, energy and resources in blood and treasure that medieval monarchs poured into war. Contemporaries recognised this, as the chronicles of the age reveal, dominated as they are by war. It is from these chronicles that this book takes its lead.
Problems of Historiographical Interpretations
All sources, whether primary or secondary, require handling with care. Although this is especially true of contemporary authorities, historians of this period are blessed with some extremely well-informed chroniclers. In the vernacular we have the writings of the Anonymous of Béthune and The History of William Marshal; in Latin we have the monastic records of, among others, Guillaume le Breton (hereafter William the Breton), Ralph of Coggeshall and Roger of Wendover. The last of these has been disparaged by modern commentators; one contention of this study is that Wendover is generally an accurate and trustworthy source, and of particular value to the study of medieval warfare.9 For the most part, the sources used in this book are strictly contemporary, the authors having lived through these events and in many cases witnessing them first-hand. An immediate problem with medieval sources, both Latin and vernacular, is the hyperbole of the writers when depicting incredible feats of arms against impossible odds: monastic chroniclers often imbued their numbers for armies (frequently an inflated 60,000) with biblical significance;10 lay writers sometimes emulated the chanson de geste with exaggerated tales of derring-do. William the Breton’s epic poem, the Philippidos, is especially culpable in these respects, yet it remains an invaluable literary work (his chronicle is far more sober in relating the events of his day). That said, the chief sources for this period are notable for their restraint and veracity (if not always their historical objectivity).
Although the sources are rightly approached with some caution, historians have sometimes been over-cautious in heeding contemporaries’ accounts of suffering, dismissing tales of horror as the excited embellishments of clerics bemoaning attacks on church property and men of the cloth and the wickedness of soldiers sinning against God and his people. One extreme example of this form of writing comes from Symeon of Durham’s description of Malcolm Canmore’s Scottish invasion of northern England in 1070:
Gazing upon the church of St Peter, blazing with the flames kindled by his men … he ordered his troops no longer to spare any of the English nation … It was pitiable to witness what they did to the English: some old men and women were beheaded by swords; others were run through with spears, like pigs meant for food; babies were snatched from their mother’s breast and thrown high into the air and fell on the points of spears placed close together on the ground.11
