The twilight of the bomb.., p.44

The Twilight of the Bombs, page 44

 

The Twilight of the Bombs
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  40 “In retrospect, the U.S.…”: Jamie McIntyre, “Explaining Why U.S. Intelligence Failed to Anticipate Indian Nuclear Tests,” CNN Worldview, 2 June 1998.

  41 “was basically a Democratic …”: Keith Hansen interview, 2007.

  42 “By the end of September …”: Deibel (2002), p. 147.

  43 “with no guarantee …”: Ibid., p. 148.

  44 “Clinton had not mounted …”: Ibid., p. 151.

  45 “wrote on the day …”: Ibid., p. 157.

  46 It would be a mistake …”: Ibid., p. 160.

  47 “the problem of nuclear weapons …”: Butler (2001), p. 11.

  FOURTEEN REGIME CHANGE

  1 “One of the keys …”: Quoted in Kim Cobb, “Writer Says Bush Talked About War in 1999,” Houston Chronicle, 1 Nov. 2004, p. A10 (online at http://downingstreetmemo.com).

  2 “The only way we can hope …”: Al Gore, “Defeating Hussein, Once and for All,” New York Times Op-ed, 26 Sept. 1991 (online).

  3 “In general … the formula …”: Ibid.

  4 “From 1993 to early 1998 …”: Burgos (2008), pp. 241–242.

  5 “In the rhetorical contestation …”: Ibid., p. 223.

  6 “This unilateral destruction …”: “Amb. Richard Butler’s Presentation to the UN Security Council,” June 3, 1998, p. 2 (online at www.fas.org).

  7 “only 13 targets on the list …”: William Arkin, “The Difference Was in the Details,” Washington Post, 17 Jan. 1999, p. B1 (online).

  8 “insisted that the United States …”: Ibid.

  9 “Iraq’s nuclear and chemical materials …”: Fred Kaplan, “Strikes Didn’t Finish Job US Set Out to Do,” Boston Globe, 21 Dec. 1998 (online).

  10 After the 1998 bombing: Duelfer (2009), pp. 159–60.

  11 “It would have been normal …”: Duelfer (2009), pp. 163–64.

  12 “There was never any answer …”: Duelfer (2009), p. 160.

  13 “on the grounds that this new …”: Scott Ritter, “The Case for Iraq’s Qualitative Disarmament,” Arms Control Today, June 2000 (online at www.armscontrol.org).

  14 “From 1994 to 1998 …”: Ibid.

  15 “Responsibility for overseeing …”: Ibid.

  16 “By December 1998 …”: Mohamed ElBaradei, “The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq,” statement to the United Nations Security Council, New York, 27 Jan. 2003 (online at www.IAEA.org).

  17 “From an Iraqi perspective …”: Duelfer (2009), p. 165.

  18 “Our continued insistence …”: Ibid., p. 167.

  19 “How close is the peril …”: Quoted in Pollack (2004).

  20 “The opening premise …”: Suskind (2004), pp. 73–74.

  21 “should examine our military options …”: Ibid., p. 75.

  22 “The risk to US and Alliance …”: Quoted in ibid., pp. 77–78.

  23 “From the start …”: Quoted in ibid., p. 86.

  24 “impacted the World Trade Center”: Associated Press, 26 Nov. 2001, quoted in Allan Wood and Paul Thompson, “An Interesting Day: President Bush’s Movements and Actions on 9/11,” www.historycommons.org.

  25 “I was sitting outside the classroom …”: White House, 4 Dec. 2001, quoted in ibid.

  26 “Today, we’ve had a national tragedy …”: “Remarks by President Bush at Emma Booker Elementary School.” Federal News Service transcript, 11 Sept. 2001 (online).

  27 “And for the record …”: Full transcript of bin Laden’s speech, Al Jazeera English archive, 1 Nov. 2004 (online).

  28 2,954 victims: The number was initially given as 2,974 but revised downward two years later.

  29 “a great opportunity”: Quoted in Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, “America’s Chaotic Road to War; Bush’s Global Strategy Began to Take Shape in First Frantic Hours After Attack,” Washington Post, 27 Jan. 2002 (online).

  30 “The Pearl Harbor of the twenty-first …”: Quoted in ibid.

  FIFTEEN THE HARD STARE INTO THE ABYSS

  1 “At 2:40 p.m. that day …”: Woodward (2004), pp. 24–25.

  2 “opportunity”: Quoted in ibid., p. 25.

  3 “If we go after Saddam …”: Quoted in ibid.

  4 on Meet the Press … “No”: Quoted in Frank Rich time line: “What the White House Knew, and When It Knew It,” www.frankrich.com.

  5 “Bush told Rice …”: Woodward (2004), p. 26.

  6 “Get Tommy Franks looking …”: Quoted in ibid., p. 2.

  7 No U.S. cases since 1992: U.S. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 51(53) 37, 2004.

  8 “reasonable … but I must say …”: “Cheney: ‘Reasonable’ to Assume Anthrax Cases Linked to Terrorists,” CNN.com, 12 Oct. 2001 (online).

  9 “In a sense, September 11 …”: Matthew Engel and Anthony Sampson, “Attack on Afghanistan: US War Aims: Sabre-rattling at Saddam: Threat to Baghdad Is Way of Keeping Options Open,” The Guardian (London), 10 Oct. 2001, p. 4 (online).

  10 “Everyone who had entered …”: Mayer (2009), Chapter 1 (Kindle edition).

  11 “when the White House sensor …”: Ibid.

  12 “had convinced the President …”: Ibid.

  13 On 29 October Cheney literally: Ibid.

  14 “Officials who worked …”: Ibid.

  15 A story about Lundgren … next day: Rick Weiss and David Brown, “Inhalational Anthrax Is Suspected in Conn. Woman,” Washington Post, 21 Nov. 2001, p. A01.

  16 He probably discussed it with Cheney: Woodward (2004), p. 4.

  17 “I think the seminal event …”: Weisberg (2008), p. 191.

  18 “cut and run early”: Quoted in Weisberg (2008), p. xvii.

  19 “The key thought about this …”: Quoted in Woodward (2004), p. 34.

  20 “Since the end of the Gulf War …”: Alfonsi (2006), pp. 385–86.

  21 “Saddam Hussein agreed …”: Quoted in Jim Lobe, “Baghdad Veers Back into Washington’s Crosshairs,” Taiwan Economic News, 4 Dec. 2001 (online).

  22 “axis of evil”: “The President’s State of the Union Address,” 29 Jan. 2002 (online).

  23 “From what she said …”: Memorandum, David Manning to Tony Blair, 14 Mar. 2002 (online).

  24 The New York Times … interior: Patrick E. Tyler with John Tagliabue, “Czechs Confirm Iraqi Agent Met with Terror Ringleader,” New York Times, 27 Oct. 2001 (online).

  25 Václav Havel, had called White House: Frank Rich time line (online).

  26 “3. The Iraq regime …”: Jack Straw to Tony Blair, 25 Mar. 2002 (online).

  27 “The truth is … that for reasons …”: U.S. Department of Defense news transcript, “Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with Sam Tanenhaus, Vanity Fair” (online).

  28 “a perceptible shift in attitude …”: “The Secret Downing Street Memo,” Sunday Times (London), 1 May 2005 (www.timesonline.co.uk).

  29 “It seemed clear that Bush …”: Ibid.

  30 “We know that in the last four years …”: CNN Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer: Interview with Condoleezza Rice, aired 8 Sept. 2002, CNN.com transcript (online).

  31 Bush built … Cincinnati, Ohio: Remarks by the president on Iraq, Cincinnati, Ohio, 7 Oct. 2002 (online).

  32 “Referring to the sentence …”: U.S. Select Committee on Intelligence (2004), pp. 56–57.

  33 “a report purporting to be …”: Wilson (2005), p. 14.

  34 “Niger had not actually …”: Ibid., p. 15.

  35 The first information … true: Ibid., p. 21.

  36 “but only COGEMA …”: Ibid., p. 23.

  37 “would have been absolutely …”: Ibid., p. 24.

  38 “The British government …”: “Transcript of the State of the Union, Part 8: Iraq,” CNN.com, 29 Jan. 2003.

  39 “Baghdad offered to let …”: Prados (2004), p. 27.

  40 “gave the impression of a solid …”: Blix (2004), p. 86.

  41 “He explained to us that the U.S.…”: Ibid.

  42 “immediate, unconditional and active …”: Ibid., p. 89.

  43 “We counted on keeping …”: Ibid., p. 90.

  44 “Should we expand …”: Hans Blix, “Introduction to the 11th Session of the College of Commissioners/Notes for the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Dr. Hans Blix/New York, 26 November 2002.” Hans Blix, personal communication.

  45 “What we came to discover …”: Blix (2004), p. 93.

  46 George Tenet … “The Case”: Woodward (2004), pp. 247–49.

  47 “Bush turned to Tenet …”: Ibid., p. 249.

  48 “Why We Know Iraq Is Lying”: Condoleezza Rice, New York Times op-ed, 23 Jan. 2003.

  49 Bush then calmly … Saddam Hussein: Reported by David Manning, chief foreign policy adviser, in a memo to Tony Blair. Frank Rich time line, pp. 26–27.

  50 “How much, if any, is left …”: Hans Blix, “Briefing of the Security Council, 14 February 2003” (online at IAEA.org).

  51 “the first case of a war …”: Hans Blix, “Notes for introduction to a seminar in Stockholm, 5 April 2003,” p. 6. Hans Blix, personal communication.

  52 “It is hard to resist the reflection …”: Hans Blix, “The UN, Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Use of Force—The View of a Nordic Lawyer,” Riga Graduate School of Law, 20 May 2005, p. 11. Hans Blix, personal communication.

  53 “spend[ing] several sessions …”: FBI Interview Session 00, Saddam Hussein, 21 March 2004, p. 5 (online at National Security Archive).

  54 “Even though Hussein claimed …”: FBI Interview Session 24, Saddam Hussein, 11 June 2004, p. 2 (online at National Security Archive).

  55 “that when it was clear that …”: Ibid., pp. 3–4.

  56 “To conclude, we have to date …”: Mohamed ElBaradei, “The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq,” statement to the United Nations Security Council, New York, 27 Jan. 2003, p. 6 (online at www.IAEA.org).

  57 “Cheney had absorbed two …”: Alfonsi (2006), pp. 394–95.

  58 Joseph Stiglitz … 2007 dollars: Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes, “The three trillion dollar war,” Timesonline, 23 Feb. 2008.

  59 “After the war …”: Hans Blix interview, 2004.

  SIXTEEN THE TWILIGHT OF THE BOMBS

  1 Yet despite … fewer than 10.): Federation of American Scientists (online).

  2 “By way of comparison …”: Schwartz and Choubey (2009), pp. 6–7.

  3 “waiting … to retaliate …”: Mazarr (1999), p. 1.

  4 “the administration’s leadership …”: Linton Brooks interview, 2007. All Linton Brooks quotations in this chapter come from this source unless otherwise attributed.

  5 “The more than 10,000 warheads …”: Stephen Schwartz, “Letter to the Editor: Nuclear deterrence,” Washington Times, 12 Feb. 2009.

  6 “technical problems facing a nation …”: Frank (1967), p. v.

  7 “The goal of the participants …”: quoted in Oliver Burkeman, “How Two Students Built an A-bomb,” www.Guardian.co.uk, 24 June 2003, p. 4.

  8 “Can terrorists build nuclear weapons?”: Mark et al. (1987) (online).

  9 John Mueller … extremely unlikely: See Mueller (2009).

  10 “the atomic terrorist”: Ibid.

  11 as Mueller … seem to think: Ibid., p. 6: “Because of the dangers and difficulties of transporting and working with plutonium, a dedicated terrorist group, it is generally further agreed, would choose to try to use highly enriched uranium.”

  12 “or even a year”: Ibid., p. 9.

  13 “daunting problems associated …”: Quoted in ibid.

  14 John McPhee … The Curve of Binding Energy: McPhee (1974).

  15 “A small group of people …”: Quoted in Bunn and Wier (2004), p. 20.

  16 “Setting off a nuclear explosion …”: Ibid.

  17 “asked the three U.S. nuclear …”: Ibid., pp. 20–21.

  18 “U.S. nuclear policies remain …”: Daalder and Lodal (2008), pp. 80–81.

  19 “It was identified by …”: Richard Butler, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California, 2008.

  20 “The article was about …”: Richard Butler, telephone interview, 2009.

  21 “to propose practical steps …”: Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Aug. 1996 (online), p. 3. Hereafter Canberra Commission report.

  22 “They were an extremely interesting …”: Richard Butler interview, 2009.

  23 “As long as others have …”: Robert Gates, “Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in the 21st Century,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 28 Oct. 2008 (online).

  24 “We must face the fact …”: Quoted in Sloan (1983), p. 57.

  25 “Effective verification is critical …”: Canberra Commission report, p. 13.

  26 “What about rogues …”: Richard Butler, telephone interview, 2009.

  27 Monitoring for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: See Clery (2009).

  28 “its executive council …”: Ibid., p. 385.

  29 “weapons of precise destruction”: See David Blair, “How to Defeat the United States: The Operational Military Effects of the Proliferation of Weapons of Precise Destruction,” in Sokolski (1996), Chapter 4.

  30 “It is absurd to look upon …”: Elliot (1972), pp. 5–6.

  31 “Our societies are dedicated …”: Ibid., p. 8.

  32 “[I do not wish] to claim …”: Ibid., pp. 8–9.

  33 “In fact, the manner …”: Ibid., p. 10.

  34 “The reduction of the death …”: Quoted in Rosen (1958), p. 440.

  35 “Perhaps everything terrible …”: Rilke (1984), Letter Eight.

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