The Eagles of Bastogne, page 27
At the beginning of the New Year, 1 January 1945, the Battalion was still in position about a thousand yards north and west of Bastogne. The 101st Airborne Division was defending the city and the Battalion was attached to the Division in General Support. The Third Army was gradually widening the corridor in the south, the Division sector was being reduced and operations were daily becoming more normal. The enemy was still launching probing attacks from three sides, but he did not succeed in making any penetrations. The Battalion was shooting harassing and interdiction missions as well as observed targets of opportunity. Considerable harassing fire was landing in the Battalion area and although some of it was heavy caliber, casualties were few.
Hitler gave orders to launch Operation Nordwind on December 31. According to reports, the entire area to the south of Bastogne was covered in thick fog when the attack commenced. The Americans were well dug in and had occupied some Maginot Line bunkers that were still intact. The Germans were ill informed and poorly prepared from the start; they had neither location maps nor knowledge of these bunkers. Moreover, they hadn’t conducted any serious reconnaissance and were lacking concerted artillery support. More importantly, they didn’t have enough boots on the ground at any given time to affect any serious breaches in the American Seventh Army and French 1st Army lines, although they did make a temporary 10-mile indentation in the American line. The only real result of this abortive offensive was the terrible collateral damage it inflicted on those centuries-old villages in the area, which were reduced to ruins, killing innumerable innocent civilians.
The initial purpose of this offensive, led by three corps of Army Group G, belonging to the German 1st Army, was overly ambitious from the offset, and although it was intended to weaken VI Corps, there was never any significant danger that it would draw Gen. George Patton’s forces away from their positions in the Ardennes. After the Normandy breakout, Patton had initially placed his Third Army in the Alsace–Elzas area because he suspected that, if the Germans were going to launch a counteroffensive, this is where it would occur. It’s true that this area was the location of the first attacks during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, and it was heavily contested in World War I, but the general got it wrong on this occasion. Being an avid student of history, he should have known the Germans attacked through the Ardennes in 1870, 1914 and 1940.
The Battle of the Bulge witnessed the final serious air attack by what remained of the Luftwaffe. Reich Marshal Hermann Göring had promised Hitler 3,000 aircraft to provide support for the initial counteroffensive, but at that stage of the war he knew full well he had neither the machines nor the pilots.
General Dietrich Peltz, commander of Jagdkorps II, received instructions to execute an aerial attack with all available aircraft, codenamed Operation Bodenplatte, or “Baseplate.” The target was Allied airfields and the purpose was to create conditions that would level the playing field aeronautically. The plan for the attack was to take British and American airfields by surprise. The by now traditional radio silence was to be observed for all German fighter formations that would fly at tree-top level to avoid detection.
The attack began just before sunrise on January 1, 1945, while the Allies were nursing massive hangovers after celebrating New Year’s Day. German aircraft attacked 27 Anglo-American bases in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands in combined groups of between 50 to 70 aircraft. The first wave caused considerable destruction and devastation as they swooped in on airstrips and fuel depots. Allied command reported losses were significant: 200 aircraft destroyed on the ground and 400 damaged. These aircraft were rapidly replaced.
The main problem the Germans encountered was due to the unavoidable use of inexperienced pilots; around 200 of their aircraft were shot out of the sky by Allied fighters and antiaircraft defenses. Although Bodenplatte could be considered a tactical success, it accentuated a major strategic failure, further reducing the resources of an already decimated Luftwaffe. It was an effective strike, but it was too little too late to affect the inevitable outcome.
Bodenplatte was bad indeed but, on the ground, Patton’s reinforcements had provided some relief for the embattled paratroopers and supporting units, but they also brought news of terrible German atrocities perpetrated by the SS on the northern shoulder. One story claimed the Germans were murdering American prisoners of war. This had happened on December 17 just east of the Belgian town of Malmedy in the north, at a diminutive farming village called Baugnez, but, as with all bad news, the numbers increased exponentially every time the story was retold and disseminated among the ranks. The 84 men killed soon became 100, then 200. Either way, the news had an understandably adverse effect on some American units, and not just those in the line around Bastogne.
Some troopers from the 82nd Airborne Division operating in the Amblève Valley, facing the wrath of the SS, also on the northern shoulder, made no secret of the fact they didn’t take prisoners. Private First Class Bill Hannigen, H Company, 82nd Airborne, said quite openly, “We didn’t take those SS men prisoner. We were paratroopers, where were we going to put them? We just took them into the woods and finished them off.” The murder of SS prisoners had become commonplace for some American units, but the Germans captured in Chenogne, five miles west of Bastogne, were not SS.
Private First Class John Fague, B Company, 21st Armored Infantry Battalion, 11th Armored Division, went into action with his unit near Chenogne. He described how some German prisoners were executed by GIs from his company:
Some of the boys had prisoners lined up. I knew they were going to shoot them, and I hated that business. They brought the prisoners back to assassinate them with the rest of the prisoners we had taken that morning. As we walked up the hill out of town, some of our boys lined up German prisoners in the fields on both sides of the road. There must have been 25 or 30 German boys in each group. Machine guns were set up as we prepared to commit the same crimes the Germans had been accused of.
I didn’t participate in these murders, but a little time later when I scanned the adjacent fields where the German boys had been killed I saw bloodied, lifeless forms lying prostrate in the snow.
The victims were identified as soldiers from the Führer-Begleit-Brigade (Führer Escort Brigade) and the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division. Eisenhower was informed sometime later and ordered an investigation, but the incident was conveniently erased from the records; by the time the war had concluded, most of the perpetrators had scattered to the four winds. Hence, no arrests were ever made, and no trial ever transpired. But another detail emerged from American soldiers taken prisoner during the Battle of the Bulge, indicating those of the Jewish persuasion were being singled out and separated from their comrades. They would receive very different treatment than their fellow soldiers. Prisoners of war would become “slave labor” as they were sent to Nazi labor camps and subjected to horrendous, inhumane treatment by their captors. Two of the GIs who were part of an 11th Armored tank crew suffered this fate.
In the corner of the main square (Place McAuliffe) in Bastogne, there’s a lone Sherman tank with “Barracuda” written on the side; it belonged to the 11th Armored Division. Combat Command B of the 11th Armored successfully liberated the villages of Lavasalle and Houmont but suffered significant casualties. Early in the engagement, Barracuda, under the command of S/Sgt. Wallace Alexander, and a companion tank commanded by Capt. Robert L. Ameno, became separated from the rest of the company. They moved north into enemy held terrain, approaching the village of Renuamont, the command post of Col. Otto Ernst Remer, commander of Hitler’s elite Führer-Begleit-Brigade. After being discovered by an astounded Col. Remer himself, they came under attack.
While attempting to turn and escape, Barracuda became mired in a snow-and-ice covered pond. It became a sitting duck for German tanks and panzerfaust (bazooka) fire. Alexander was mortally wounded; gunner Cpl. Cecil Peterman and loader Pfc. Dage Herbert were wounded and captured. Driver T/4 Andrew Urda and bow gunner Pfc. Ivan Goldstein were uninjured but also captured. Alexander died several days later in captivity. Peterman and Herbert received minimal treatment for their wounds, survived, and were incarcerated as prisoners of war in Stalag XIIA near Limburg, Germany. Urda and Goldstein also eventually made it to Stalag XIIA, but only after being treated as slave laborers. Goldstein had been identified as Jewish by his dog tags, and by a letter in his pocket from his mother reminding him to observe the Jewish holiday, Hanukkah. Goldstein and Urda had already made a pact, vowing to stay together in captivity. They narrowly escaped execution but were brutally overworked and starved. After their liberation near the end of the war, the two severely emaciated captives spent many months recovering in U.S. Army hospitals. Andrew Urda never fully recovered from his mistreatment in captivity. He died in 1979. Ivan Goldstein’s health was eventually restored. He eventually settled in Jerusalem. Captain Ameno’s tank was also destroyed, killing the crew. One of them was wounded but died in captivity a short time later.1
Out west, in support of the British 53rd (Welsh) Infantry Division, low-flying fighter planes were strafing the 2nd Panzer Division in the area between Hotton and Marche. Simultaneously, the American 2nd Armored Division was arriving from the north and hitting the same Germans in the flank, who would be decimated. Meanwhile, in Bastogne, the new year got off to a resounding start. At noon, all American artillery units lashed out at German positions with the most powerful artillery barrage to date.
Clear weather on New Year’s Day allowed P-47 Thunderbolt fighter-bombers to provide effective air support by strafing German positions with devastating effect throughout the day. Some pilots said it was like a turkey shoot. Now that all the commanding officers had collectively concurred Bastogne had been secured, over the coming days, Allied military strategy in the Ardennes moved from the defensive to the offensive. The first orders issued to 506th PIR were to clear the Bois Jacques, north of Bastogne between the villages of Foy and Bizory.
The German 5th Army’s Gen. Hasso von Manteuffel was sounding pessimistic when he wrote in his diary:
The German 2nd Panzer Division covered almost a hundred kilometers in a week, but although they didn’t reach the River Meuse, on Christmas Day 1944 they were within 6 kilometers of their target. Three days earlier, Patton had begun his advance against the German left flank, which culminated in the raising of the siege on the afternoon of December 26. Allied High Command had been initially taken by surprise by the German offensive, but now they said that German Army Group B no longer posed a strategic threat. When the weather was conducive to Allied air forces, they orchestrated massive aerial bombardment and destroyed the German supply lines on the left bank of the Rhine in massive attacks. It has to be said that before the new year dawned Rundstedt’s armies were a spent force.
Many of the soldiers serving under General von Manteuffel would have worn belts with metal belt buckles inscribed with “Gott Mit Uns” (God with Us) and the Swastika in the center. World War II challenged the beliefs of many people, but there were those whose faith was unshakeable. One of those was Father François L. Sampson.
One of the most revered and respected officers of the 101st Airborne Division was a man of the cloth. Regimental Chaplain François Sampson, better known as “Father Sam,” made his first combat jump in Normandy, which saw him land in the middle of a flooded canal. Fumbling for his knife, he was able to free himself from his pack, but still could have drowned had it not been for a divine gust of wind filling his still-attached parachute, which pulled him to the canal bank. Then he repeatedly dove back into the canal to retrieve the tools of his trade, a mass kit and holy oils. He told one of his comrades that he was just unlucky when it came to jumping, “If I jumped into a desert, I’d probably land on a camel’s hump.”
When war reached the United States, Father Sampson was granted permission to join the Chaplain Corps of the U.S. Army. After enduring the harsh rigors of training, he volunteered for the Airborne, though he later admitted he did not know in advance that he would be required to jump. He was assigned to the 501st PIR as the regimental chaplain.
He was captured, while tending some wounded paratroopers during the Battle of the Bulge, and sent to a prison camp in Germany where he spent six days in an overcrowded boxcar, sustained only by snow scraped from the top of the train. At his own request, Father Sampson was confined with the enlisted men, rather than the officers. James D. Alger, a fellow prisoner who later became a lieutenant general, said, “Father Sampson’s misfortune in being captured turned out to be a blessing for the men he served in Stalag II-A [sic]. God knew he was sorely needed there.”
The 1st Battalion, 506th PIR, was being kept in reserve in the village of Savy until it was requested to provide cover for the 2nd Battalion about a mile away on the Foy–Bizory road. When the column reached Luzery, on the Bastogne–Houffalize road, it was strafed by around a dozen German aircraft. At about the same time, the remnants of Team Cherry and the 327th GIR’s F Company prepared to attack Senonchamps. They once again displayed tremendous cooperation and cohesion. The 506th’s 2nd Battalion attacked Foy but was repulsed after experiencing some stubborn resistance.
Field Marshal Walter Model presented a plan to Hitler that would, in his opinion, put the final nail in the coffin and capture Bastogne; the 9th and 12th SS Panzer Divisions (Hitler Youth) would strike from the north-east, and the Führer Grenadier Brigade from due east. Hitler readily agreed to this audacious plan, but no consideration was given to the terrible weather hitting the area at the time. Regardless, it was “Game on” again.
1Information from http://www.11tharmoreddivision.com/news/barracuda/index.htm, accessed January 10, 2024.
Chapter nineteen
The Seminal Month
There was a first sergeant that got killed by a 50 caliber bullet, by our own P-51s. One of them was still in his chest. We were that close together you know, the Germans and us.
al mampre, medic, e company, 2nd battalion,
506th parachute infantry regiment
Sources indicate that, by December 30, Gen. Anthony McAuliffe had left Bastogne and was in Luxembourg, awaiting his next assignment, which would be commanding general of the 103rd Infantry Division. He would return to Bastogne in time but only for ceremonial purposes.
By January, it must have been overtly apparent to all that Hitler’s strategy for reaching Antwerp had been an abject failure and all that was left was a “limited objective strategy” designed to inflict as much damage as possible before the inevitable retreat. Bastogne had assumed a significance disproportionate to its actual military importance because of the powerful Allied propaganda generated by the siege and ensuing battles to facilitate its capture. Inside the perimeter, it represented and encapsulated a strategic microclimate, a pervasive spirit of defiance, and ultimately great courage, that affected absolutely everyone who was there.
January was going to be a seminal month in the history of the city where seven roads converged, and the 3rd was going to be a day of frenetic activity as the Germans attempted to dislodge the defenders for the umpteenth time. Some of the American soldiers would come to regard this as the toughest day yet, and those who had experienced the full brunt of the siege would concur. The 327th Glider Infantry Regiment’s (GIR) S-3 (operations) journal for January 1945 read:
First Battalion patrols reconnoitred [sic] the main road to Mande St. Etienne on 3 January and reported it clear of enemy. At 1330 hours the First Battalion began a movement to relieve the First Battalion, 502d Parachute Infantry at Champs. Strong enemy pressure here and at Longchamps where a tank and infantry attack was launched by the 10th S Panzer Division at 1400 hours delayed completion of the relief until 2000 hours. The Second Battalion was attached to the 502d Parachute Infantry at 1410 hours and close into its assembly area at 533610 at 1630 hours. At 1530 hours this Regiment became part of a Task Force commanded by Brigadier General Higgins.
A heavy barrage fell on First Battalion positions beginning at 0430 hours on 4 January. At 0500 hours the enemy launched a regimental strength attack striking at both flanks and at the center of the First Battalion. The enemy unit, later identified as the 104 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 15 Panzer Division, was preceded by an estimated total of eleven S.P. guns and tanks. Four tanks with infantry in support broke through in the vicinity of 514620 and drove to within 100 yards of the Battalion Command Post in Champs. Furious fighting continued until about 0845 hours.
Sometime around noon, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) began to advance through Bois Jacques to eradicate any German opposition. Meanwhile, covering the right flank, the 3rd Battalion moved out, supported by the 50th Armored Infantry Battalion, 5th Armored Division. They encountered heavy German resistance from the outset but continued to advance. At the same time, the 2nd Battalion progressed deep into the woods almost unimpeded. About an hour later, D and F Companies reached their target astride the Foy–Michamps road. Once there, they established a roadblock at the Bastogne–Bourcy railroad line that runs almost parallel to the road. Twenty minutes later, Sgt. Lawrence J. Silva, D Company, 502nd PIR, called the regimental command post to let it know he’d spotted around 20 tanks heading in his direction. Sadly, it would be his valedictory message because, moments later, he was crushed to death by a German tank in his foxhole.
The 502nd was still covering a line that extended south-west from Longchamps, through Champs to as far as Recogne, when an attack by what remained of the German 9th and 12th SS Divisions hit its positions hard. Recogne lies in a natural valley, covered by dense mist at the time, making it difficult for the defenders to determine the nature and strength of the opposition. This was very much a “déjà vu” situation for the Americans, who were largely unprepared when the assault commenced, but they quickly rallied and stepped up to do the job. They estimated they were being attacked by about 35 Mark IV tanks followed by a quite widely dispersed company of grenadiers. The 506th PIR war diary attests to the severity of the combat, with the entry for January 3, reading:
