Operation Menace, page 3
At 1400 Cunningham, Irwin and de Gaulle gathered yet again to discuss what to do. It was now clear that the defences of Dakar had been badly underestimated. De Gaulle suggested an alternative strategy. Small parties of Free French troops would land at lightly defended positions along the coast and march on Dakar overland, whilst the fleet blockaded the harbour. The only alternative was to abandon the expedition. The British commanders thought that no landing could be feasible while Richelieu and the Force Y cruisers were active, but they were equally chary of abandoning the long prepared operation. They therefore decided, independently and without the general’s knowledge, to resume bombardment of the defences on the 25th if the conditions were favourable.
In the meantime they resorted to air attack with a strike against the Vichy cruisers. Nine Swordfish, escorted by three Skuas, made a low-level torpedo run at around 1530. The French were caught by surprise, but by good evasive action avoided all the torpedoes fired at them. Two of the Swordfish were lost, although the crews were safely picked up by British destroyers.
September 25th.
The new day dawned bright and hopeful for the Allies. The weather had cleared and visibility was extremely good. Even news of Vichy reprisals the previous day only added to the sense of determination. Boisson had kept the government he served will informed of developments. They backed his actions unequivocally, and decided that a forceful expression of French displeasure was needed in addition to the denouncements of the British and de Gaulle they had made to the world’s press. Late in the afternoon of September 24th a high altitude retaliatory raid was conducted against Gibraltar by about forty bombers from French bases in Algiers. It was not pressed very hard and little damage was done.
The British battleships moved to their bombardment positions approximately 21,000 yards from Dakar, using their Walrus seaplanes to direct fall of shot. Seeing their stately progress the French decided to pre-empt them. At around 0900 Richelieu opened fire at 23,000 yards, and the British, rather startled, returned fire almost simultaneously. Richelieu, being kept clear of the jetty by tugs, was almost immediately hit by a 15" shell from Barham. Flames spurted up, but were quickly brought under control, and Barham's Walrus was shot down. The British ships continued to close to their prearranged gun line, but this took them into the sights of the last Vichy submarine, Beveziers, which had been cunningly positioned by Admiral Landriau.
Captain Lancelot of the Beveziers had exercised continuously with the British before the armistice and was familiar with their methods. He recognised the signal to turn onto the gun line and, in spite of being detected and heavily attacked, fired a full spread of torpedoes at Resolution as she reached the turning point, hitting her once amidships. The battleship immediately listed heavily to port and lost all power, and Inglefield and Foresight were ordered to screen her with smoke.
It was a sweet moment for Vichy, for Resolution had played a major part in the attack on Oran. Without her Cunningham's force was outgunned by the Vichy defences, but they persisted for a few minutes yet. Barham took on the Richelieu alone, while Australia engaged the French cruisers and Devonshire shot at the forts. In a twenty minute gun duel Barham was hit once and Australia twice. It was now plain to Cunningham that the defences were too strong to be overcome without sustaining unacceptable levels of damage, and so he decided to abandon the operation. The British ceased fire at 0912 and drew off. At 0918 French fighters shot down Australia's Walrus plane. The British headed south, covering Resolution. At 0940 and 0950 Martin bombers from Ouakam made high altitude attacks on her, and in fact she was fortunate not to be hit again.
The ultimate irony.
But Cunningham had pulled out too early. If he had held on for just a few minutes longer the prize for which so much blood had been spilled and so much damage had been suffered would have been his. Unknown to the British and Free French Boisson was writing out Dakar's surrender just as Cunningham’s fleet turned away. The garrison had almost expended their ammunition, but because of the withdrawal of the battleships the note was never sent. As the dejected Allied fleet withdrew southwards for the last time, they were not to know that they had missed victory by a matter of minutes. The war cabinet in London approved the decision to abandon “Menace” a few hours later. Barham took Resolution in tow, and the entire force retired to Freetown.
Meanwhile Vichy continued its reprisal actions against Gibraltar. During the night a naval foray of four destroyers was made from Casablanca, and later on the 25th another, larger, air raid was made. Nearly one hundred aircraft bombed the rock, although without any great vigour, many bombs landing in the water. Two Martin bombers were shot down, and both sides tacitly called it quits.
Aftermath.
Politically Dakar was a heavy Allied setback. It was apparent that the garrison had chosen Vichy above Free France, and Vichy propaganda made sure everyone knew as well. The failure to seize the port was a blow to British and especially Royal Navy prestige, at a time when both the will and ability to stand alone against the Germans was being severely questioned. The Americans were particularly disappointed. Dakar in Axis hands endangered their security too, as it bypassed the main British naval bases that otherwise blocked Germany and Italy from the Atlantic.
The failure of operation "Menace" was primarily down to faulty intelligence, both of the physical defences of Dakar and the morale of the garrison. Although there had been some indiscipline amongst French naval reservists in July 1940, this had mostly been about service conditions, not dissatisfaction with Vichy policy. In August Darlan sent Landriau to restore efficiency and discipline, a task in which he succeeded only too well. The operation itself was hastily and sketchily drawn up, and its timetable disrupted by delays and changes of plan. The unseasonable weather limited the effect of the fleet. The unexpected arrival of Vichy reinforcements on top of all that ended any hope of success.
There were some positive results for the Allies from the debacle at Dakar. The Vichy squadron never reached equatorial Africa, and so de Gaulle was able to subsequently land at Duala and rally the French African colonies. More importantly, France's ability to defend it's colonies had been proven, and provided Vichy with the ammunition they needed to forestall German attempts to intervene in colonial affairs. Finally the Allies learnt a great many useful lessons about amphibious operations, which were to stand them in good stead in the future.
On the military side, no British ship was lost during "Menace", but several were very badly damaged. Cumberland was out of service for two weeks, Fiji for six months and Resolution for a whole year. Several other ships sustained lesser damage and at least twelve aircraft were lost. Happily there were less than fifty casualties. Upon reaching Freetown, the fleet dispersed to other duties.
The Vichy French had lost two destroyers and two submarines. There was also damage done to both Richelieu and the coastal forts. This was particularly serious as the facilities at Dakar were such that repairs to damage of this nature were very difficult to make. French personnel losses are unknown. They were certainly higher than Allied casualties but were nevertheless still quite light.
The destroyer L'Audacieux, beached at Rufisque, was subsequently refloated and towed to Bizerta for repairs, which took nearly two years to complete. She was destroyed by the USAAF in early 1943.
Captain Lancelot and the crew of the Beveziers were lauded as heroes in France. The good captain survived to fight for the Allies later on in the war.
Richelieu took nearly a year to repair. She remained at Dakar up until the Torch landings in November of 1942 when the port and all its resources joined the Allied cause. She was refitted in America, and then served, in succession, the Mediterranean fleet, the Home fleet and finally the Eastern fleet, in all of which she made a very good impression.
Bibliography.
“The Guns of Dakar”, by J. Williams. Published by William Heineman Ltd, London, 1976.
“The Second World War, Volume II”, by W. S. Churchill. Published by Cassel & Co. Ltd, 1949.
“De Gaulle, by B. Ledwidge. Published by Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd, London, 1982.
“De Gaulle”, by A. Crawley. Published by Collins Ltd, London, 1969.
“De Gaulle. The Warrior”, by B. Crozier. Published by Eyre Methuen Ltd, London, 1973.
“Ships of the Royal Navy, Vol 1 & 2”, by J. J. Colledge. Published by Daniel & Charles, Newton Abbot, 1969.
“The War at Sea, 1939-1945 Volume 1”, by S. W. Roskill. Published by H.M.S.O., London, 1954.
“Warship losses of World War Two”, by D. Brown. Published by Arms and Armour Press, London, 1990.
“Battle Summary No. 20, Naval Operations off Dakar”, H.M.S.O.
Martin Bourne, Operation Menace
