The Next Development in Man, page 3
We are now confronted with a peculiar difficulty. We have formulated a problem of organic integration, but there is no recognized method with which it can be attacked. There does not as yet exist any intellectual method or system of thought for treating the integration of organic systems. Experimental biology has insufficient evidence of the way in which organic processes are co-ordinated and theoretical biology has no method appropriate to the problem. For more than two thousand years thought has mainly relied on methods of thought which assume that the apparent confusion of natural processes must be reduced to order by analyzing from every process component parts which are permanent and unchanging. From long habit thought tends to beg the question, and to assume the necessity of this demand for static parts as the ultimate elements of structure. The structure of an organism has then to be regarded as an assembly of such parts, and the fact of integration, being denied at the start, becomes an insoluble problem. This difficulty must sooner or later be resolved by a more general scientific method reconciling two sets of facts: those which have been successfully described in terms of independent and relatively static atoms, tissues, or organs, and their changing relations, and those other facts connected with the development of organic form which are covered by the term integration. But we cannot wait for that authoritative reconciliation, and must proceed without it.
There is a method by which the most stubborn problem can be overcome, if one is ready to pay the price. Goethe expressed it by saying that "the greatest art in theoretical and practical life consists in changing the problem into a postulate; that way one succeeds." The art lies in seeing the problem to have been the result of an unsuitable approach and in transforming the system 0f thought so that new vistas are opened up and new facts brought within its scope. Our problem is the description, in terms of component parts, of the fact of integration. This problem is insoluble within the frame of contemporary scientific thought. The fact of integration, i.e. the development of organic form, is certain. It is equally certain that this fact can never be explained by a system of thought which is based on the assumption that the ultimate elements of structure are permanent, static, independent parts. Only one possibility remains: since the analytical method cannot account for the fact of integration, a new method must be tried which starts from this fact and uses it to explain the apparent existence of static parts. The problem of integration is converted into the postulate of integration. But the development of organic form must be treated as a special case of the development of form in general, including inorganic form. The postulate of the new form of thought is therefore:
Process consists in the development of form, when circumstances
permit. This fact must be represented in the general form of natural
law and does not require explanation.
I shall call this the unitary postulate and method, thereby distinguishing it from what I call the analytical method, which assumes the existence of static, permanent, component parts. Unitary thought is a special form of monism, which discovers the unity of nature in one universal process. The unitary postulate asserts that thought has to proceed by recognizing the general form of process, and using it to account for details of structure, in contrast to the analytical method which implicitly assumes the reality of permanent particles of substance or the like and then seeks to explain the existence and development of form. On the unitary view the development of form is the primary characteristic of all natural processes and must be represented in the general form of all thought. The development of form is not postulated as an arbitrary choice by unitary thought, but is implicit in the form of its basic concepts. But this system of thought has then to be applied to account for the frequent failure of integration and destruction of form, and for the cumulative success of the analytical method.
The concept of substance has failed to account for form; a concept of the development of form has now to account for the partial success of the concept of substance.
For certain purposes the two methods may be regarded as complementary methods of research appropriate to the representation of complementary aspects of nature. The analytical method studies permanence and conservation, the unitary method development. But this dualism can only be provisional; the two methods are mutually exclusive, and nothing is gained from the unitary method if at the outset it discards the demand for unity. I assert the truth of the unitary postulate. The analytical method has to its credit the cumulative achievements of more than two thousand years of thought and experiment, yet it cannot account for the development of form. It was developed first because, as we shall see, it corresponded to the structure of thought during one stage of the development of the mind. But the unitary method is logically the more general and as yet almost untried. It is possible that the unitary method can, owing to its greater generality, account for the success of the analytical method, while the reverse is not possible. Moreover I assert, though I cannot justify it here, that the unitary postulate represents the minimum that is presupposed in the use of reason; it is the irreducible assumption necessary to make the real rational.
The unitary postulate is the appropriate expression today of the unending search for unity in diversity. It seeks to go to the root of all confusions, and by bringing logic into conformity with experienced fact to form a cosmos from chaos. It provides the basis of a complete system of thought, not of static categories abstracted from nature, but in conformity with the system of natural processes of which thought itself is part. Moreover, as we shall see, it is adapted, as was the analytical method, for use by a particular kind of man living a particular mode of life. The unitary postulate is not one of several possible methods of equal status. It is the only method which is now appropriate; it is as necessary to contemporary man as the assumption of the quantitative space-time frame was to Cartesian man.
The postulate undercuts assumptions implicit in much of the thought of recent centuries. If the universal form of process displays the asymmetry between earlier and later states which is implied in the development of form, then all philosophical and scientific terms have to be reconsidered. None of the philosophical arguments which assume static concepts can challenge the unitary postulate on its own ground. If such conceptions as causality, teleology, perception, knowledge, and truth are to be retained in unitary thought, their meanings must undergo modification.
It might be thought that so general a postulate could have little bearing on the problems of the contemporary world. The moments are rare when speculative generalizations can throw light on the complex processes of society. This is only possible when new forms in process of development which impose themselves on the thought of individuals are so far in advance of the recognized methods of thought that they appear to be mere speculation. If the unitary postulate appears to be arbitrary speculation then this is one of those rare moments. On similar occasions in the past a new religious, political, or economic conception gave man a novel view of himself which facilitated his further development. Today a postulate concerning nature as a whole can provide man with a conception of himself as part of nature and hence also with an interpretation of his present condition. The present confusion in knowledge and behavior is closely related to the deep-lying errors of analytical thought. Ideas are never the sole cause of social changes, but thought is part of the social process and may facilitate or inhibit its development. Analytical thought was appropriate to a stage of development which is now over, or will be as soon as the unitary method is adequately formulated and applied. That, at least, is my argument. I can see no alternative to the unitary postulate which can rival either its potential power or its timeliness. The proper formulation and general application of unitary thought may prove to be one of the necessary conditions for the reorganization of knowledge and of society which must follow the failure of the West.
So long as integration remains merely an unsolved problem of analytical thought it is impossible to discover the reason for the partial failure of integration in civilized man. But if the tendency of systems to develop their characteristic forms is treated as the expression of a normal property of natural processes, then it may be possible to find the reason for its failure in particular cases. Our approach to the diagnosis of contemporary man therefore takes the following shape: we assume that the tendency to develop form is universal, that organic integration is an expression of this general tendency, that the development of society is a process continuous with organic nature and the animal world, and that the partial failure of integration in contemporary civilized man is a process requiring special explanation.
There are many dangers in the use of a unitary system of thought based on a conception of development. Systems which deny ultimate dualism tend to neglect the complexity of fact. Dualistic modes of thought have the advantage of automatically providing means for expressing the subtle antitheses and polarities which refute every crude simplification. A unitary system can only be safeguarded against over-simplification, and can only provide a reliable approach to human nature, if its central principle is one which invites caution, always stimulates consideration of the complementary thesis, and denies the ultimate validity of all sharp categories. We shall see that these conditions are satisfied by the unitary method.
But a more serious danger awaiting any general philosophy of development is the opportunity it offers for facile misinterpretation as an optimistic doctrine of moral progress. It may seem improbable, as these words are being written, that any such optimism could arise. It may even appear daring to offer a general postulate of development at the moment of Europe's greatest agony. But the more cruel the world, the greater the temptation to escape it in thought, and it is disquieting to consider the intensity of optimism which, failing the proper catharsis of constructive action, may shortly be necessary to deaden the pains that are now scarring the memory of the race. More probable, perhaps, than the rejection of a principle of development is its acclamation as a guarantee of what each individual, chooses to understand by progress. But a concept of development which denies permanence and permits no flattery of the individual as conscious subject is too austere to encourage runaway optimism in those who understand it. The ideas with which we are concerned have no direct relation either to "moral progress," or to any particular system of moral standards. The processes of history cannot be seen in their true shape if approached with moral ideas or ideals. The moments of greatness in the history of a people, as in the life of an individual, are those in which all its processes are fused in a whole-natured action by which it transforms its own situation and outgrows its ideals.
Unitary thought must accompany such a transformation and thereby achieve a vantage point from which it is possible to look back on the history of Europe with greater objectivity and understanding so that a reliable diagnosis of the present becomes possible. This implies an unhesitating step into a new world of thought and a transvaluation of values in which the conception of value is itself transformed. The unitary method demands a price. In denying separation and permanence it robs the rich of the illusion that power can be accumulated and preserved, the adherents of the Christian religion of their assurance of personal survival, and the humanists of their over-emphasis on the subjective aspects of personality. The unitary method helps us to understand Europe because its application implies the appearance of a new type of man who has emancipated himself from the characteristically European prejudices and illusions.
The story of Europe and the West has been richer than that of any other civilization, as is fitting since it is a phase not of a local cycle but of the general development of man. In Europe we see the spirit of man living in this world and yet aspiring; striving to escape the sordid and restricted into the open, free, and generous life; opening its eyes to facts and yet saying yea to life; refusing imprisonment either in the world as it is or in dreams of another world; living and dying for illusions, but achieving greatness; separating the ideal and the real and so impelled to perpetual creation in its desire to recombine them; and finally frustrated because its pride blinded it to the changes proceeding within itself. The European soul was dual, and perpetually aspired to bring together again the ideal and the real which it had separated. This quality of aspiration is as valid a component in the story of Europe as is the setting of sordid frustration from which it sprang, and here again the dualism is inherent in the European psyche. Aspiration and frustration are the complementary facets of the unique quality of Europe. Asia aspired less and therefore experienced less frustration; the New World was less frustrated and therefore aspired less. The impulse to develop which reveals itself in this dual experience of yearning and frustration is Europe's special contribution to the species, the result, we must believe, of its unique geography. My subject is the past and the immediate future of this unique type of man which has left all others behind in the differentiation of his faculties and in the development of knowledge and power. It may be regarded as a study of the development of European man and unitary man, these being both potentially complete types of men, while western man, who represents the transition from one to the other, is a creature of disorganization and unbalance, lacking characteristic integrity.
Though it is not my intention to enter here into the metaphysics or aesthetics of social development, there is one issue which must be faced if we are to approach the story of Europe unhampered by nostalgic regret. The reader who does not love Europe will not understand me; nor will the European who clings to the burden of his sense of loss. The only true European today is one who recognizes that the old values are no longer valid and is occupied in transmuting them within himself so that Europe may find herself again within a new and universal community. Whoever weeps for the old world justifies the gangster who asserts that the spirit of man is effete and the game open to revenge and hate.
When a great ideal has ceased to illuminate the human understanding and has therefore lost its power, man has no choice but to search afresh for some element in the processes of the real world with which he can identify himself. At such a moment men may believe that they have lost something beyond price, for a grand vision has faded into despair and self-assurance given place to the humiliation of man's inability to understand himself. Yet the loss of what has been found to be only a beautiful illusion may leave the way clear for the discovery of a new course of development. There is no persistence in complete despair; when the guiding theme of any field of activity has gone beyond hope, the formative processes immediately begin to shape the new course. The change may have been long prepared, but dominance is single and until the old has gone the new cannot take its place. The change cannot come until neither loyalty to the old nor fear of the new can longer delay it.
Such a transformation is all the more difficult because it seems to require the greater to be exchanged for the less. Each real advance is paid for by aiming at less in order to achieve more. The crucial step cannot be taken until men are ready to choose the less which can be realized in place of the more which had remained a dream. But this apparent narrowing of the aim is illusory and expresses merely a failure of the language of idealism. Aims and ideals represent the demand of man for fixed directions within the course of his development. It may seem that a proud ideal has to be replaced by a humbler, when in fact man may be learning to live without any ideal other than readiness to follow the course proper to his condition. To seek better ideals for the future is to try to measure the new in terms of the old and to prejudice what is still undeveloped. Later stages in the development of man cannot be interpreted through the ideas of earlier times, but thought as it matures can look back and achieve an increasing understanding of the past. In doing so we shall find that the grandeur of Europe sprang from a source that is not yet exhausted. European civilization embraced man's greatest achievements and his ugliest conflicts; its richness and scope were unique. But the tradition has lost its power, and its disorganization has infected the world. This process cannot be understood either as progress or as reaction; better and worse are terms which apply to details within the changing structure and cannot describe the development of the whole.
This book is neither an argument to convince, nor an exhortation to action; as an argument it is far from complete, and unitary action is not furthered by exhortation. It is the assertion of a personal conviction, the manifesto of an irresponsible and self-justifying adventure. But I believe it to be well timed. I have more confidence that these ideas, in so far as I have been able to express them, have been molded by a universal situation than I have in any personal ability to influence men or events. Change is inevitable, and the proper result of an improved understanding of the world is to facilitate those changes which are proper to man's nature. If the unitary method is now appropriate, this formulation, however faulty, will help to do that. In any case I honor Europe's long struggle for the right of the individual to develop his own form of life and thought, and I can help to preserve that right by using it. The expression of a personal conviction is no less proper because every formulation must eventually prove inadequate. What I assert is not the transcendental truth of what follows, but that it is a component of the developing truth, what I can discern of the form of truth which is appropriate to the present condition of man.
