Awaiting MacArthur's Return, page 17
With Leyte secured, the Allied forces turned their attention to liberating Luzon, the largest island of the Philippine archipelago and the location of the national capital, Manila. As a precondition to landing on Luzon, Allied leaders decided to seize Mindoro to establish airbases within fighter and bomber range of the northern part of Luzon. General Krueger assigned the US 24th Infantry Division the mission of seizing Mindoro with the 503rd Parachute Regimental Combat Team in support.26 With 10,000 attacking troops outnumbering the 1,200 defending Japanese, the US troops landed on December 15, 1944, against little opposition, and quickly began establishing airfields to support the landings on Luzon after incurring several hundred Japanese casualties. Guerrillas on the island rendered “substantial assistance” during several Allied landings on the island in January 1945, assisting the clearance of the northwestern side of the island.27 The remaining Japanese fled into the jungles and were gradually engaged and destroyed over the next few months, in many instances by guerrilla units. The example of the Japanese 2nd Provisional Infantry Company of the 359th Independent Infantry Battalion, guarding positions in northeastern Mindoro, is particularly instructive. According to reports from Japanese officers after the war, Allied attacks, largely by guerrilla forces, reduced the company from 188 soldiers to a mere 7 survivors by March 1945.28
Luzon was the most heavily garrisoned island in the Philippines, and on the eve of the US invasion it had 287,000 Japanese troops.29 Many of these units had participated in heavy-handed operations that successfully disrupted Luzon guerrilla forces during much of the Japanese occupation. Nevertheless, by the time US units landed on Luzon on January 9, 1945, several large guerrilla units were operating under the purview of several US and Filipino commanders scattered throughout the island.30 As on other islands, the guerrillas kept SWPA GHQ abreast of Japanese troop strength and dispositions through radio communications, and prepared for combat and sabotage operations against Japanese troops and installations. In particular, Jesus Villamor’s most trusted Manila contact, Lieutenant Colonel Narciso Manzano, provided valuable intelligence in Manila proper, eventually making his way to Sixth Army Headquarters after the landings at Lingayen to give detailed reports on conditions in the capital and later smuggling important municipal employees out of the capital to give intelligence to the Sixth Army.31
Immediately before and following the Allied landings at Lingayen Gulf, guerrilla units sprang into action on a large scale, conducting direct attacks on Japanese troops and installations. A Japanese company commander from the 31st Regiment on Luzon recounted the effectiveness of the guerrillas in December 1944. Near the end of the month, a Japanese detachment operating near Alfonso south of Manila disappeared. Assuming the disappearance was because of guerrilla action, the Japanese sent two infantry platoons to search for their comrades, but these troops found Alfonso completely occupied by guerrillas. Launching an unsuccessful attack against the guerrillas, the Japanese were forced to withdraw without finding their missing soldiers.32 One of the chief logistics officers in the Japanese Fourteenth Area Army noted that attacks by Allied aerial and guerrilla units prevented the movement of supplies necessary to prepare adequate defenses against the advancing units of the US Sixth Army, especially in the area of Clark Field northwest of Manila.33 Guerrilla destruction of key bridges and their planting of land mines along roads were the most disruptive actions to Japanese movements.34 By the summer of 1945, the remaining Japanese on Luzon found themselves short on food, having suffered heavily from Allied attacks, cut off from re-supply, and harassed by increasingly bold guerrilla forces.35
Some of the first guerrillas to make contact with Allied forces advancing from Lingayen Gulf, central Luzon guerrilla units were still not as unified as those in other areas and included those under Major Edwin P. Ramsey in the ECLGA. By this point, Ramsey commanded an estimated 40,000 guerrillas armed with everything from M2 .50-caliber machine guns to swords, but only a quarter could be armed at any one time.36 Also still operating in central Luzon was Major Robert Lapham, commanding the LGAF of 5,000–6,000 guerrillas. Other smaller groups that had survived the occupation included the Hunters ROTC, PQOG, and the 155th Provisional Guerrilla Battalion.37 Additionally, by this time Marking’s Fil-American Yay Regiment, led by Marcos V. Augustin and Yay Panlilio, numbered several thousand guerrillas, while the Huks, the largest and best organized group on central Luzon, were estimated at 10,000 guerrillas including unarmed auxiliaries.38 Although these larger groups in central Luzon were generally effective at undertaking combat operations against the Japanese, one should note that combat effectiveness was not always the rule among guerrillas. In one case, two guerrilla platoons were attached to the US 35th Infantry Regiment while it was clearing areas in the vicinity of Mount Aja northeast of Manila. The platoons, left to guard a part of the Rizal–Patabangan Road, promptly fled when attacked by a small force of Japanese troops, and “the services of the guerilla band were immediately discontinued.”39
Also mainly operating in central Luzon, Chinese guerrillas were divided between a variety of Nationalist and Communist groups, the latter often aligned with the communist Huks. The Nationalist groups included four units: the Chinese Overseas Wartime Hsuehkan Militia (COWHM), the Pekek Squadron (Squadron 399), the Philippine Chinese Youth Wartime Special Services Corps (PCYWSSC), and the Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines (CVP).40 These groups generally operated in smaller units supporting other Filipino groups or US Army units during the liberation. For example, 159 members of the COWHM fought with the US 25th Infantry Division’s 161st Infantry Regiment at Santa Fe and near the Balete Pass in the northern part of Luzon.41
The leftist units, far better organized and unified than their Nationalist counterparts, included the Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Force (Feilubin huaqiao kangri zhidui), normally shortened to Hua Zhi (Wha Chi or Wah Chi), and the Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Corps (Feilubin huaqiao kangri chujian Yiyongdui, PCAJVC), or abbreviated Kang Chu.42 Although generally forming larger units of several hundred guerrillas, the Communist Chinese units operated in conjunction with larger guerrilla groups or US units, as did their Nationalist counterparts. In particular, the Hua Zhi’s 1st Squadron assisted the US 1st Cavalry Division during the liberation, while the 11th Airborne Division had the assistance of the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons.43 They offered smaller contributions than the largely Filipino and US groups, but the ethnic Chinese involvement in the resistance to the Japanese remains an interesting part of the guerrilla story.
In contrast to the variety of groups in central Luzon, the guerrillas in the northern part of the island were generally united in one group under a single commander. That group, US Colonel Russell Volckmann’s US Army Forces in the Philippines, Northern Luzon (USAFIP-NL) numbered approximately 10,000 guerrillas by the time of the Allied invasion.44 We’ve seen how Volckmann’s forces were distributed among five different sectors and were divided into regiments numbering approximately 1,000–2,000 men. During the liberation, Volckmann’s well-organized units were largely able to operate independently of US forces, only requiring air or artillery support for selected offensive operations against Japanese forces in strong fortified positions. By harassing Japanese lines of communication, Volckmann’s guerrillas also forced the Japanese to largely withdraw from the area of San Fernando on the central plain, indirectly assisting the rapid advance on Manila.45
US air support proved crucial to the operations of the USAFIP-NL. A radio message from Krueger to Volckmann on January 27 notified the latter of an upcoming airstrike by eight US P-51 fighter-bombers on Japanese positions in Lingsa School and San Fernando Central in support of USAFIP-NL. Krueger instructed Volckmann’s forces to mark their front line by placing a fabric marking panel across the national highway.46 This was to occur as the fighters were making three counterclockwise circles over the target area. Later communications showed that this strike was successful, with no friendly casualties.
Volckmann himself related that air support was important in the seizure of San Fernando by the guerrillas of the 121st Infantry Regiment. US Marine Corps dive bombers operating from the Mangaldan airstrip in the vicinity of Lingayen Gulf provided close air support for the guerrilla attack, with the guerrillas finally seizing San Fernando on March 14 after several weeks of fighting, but the area was not entirely cleared until March 23.47 Volckmann and his men developed effective procedures for air-to-ground integration during this operation, working with embedded ground liaison parties from the 24th Marine Air Group and attached L-5 liaison planes from the 308th Bomb Wing, which operated out of Darigayos.48 It became a standard operating procedure for guerrillas to mark their front lines with white panels, important because low strafing runs were often requested a mere fifty yards from friendly troops. Coordination became so refined that on a prearranged signal, Volckmann’s men often prepared to rush Japanese positions as the final US aircraft completed its strafing run, and normally caught the Japanese with their heads down.49
Volckmann’s men were typically the ones sending, and not receiving, intelligence in the exchange between their own and higher headquarters, but intelligence-sharing did go both ways, demonstrating the high level of cooperation between Volckmann and the Sixth Army. On January 24, Volckmann radioed Krueger to request aerial reconnaissance of Japanese artillery positions in concrete emplacements that had previously been identified by his own forces.50 Volckmann doubted the authenticity of his units’ report and wanted confirmation through other means.
In the Battle of Bessang Pass, fought by approximately 9,000 guerrillas of USAFIP-NL essentially operating as a combat infantry division, guerrilla units secured the key terrain and municipality of Cervantes from Japanese forces after heavy fighting from April to June 1945.51 Sixth Army directed Volckmann’s USAFIP-NL to seize the pass by June 15 in conjunction with a Sixth Army operation to seize the Balete Pass. Initially, Volckmann only sent the 121st Infantry Regiment to complete the mission, but as resistance stiffened over the course of May, he reinforced the attack with the 15th and 66th Infantry Regiments.52 These three regiments were supported by the US Army’s 122nd Field Artillery Battalion, detached by Sixth Army to support the guerrillas and their own organic guerrilla battalion of 75-mm pack howitzers.53 The men of the 122nd and their commander, Lieutenant Colonel R. P. Carlson, were initially reluctant to support the guerrillas, but the artillerymen eventually developed a healthy respect for Volckmann’s forces.
The Japanese were well entrenched in the Bessang Pass, and as Volckmann’s three regiments advanced along an 8,000-yard front, they were met by withering fire from the Japanese in the pass and the heights alongside it. Volckmann described the battle as “the fiercest that I have ever witnessed,” with his men fighting the steep terrain and the Japanese at the same time.54 However, the guerrillas continued to make slow progress and, well supported by attached artillery, succeeded in overrunning the remaining Japanese positions on June 14, with artillery liaison planes calling down a heavy barrage on the retreating Japanese.
The following day, the 121st Infantry seized Cervantes, and Volckmann’s three regiments continued their advance against token Japanese resistance, with the 121st finally linking in with the US 6th Infantry Division on July 14 to complete the encirclement of Yamashita’s forces in the north. Although heavy fighting ensued as the 66th Infantry pushed into the well-fortified Lepanto area on June 21, the 66th Infantry, under John Patrick O’ Day, was able to overcome the Japanese positions, even seizing objectives that had been assigned to the US 32nd Infantry Division.55 After the 66th Infantry Regiment successfully made contact with the 32nd Infantry Division, Yamashita’s forces were surrounded, confined to a pocket with no roads and few trails. USAFIP-NL pressed the attack into the remaining Japanese positions from the north and west as the 32nd and 6th Infantry Divisions advanced from the east and south until the final cease-fire on August 15, when units of the USAFIP-NL were within five miles of Yamashita’s headquarters. The effectiveness of Volckmann’s guerrillas, totaling 25,000, coupled with the loss of two of Sixth Army’s combat infantry divisions to operations elsewhere, caused the newly promoted General Krueger to increase the role for guerrillas in operations on Luzon, and Sixth Army quickened efforts to arm and equip them.56 As Volckmann was quick to point out, because of the combat prowess of his and other guerrilla forces, MacArthur and Krueger never had to deploy more than three US divisions in northern Luzon against more than 120,000 Japanese troops.57
Map 6. Seizure of the Ipo Dam
Volckmann’s USAFIP-NL was not the only large body of guerrillas to see combat against the Japanese on Luzon. Guerrillas under Filipino Marcos V. Augustin in the Fil-American Yay Regiment (Marking’s Regiment) assisted the US Army’s 43rd Infantry Division in seizing the Ipo Dam in May 1945.58 The dam, which supplied approximately 30 percent of Manila’s water, had been cut off by the Japanese in April, and MacArthur ordered his forces to seize and reopen it.59
Operating under the scheme of maneuver dictated by the 43rd Infantry Division, 3,000 of Marking’s guerrillas advanced independently from the northwest while two US columns advanced from the south and west.60 Marking’s men had to move 9,000 yards over rugged terrain to reach their designated objectives, but managed to drive in Japanese patrols and outposts that they encountered as the attack began.61 The guerrillas seized Mount Kabuyao on May 9 and were able to destroy a Japanese artillery observation post, an important development given the great weight and effectiveness of Japanese artillery during the entirety of the Ipo Dam operation.62 On May 11, in contrast to their earlier encounters, Marking’s guerrillas found stiff Japanese resistance as they tried to seize Four-Cornered Hill north of the dam, being repulsed three times.63
A fourth attack on the hill on May 12, supported by heavy US air and artillery attacks, finally succeeded. The guerrillas then went on to seize Hill 803, which commands the northern portion of the dam. Over the course of the night of May 14–15 the guerrillas repulsed two Japanese counterattacks, but were driven from one position on Hill 803 in vicious hand-to-hand fighting in a third Japanese attack on the morning of May 15.64 Despite this small setback, on May 17, in conjunction with a coordinated attack from the south by the three infantry regiments of the 43rd Division, the guerrillas moved down from Hill 803 to seize the north end of the dam.65
The dam was successfully captured intact and reopened as US forces, despite logistical difficulties, seized the hills south of the dam in vicious fighting to link in with Marking’s men, averting a potential humanitarian disaster. The 43rd Infantry Division had to supplement its logistical support units with native carriers and even some guerrillas to move supplies as the rains turned makeshift roads in the hills into an impassable quagmire. US and Filipino forces later discovered that the gate to the dam had been rigged with several hundred pounds of explosives which the Japanese had failed to detonate.66 On May 18, the day after the seizure of the dam by the combined Filipino-US forces, Private Urbano P. Gadon of Marking’s Regiment killed two Japanese soldiers with a knife, an action for which he received a Silver Star through the 43rd Infantry Division.67 Marking’s guerrillas continued to work closely with the 43rd Division to pursue and destroy remaining Japanese forces who had retreated into the hills.
South of the USAFIP-NL and Marking’s Regiment, the other guerrillas on Luzon attacked the Japanese and assisted US units in significant ways. Guerrillas in the 155th Provisional Battalion, armed with bows and arrows, rifles, and shotguns, ambushed retreating Japanese troops and laid vicious pig traps for them along trails into the mountains.68 Other guerrillas harassed Japanese troops defending the Bataan peninsula.69 Major Edwin Ramsey (later colonel), operating out of a makeshift base in Tala in central Luzon, received orders from MacArthur to begin sabotage operations with “maximum possible violence” on Japanese communication, transportation, and supply nodes on January 8.70 As the Sixth Army advanced, Ramsey’s 40,000 men and auxiliaries, formed into regiments, attached themselves to Sixth Army units in their respective areas, notably the 1st Cavalry Division.71 However, as less than a quarter of Ramsey’s men could be armed at any one time, their standards of training were poor.72 In April, a processing and training center for Filipino troops was established under the supervision of the Sixth Army, speeding the integration of Ramsey’s guerrillas into Sixth Army operations that were continuing in northern Luzon.73
At the request of the US Sixth Army, Lapham organized his estimated 6,000 guerrillas into the 1st Infantry Regiment of the LGAF, which trained for several weeks before it was officially integrated into the US 25th Infantry Division on January 20, 1945.74 By June, Lapham’s forces had swelled to 10,000–12,000 men, allowing him to organize a second regiment to attach to the US 32nd Infantry Division.75 These units would prove very effective during several high-profile missions with US forces.
One of the most famous special operations of the Pacific War, the liberation of Allied prisoners at Cabanatuan, saw extensive cooperation between Lapham’s guerrillas and the US Army’s 6th Ranger Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Henry Mucci.76 Guerrillas provided the Sixth Army the initial intelligence reports of the prisoners being held at the camp.77 The LGAF provided 287 guerrillas and guides to augment Mucci’s 122 Rangers who assaulted the Cabanatuan prison camp on January 30. The raid succeeded in liberating 513 prisoners and eliminated the entire Japanese garrison of 200 men.78 Besides their significant contribution to the assault force, the guerrillas also manned blocking positions that prevented Japanese reinforcements from interfering with the raid. Lapham entrusted this important mission to Filipino Captains Eduardo Joson (who would later be elected a provincial governor) and Juan Pajota.79 In one harrowing engagement, LGAF troops under Captain Pajota fought for two hours against approximately 800 Japanese attempting to move from the town of Cabanatuan to the prison camp, inflicting dozens of Japanese casualties in a well-placed ambush while taking none themselves.80 Later, LGAF units assisted the US Army’s 1st Cavalry Division during the liberation of Allied prisoners in the Santo Tomas prison in Manila and, under Lapham’s subordinate Captain Ray C. Hunt, fought alongside the 32nd Infantry Division during successful, but bloody, operations to clear the Villa Verde Trail in central Luzon.81
