Three Days in June, page 39
10.42hrs (zt): AAC R/L from 2F to 0: ‘Finding way around snow shower.’
The C Company 3 PARA radio operator asks for confirmation of the location of Battalion ‘O’ Group:
10.50hrs (zt): from C/S 3 to C/S 9: ‘Area of O Group?’
CO confirms RAP location:
10.50hrs (zt): from C/S 9 to C/S 3: ‘9A location.’
At approximately 11.15hrs (zt), there is an Argentine counter-attack against 2 PARA from Moody Brook Barracks. Lt John Page of D Company 2 PARA calls for fire support and the attack is broken up by a fire mission from all five batteries firing proximity rounds (air burst). The enemy then retreats in disarray; the fire mission also destroys what was left of the Royal Marines Barracks signals room, and officers’ and sergeants’ mess accommodation.
11.15hrs (zt): Arty R/L from 29FOC: ‘79 Battery engaged grid 367736 [i.e. Moody Brook].’
11.40hrs (zt): Arty R/L from 9Z: ‘G19 reports small counter-attack from Moody Brook against 2 PARA 14 POWs taken.’
Scout helicopters are busy flying casevac missions:
11.48hrs (zt): AAC R/L from BM: ‘All Scout Call Signs to remain on casevac stand by, task 004 postponed. Sit rep 2 Scots Guards – 2 dead, 9 wounded in south, 3 wounded in north, with 4 dead, up to 16 other casualties in north to be moved from 1/7GR/2SG.’
The situation begins to change.
CSgt Andy Gow
Major Osborne went across to Mount Longdon for an ‘O’ Group with the CO; we knew he’d be receiving orders for the next phase of the campaign and that C Company would now be the lead element of 3 PARA.
11.55hrs (zt): Arty R/L from FDC4, ‘97 Battery, finished on fire mission battery grid 350727 [eastern end of Mount Tumbledown] 110 rounds fired.’
Major Martin Osborne
I went across to an Orders group that was being held near the RAP on Mount Longdon at 12.00hrs (zt). This would be the warning orders for the attack into Port Stanley; it followed a familiar pattern: Situation enemy forces, Friendly forces, Task, Execution, and General outline etc. My company would now be the lead company.
3 PARA HQ informs the CO that the situation is changing!
12.10hrs (zt): from C/S 0 to C/S 9: ‘Enemy withdrawing from Sapper Hill, unconfirmed report 300 enemy withdrawing.’
12.16hrs (zt): Arty R/L from 9Z: ‘Reference troops withdrawing from Moody Brook, being engaged by Call Signs 1+2.’
12.20hrs (zt): Arty R/L from FDC29: ‘Fire Mission 2 Battery – engaging with Call Sign 1, troops withdrawing from Moody Brook, plus Call Sign 3.’
12.22hrs (zt): AAC R/L from 2 S/Guards: ‘Troops withdrawing from Mount William; artillery may engage shortly, troops about to surrender on Mount William. Large numbers of enemy moving from Moody Brook into Stanley, 300 men moving from Sapper Hill into Stanley unconfirmed.’
12.25hrs (zt): Arty R/L from 9Z: ‘Reference Call Sign 1+2 engaging Call Sign 3 now joined them.’
Major Martin Osborne
Halfway through the orders, we suddenly got a message from 2 PARA saying something like, ‘The enemy is running off the back of Mount Tumbledown.’ The CO turned to me and said, ‘Martin; you must go back across to C Company and get them ready to move. Let me know as soon as you’re ready.’ The intent was that C Company was going to be the assault company supported by 2 PARA. They [2 PARA] would hold Wireless Ridge while C Company [3 PARA] assaulted Moody Brook.
12.27hrs (zt): AAC R/L from LO: ‘Mount William large numbers of troops moving back to Stanley RA may engage, looks like a number of troops about to surrender, mass withdrawal into Stanley, Moody Brook troops moving back, 300 moving from Sapper Hill.’
Lt Col David Chaundler, 39 yrs – CO 2 PARA
At the time of the Argentinian collapse only D Company and my Tac HQ were on the final objective overlooking Moody Brook.3
12.32hrs (zt): Arty R/L from 9Z: ‘Enemy also withdrawing from area forward of Sapper Hill.’
12.36hrs (zt): Arty R/L from FDC4: ‘Fire Mission 2 x Batteries 348711 [Mount William].’
12.36hrs (zt): Arty R/L from FDC4 ‘Fire Mission 2 x Batteries 391717 [Sapper Hill].’
Lt Mike O’Neill, 25 yrs – C Company
When Major Osborne returned, he immediately called all Platoon Commanders together for an ‘O’ Group. The company was told to prepare to move. The OC gave his orders, explaining that we, C Company, would now be the lead company of 3 PARA, and our task was to attack the barracks at Moody Brook. We would be supported in this task by 2 PARA. The entire company was delighted at the chance to lead the battalion into battle; I then quickly briefed all my Section Commanders.
3 PARA HQ inform the battalion that they are to be on 30 minutes’ notice to move:
CSgt Andy Gow
Not long after he had left, Major Osborne came running back over to C Company and he hurriedly called in his Platoon Commanders and SNCOs for a quick briefing. Our CSM was suffering with a knee injury, so he gave me his map, and I attended the briefing in his place. The gist of the briefing was that we were to make our way as fast as possible to Moody Brook; we would attack the barracks and clear it. We would be supported in this task by 2 PARA, who were at the moment positioned on Wireless Ridge overlooking Moody Brook. 8 Platoon will lead, followed by Tac HQ, then 7 Platoon and 9 Platoon. We were to move out in single file and we were warned we might be passing through minefields en route. As we got closer to the objective, we were to shake out into assault formation, A Company and B Company would follow behind us.
It was also decided to contact WO2 John Carey, who would take over the role as CSM, and a message was sent across to the RAP where he was based. However, such was our urgency to move out we decided to leave without the new CSM and hoped he would catch us up, but until then I would take over the role of CSM. We were going to move on to an open forward slope in direct view of the enemy, then assault and fight through Moody Brook; we had visions of a stand-up fight and then progressing into Port Stanley, clearing house to house. We knew it would be hard work, but as a company we were really up for it.
13.20hrs (zt): AAC R/L from Arty: ‘Welsh Guards move forward for attack on Sapper Hill.’
13.27hrs (zt): Arty R/L from FDC29: ‘Situation report, C/S G19 states nobody between him and Stanley and in his opinion a good regimental shoot on Sapper Hill would clear.’
13.35hrs (zt): Arty R/L from FDC29: ‘Under fire in Moody Brook, try and find out where it’s coming from.’
13.36hrs (zt): Arty R/L from FDC29: ‘Lots of smoke from the racecourse, plus bad visibility because of a snow storm.’
13.36hrs (zt): Arty R/L from FDC29: ‘If possible don’t use WP [white phosphorus], can if you want, but rather you would not.’
13.40hrs (zt): AAC R/L from Brigade: ‘H-Hour assault on Mount William now 14.00hrs (zt).’
13.42hrs (zt): Arty R/L from FOC29: ‘Fire Mission Battery (79) grid 370728 *** [word unclear] A888 DN360.’
[Grid 370728 = enemy gun positions west of Stanley.]
CO orders C Company 3 PARA to move to Moody Brook:
13.44hrs (zt): from C/S 9 to C/S 3: ‘C Company now on 30 minutes, get ready now and close up behind 2 PARA, inform me when you’re on the move.’
Cpl Boyd (Smudge) Smith
I remember Major Osborne saying to us, ‘I want you to take me by the shortest route possible to Moody Brook.’ We now took a direct line to Wireless Ridge, Pte Gaz Pullen would lead. We received small-arms fire from someone – we weren’t sure whether it was an enemy or friendly fire [but] it came from the direction of A Company. However, we did not return fire.
Lt Barry Griffiths
When Major Osborne returned from his ‘O’ Group there was a sense of urgency. He told us that the Argentines were withdrawing off Tumbledown and we [C Company] were now going to attack the barracks at Moody Brook. We quickly loaded up and set off; we moved off at quite a rapid pace.
Cpl Boyd (Smudge) Smith
We carried on across the back of Longdon into an area of dead ground between Longdon and Wireless Ridge. We were aware that there was the possibility of minefields ahead. C Company followed behind us, and then as we got closer to Longdon someone behind us shouted, ‘Are we in a minefield?’ Gaz Pullen, who was the lead man, shouted back, ‘Shut the fuck up, and just keep walking.’ I looked back and there was a huge company snaking behind us, following in our footsteps.
Lt Col David Chaundler
I ordered the tanks and Machine Gun Platoon forward and they were firing down into the valley, also the Mortars were carrying out a searching shoot. The Battery Commander Tony Rice managed to get the artillery back and they were carrying out a regimental shoot. I had requested Fighter Ground Attack, but the weather was too bad for the Harriers to fly.4
14.15hrs (zt): Arty R/L from FDC29: ‘C/S 3 Fire Mission Bombardment with G19 grid 387722 FUP [form-up point].’
Form-up point at base of Sapper Hill, codenamed Old Bill.
Scout helicopters from 656 Squadron collect SS11 missiles for forthcoming attack on gunline west of Port Stanley:
14.18hrs (zt): AAC R/L from AQ: ‘From 656 echelon, Call Sign 1D at Echelon and Call Sign 2D, crew of 2D, awaiting collection of ASM [air to surface missiles], to move to Echelon to co-ordinate as part of task 012 C/S 1A on task.’
Lt Col David Chaundler
I ordered A and B Companies forward onto the final ridge line. There was a big attack planned for that night, in which 2 PARA was to hold Moody Brook as the Start Line. However, I realized we must, and could, get into Port Stanley before the Argentinians had time to reorganize. I ordered a ceasefire, I think this was at something like 14.00hrs or 14.30hrs (zt) as we were slaughtering the Argentinians for no good purpose. However, communications with Brigade HQ were not good and I became frustrated that I could not get the message across that we must capture Port Stanley now.5
C Company 9 Troop of 40 Commando and the Welsh Guards begin moving forward by helicopter to a form-up position to assault Sapper Hill:
14.20hrs (zt): Arty R/L from 3J: ‘Situation Report, C/S 49 and 1–2 moving out to phase 1 now, after that they will move forward to “Old Bill”.’
Brigadier Thompson arrives by helicopter just behind Wireless Ridge and makes his way forward to meet Lt Col Chaundler, who is up on Wireless Ridge, and asks for a situation report.
Cpl Martin (Taff) Richardson
We now began moving off in a company snake. The Anti-Tanks were now located with Company HQ; I was quite wary as I knew from a previous briefing that we were moving through an area that was known to be mined. As we progressed towards Wireless Ridge a member of our section yelled, ‘Taff, are we in a fucking minefield!’ and I shouted, ‘Shut the fuck up! And keep walking.’ As we were already in the middle of it, and there was fuck all we could do about it, we might as well crack on.
Lt Barry Griffiths
As we approached Wireless Ridge, I remember spotting ankle-height wire, which I knew from previous intelligence briefings to be an indication that we were on the edge of a minefield. I then followed our Standard Operating Procedures for crossing a minefield when not in contact, which was to warn the platoon to follow in the footsteps of the man in front and spread out.
British Forces are warned to be aware of Argentine helicopters loading casualties on board the hospital ship ARA Almirante Irízar in Port Stanley Harbour. The helicopters will have some form of Red Cross or white flag attached:
14.25hrs (zt): Arty R/L from U2: ‘The Argentinian hospital ship will be loading in Port Stanley all afternoon; military helicopters will be used to ferry wounded soldiers; they are Not, repeat. Not to be engaged.’
14.25hrs (zt): Arty R/L from 9Z: ‘C/S 3 End of Mission on FUP, many casualties, remainder hiding in rocks.’
Lt Col David Chaundler
It was at this time that Brigadier Julian Thompson arrived by helicopter behind the ridge. He was as frustrated as I was by the problems of communications. He crawled up onto the crest of the ridge. I was standing out on the forward slope feeling pretty pleased with events. He obviously thought, My God, I have already lost one CO from 2 PARA and rushed out and rugger-tackled me. As we got up I said, ‘It is all right, Brigadier, we must get into Port Stanley.’ He looked at the situation and agreed.6
Major John Crosland, 35 yrs – OC B Company 2 PARA
There was an ‘O’ Group on Wireless Ridge attended by Brigadier Julian Thompson, and we strongly suggested that we needed to keep the momentum going and not allow the Argentines to regroup in Port Stanley, as if they did, we would have a harder job fighting through them, which would result in inevitable civilian and military casualties. Brigadier Thompson agreed. It was decided that C Company and D Company plus elements of Support Company and the Tanks of Blues and Royals would provide fire support from Wireless Ridge, whilst B Company 2 PARA would advance into Moody Brook, clearing the barracks, and then move up onto the high ground to provide an element of cover for A Company 2 PARA, while they would move parallel to us along the road into Port Stanley.7
Brigadier Julian Thompson, 47 yrs
We stood and watched the Argentines fire what must have been one of the last artillery fire missions on the north side of Tumbledown. The shells crashed down, throwing up smoke and peat. Lt Col Chaundler told me that he had seen the enemy running away in large numbers from Moody Brook, Mount William, Tumbledown and Sapper Hill, nevertheless, the Argentine artillery was still effective, as had just been demonstrated. I told him to take his battalion and advance as far as the spur above the ESRO [European Space Research Organization] Building on the very edge of Stanley. I would then go back to my Tactical Headquarters and get the rest of the Brigade moving.8
14.30hrs (zt): (Argentine) C Battery of GAA4 fire their last 105mm round.
14.30hrs (zt): British artillery stops firing HE.
Brigadier Thompson makes his way north to RV with a helicopter which is inbound to take him back to Tactical HQ.
Brigadier Julian Thompson
As we waited, we saw three Scout helicopters fly in behind Wireless Ridge, line up and hover-taxi forward to fire their SS11 missiles at an Argentine gun position across the valley.9
Target, 4th Airborne Artillery Group GA4 located by the Felton stream, which is 1 kilometre west of the edge of Port Stanley.
Lt Col David Chaundler
Scout helicopters came up and fired SS 11s into the valley, but I ordered them away as they were attracting too much return fire from the Argentinians. I ordered A and B Company to close up onto the final ridge line.10
14.40hrs (zt) approximately: C Company 9 Troop of 40 Commando is landed by mistake, forward of Argentine troops on Sapper Hill. A firefight ensues, two Royal Marines are wounded and three Argentine Marines, Roberto Leyes, Eleodoro Monzon and Sergio Ariel Robledo, are killed. This is the final clash of the war.
14.45hrs (zt): AAC Radio log from 1/7GR: ‘On Mount William, no location, status or security status yet available, civilians not centralized in church in Stanley.’
CSgt Andy Gow
We advanced with caution across the western end of Wireless Ridge, and then swung east into Moody Brook valley. We could see that the situation was changing; Argentines were moving off Mount Tumbledown and running towards Port Stanley. As we progressed towards Moody Brook, the Argentines were abandoning their positions and running along the road towards Port Stanley.
Major Martin Osborne
As we got closer we could see the smouldering Royal Marine Barracks in Moody Brook – it was obvious that the Argentines had run off.
Lt Col David Chaundler
I ordered B Company down through Moody Brook and on to the high ground on the other side, to protect our right flank whilst A Company were to advance down the Ross Road into the town.11
Cpl Boyd (Smudge) Smith
We then moved into the Moody Brook valley. We were moving parallel to Wireless Ridge heading east, and we continued advancing towards Moody Brook Barracks. 2 PARA were still up on Wireless Ridge to our left, and Argentines were still leaving Moody Brook and Mount Tumbledown. Then B Company 2 PARA began moving down to clear the buildings in Moody Brook.
Lt Mike O’Neill
As we were moving towards Moody Brook the Argentines in Moody Brook broke and ran. Then elements of 2 PARA started moving down off Wireless Ridge.
At 15.00hrs (zt), 2 PARA’s Forward Observation Officer calls in a fire mission for smoke onto the gunline west of Port Stanley, to provide cover as first B Company, and then A Company descend into Moody Brook to clear and secure it:
Captain Robert Ash, 25 yrs – 29 Field Bty RA attached to B Company 2 PARA
I called a deliberate smoke mission using base ejection smoke rounds. The area to be blinded was the Argentinian positions to the west of Port Stanley, and the high ground dominating the road. But as to where the smoke canisters actually landed, I don’t really remember, as it would have been dictated by the direction of the wind and its speed, which was usually pretty high.12
The weather has changed.
15.00hrs (zt): Two Harriers are launched from HMS Hermes: Sqn Leader Harris (XZ997) and Flt Lt Gilchrist (XZ113) en route for Sapper Hill. The first Harrier is armed with two x 1,000lb LGBs (laser-guided bombs) and the second is armed with two CBUs (cluster bombs).
