The New Makers of Modern Strategy, page 130
65. Joseph Votel and Elizabeth Dent, “The Danger of Abandoning Our Partners,” The Atlantic, October 8, 2019.
66. Mazloum Abdi, “If We Have to Choose Between Compromise and Genocide, We Will Choose Our People,” Foreign Policy, October 13, 2019.
67. Brian Dodwell, Paul Cruickshank, and Kristina Hummel, “A View from the CT Foxhole: General (Ret) Joseph Votel, Former Commander, U.S. Central Command,” CTC Sentinel 12:10 (2019): 12.
68. Carter Malkasian, The American War in Afghanistan: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 357.
69. “Terrorism,” Gallup, https://news.gallup.com/poll/4909/terrorism-united-states.aspx, accessed January 27, 2018; “Most Important Problem,” Gallup, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1675/most-important-problem.aspx, accessed December 7, 2021.
CHAPTER 38
Strategies of Jihad
FROM THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD TO CONTEMPORARY TIMES
Ahmed S. Hashim
The word jihad is one of the most ominous and least understood in contemporary political discourse.1 It is invariably associated with “holy war” or with terrorism in the popular imagination in the West.2 For some anti-Islamic polemicists going as far back as the early interactions of Islam and Christianity, jihad as violence is the very essence of Islam.
What does jihad actually mean? Jihad is a broad term, which comes from the Arabic language root, JHD which is associated with “struggle,” “striving,” “exertion,” or “effort.” In this context, jihad generally may be associated with almost any activity by which Muslims strive to bring personal, political, social, and economic life into conformity with God’s ordinances as revealed to man. The word “jihad” is frequently used in conjunction with the phrase fi sabil Allah (“in the path of God”). The full phrase in Arabic, al-jihad fi sabil Allah, means “struggling or striving for the sake of God,” and this can be done in multiple ways, only one of which is associated with the waging of war.3
What are the sources for Islam’s thinking on war, and how is the word “jihad” used in relation to war? These include the Quran, the word of God directly revealed to the Prophet Muhammad during his period of prophecy and after; the Sunnah, the actions and behavior of the Prophet; and the ahadith or the written accounts of the Sunnah, which were assembled into sayings attributed to Muhammad. After Muhammad, the public declarations of his immediate successors were considered part of the sources of Muslim thinking about war. Islamic jurists, beginning in the Umayyad dynasty (661–750 CE) and continuing onto the Abbasids (750–1258 CE) produced the classical theory of jihad. These scholars built their theory on their understanding of what had been said and what had transpired in the past as well as on the geopolitical realities of their own times.
The Quran, however, is not a divine revelation on the strategy or philosophy of war. It speaks to many topics and its myriad principles regarding war are scattered in different verses or suras. War, in the Quran’s view, is an integral part of human society; an evil institution but a necessary one; (Quran 2:216) “Fighting is ordained for you, while it is repugnant to you.” The specific Quranic terms that are associated with military activity are jihad, qital, and harb. Qital is the term which specifically refers to “fighting” or “armed combat” and is an element of jihad in specific situations. Harb is the Arabic word for war in general. From early on in the trajectory of Islam, jihad came to be associated particularly with fighting or making war “in the path of God.” Associated with jihad as warfare is the concept of martyrdom (shahada); in Islam, unlike in Christianity, martyrdom is inevitably understood to be dying in battle, either in the mission to expand the domains of the Muslim state—ummah—or in defense of the faith.
The association of jihad with war is a complicated issue. First, to reiterate, jihad is not the Arabic word for war; its association with war means exerting oneself or striving with the utmost effort in a war for the faith. Second, jihad is not an objective; one does not wage war for the sake of jihad. Third, it is a set of beliefs—a doctrine—laying out why to fight, whom to fight, and how to fight. Fourth, historically, jihad has been used in conjunction with the promotion of two key objectives: to expand the domains of Islam until the entire world comes under the faith or to protect Islam from assaults from within and without. Fifth, while military jihad was conducted by Muslim states and empires throughout much of history, even if it was merely a justification to hide the aggrandizement of rulers rather than the promotion of the faith, from modern to contemporary times, it has been promoted by Islamist non-state actors, be they insurgents, rebels, or militias fighting against domestic tyrants or foreign occupiers. Military jihad or “jihad of the sword” is thus a purposive activity, as this historical survey of the practice of jihad from Muhammad to contemporary times will show.
I
Most of the Arabian Peninsula is a “victim of natura maligna.”4 Arabia is vast and inhospitable, and for the most part lacks fertile land. The environment had an impact on its political and social evolution.
The population of northern and central Arabia consisted of nomadic tribes—the Bedouin (Badu) and sedentary inhabitants (hadari) of the few existing towns. No centralized political authority existed in those parts of the Arabian Peninsula. “Political anarchy” reigned supreme, pushing the inhabitants to seek security within the confines of their respective tribes. The concept of asabiyyah, defined centuries later as the spirit of exclusivist clan cohesion and chauvinism, best described Arab tribal society.
The Bedouins were a suspicious lot. War or the threat of war was the normal condition. Two distinct forms of warfare existed among the pre-Islamic Arabs. The first, “real” war over substantive issues such as conquest of territory, was rare; Arab tribes generally did not have the manpower or resources to prosecute it. The second type, the ghazw—raid—was more prevalent. Ibn Khaldun referred to Bedouin warfare as the “technique of attack and withdrawal.”5 The primary purpose of raids was the brutal but largely non-bloody redistribution of limited material resources to supplement subsistence lifestyles. The ghazw itself was constrained by the low-level of military capabilities and technologies, paucity of manpower, and by cultural taboos on killing for fear of perpetual blood vendettas.
The few cities created stable political and socioeconomic structures that relied on trade to create wealth. In Mecca, the Qureish confederation dominated commercial traffic in Arabia and established trading links with the outside world. Most pre-Islamic Arabs were pagans and Mecca was the center for the various pagan deities that the Arabs worshipped. Arab tribes would come to Mecca to perform pilgrimage rituals around the Kaabah, an ancient cube shrine in the heart of the city. Commerce and religion were intricately linked, allowing the Qureish to become fabulously wealthy. An enormous gap emerged between the haves and the have-nots, and any old tribal feelings of solidarity with the less fortunate evaporated in the face of the elite’s determination to hold on to their material gains.
Into this environment—later described by Muslims as the period of jahiliyyah or the time of “ignorance” of religion and the One God’s purpose—was born Muhammad ibn Abdallah ibn Abd al-Muttalib ibn Hashim. His clan, the Hashims, were part of the Qureish confederation but had fallen on hard times. Muhammad’s own early life did not begin auspiciously; orphaned at an early age, he was cared for by close relatives until maturity, when he became a trader and well-versed in commerce. His fortunes took a turn for the better when he married a rich widow.
II
Freed from the threat of poverty, Muhammad often partook of the opportunity to meditate on Mount Hira, above Mecca. There, Muhammad experienced visions and was instructed by the Archangel Gabriel—the Angel of Revelation—to recite the words of God that were being transmitted to him. Over the next several years, Muhammad experienced several revelations that announced him to be the “messenger” of a new religion, which were collected later as the Quran. The Quran revealed a monotheistic religion, Islam, which means surrender to the one God (Allah); a Muslim being a man or woman who has made that submission to the one God. Muhammad began preaching his monotheistic message in Mecca. That message—submission to the one true God, the creation of a community of believers who would treat their brothers and sisters as equals, and the institution of social justice—was not well received in the city whose well-to-do did not wish to do away with their lucrative deities or to redistribute their wealth. When Muhammad acquired a following among all social classes, the elite decided to crush the nascent movement.6
This period of revelation was one of extreme vulnerability characterized by the persecution of Muhammad and his followers. Many of the Prophet’s Companions urged retaliation. Muhammad refused, saying that he had been given an order only to preach. The Quran recognized the right to self-defence, but it maintained that the best course of action in this early period was for the Muslims to patiently bear the wrongdoing of others and to forgive those who caused them harm. This was justified on the basis that patience or sabr is a form of struggle, a jihad of the faithful. However, God did not intend that the adoption of nonviolent struggle meant passivity. In the face of grave oppression and injustice, passivity is immoral in the Quranic view.
Muhammad was a realist; armed struggle in the face of the overwhelming advantages of the ruling Qureish was not a viable option. Muhammad was exercising prudence in that period of weakness, but the consensus among scholars, given the yawning chasm between his message and the Qureish system, is that Muhammad recognized that in this confrontation between God and polytheism, only one side could ultimately triumph. Violence was going to be inevitable, but the situation in Mecca was not the time to engage in open confrontation.
However, remaining in Mecca was dangerous. The Muslims withdrew to the rival city of Yathrib, renamed Medinat al-Nabi or City of the Prophet. Muhammad’s reputation as a negotiator facilitated the entry of the Muslim emigrants into Medina, where the various tribes were at loggerheads. This emigration—the hijrah—in 622 CE is a seminal event in the history of Islam. Muhammad and his followers did not flee merely to ensure their own personal safety in light of the threats in Mecca; it was a strategic retrenchment undertaken to allow them a sanctuary from which to build their power, to organize and gather resources, and to seek allies for the inevitable showdown. The move resulted in the creation of a more cohesive community based on faith—the ummah—the setting up of a state, and the formation of an armed contingent, ideologically motivated and willing to fight.
The Muslim community differed from that of the pre-Islamic Arabs. The Muslims fought for an ideology—a faith—and they fought in the disciplined ranks of a cohesive community united by that faith. But on what basis did they justify their fighting? The specific reasons for resorting to armed combat (casus belli) are mentioned in the Quran starting in the Medinan period. In the Medinan verse (Quran 22:39–40), unjust aggression against people and their expulsion from their homes and for affirmation of belief in one God is an explicit reason that makes defensive war permissible (Quran 22:39): “Those who have been attacked are permitted to take up arms because they have been wronged.”
In Medina, Muhammad was also transformed into a military commander. He built sufficient manpower to engage in military action against his enemies. Jihad as war became an important strategy used by the nascent Muslim state. It started as a defensive war in accordance with Quranic injunctions. However, as the Muslim state under Muhammad grew in strength, jihad was transformed into an offensive war to defeat the Meccans, extirpate polytheism, and extend the sway of the faith. The Muslims introduced something almost unheard of in pre-Islamic Arab society: real war. Ibn Khaldun described this as the evolution from the “technique of attack and withdrawal” to the “advance in closed formation” among the Arabs. Fighting in “closed formation” is steadier and fiercer than fighting with the “technique of attack and withdrawal.” Close quarter battle leads to greater casualties. Furthermore, in “closed formation,” the lines of the soldiers are orderly and evenly arranged, “like arrows or like rows of worshippers at prayers.”7 Historian Malik Mufti pointed out that the political imperatives of the new religion “mandated a much higher degree of organization and discipline.” Highlighting the bond between religious purpose and military deployment, Mufti cited Ibn Khaldun as noting that “the closed formation is the fighting technique most suitable for one willing to die.”8
Economic warfare also played a significant role in Muhammad’s jihad against Mecca. The nascent Muslim state in Medina used military raids to improve its economic position; the migrant Muslims from Mecca were financially dependent on the Muslims of Medina and these military expeditions were an important means to give them some economic independence. Economic independence would free the Muslims from being at the mercy of their Medinan benefactors and would allow them to create their own cohesive community.9 The seizure of Meccan goods permitted the distribution of spoils among the warriors and their families to make up for the lack of formal pay. Economic warfare also served to lessen the economic superiority of the enemy, thus reducing its warfighting capabilities.
Muhammad triumphed over his Meccan enemies, and he marched into the city in early January 630 CE, or 8 years after the Hijrah to Medina (8 AH). Before his death, the Prophet dispatched military expeditions to different parts of the Arabian Peninsula in order to call the people to Islam. He initiated preparations for military expeditions beyond the Arabian Peninsula, allegedly to offer non-Muslims the choice of conversion to Islam, keeping their own faith and paying the tax on non-Muslims (jizya) as subjects of the Muslim state, or deciding the matter on the battlefield, that is, fighting.
III
After Muhammad’s death in 632 CE, the Muslim state was led by four immediate successors—the khulafah—Abu Bakr, Umar, Usman, and Ali between 632 and 661 CE.10 All four were known as the “Rightly Guided Caliphs.” After defeating apostatizing Arab tribes, the first successor initiated raids into the extensive territories of the powerful Byzantine and Sasanian Empires to the northwest and northeast, respectively. Abu Bakr advised the Muslim soldiers not to kill women, priests, children, or the elderly; nor to mutilate or commit treacherous actions. They were advised not to cut down fruit trees nor burn houses and cornfields and to refrain from killing livestock. Despite Abu Bakr’s injunctions to fight righteously, there was no elaborate doctrine of or strategy for jihad at that time; the advice was derived from the practices of the Prophet during the wars against the polytheists.
The raids set the stage for the impressive series of military campaigns and conquests—the futuhat or “openings” of adjacent lands. Under the caliphs Umar, Uthman, and Ali, the Arabs conquered Egypt, the Fertile Crescent, Iraq, and much of Iran.11 Under the Umayyad dynasty, which ruled from Damascus and lasted from 661 CE to 750 CE, Muslim armies went on the offensive even further afield conquering vast swathes of territory. Historians have debated the motivations of the Muslim Arabs for erupting out of their homeland to engage in one of the most rapid conquests in history. Jihad to expand the sway of Islam was a potent weapon and provided the Arab forces with extraordinary unifying spiritual power, as did the promise of rewards of Heaven for those who fell in battle. Engaging in jihad for the sake of Islam largely accounts for the victories against the powerful Byzantine and Sasanian empires.
The quest for economic largesse cannot be discounted in the Arab conquests, although it was dressed up in the language of religion to legitimize the seizure of plunder. Given the economic poverty of their homeland, the idea of extra-peninsular expansion roused the Arabs to acquire the “spoils of war.” The Quran itself promised Muslims that, if they went to war to defend Islam and extend its territories, they would get many spoils. Ghanimah—booty—provided the material motivation for Arab warriors to take part in jihad and to risk their lives; they knew also that if they fell in battle as martyrs their families would be looked after.
The Umayyad dynasty’s expansion came to an end when the Muslims overextended themselves or were forced on the defensive. The Muslims then chose to consolidate their gains rather than to acquire more territory, while their Christian enemies, especially the Byzantines, generally proved loath to go on a counter-offensive to recover lost lands. Both the Byzantines and Muslims conducted annual campaigns along the frontiers, but these gradually became ritualized warfare designed to uphold the image of emperor and caliph, respectively; neither side was stirred mightily by religious motivation to conquer new territories, add new adherents, and convert or slay the unbeliever.12
Jihad doctrine was formulated in the latter stages of the Umayyad dynasty and more rigorously during the Abbasid dynasty. During the Umayyad period (661–750 CE), jurists based in Syria—the Umayyad center of power—promoted the view that offensive jihad was obligatory and that its prosecution was one of the caliph’s chief tasks. This group’s views stemmed from the fact that their Umayyad patrons were engaged in ceaseless frontier warfare with the Byzantines and there was a need to justify these frontier hostilities on a theological and legal basis even as expansion of the ummah stalled. Not everyone agreed with this argument; jurists not aligned with the powers that be believed that jihad was primarily defensive. In other words, the ummah merely needed to defend its gains against efforts to attack it.
The Umayyads’ demise came at the hands of a major rebellion in 750 CE by the Abbasid family who were related to the Prophet Muhammad. The ummah with its capital in Baghdad constituted an advanced political and cultural civilization at the height of the Abbasids. It was then that jurists began the process of codifying classical Muslim law. They wanted to provide a solid framework within which the ummah might flourish, and it was within the overall context of the systemization of Islamic law that the religion’s theory of international relations and the classical theory of jihad were elaborated.13 As they set about their mission, the jurists had at their disposal a vast array of rules and norms scattered among disparate verses of the Quran, but which were not in chronological order, in the traditions of the doings and sayings—Sunnah—of the Prophet, which were assembled into the collections of sayings—Hadith—attributed to Him, in the public declarations of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, and finally in precedent based on the past wars conducted by the rulers and soldiers of Islam from the time of Muhammad to their own times. The classical theory of jihad established a number of norms.
