Metamagical themas, p.101

Metamagical Themas, page 101

 

Metamagical Themas
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  The real reason behind Hardin's article was to talk about the population explosion and to stress the need for rational global planning-in fact, for coercive techniques similar to parking tickets and jail sentences. His idea is that families should be allowed to have many children (and thus to use a large share of the common resources) but that they should be penalized by society in the same way as society "allows" someone to rob a bank and then applies sanctions to those who have made that choice. In an era when resources are running out in a way humanity has never had to face heretofore, new kinds of social arrangements and expectations must be imposed, Hardin feels, by society as a whole. He is a dire pessimist about any kind of superrational cooperation, emphasizing that cooperators in the birth-control game will breed themselves right out of the population. A perfect illustration of why this is so is the man I heard about recently: he secretly had ten wives and by them had sired something like 35 children by the time he was 30. With genes of that sort proliferating wildly, there is little hope for the more modest breeders among us to gain the upper hand. Hardin puts it bluntly: "Conscience is self-eliminating." He goes even further and says:

  The argument has here been stated in the context of the population problem, but it applies equally well to any instance in which society appeals to an individual exploiting a commons to restrain himself for the general good-by means of his conscience. To make such an appeal is to set up a selective system that works toward the elimination of conscience from the race.

  An even more pessimistic vision of the future is proffered us by -one Walter Bradford Ellis, a hypothetical speaker representing the views of his inventor, Louis Pascal, in a hypothetical speech:

  The United States-indeed the whole earth-is fast running out of the resources it depends on for its existence. Well before the last of the world's supplies of oil and natural gas are exhausted early in the next century, shortages of these and other substances will have brought about the collapse of our whole economy and, indeed, of our whole technology. And without the wonders of modern technology, America will be left a grossly overpopulated, utterly impoverished, helpless, dying land. Thus I foresee a whole world full of wretched, starving people with no hope of escape, for the only countries which could have aided them will soon be no better off than the rest. And thus unless we are saved from this future by the blessing of a nuclear war or a truly lethal pestilence, I see stretching off into eternity a world of indescribable suffering and hopelessness. It is a vision of truly unspeakable horror mitigated only by the fact that try as I might I could not possibly concoct a creature more deserving of such a fate.

  Whew! The circularity of the final thought reminds me of an idea I once had: that it will be just as well if humanity destroys itself in a nuclear holocaust, because civilizations that destroy themselves are barbaric and stupid, and who would want to have one of them around, polluting the universe?

  Pascal's thoughts, expressed in his article "Human Tragedy and Natural Selection" and in his rejoinder to an article by two critics called "The Loving Parent Meets the Selfish Gene" (which is where Ellis' speech is printed), are strikingly reminiscent of the thoughts of his earlier namesake Blaise, who in an unexpected use of his own calculus of probabilities managed to convince himself that the best possible way to spend his life was in devotion to a God who he wasn't sure (and couldn't be sure) existed. In fact, Pascal felt, even if the chances of God's existence were one in ,a million, faith in that God would pay off in the end, because the potential rewards (or punishments) if Heaven and Hell exist are infinite, and all earthly rewards and punishments, no matter how great, are still finite. The favored behavior is to be a believer, Pascal "calculated"-regardless of what you do believe. Thus Blaise Pascal devoted his brilliant mind to theology.

  Louis Pascal, following in his forebear's mindsteps, has opted to devote his life to the world's population problem. And he can produce mathematical arguments to show why you should, too. To my mind, there is no question that such arguments have considerable force. There are always points to nitpick over, but in essence, thinkers like Hardin and Pascal and Anne and Paul Ehrlich and many others have recognized and internalized the novelty of the human situation at this moment in history: the moment when humanity has to grapple with dwindling resources and overwhelmingly huge weapons systems. Not many people are willing to wrestle with this beast, and consequently the burden falls all the more heavily on those few who are.

  * * *

  It has disturbed me how vehemently and staunchly my clear-headed friends have been able to defend their decisions to defect. They seem to be able to digest my argument about superrationality, to mull it over, to begrudge some curious kind of validity to it, but ultimately to feel on a gut level that it is wrong, and to reject it. This has led me to consider the notion that my faith in the superrational argument might be similar to a self-fulfilling prophecy or self-supporting claim, something like being absolutely convinced beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Henkin sentence "This sentence is true" actually must be true-when, of course, it is equally defensible to believe it to be false. The sentence is undecidable; its truth value is stable, whichever way you wish it to go (in this way, it is the diametric opposite of the Epimenides sentence "This sentence is false", whose truth value flips faster than the tip of a happy pup's tail). One difference, though, between the Prisoner's Dilemma and oddball self-referential sentences is that whereas your beliefs about such sentences' truth values usually have inconsequential consequences, with the Prisoner's Dilemma, it's quite another matter.

  I sometimes wonder whether there haven't been many civilizations Out There, in our galaxy and beyond, that have already dealt with just these types of gigantic social problems-Prisoner's Dilemmas, Tragedies of the Commons, and so forth. Most likely some would have survived, some would have perished. And it occurs to me that perhaps the ultimate difference in those societies may have been the survival of the meme that, in effect, asserts the logical, rational validity of cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma. In a way, this would be the opposite thesis to Hardin's. It would say that lack of conscience is self-eliminating-provided you wait long enough that natural selection can act at the level of entire societies.

  Perhaps on some planets, Type I societies have evolved, while on others, Type II societies have evolved. By definition, members of Type I societies believe in the rationality of lone, uncoerced, one-shot cooperation (when faced with members of Type I societies), whereas members of Type II societies reject the rationality of lone, uncoerced, one-shot cooperation, irrespective of who they are facing. (Notice the tricky circularity of the definition of Type I societies. Yet it is not a vacuous definition!) Both types of society find their respective answer to be obvious-they just happen to find opposite answers. Who knows-we might even happen to have some Type I societies here on earth. I cannot help but wonder how things would turn out if my little one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma experiment were carried out in Japan instead of the U.S. In any case, the vital question is: Which type of society survives, in the long run?

  It could be that the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma situations that I have described are undecidable propositions within the logic that we humans have developed so far, and that new axioms can be added, like the parallel postulate in geometry, or Godel sentences (and related ones) in mathematical logic. (Take a look at Figure 31-1, and see what kind of logic will extract those two poor devils from their one-shot dilemma.) Those civilizations to which cooperation appears axiomatic-Type I societieswind up surviving, I would venture to guess, whereas those to which defection appears axiomatic-Type II societies-wind up perishing. This suggestion may seem all wet to you, but watch those superpowers building those bombs, more and more of them every day, helplessly trapped in a rising spiral, and think about it. Evolution is a merciless pruner of ill logic.

  Most philosophers and logicians are convinced that truths of logic are "analytic" and a priori; they do not like to think that such basic ideas are grounded in mundane, arbitrary things like survival. They might admit that natural selection tends to favor good logic-but they would certainly hate the suggestion that natural selection defines good logic! Yet truth and survival value are all tangled together, and civilizations that survive certainly have glimpsed higher truths than those that perish. When you argue with someone whose ideas you are sure are wrong but who dances an infuriatingly inconsistent yet self-consistent verbal dance in front of you, your one solace is that something in life may yet change this person's mind, even though your own best logic is helpless to do so. Ultimately, beliefs have to be grounded in experience, whether that experience is the organism's or its ancestors' or its peer group's. (That s what Chapter 5, particularly its P.S., was all about.) My feeling is that the concept of superrationality is one whose truth will come to dominate among intelligent beings in the universe simply because its adherents will survive certain kinds of situations where its opponents will perish. Let's wait a few spins of the galaxy and see. After all, healthy logic is whatever remains after evolution's merciless pruning.

  "The problem is how to turn loose without letting go."

  FIGURE 31-1. One powerful metaphor for the absurdity we have collectively dug ourselves into. The symmetry of the situation is acutely portrayed in this cartoon drawn by Bill Mauldin in 1960. Note that if either person releases his rope, thus chopping of his counterpart's head, that person's hand will go limp, thus releasing his rope and causing the other blade to fall and chop of the head of the instigator. That idea is a centerpiece of our current nuclear deterrence strategy: Even if we are wiped of the globe, our trUSty missiles will still wreak divine revenge on the evil empire of Satanic Uglies who dared do harm to US.

  * * *

  I was describing the Copycat project (Chapter 24) to physicist Victor Weisskopf, and I gave him our canonical example: "If abc goes to abd, what does xyz go to?" After we had discussed various possible answers and settled on wyz as the most compelling for reasons of symmetry, he surprised me by saying this: "You know, the root of the world's deepest problems is the tragic inability on the part of the world's leaders to see such basic symmetries. For instance, that the U.S. is to the S.U. what the S.U. is to the U.S.-that is too much for them to accept." Oh, but how could Weisskopf be so silly? After all, we're not trying to export communism to the entire world!

  Logician Raymond Smullyan, who first heard about the Prisoner's Dilemma from me and who was absolutely delighted by it, also surprised me, but in a different way: He vehemently insisted on the correctness of defection in a one-shot situation no matter who might be on the other side, including his twin or his clone! (He did waver about his mirror image.) But just as I was giving up on him as a lost cause, he conceded this much to me: "I suspect, Doug, that this problem is a lot knottier than you or I suspect." Indeed, I suspect so, Raymond.

  32 The Tale of Happiton

  June, 1983

  HAPPITON was a happy little town. It had 20,000 inhabitants, give or take 7, and they were productive citizens who mowed their lawns quite regularly. Folks in Happiton were pretty healthy. They had a life expectancy of 75 years or so, and lots of them lived to ripe old ages. Down at the town square, there was a nice big courthouse with all sorts of relics from WW II and monuments to various heroes and whatnot. People were proud, and had the right to be proud, of Happiton.

  On the top of the courthouse, there was a big bell that boomed every hour on the hour, and you could hear it far and wide-even as far out as Shady Oaks Drive, way out nearly in the countryside.

  One day at noon, a few people standing near the courthouse noticed that right after the noon bell rang, there was a funny little sound coming from up in the belfry. And for the next few days, folks noticed that this scratching sound was occurring after every hour. So on Wednesday, Curt Dempster climbed up into the belfry and took a look. To his surprise, he found a crazy kind of contraption rigged up to the bell. There was this mechanical hand, sort of a robot arm, and next to it were five weird-looking dice that it could throw into a little pan. They all had twenty sides on them, but instead of being numbered 1 through 20, they were just numbered 0 through 9, but with each digit appearing on two opposite sides. There was also a TV camera that pointed at the pan and it seemed to be attached to a microcomputer or something. That's all Curt could figure out. But then he noticed that on top of the computer, there was a neat little envelope marked "To the friendly folks of Happiton". Curt decided that he'd take it downstairs and open it in the presence of his friend the mayor, Janice Fleener. He found Janice easily enough, told her about what he'd found, and then they opened the envelope. How neatly it was written! It said this:

  Grotto 19, Hades

  June 20, 1983

  Dear folks of Happiton,

  I've got some bad news and some good news for you. The bad first. You know your bell that rings every hour on the hour? Well, I've set it up so that each time it rings, there is exactly one chance in a hundred thousand-that is, 1/100,000-that a Very Bad Thing will occur. The way I determine if that Bad Thing will occur is, I have this robot arm fling its five dice and see if they all land with `7' on top. Most of the time, they won't. But if they do-and the odds are exactly 1 in 100,000-then great clouds of an unimaginably revoltingsmelling yellow-green gas called "Retchgoo" will come oozing up from a dense network of underground pipes that I've recently installed underneath Happiton, and everyone will die an awful, writhing, agonizing death. Well, that's the bad news.

  Now the good news! You all can prevent the Bad Thing from happening, if you send me a bunch of postcards. You see, I happen to like postcards a whole lot (especially postcards of Happiton), but to tell the truth, it doesn't really much matter what they're of. I just love postcards! Thing is, they have to be written personally-not typed, and especially not computer-printed or anything phony like that. The more cards, the better. So how about sending me some postcards-batches, bunches, boxes of them?

  Here's the deal. I reckon a typical postcard takes you about 4 minutes to write. Now suppose just one person in all of Happiton spends 4 minutes one day writing me, so the next day, I get one postcard. Well, then, I'll do you all a favor: I'll slow the courthouse clock down a bit, for a day. (I realize this is an inconvenience, since a lot of you tell time by the clock, but believe me, it's a lot more inconvenient to die an agonizing, writhing death from the evil-smelling, yellow-green Retchgoo.) As I was saying, I'll slow the clock down for one day, and by how much? By a factor of 1.0000 1. Okay, I know that doesn't sound too exciting, but just think if all 20,000 of you send me a card! For each card I get that day, I'll toss in a slow-up factor of 1.00001, the next day. That means that by sending me 20,000 postcards a day, you all, working together, can get the clock to slow down by a factor of 1.00001 to the 20, 000th power, which is just a shade over 1.2, meaning it will ring every 72 minutes.

  All right, I hear you saying, "72 minutes is just barely over an hour!" So I offer you more! Say that one day I get 160,000 postcards (heavenly!). Well then, the very next day I'll show my gratitude by slowing your clock down, all day long, midnight to midnight, by 1.00001 to the 160,000th power, and that ain't chickenfeed. In fact, it's about 5, and that means the clock will ring only every 5 hours, meaning those sinister dice will only get rolled about 5 times (instead of the usual 24). Obviously, it's better for both of us that way. You have to bear in mind that I don't have any personal interest in seeing that awful Retchgoo come rushing and gushing up out of those pipes and causing every last one of you to perish in grotesque, mouth-foaming, twitching convulsions. All I care about is getting postcards! And to send me 160,000 a day wouldn't cost you folks that much effort, being that it's just 8 postcards a day just about a half hour a day for each of you, the way I reckon it.

  So my deal is pretty simple. On any given day, I'll make the clock go off once every X hours, where X is given by this simple formula:

  X =1.00001N

  Here, N is the number of postcards I received the previous day. If N is 20,000, then X will be 1.2, so the bell would ring 20 times per day, instead of 24. If N is 160,000, then X jumps way up to about 5, so the clock would slow way down just under 5 rings per day. If I get no postcards, then the clock will ring once an hour, just as it does now. The formula reflects that, since if N is 0, X will be 1. You can work out other figures yourself. Just think how much safer and securer you'd all feel knowing that your courthouse clock was ticking away so slowly!

  I'm looking forward with great enthusiasm to hearing from you all.

  Sincerely yours,

  Demon #3127

  The letter was signed with beautiful medieval-looking flourishes, in an unusual shade of deep red ... ink?

  "Bunch of hogwash!" spluttered Curt. "Let's go up there and chuck the whole mess down onto the street and see how far it bounces." While he was saying this, Janice noticed that there was a smaller note clipped onto the back of the last sheet, and turned it over to read it. It said this:

  P. S. -It's really not advisable to try to dismantle my little set-up up there in the belfry: I've got a hair trigger linked to the gas pipes, and if anyone tries to dismantle it, pssssst! Sorry.

  Janice Fleener and Curt Dempster could hardly believe their eyes. What gall! They got straight on the -phone to the Police Department, and talked to Officer Curran. He sounded poppin' mad when they told him what they'd found, and said he'd do something about it right quick. So he hightailed it over to the courthouse and ran up those stairs two at a time, and when he reached the top, a-huffin' and a-puffin', he swung open the belfry door and took a look. To tell the truth, he was a bit ginger in his inspection, because one thing Officer Curran had learned in his many years of police experience is that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. So he cautiously looked over the strange contraption, and then he turned around and quite carefully shut the door behind him and went down. He called up the town sewer department and asked them if they could check out whether there was anything funny going on with the pipes underground.

 

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