Judaism- An Introduction, page 34
Accordingly, we members of the People’s Council, representatives of the Jewish community of Eretz Israel and of the Zionist Movement, are here assembled on the day of the virtue of our natural and historic right and on the strength of our resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz Israel, to be known as the State of Israel … The State of Israel will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice, and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants, irrespective of religion, race, or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education, and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the Charter of the United Nations.
This declaration is essentially a compromise document in which the wording represents attempts to give principles for Jewish identity which will accommodate all the widely differing viewpoints. It has in mind not only those Jews already living in the area but also those who might come and also those scattered across the world. Thus Israel is described as a Jewish State, that is a State belonging to the Jewish people wherever they are. Ben Gurion needed a single history according to which Jews could be united. He found such a history in the biblical presentation of a people who had been given a land, exiled, and returned. As he created the State, he harnessed the Jewish yearning for Zion which had originated in religious belief and yet his phrasing had to satisfy the many who by this time had broken radically with any belief in the redemption of the Messianic Age. The one unifying idea was that of peoplehood. Purpose or mission to the world did not enter into it. They were simply one people who had come from one place, travelled together, and were going back to that same one place. By calling the Jewish State ‘the State of Israel’, a clear statement was made that all Jewish history had been leading to this. Only some were still asking: what does it mean to be ‘a kingdom of priests and a holy nation’? (see Chapter 2). Many were content simply to use theology as a backdrop to their claim to nationhood. But all were still asking: what does it mean to be Jewish? The answer for all the different groups, whether they centred on certain faith ideals or on being a member of the Jewish community, was rooted in the land of Israel as home-base.
DIFFICULTIES IN DEFINING ‘JEWISHNESS’
Continuing conflict on the issue of identity surfaces as a battle over the word ‘Jew’ takes place every single year in the Knesset and there have been a number of famous cases of people challenging the definition. Jewishness was originally defined in 1950 and 1954 in ways which reflected Hitler’s definition (and other anti-Semitic persecution), that is, anyone with any Jewish blood. The case of Captain Shalit led ultimately to the 1970 amendment to the Law of Return, whereby ‘Jew’ means anyone who is born to a Jewish mother or who has been converted and who is not a member of another religion. In continuing debate, religious Jews want to add ‘according to the halakhah’ after the word ‘converted’. The Chief Rabbis, one representing the Sefardi and the other the Ashkenazi community, want Jewishness to be defined in terms of one Jewish parent. They feel that many Jews from the former USSR have taken advantage of qualifying as immigrants by having a distant relative who is Jewish. Excluded from the rights of an oleh (‘immigrant’, plural olim) is ‘a person who has been a Jew and has voluntarily changed his religion’.
By far the most celebrated and also the most revealing case in determining the present Law of Return, especially with regard to identity and religion, is that of ‘Brother Daniel’. Born Oswald Rufeisen of Jewish parents in Poland in 1922 and reared as a Jew, he had converted to Christianity in 1941, entering the Carmelite Order in 1945. Wanting to join the Carmelite chapter in Israel, he insisted on his right to immigrate as a Jew. After some years, the case finally came to court in 1962. The arguments of the various judges make fascinating reading (as found in Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel, Special Volume, ed. A.F. Landau, Jerusalem Ministry of Justice, 1971), but two will be quoted as illustrative. (Others can be found in Textual Sources for the Study of Judaism, ed. Philip S. Alexander, Chicago University Press, 1990.) Judge Cohn argued:
Never has there been such a revolutionary event in the history of the Jewish people, scattered and dispersed among the nations, as the establishment of the State of Israel. In the Diaspora we were a minority, tolerated or persecuted, but in our own State we are an independent nation like all other nations … This revolution is not merely of a political character; it renders imperative a revision of the values which we have imbibed in our long exile … There comes now to the State of Israel a man who regards Israel as his motherland and craves to find fulfilment within its borders, but his religion is Christian. Shall we therefore close the gates? … Should the State of Israel, ‘based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel’, act towards its inhabitants and those who return as did the evil rulers of some Catholic kingdoms in the past?
Judge Landau argued:
First, the author of the dictum: ‘Though he has sinned, he remains a Jew’ which appears in Sanhedrin 44a, certainly never intended thereby to refer to a Jew who has changed his faith. It is doubtful whether Talmudic scholars, in speaking of an apostate, meant to include the extreme case of a Jew who has not only committed idolatry but has renounced his faith and embraced another religion as well. Secondly, the wise interpretation given to this dictum by Rashi and by other authorities in the Middle Ages was due apparently to the desire to treat forced converts leniently and not to close the door upon them should they repent and return to the fold … The petitioner has excluded himself from the common fate of the Jewish people and has linked his destiny to other forces whose precepts he honours both in thought and in observance. That is the reality and that is still the feeling of the overwhelming majority of the Jews of today, both inside and outside the State, a feeling that springs from positive national sentiment and not from any desire to settle scores with the Catholic Church for its treatment of the Jews in days gone by …
In terms of cumulative credentials of Jewishness, Brother Daniel’s case is impeccable. He is, therefore, accordingly a Jew and yet his case is rejected on the ground that he is not a Jew as popularly understood. It may be argued that what this case debates is the identity not so much of an individual but of the Jewish State. The judgement is made that who is accepted is not entirely a matter for the halakhah and yet every Jew has to accept halakhic norms as part of the structure of the society. The assumed objective stance of a judge disappears in this hearing, as he assumes the role of teaching the people the values of Jewish civilization. Each judge, in fact, presents arguments which he will reject in order to offer a piece of teaching. The identity of the whole Jewish State and its legal system is herein being defined. Brother Daniel’s case reveals the basic conflict of values which exists within the State itself. Both sides in the argument use traditional religious sources and modern Zionist literature, yet the final decision rests on a third source, that of popular conception of what a Jew is. One judge (Berison) spends three-quarters of his judgment showing how halakhically Brother Daniel is a Jew and then a quarter saying that he is not able to rely on this and will have to decide the other way. Similarly, Judge Silberg finally rejects the petitioner’s case because: ‘there is one thing that is shared by all Jews who live in Israel (save a mere handful) and that is that we do not cut ourselves off from our historic past nor deny our ancestral heritage … Our new culture in this land at the highest is merely a new version of the culture of the past.’
Figure 17.4. Israel’s population by religion.
Figure 17.5. Origin of Israel’s Jewish population.
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Insight
This popular, rather than halakhic, definition of Jewish identity confirms the view, argued in Chapter 1, that Jewish belief, however this is understood, is regarded as an important part of being Jewish. Espousing the beliefs of another faith is seen as a fundamental denial of the Jewish heritage.
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The conflict between Israeli and Jewish law exemplified here stems from the way in which the State maintained the status quo, from the time of the Ottoman Turks, that personal status is a matter of religious jurisdiction while citizenship is different. The Law of Return is a secular law not within the jurisdiction of the rabbinic courts and its definition of Jewishness differs from the one used in these courts as they decide such issues as marriage and divorce. There are those who argue that Jewish religious law plays too small a part in Israel, wanting the whole system of civil and criminal law which is provided by the halakhah to be operative.
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Insight
In a legal dispute in the UK in 2009, the halakhic definition of Jewishness came into conflict with the secular Race Relations Act of 1976. There was much discussion, with more than a little confusion, over whether Jews were an ethnic group, a religious group, or both.
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The same issue of status and the ‘freedom of religion’ which is guaranteed raises the other most serious difficulty both in the Declaration and in subsequent statements of what it is to belong to the Jewish State. Over twenty per cent of Israeli citizens are non-Jews, mainly Muslim Arabs. (Not all the Muslims are Muslim in observance any more than all the Jews are Jewish in observance.) Muslim, Christian, Druze, and Bahai enjoy equality before the law, a pluralism not always supported in other Middle Eastern countries. Seven different calendars of religious festivals (including Eastern and Western Christian and Samaritan) are recognized. Though there are disputes about the ‘Holy Places’ referred to in the Declaration, the difficulty with ‘freedom of religion’ is not so much with Muslims and Christians who both have autonomous religious courts in Israel but with non-Orthodox Jews. Jews who do not meet the Orthodox requirements are restricted in the areas of marriage and divorce (see Chapter 9). Civil marriage is effectively blocked, a situation which is deeply resented by Jews not in agreement with Orthodoxy.
Peace with justice and security
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Turbulent years in the Middle East
1956
Israeli forces occupy Sinai Peninsular. Sinai Campaign. British and French attack in Egypt. UN ceasefire. Israeli forces withdraw to armistice line.
1967
Egyptian blockade of Gulf of Eilat. Six Day War. Israel defeats Egypt, Jordan, and Syria and takes Golan Heights and West Bank of Jordan River. Partition in Jerusalem lifted.
1969–70
Conflict over Suez Canal.
1973
Egyptians launch surprise attack on Day of Atonement. Yom Kippur War.
1979
Peace treaty signed between Israel and Egypt, following Camp David Agreement of 1978.
1982
Israel attempt to eliminate Palestianian Liberation Organization (PLO) by invading the Lebanon. Lebanese War.
1987
Palestine uprising begins. Intifada.
1990–1
Israel bombarded by Iraq in Gulf War.
1991
Madrid peace talks inaugurated. Madrid Framework.
1993
Oslo Peace Accord. PLO and Israel sign Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government. Vatican recognition of Israel, Fundamental Agreement between the Holy See and the State of Israel.
1994
Limited Palestinian self-rule as Israelis withdraw from Jericho and Gaza Strip. First meeting of Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Israel and Jordan sign peace treaty.
1995
Cairo summit of leaders of PLO, Jordan, Israel, Egypt, and Syria to sign peace treaty (difficulty of Golan Heights taken by Israel in 1967). Oslo II Accord.
1996
Assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Rabin. Palestinian National Council election. PNA controls some towns and cities on West Bank and Gaza Strip. Right-wing government, Likud, elected.
1998
Wye River Memorandum restarts peace process – further West Bank areas, including villages, controlled by PNA. PLO revokes clauses in covenant calling for destruction of Israel.
1999
Moderate government, Labour, elected under Prime Minister, Ehud Barak.
2000
Papal visit to Israel-Palestine. Israeli withdrawal from the Lebanon. Death of Syrian President, Hafiz al-Assad and succession of his son, Bashar, leaving conflict over possession of Golan Heights unresolved. Palestinian–Israeli talks at Camp David break down over the status of Jerusalem. Second Intifada begins.
2001
Barak resigns and Likud elected under Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.
2002–3
Recurrent suicide bombings and retaliation.
2003
Mahmoud Abbas appointed Palestinian Prime Minister. Quartet on the Middle East details the Road Map for peace. Geneva Accord.
2004
The International Court of Justice rules that the Israeli security barrier violates international law. Death of Yasser Arafat.
2005
Mahmoud Abbas elected President of the Palestinian National Authority. End of Intifada. Israeli evacuation of Gaza.
2006
The radical Islamist Hamas movement wins landslide victory in Palestinian legislative Council elections.
Ehud Olmert elected Prime Minister of Israel, heading Kadima party coalition. Israel–Lebanon conflict.
2007
US convenes Middle East Summit in Annapolis. Israelis and Palestinians agree to implement Road Map under US monitoring and to negotiate continuously with the aim of reaching a final status agreement by the end of 2008.
2008
Israel launches air strikes at rocket-launching facilities of Hamas and associated groups in Gaza.
2009
Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu accedes to US President Barack Obama’s demand that Israel support creation of a Palestinian state, but refuses to end construction of settlements.
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CONFLICT
Decades of conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbours have left a background of insecurity, mistrust, and aggression on both sides. To the onlooker it would seem as if their shared suffering could promote mutual understanding. Yet, personal experience is compounded by history, recollection, and the fearful prospects of modern warfare. On territorial disputes with such a long and complex history as this, it is not always easy to get at the facts, let alone to understand them. Conflicting statements about who originally lived where, who seized land from whom, and who created refugees, and so on are part of both the Palestinian and the Israeli propaganda machines.
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Insight
Apportioning blame for any part of the conflict outlined in the chronology above is about as productive of a peaceful solution as is asking: ‘Who started it?’ in a personal dispute. Insert the word ‘retaliatory’ at any point and one side or another will be even further antagonized.
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It is significant that the PLO and Israeli negotiators in the Oslo discussions of 1992–3 agreed that they could only make progress towards a peaceful future if they first agreed to set aside debates about the past. Those cynical about the whole peace process might argue that this was because one side or the other could not afford the truth to be told. But those involved gave a different reason. It was not that they were unaware of great injustices and deep resentments on the part of their people. Indeed, it was precisely such an awareness which led to their initial and repeated resolve. Whatever the past culpability of both Israel and the Arab nations, the need was to achieve justice and peace.
Peace for all and justice for all remain the quest. A recurrent theme in the various congratulatory messages in the world’s press on and around Israel’s fiftieth anniversary in 1998 was that Jews must no longer deny the Palestinians the very treasure which they themselves were celebrating, namely, the freedom to be a nation. Remembering the way in which the Arabs were largely responsible for the ‘Catastrophe’, as they refer to the war of 1948, by having rejected the 1947 United Nations’ resolution partitioning Palestine into a Jewish and Arab State, a Telegraph (29 April 1998) article read:
In the ensuing war, they lost even more territory than had been apportioned to the Jews by the UN. With little sense of irony, Arabs now clamour for Israel to honour UN resolutions calling for its withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967.
Yet Israel should be wary of falling prey to the same hubris which infected the Arabs. Decades of conflict with Zionism has forged a Palestinian nation which demands what the Jews have – the return from exile and the creation of their own state … The Jewish question has been resolved: the Palestinian question has not. Let us hope it will not take another 50 years.
The Guardian (30 April 1998) said:
Israel’s independence was the Palestinians’ catastrophe. This is not a case of spoiling the party by daring to mention the war(s). Conflict with the Palestinians and the wider Arab world remains the central, defining problem of Israeli life. Unresolved, it will remain not so much a blot on the country’s achievements as a fundamental, distorting flaw.
