Manfred von Richthofen, page 16
When we were down to about 1800 metres, without having achieved anything in particular, my opponent should have realised that it was the time to leave. The wind was in my favour and was driving us further over our side of the lines. But this gallant man was full of courage and when we were down to 900 metres he cheerfully waved to me as if to say ‘Well, how do you do?’
The circles we made around each other were now so small that their diameter was probably no more than 75 to 90 metres … I looked down into his aircraft and could see every movement of his head. If he had not been wearing a helmet I would have been able to see the expressions he was making.
He was a good sportsman but by and by things became a little too hot for him. He had to decide whether to land on German ground or fly back to the English lines. He tried the latter, after trying in vain to escape me by looping and such manoeuvres … He went down to 90 metres and tried to escape by flying a zig-zag course … This was my most advantageous moment. I followed him at a height of 75 to 45 metres, firing all the time, but my guns jammed and nearly robbed me of my success.
However, my opponent crashed, having been shot through the head, 45 metres inside our lines. His machine gun was dug out of the ground and now graces the entrance of my dwelling.
Hawker was buried in a rapidly dug grave alongside his crashed aircraft, but being so close to the front line meant that he didn’t lie undisturbed for long – his grave disappearing, a victim of constant artillery fire. Yet memorials to his life remain, not least of all in von Richthofen’s autobiography. And to this can be added a significant number of press reports and front pages dedicated to his life and accomplishments. These, most notably, were carried in the populist newspapers – the Sketch, Mirror, Express and Mail – which between them generated sales of nearly 4 million copies each day. Over on the other side, the German press were also quick to pick up the story, although in this case the headlines emphasized the part played by von Richthofen.
As this was happening, the German film industry had begun producing newsreels and films that could, within days, be screened in local cinemas across the country. Short sequences showing German heroes, especially the aviators, soon appeared with Immelmann and Boelcke’s faces becoming ever more familiar to the paying public. Even Kunigunde was drawn to this new medium, especially when it involved Manfred:
We all went to the cinema to see the film of Boelcke’s funeral. Manfred carried the cushion with the medals. He was clearly recognizable … After dinner, my sister and the relatives went to the cinema again where the film of Boelcke’s funeral was still being shown. They had the film shown quite slowly; they were very interested, and in this way I was able to enjoy an odd reunion with Manfred.
As his fame spread and cameras were given greater access to the squadrons, more films appeared, with von Richthofen clearly becoming the star of the show. The moment was his and fame beckoned, urged on by forces he little understood as the media exploited his growing accomplishments. With so much happening in the background, he might have been forgiven if he’d lost focus as his reputation continued to grow, but as Christmas approached he continued to fight with a single-minded determination. In so doing, he destroyed two more DH.2s on 11 and 19 December, then sent down two F.E.2bs on 20th and 27th, raising his score to fifteen confirmed ‘victories’ and putting him even closer to the award of the Pour le Mérite.
As casualties mounted in Jasta Boelcke (as Jasta 2 became during the last few weeks of 1916, in honour of its famous leader), new recruits were urgently required. On 21 November Werner Voss, a recently commissioned officer, who was awarded his Pilot’s Badge on 28 May 1916, arrived from Kasta 20, where he had been flying ‘large battle aeroplanes’ over the Somme then, it seems, on the Bulgarian front. It is unclear how or why he ended up as a fighter pilot, though it is safe to assume that he may have requested a transfer or was chosen for these duties having shown himself to be promising single-seater material. As things turned out, this proved to be a wise choice and a close friendship, tinged with rivalry, soon developed between the 19-year-old and von Richthofen, which both men seemed to enjoy.
It did not take Voss long to show his mettle. On 27 November he brought down two British aircraft – a Nieuport 17 of 60 Squadron and an F.E.2b from No. 18. For a newly minted fighter pilot, this was a remarkable achievement, but one he didn’t repeat for several weeks. A move to Pronville on 19 December allowed Jasta Boelcke to take advantage of the winter weather, which restricted combat missions, but two days later Voss shot down a B.E.2d from 7 Squadron. In the months that followed he flourished as fighter pilot and his score rose rapidly.
Manfred spent Christmas that year with Jasta 2, being joined there by his father and brother for the celebrations. In a letter to his mother on the 28th he described this brief pause in the action:
Papa and Lothar both joined me on Christmas Eve. It was a memorable day. Christmas in the field was indeed more fun than you in the homeland might think. Our celebrations consisted of a Christmas tree and a very good meal. The next day, Lothar made his first solo flight. A comparable event will be his first victory. Yesterday I shot down my 15th Englishman …
Albrecht, now apparently based near Lille, would soon become a regular visitor to the airfields from which both sons flew. It is hard to say whether this would have been good or bad for a worried parent. But he clearly felt proud of both his sons and may even have lived vicariously through them, having been denied front-line service himself. However, being so close to the action came with many risks, not least of all seeing his boys die in action. He would also find himself swept up in the PR bandwagon that would soon surround both sons and feature in many press photos and several films that appeared to great acclaim in 1917–18. But celebrity is a double-edged sword because the camera does not discriminate between joy and grief, only seek a good story. Both these extreme emotions, and much else besides, are recorded without sympathy or mercy, as he would soon find out to his cost.
Meanwhile, Lothar, who seemed destined to live in his brother’s shadow, was soon to receive his Pilot’s Badge, having made a name for himself flying as an observer with Kasta 23. Such was his success that in December he was, according to Kunigunde, presented with the Iron Cross 1st Class by von Hoeppner himself. Yet any sense of accomplishment Lothar may have felt was soon eclipsed by Manfred, who was promoted to command Jasta 11 on 15 January and, a day later, received word that he had been awarded the Pour le Mérite by the Kaiser.
His promotion to Jastaführer probably came as no surprise to those around him, bearing in mind his fighting record and the leadership skills he had begun to demonstrate in the weeks since Boelcke’s and Kirmaier’s deaths. In the words of Douglas Bader, von Richthofen would have been seen as ‘press-on merchant’ by comrades and leaders alike – a man eager for battle and for victory, but with the skill to lead and shape other men along the way. But to be truly successful in such a role he required broader leadership skills to meet all the needs of an active service unit, as Mike Tritton, a wing leader in 1944–45, remembered:
To manage one or more squadrons successfully you had to be a politician, a diplomat, a teacher, welfare worker, engineer and clerk. Basically a ‘jack of all trades’. Leading in the air, with all its perils, at least meant you could escape for a brief moment a sea of paperwork and the demands of all those who supported the squadron and do what you had been trained to do.
Everything you did as leader was essential to the smooth running of the wing or squadron. Key amongst these were ‘ground’ duties to ensure that sufficient aircraft and fit pilots were available for each operation, which in the front line might soon prove impossible to achieve as high rates of attrition reduced numbers and exhaustion set in. There had to be sufficient spares to meet maintenance needs and suitably trained men, of many trades, available to do the work. This was not always possible in the front line where the supply organisation was often stretched to the limit by many competing demands. To keep going was often a matter of begging, borrowing or stealing anything you could lay your hands on, which was a time-consuming, frustrating business, requiring endless amounts of paperwork and much scurrying about.
Perhaps the most difficult duty was coping with a group of young pilots, many of whom were barely out of school, who had been asked to do something very difficult, if not impossible, over a long period of active service – or until killed, wounded or their spirit broke. The tough ones lasted longer but all would eventually fall victim to a deep-rooted fatigue. Trying to spot which ones needed to be rested, and when, proved to be very a difficult at times, especially when our leaders were urging even greater efforts. As a result, many is the time that good men died because they were exhausted and became uncaring of their own safety. As leader, you tended to ignore these things in yourself, which could prove very costly in the long run. However, your sense of responsibility to others, and being constantly busy ensuring their wellbeing, could carry you through some very difficult times. But even so you had your limit and woe betide those who chanced their luck for too long.
Von Richthofen, although still a fledgling in these matters, seems to have had a natural understanding of some of these issues and even before promotion to Jastaführer had begun to understand the political nature of the role he was taking on. The late A.E. Ferko, in his well-written and well-researched book Richthofen, provided a graphic example of this:
Richthofen’s front line experience told him what was required of a fighter aeroplane. The following attests to this.
Oblt Wilhelm Siegert [Inspector of Flying Troops] wrote that on 22nd December 1916 a conference made up of Germany’s most experienced fighter pilots was convened at Headquarters, Kofl 1, Cambrai. The purpose of the meeting was to air the views of those present as to the way future fighter development should proceed. The majority wanted the two-gunned 120 hp Halberstadt D.V. Only one pilot pleaded for a 150 hp machine – the relatively unknown Ltn von Richthofen [with which, as we have seen, he’d already enjoyed considerable success]. Perhaps unknown to the assembled pilots, the Albatros Company, with the co-operation and support of Idllieg, had proceeded with the development of their model D.III … By spring 1917 the D.III was largely responsible for aerial superiority over the Western Front and delivery of them could not move ahead fast enough.
On this issue von Richthofen wouldn’t be swayed, stood his ground and, as a result Albatros fighters remained the mainstay of the Jastas until better aircraft began to appear. It may also be the case that this determination to get what he wanted, coupled to his outstanding war record, impressed von Hoeppner. So when considering who should lead each squadron in the rapidly expanding fighter arm his name would have been high on the general’s list. Perhaps the issue of publicity and propaganda also played a part in this decision; if so it was a choice that would pay unexpected dividends in the months to come.
In reality the task he inherited when taking over Jasta 11 might have proved too much even for an experienced leader, let alone von Richthofen. For the situation that awaited him at La Brayelle near Douai was hardly a satisfactory one.
Formed in October 1916, it had been placed in the hands of the experienced 27-year-old Oblt Rudolf Emil Lang, who hailed from Munich and trained as an aviator during 1914. According to his personnel records, various postings followed during which he seems to have flown two-seater reconnaissance aircraft. All this changed in December 1915 when he was posted to FFA 6b as an Eindeckerflieger. In May he then transferred to Artillerie-Fliegerabteilung 103b in the same capacity, but remained there for only two months until placed in command of Kampfstaffel 31b. With such a wealth of experience he must have been seen as a wise choice to lead Jasta 11, but in practice he seems to have found this a difficult task to complete successfully.
Some reports suggest that he was ill-suited to commanding a fighter squadron, lacked the skill to train his men as Boelcke had done and lacked a true fighting spirit, so leaving his pilots leaderless where it mattered most – in the air. True or not, by Christmas the Jasta had claimed only one victory, by Lt Konstantin Krefft, which had not been confirmed. They were floundering and their lack of success undoubtedly attracted criticism and scrutiny. However, the whole fighter arm was still in its infancy and had few talented pilots and leaders available to populate all the Jastas being created. So, while they learnt their trade, there were some serious shortcomings to deal with. All in all, it was a difficult balancing act, that quickly benefited von Richthofen at the cost of Lang, who was transferred to Jasta 28 to try again. In due course, they too would dispense with his services, leaving him free to return to reconnaissance work for which he seems to have been ideally suited.
It remained to be seen if von Richthofen could do any better, but he began his command in a positive way by flying a new Albatros D.III from Pronville to La Brayelle, suggesting that a strong new leader, suitably armed, had arrived. Up to then the Jasta seems to have made do with Halberstadt D.II and D.Vs and a few Albatros D.Is, which may have contributed to their conspicuous lack of success. Over the next few weeks this would all change as von Richthofen led his pilots to glory and with this his legend began to grow, allowing Ludendorff’s masters of propaganda to begin their work in earnest.
Chapter 6
In the Devil’s Iron Grip
In his biography of Lawrence of Arabia, a man whose rise to fame in the Great War mirrored von Richthofen’s own emerging status as a celebrity, Michael Yardley coined the phrase ‘Backing into the limelight’. The theme of grudging acquiescence is relevant in both cases. Neither sought public attention, but in achieving so much, and displaying great courage and fortitude along the way, their chances of remaining in obscurity soon disappeared. In a war of such terrible slaughter and little movement, men such as Lawrence and von Richthofen were seen as rising above the senseless carnage into cleaner air where fading illusions might be sustained for a time. It was a hopeless task, but in a world gone mad clinging to any wreckage was essential for survival. And here lies the essence of von Richthofen’s appeal; a fascination carefully managed by a media in thrall to Ludendorff and his entourage, yet ultimately damaging to the hero they proclaimed.
In early 1917, having established himself as Hindenburg’s second in command, but in reality the Supreme War Lord who pulled many important strings, Ludendorff expressed his concern about the state of mind of Germany’s civilian population, fearing that revolution might soon break out, later recalling in his memoirs that:
The spirit of the people at home rendered some action imperative. We have the best prospects of winning the war, but it was not over and what we have won must be kept. We are still a long way from that. The popular state of mind (at home and in the Army) jeopardized everything … This is now becoming a burning issue.
In accordance with a proposal submitted to me by Nicolai, General Headquarters arranged for patriotic instruction to begin in the Field Army. But this is only a poor substitute for the work of enlightening public opinion at home.
Nicolai, a man of unfailing industry and devotion, is responsible for the military direction of the press and the cognate duty of watching and fostering the morale of the Army and the people at home … The military censorship of the Press is another of Nicolai and his subordinates’ duties … Another great branch of his work consists of the Secret Intelligence Service, prevention of spying, supervision of post, telegraph and telephone services, and the adoption of measures against industrial spying and sabotage.
By 1917 Walter Nicolai, then a major, wielded power considerably greater than his rank would usually allow and in this role was instrumental in promoting von Richthofen to the status of national hero. For this reason alone, Nicolai, a man who seemed able to move through the shadowy worlds of espionage and propaganda with great skill, is worthy of closer scrutiny.
He was born on 1 August 1873 to a Prussian Army captain and his wife in Braunschweig. With such a background it was perhaps inevitable that he would follow a military career. Shortly after attending the War Academy in Berlin he was appointed to the intelligence services, having displayed talent for such work. In so doing he became a Russian specialist, could speak the language fluently and often visited that country in the course of his duties.
In 1906, Nicolai was transferred to Abteilung IIIb where, among other things, he controlled the East Prussian news station based in Königsberg. Here he soon created a major centre for espionage against the Russian Empire and, in 1913, became the Abteilung’s head. As such he was well-positioned to lead and dominate all secret service activities during the war. One of his most high-profile activities was the recruitment of Mata Hari as Agent H21, whose case officer, Major Rodell, worked directly to Nicolai. Then in 1917 he was complicit in the plan to allow Lenin free passage across Germany to Russia. Here the German aim was a simple one. This well-known political agitator, who was living in Paris at the time, would, it was hoped, incite revolution and help bring an end to the Tsarist regime. This, in turn, might end the war in the east and release the forces tied down there to boost numbers on the Western Front and so achieve a favourable decision there.
As the war went on Nicolai acquired more power and influence, both of which he exercised with considerable dexterity and cunning. So it is hardly surprising that Ludendorff came to value him highly and trusted him with many other issues including the question of propaganda. With a growing concern that the civilian population might soon rebel against the war, the scene was set for this arch propagandist to intensify the crucial battle for hearts and minds. At the same moment von Richthofen stepped into the limelight, a readymade hero whose image could be used to the full.
